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Abstract	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  science	  and	  politics.	  	  More	  
specifically,	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  scientism.	  Features	  of	  scientism	  include	  the	  
dogmatic	  faith	  in	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  (and	  the	  accompanying	  assumption	  
that	  those	  methods	  can	  be	  successfully	  imported	  into	  the	  social	  sciences),	  a	  materialistic	  
worldview,	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  bios	  theoretikos,	  the	  prohibition	  of	  philosophical	  questions,	  
and	  an	  emphasis	  on	  immanent	  fulfillment	  through	  the	  power	  of	  science.	  I	  seek	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  scientism	  is	  intellectually	  impoverishing	  and	  politically	  dangerous.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  full-­‐length	  studies	  on	  the	  subject,	  I	  trace	  the	  development	  of	  scientism	  
from	  early	  modernity	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  	  I	  begin	  with	  Francis	  Bacon	  and	  argue	  that	  he	  
stands	  as	  the	  founder,	  not	  only	  of	  the	  experimental	  method,	  but	  also	  of	  scientism.	  	  This	  is	  
most	  evident	  in	  his	  presentation	  of	  a	  scientific	  utopia	  in	  New	  Atlantis.	  	  After	  briefly	  
exploring	  the	  works	  of	  Isaac	  Newton	  and	  the	  French	  Encylopedists,	  I	  move	  on	  to	  the	  other	  
great	  representative	  figure	  of	  scientism:	  Auguste	  Comte.	  Comte	  demonstrates	  the	  religious	  
fervor	  that	  accompanies	  the	  scientistic	  attitude.	  Continuing	  on	  the	  path	  set	  forth	  by	  Bacon,	  
Comte	  argues	  for	  a	  reorganization	  of	  society	  based	  on	  the	  precepts	  of	  positive	  science.	  I	  
argue	  that	  Comte’s	  founding	  of	  the	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  serves	  as	  a	  logical	  progression	  
from	  his	  positive	  philosophy.	  	  I	  then	  explore	  the	  eugenics	  movements	  in	  20th	  century	  
America	  and	  Germany	  and	  argue	  that	  they	  reflect	  the	  new	  worldview	  that	  had	  emerged	  
from	  Darwin’s	  evolutionary	  theory;	  a	  theory	  partially	  based	  on	  scientistic	  prejudices.	  I	  
ultimately	  argue	  that	  the	  solution	  to	  scientism	  lies	  in	  a	  new	  (or	  revised)	  science	  of	  politics;	  
the	  foundation	  of	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Classical	  sources	  that	  were	  either	  discredited	  or	  
banned	  outright	  by	  the	  proposals	  of	  Bacon	  and	  Comte.	  




Scientism	  and	  the	  Dogmatics	  of	  Modernity	  
	  
“The	  damage	  of	  scientism	  is	  done…	  the	  insane	  have	  succeeded	  in	  locking	  the	  sane	  in	  the	  asylum.	  	  From	  this	  
asylum	  no	  physical	  escape	  is	  possible.	  	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  interlocking	  science	  and	  social	  power,	  the	  
political	  tentacles	  of	  scientistic	  civilization	  reach	  into	  every	  nook	  and	  corner	  of	  an	  industrialized	  society,	  and	  
with	  increasing	  effectiveness	  stretch	  over	  the	  whole	  globe.	  	  There	  exist	  only	  differences,	  though	  very	  
important	  ones,	  in	  the	  various	  regions	  of	  the	  global	  asylum	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  personal	  escape	  
into	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  spirit.	  	  What	  is	  left	  is	  hope—but	  hope	  should	  not	  obscure	  the	  realistic	  insight	  that	  we	  
who	  are	  living	  today	  shall	  never	  experience	  freedom	  of	  spirit	  in	  society.”1—Eric	  Voegelin	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  During	  his	  Inaugural	  Address,	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  vowed	  to	  “restore	  science	  to	  its	  
rightful	  place.”2	  This	  certainly	  did	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  anyone	  who	  even	  casually	  
followed	  his	  campaign.	  The	  issues	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research	  
came	  up	  in	  numerous	  speeches	  and	  debates	  throughout	  Obama’s	  presidential	  campaign.	  
The	  foundation	  had	  been	  set	  several	  years	  earlier	  as	  former	  Vice	  President	  Al	  Gore	  
successfully	  brought	  the	  issue	  of	  global	  warming	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  political	  debate,	  
primarily	  through	  his	  book	  and	  subsequent	  documentary,	  An	  Inconvenient	  Truth.	  And	  
record	  high	  oil	  prices	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  receding	  economy	  all	  but	  ensured	  that	  the	  topic	  
would	  be	  of	  utmost	  concern	  in	  the	  election	  season.	  	  Not	  even	  halfway	  into	  his	  first	  term,	  
Obama	  has	  already	  made	  good	  on	  his	  campaign	  promises	  to	  push	  for	  environmental	  
regulations	  as	  well	  as	  to	  aggressively	  promote	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research.	  	  Through	  
these	  actions,	  Obama	  can	  claim	  to	  be	  making	  good	  on	  his	  promise	  to	  “restore	  science	  to	  its	  
rightful	  place.”	  	  But	  considering	  the	  stakes,	  we	  owe	  it	  to	  ourselves	  to	  seriously	  consider	  
what	  science’s	  “rightful	  place”	  truly	  is	  within	  society.	  The	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  carries	  
serious	  political	  consequences	  and	  thus	  deserves	  our	  full	  attention.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Eric	  Voegelin.	  The	  English	  Quest	  for	  the	  Concrete.	  	  Volume	  24	  of	  the	  Collected	  Works	  of	  Eric	  
Voegelin:	  History	  of	  Political	  Ideas	  Volume	  VI:	  Revolution	  and	  the	  New	  Science.	  Ed.	  Barry	  
Cooper.	  (Columbia:	  	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  1998)	  pp.214-­‐215	  
2	  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-­‐obama.html	  
	   2	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  interplay	  between	  politics	  and	  science	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  new	  phenomenon,	  but	  the	  
unprecedented	  scientific	  advances	  in	  medicine	  and	  technology	  during	  the	  20th	  century,	  and	  
into	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st,	  have	  forced	  us	  to	  reconsider	  that	  relationship.	  	  While	  
advances	  in	  medicine	  and	  technology	  led	  to	  unprecedented	  wealth	  and	  accumulation	  of	  
material	  comforts,	  man’s	  increased	  control	  over	  nature	  also	  meant	  that	  he	  could	  destroy	  
his	  fellow	  man	  with	  greater	  ease.	  	  Thus,	  in	  addition	  to	  penicillin,	  vaccinations	  for	  crippling	  
diseases	  such	  as	  polio	  and	  smallpox,	  the	  mass	  production	  of	  the	  automobile,	  television,	  the	  
internet	  and	  countless	  other	  beneficial	  inventions,	  the	  20th	  century	  saw	  tens	  of	  millions	  die	  
at	  the	  hands	  of	  their	  own	  governments.3	  	  Atomic	  energy	  could	  provide	  power	  for	  a	  whole	  
city,	  but	  it	  could	  also	  be	  used	  to	  decimate	  that	  same	  city.	  	  Therefore,	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  
must	  be	  raised	  as	  to	  the	  proper	  relationship	  between	  science	  and	  politics.	  	  Should	  
governments	  control	  scientific	  research	  agendas?	  Should	  they	  determine	  what	  inventions	  
to	  allow?	  	  And	  if	  so,	  how	  can	  such	  determinations	  be	  made?	  Who	  ultimately	  decides	  if	  a	  
scientific	  advancement	  is	  good	  or	  bad	  for	  society?	  	  The	  answers	  to	  such	  questions	  go	  a	  long	  
way	  in	  determining	  the	  role	  of	  science	  within	  a	  society.	  What	  cannot	  be	  disputed	  in	  
contemporary	  politics	  is	  that	  science	  carries	  great	  weight.	  	  No	  matter	  what	  the	  issue	  may	  
be	  (stem	  cell	  research,	  global	  warming,	  militarized	  weapons,	  etc.),	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  
science	  on	  “your	  side”	  cannot	  be	  overestimated.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  both	  sides	  will	  claim	  to	  
have	  scientific	  support	  for	  their	  arguments	  (this	  certainly	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  global	  
warming	  debates).	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  simple:	  science	  has	  produced	  countless	  useful	  
innovations,	  especially	  within	  the	  past	  century.	  	  Nobody	  has	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  power	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  R.	  J.	  Rummel	  has	  coined	  the	  term	  “democide”	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  citizens	  by	  their	  own	  
governments.	  Democide	  accounted	  for	  far	  more	  deaths	  than	  war	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  
(including	  62	  million	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  alone).	  See	  R.	  J.	  Rummel.	  	  Death	  by	  Government.	  	  
(New	  Jersey:	  	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1994)	  p.24	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science	  or	  its	  utility	  to	  society,	  as	  the	  evidence	  is	  overwhelming.	  	  However,	  that	  prestige	  
can	  be	  abused	  and	  exploited	  to	  advance	  political	  agendas.	  One	  need	  look	  no	  further	  than	  
the	  Nazis’	  “scientific”	  race	  theories	  during	  WWII	  to	  see	  the	  horrendous	  results	  of	  such	  an	  
abuse.4	  	  Under	  the	  auspices	  of	  “science,”	  the	  Nazis	  were	  able	  to	  advance	  their	  horrific	  
eugenics	  programs.	  	  According	  to	  this	  argument,	  the	  Aryan	  race	  was	  biologically	  superior	  
and	  thus	  had	  license	  to	  dominate	  and	  destroy	  the	  sub-­‐human	  races.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  
“science”	  used	  to	  come	  to	  this	  conclusion	  was	  not	  scientific	  at	  all,	  but	  rather	  a	  politically	  
motivated	  pseudo-­‐science.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  claim	  of	  science	  served	  to	  legitimate	  the	  
political	  actions	  that	  followed.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Much	  like	  with	  religion,	  the	  abuses	  committed	  in	  the	  name	  of	  science	  should	  not	  
condemn	  the	  whole	  enterprise.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  genuine	  
science	  and	  pseudo-­‐science.	  	  Science	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  is	  the	  search	  for	  the	  truth	  about	  
the	  nature	  of	  things.	  Modern	  science	  is	  essentially	  synonymous	  with	  natural	  science	  (or	  
what	  used	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  natural	  philosophy)	  and	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  scientific	  
method.	  	  Experimentation	  is	  the	  hallmark	  of	  modern	  science	  as	  nature	  is	  “vexed”	  in	  order	  
to	  understand	  its	  workings.	  	  And	  to	  say	  that	  the	  scientific	  method	  has	  led	  to	  positive	  results	  
within	  the	  realm	  of	  natural	  science	  would	  be	  to	  understate	  the	  case.	  	  Yet,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  why	  modern	  science	  has	  enjoyed	  success.	  	  It	  is	  not	  due	  to	  the	  inherent	  worth	  of	  the	  
method,	  but	  rather	  because	  the	  method	  was	  designed	  with	  the	  subject	  matter	  in	  mind.	  	  The	  
mistaken	  belief	  in	  the	  inherent	  power	  of	  the	  method,	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  incredible	  successes	  
of	  natural	  sciences	  such	  as	  physics	  and	  biology,	  led	  to	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  method	  to	  fields	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  For	  an	  excellent	  study	  on	  the	  race	  idea	  see	  Eric	  Voegelin’s	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Race	  Idea:	  
From	  Ray	  to	  Carus.	  Volume	  3	  of	  the	  Collected	  Works	  of	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  Ed.	  Vondung.	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  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  1998)	  
	   4	  
that	  it	  was	  not	  designed	  for.	  	  This	  was	  most	  apparent	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  social	  sciences.	  The	  
majority	  of	  the	  scholarship	  on	  scientism	  centers	  on	  this	  crucial	  error.	  	  Let	  us	  briefly	  explore	  
some	  of	  the	  seminal	  critiques,	  as	  our	  study	  is	  indebted	  to	  the	  foundation	  provided	  by	  
them.5	  	  
Past	  Critiques	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  critiques	  of	  scientism	  have	  generally	  been	  directed	  towards	  the	  intellectual	  
manifestations	  (i.e.	  within	  philosophy	  and	  the	  academy).	  	  Eric	  Voegelin’s	  New	  Science	  of	  
Politics	  serves	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  examples.	  	  Voegelin’s	  call	  for	  a	  new	  science	  of	  
politics	  was	  spurred	  by	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  positive	  political	  science	  to	  address	  the	  political	  
crises	  of	  his	  time	  (especially	  the	  experience	  of	  Nazi	  Germany).	  	  According	  to	  Voegelin’s	  
analysis,	  a	  restoration	  of	  political	  science	  is	  required	  because	  of	  two	  particularly	  
destructive	  effects	  of	  positivism.6	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  
natural	  sciences	  have	  inherent	  worth	  and	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  other	  sciences,	  including	  the	  
human	  sciences.	  	  The	  second,	  and	  most	  dangerous,	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  
natural	  sciences	  become	  the	  criterion	  for	  theoretical	  relevance.	  As	  Voegelin	  notes:	  
	  “The	  second	  assumption	  is	  the	  real	  source	  of	  danger.	  	  For	  this	  second	  assumption	  
subordinates	  theoretical	  relevance	  to	  method	  and	  thereby	  perverts	  the	  meaning	  of	  science.	  
Science	  is	  a	  search	  for	  truth	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  various	  realms	  of	  being.	  	  Relevant	  
in	  science	  is	  whatever	  contributes	  to	  the	  success	  of	  this	  search.	  	  Facts	  are	  relevant	  in	  so	  far	  
as	  their	  knowledge	  contributes	  to	  the	  study	  of	  essence,	  while	  methods	  are	  adequate	  in	  so	  
far	  as	  they	  can	  be	  effectively	  used	  as	  a	  means	  for	  this	  end.	  Different	  objects	  require	  
different	  methods.”7	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  We	  are	  especially	  indebted	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Eric	  Voegelin;	  both	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  scientism	  
and	  in	  the	  solution	  offered	  through	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics.	  	  
6	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  The	  New	  Science	  of	  Politics:	  An	  Introduction.	  (Chicago	  and	  London:	  	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1952)	  p.4	  
7	  Ibid	  pp.4-­‐5	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  Voegelin’s	  critique	  of	  positivism	  is	  echoed	  by	  Leszek	  Kolakowski	  in	  The	  Alienation	  of	  
Reason.	  	  Although	  Kolakowski’s	  work	  is	  intended	  more	  as	  a	  history	  of	  positivist	  thought	  
than	  a	  critique,	  he	  does	  raise	  several	  critical	  questions	  about	  positivism.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  
the	  more	  radical	  forms	  of	  positivism	  impose	  a	  language	  that	  “exempts	  us	  from	  the	  duty	  of	  
speaking	  up	  in	  life’s	  most	  important	  conflicts,	  encases	  us	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  armor	  of	  indifference	  
to	  the	  ineffabilia	  mundi,	  the	  indescribable	  qualitative	  data	  of	  experience.”8	  The	  value-­‐free	  
language	  prohibits	  us	  from	  making	  critical	  judgments	  and	  discourages	  us	  to	  think	  about	  the	  
fundamental	  questions	  of	  existence	  since	  those	  are	  deemed	  meaningless.9	  Furthermore,	  
“Positivism,	  when	  it	  is	  radical,	  renounces	  the	  transcendental	  meaning	  of	  truth	  and	  reduces	  
logical	  values	  to	  features	  of	  biological	  behavior.”	  It	  results	  in	  “the	  reduction	  of	  all	  
knowledge	  to	  biological	  responses.”10	  In	  other	  words,	  man’s	  physical	  nature	  is	  stressed	  to	  
the	  expense	  of	  his	  spiritual	  capacities.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  F.A.	  Hayek’s	  The	  Counter-­‐	  Revolution	  of	  Science	  stands	  as	  perhaps	  the	  most	  
comprehensive	  study	  of	  scientism	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Like	  Voegelin,	  Hayek	  points	  to	  
the	  problematic	  influence	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  on	  the	  social	  sciences.	  As	  the	  successes	  in	  
the	  natural	  sciences	  became	  more	  apparent,	  those	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  began	  to	  take	  note.	  	  
They	  became	  “increasingly	  concerned	  to	  vindicate	  their	  equal	  status	  by	  showing	  that	  their	  
methods	  were	  the	  same	  as	  those	  of	  their	  brilliantly	  successful	  sisters	  rather	  than	  by	  
adapting	  their	  methods	  more	  and	  more	  to	  their	  own	  particular	  problems	  .	  .	  .this	  ambition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Leszek	  Kolakowski.	  	  The	  Alienation	  of	  Reason:	  A	  History	  of	  Positivist	  Thought.	  Trans	  
Norbert	  Guterman.	  (New	  York:	  	  Anchor	  Books,	  1969)	  p.204	  
9	  Ibid	  p.206	  
10	  p.	  208	  
	   6	  
to	  imitate	  Science	  in	  its	  methods	  rather	  than	  its	  spirit	  has	  now	  dominated	  social	  studies.”11	  
Hayek	  is	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  claims	  to	  an	  inherent	  virtue	  for	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  
natural	  sciences	  were	  “mostly	  advanced	  by	  men	  whose	  right	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  
scientists	  was	  not	  above	  suspicion.”12	  Moreover,	  “the	  methods	  which	  scientists	  or	  men	  
fascinated	  by	  the	  natural	  sciences	  have	  so	  often	  tried	  to	  force	  upon	  the	  social	  sciences	  were	  
not	  always	  necessarily	  those	  which	  the	  scientists	  in	  fact	  followed	  in	  their	  own	  field,	  but	  
rather	  those	  which	  they	  believed	  that	  they	  employed.”13	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  average	  
scientist	  is	  not	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  scientistic	  attitude	  and	  those	  that	  do	  propound	  
the	  dogma	  often	  do	  not	  even	  understand	  how	  natural	  science	  is	  actually	  practiced.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Hayek’s	  criticism	  then	  is	  not	  aimed	  at	  science	  itself	  and	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  raise	  questions	  
as	  to	  its	  value.	  Instead,	  he	  is	  concerned	  about	  the	  “slavish	  imitation	  of	  the	  method	  and	  
language	  of	  Science”	  and	  with	  the	  “mechanical	  and	  uncritical	  application	  of	  habits	  of	  
thought	  to	  fields	  different	  from	  those	  in	  which	  they	  have	  formed.”14	  The	  scientistic	  view,	  
unlike	  the	  scientific,	  is	  a	  “very	  prejudiced	  approach,	  which,	  before	  it	  has	  concerned	  its	  
subject,	  claims	  to	  know	  what	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  way	  of	  investigating	  it.”15	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Leo	  Strauss	  and	  Michael	  Oakeshott,	  while	  not	  offering	  full	  treatises	  on	  the	  subject,	  have	  
offered	  important	  contributions.	  	  Strauss’s	  “Epilogue”	  from	  Liberalism:	  Ancient	  and	  Modern	  
reminds	  us	  “political	  science	  stands	  or	  falls	  by	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  prescientific	  awareness	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  F.A.	  Hayek.	  The	  Counter-­‐Revolution	  of	  Science:	  Studies	  on	  the	  Abuse	  of	  Reason.	  
(Indianapolis:	  	  Liberty	  Press,	  1952)	  p.21	  
12	  Such	  as	  Auguste	  Comte	  and	  Francis	  Bacon.	  Neither	  had	  a	  noteworthy	  scientific	  
achievement.	  	  Hayek	  calls	  Bacon	  the	  “demagogue	  of	  science.”	  Ibid	  p.21	  	  
13	  Ibid	  p.22	  
14	  Ibid	  p.24	  
15	  Ibid	  p.24	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political	  things.”16	  Common	  sense	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  political	  
things,	  yet	  the	  narrow	  empiricism	  of	  the	  new	  political	  science	  (i.e.	  behavioralism)	  “must	  
reduce	  the	  political	  things	  to	  nonpolitical	  data”	  in	  its	  attempted	  break	  with	  our	  common	  
sense	  understanding	  of	  politics.17	  And	  as	  Strauss	  further	  notes,	  that	  break	  cannot	  be	  
completed	  because	  “empiricism	  cannot	  be	  established	  empiricistically:	  	  it	  is	  not	  known	  
through	  sense	  data	  that	  the	  only	  possible	  objects	  of	  perception	  are	  sense	  data.”18	  	  Like	  
Voegelin	  and	  Hayek,	  Strauss	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  subordination	  of	  theoretical	  relevance	  
to	  method.	  He	  concedes	  that	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  new	  science	  may	  provide	  criteria	  of	  exactness,	  
but	  “it	  does	  not	  provide	  criteria	  of	  relevance.”19Instead,	  criteria	  of	  relevance	  are	  inherent	  in	  
the	  prescientific	  knowledge	  that	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  new	  science.	  In	  other	  words,	  
informed	  citizens	  are	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  important	  and	  unimportant	  political	  
matters.20	  And	  without	  a	  proper	  place	  for	  prescientific	  knowledge,	  political	  science	  cannot	  
distinguish	  between	  relevant	  and	  useless	  information.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Michael	  Oakeshott’s	  Rationalism	  in	  Politics	  gets	  at	  a	  similar	  notion.	  Oakeshott	  provides	  a	  
reaction	  “against	  the	  modern	  quest	  for	  a	  science	  of	  social	  life.”21	  He	  outlines	  two	  types	  of	  
knowledge,	  practical	  and	  technical,	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  rationalism	  of	  modernity	  has	  
focused	  on	  technical	  knowledge	  (due	  to	  its	  popularization	  by	  Francis	  Bacon).	  	  This	  limits	  
what	  can	  be	  studied	  and	  fails	  to	  realize	  the	  importance	  of	  practical	  knowledge.	  	  The	  result	  
is	  an	  ignorance	  of	  tradition,	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  infallibility	  of	  reason,	  and	  a	  politics	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Leo	  Strauss.	  Liberalism:	  Ancient	  and	  Modern.	  	  (Chicago	  and	  London:	  	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  1968)	  p.211	  
17	  Ibid	  p.212	  	  
18	  Ibid	  p.212	  
19	  Ibid	  p.214	  
20	  Ibid	  p.214	  
21	  Michael	  Oakeshott.	  Rationalism	  in	  Politics	  and	  Other	  Essays.	  New	  and	  Expanded	  Edition.	  
(Indianapolis:	  	  Liberty	  Fund,	  1991)	  pg.xvi	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uniformity.22	  Technical	  knowledge	  focuses	  on	  a	  specific	  way	  of	  doing	  something.	  	  It	  
designates	  a	  technique	  and	  gives	  rules	  and	  formulations	  on	  its	  implementation.23	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  practical	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  formulated	  into	  rules.	  	  It	  is	  a	  type	  of	  common	  
sense	  that	  has	  its	  use	  in	  actual	  practice.24	  	  One	  can	  think	  of	  this	  as	  activity	  or	  participation.	  	  
Oakeshott	  makes	  the	  strong	  case	  that	  these	  two	  types	  of	  knowledge	  are	  inseparable.	  	  They	  
need	  each	  other	  to	  function	  properly.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  critical	  flaw	  in	  modern	  rationalism	  is	  that	  it	  focuses	  on	  technical	  knowledge	  and	  
excludes	  practical	  knowledge	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  legitimate	  knowledge.	  	  It	  regards	  practical	  
knowledge	  as	  unimportant	  because	  technical	  knowledge	  is	  the	  only	  true	  knowledge.25	  	  This	  
simply	  does	  not	  reflect	  reality	  however.	  	  Politics	  necessarily	  includes	  both	  types	  of	  
knowledge.	  	  The	  certainty	  sought	  through	  technical	  knowledge	  cannot	  be	  obtained	  in	  
politics.	  	  As	  Aristotle	  noted,	  politics	  is	  an	  imprecise	  endeavor,	  yet	  the	  modern	  rationalist	  
rejects	  this.	  Tradition	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  understanding	  politics,	  but	  rationalism	  disregards	  
this	  facet	  of	  knowledge.	  	  It	  requires	  an	  intellectual	  purge	  so	  that	  the	  technique	  can	  be	  
learned.	  	  Oakeshott’s	  attempt	  to	  restore	  dignity	  to	  practical	  knowledge	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  
Strauss’s	  appeal	  to	  prescientific	  knowledge	  and	  common	  sense	  experience.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Assuming	  that	  the	  political	  philosopher’s	  primary	  task	  is	  to	  act	  as	  a	  physician	  for	  the	  
soul,	  credit	  is	  due	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  scholars	  for	  adequately	  fulfilling	  the	  role	  of	  
diagnostics.26	  	  They	  all	  drew	  attention	  to	  an	  acute	  problem,	  which	  has	  affected	  both	  the	  
academy	  and	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  However,	  the	  therapeutic	  role	  has	  not	  been	  adequately	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Ibid	  pg.9	  
23	  Ibid	  pg.12	  
24	  Ibid	  pg.12	  
25	  Ibid	  pg.13	  
26	  Voegelin	  takes	  this	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  task	  of	  the	  political	  philosopher	  as	  exemplified	  
concretely	  in	  the	  person	  of	  Socrates.	  
	   9	  
fulfilled.	  On	  the	  academic	  side,	  few	  studies	  have	  sought	  to	  offer	  a	  suitable	  replacement	  for	  
positivism.27	  Intellectual	  revolutions,	  much	  like	  political	  revolutions,	  must	  be	  concerned	  
with	  what	  will	  replace	  the	  old	  structure	  or	  regime.	  Thus,	  the	  constructive	  part	  of	  our	  study	  
will	  outline	  the	  characteristics	  that	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics	  must	  encompass	  if	  it	  is	  to	  
adequately	  address	  the	  political	  problems	  of	  our	  age.	  This	  will	  only	  be	  a	  first	  step,	  but	  
considering	  the	  consequences	  of	  inaction,	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  one.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Scientism	  is	  a	  deformation	  of	  science	  and	  arrogates	  the	  name	  of	  science	  to	  pseudo-­‐
scientific	  (and	  often	  politically	  motivated)	  endeavors.	  	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  intellectual	  
movement	  that	  places	  primacy	  on	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  	  It	  can	  be	  
characterized	  as	  a	  pseudo-­‐religion	  or	  a	  form	  of	  idolatry	  since	  its	  adherents	  express	  a	  
dogmatic	  faith	  in	  the	  power	  of	  science.	  As	  Eric	  Voegelin	  notes,	  “Science	  becomes	  an	  idol	  
that	  will	  magically	  cure	  the	  evils	  of	  existence	  and	  transform	  the	  nature	  of	  man.”28	  This	  
ignores	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  science	  and	  mistakenly	  ascribes	  transformative	  
power	  to	  it.	  Again,	  it	  must	  be	  stressed	  that	  this	  attitude	  is	  not	  common	  among	  practicing	  
scientists.	  	  We	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	  blame	  natural	  science	  for	  the	  ills	  of	  scientism.	  	  
Instead,	  we	  must	  look	  to	  the	  experiences	  that	  have	  engendered	  the	  scientistic	  attitude	  and	  
to	  those	  who	  have	  propagated	  the	  scientistic	  dogma.	  	  More	  specifically,	  we	  must	  explore	  
the	  origins	  of	  scientism.	  	  While	  past	  studies	  have	  acknowledged	  scientism	  as	  a	  problem,	  
there	  are	  few	  full	  treatments	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  And	  the	  studies	  dedicated	  to	  it	  tend	  to	  focus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Edmund	  Husserl	  is	  an	  obvious	  exception	  to	  this,	  but	  his	  solution	  of	  founding	  an	  
“apodictic	  philosophy”	  is	  less	  than	  desirable.	  	  See	  Edmund	  Husserl.	  The	  Crisis	  of	  European	  
Sciences	  and	  Transcendental	  Phenomenology.	  Trans.	  Carr	  (Evanston,	  IL:	  	  Northwestern	  
University	  Press,	  1970)	  p.72	  	  
28	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  The	  English	  Quest	  for	  the	  Concrete.	  	  Volume	  24	  of	  the	  Collected	  Works	  of	  
Eric	  Voegelin:	  History	  of	  Political	  Ideas	  Volume	  VI:	  Revolution	  and	  the	  New	  Science.	  Ed.	  
Barry	  Cooper.	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  Columbia	  1998	  p.208	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on	  the	  intellectual	  and	  epistemological	  problems	  caused	  by	  scientism	  without	  explicitly	  
addressing	  the	  political	  problems.	  	  It	  is	  our	  argument	  that	  scientism	  stands	  as	  perhaps	  the	  
key	  political	  crisis	  of	  our	  age.	  	  We	  seek	  to	  show	  that	  scientism	  is	  not	  only	  intellectually	  
impoverishing,	  but	  also	  politically	  dangerous.	  Thus,	  after	  examining	  the	  primary	  sources	  of	  
scientism	  within	  modernity,	  we	  will	  offer	  a	  solution	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  vitiate	  the	  political	  
and	  intellectual	  effects	  of	  scientism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  our	  ambitious	  aims,	  we	  realize	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  scientism	  is	  as	  old	  as	  
modernity	  itself	  and	  has	  become	  entrenched	  in	  contemporary	  politics.29	  	  A	  satisfactory	  
solution	  then	  will	  not	  come	  about	  through	  a	  monograph,	  or	  even	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  
matter.	  	  Yet,	  such	  a	  study	  can	  provide	  a	  first	  step	  in	  the	  therapeutic	  process	  that	  is	  
necessitated	  by	  the	  dire	  political	  situation.	  	  Before	  any	  constructive	  solution	  can	  be	  
attempted	  however,	  we	  must	  demonstrate,	  and	  not	  simply	  assume,	  that	  scientism	  is	  
intellectually	  impoverishing	  and	  politically	  dangerous.	  The	  majority	  of	  our	  study	  is	  
committed	  to	  such	  a	  demonstration.	  	  Throughout	  our	  study,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  several	  
important	  themes	  that	  remain	  constant	  within	  the	  scientistic	  movement	  including:	  the	  
dogmatic	  faith	  in	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  (and	  the	  accompanying	  assumption	  
that	  those	  methods	  can	  be	  successfully	  imported	  into	  the	  social	  sciences),	  a	  materialistic	  
worldview,	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  bios	  theoretikos,	  the	  prohibition	  of	  philosophical	  questions,	  
and	  an	  emphasis	  on	  immanent	  fulfillment	  through	  the	  power	  of	  science.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  We	  begin	  with	  Francis	  Bacon	  and	  argue	  that	  his	  project	  represents	  the	  foundation	  of	  
scientism.	  	  Through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Novum	  Organum,	  we	  show	  how	  Bacon	  viewed	  his	  
own	  project	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  ancient	  and	  medieval	  philosophy,	  and	  particularly	  of	  Plato	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Or	  at	  the	  least,	  comes	  about	  shortly	  after	  its	  inception	  with	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Francis	  
Bacon.	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Aristotle.	  	  We	  then	  note	  the	  foundation	  of	  his	  new	  science;	  one	  rooted	  in	  what	  we	  now	  refer	  
to	  as	  the	  scientific	  method.	  	  Of	  particular	  importance,	  we	  note	  how	  Bacon’s	  emphasis	  on	  
that	  method	  shapes	  his	  thought	  and	  especially	  his	  politics.	  	  We	  then	  explore	  Bacon’s	  New	  
Atlantis	  as	  it	  represents	  the	  most	  coherent	  and	  clearest	  picture	  of	  the	  end,	  or	  final	  cause,	  of	  
his	  project.	  	  It	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  scientific	  utopia;	  a	  society	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  
Baconian	  science.	  The	  society	  is	  controlled	  by	  a	  group	  of	  technically	  trained	  scientists	  who	  
have	  been	  able	  to	  devise	  ways,	  through	  the	  help	  of	  Baconian	  science,	  to	  overcome	  the	  
perpetual	  problems	  of	  human	  existence	  such	  as	  disease,	  lust,	  greed,	  and	  warfare.	  	  More	  
specifically,	  science	  has	  provided	  for	  the	  means	  to	  control	  chance,	  or	  vicissitude.	  	  The	  
scientists	  of	  Solomon’s	  House	  decide	  what	  inventions	  will	  be	  “allowed”	  into	  society	  and	  
they	  serve	  in	  a	  “parent-­‐like”	  role.	  	  Bacon’s	  vision	  raises	  several	  important	  issues	  such	  as	  
how	  the	  scientists	  determine	  which	  inventions	  should	  be	  allowed.	  On	  what	  basis	  can	  those	  
decisions	  be	  made?	  	  Such	  decisions	  require	  political	  judgment,	  yet	  Bacon	  subsumes	  politics	  
under	  his	  overall	  method;	  a	  method	  designed	  for	  natural	  philosophy,	  or	  science.	  	  Moreover,	  
Bacon	  is	  making	  bold	  promises	  as	  to	  the	  transformative	  nature	  of	  his	  project.	  	  Death,	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  cannot	  be	  overcome,	  yet	  Bacon	  is	  careful	  to	  veil	  this	  truth	  in	  
his	  presentation	  of	  Bensalem	  in	  New	  Atlantis.	  	  Is	  it	  not	  dangerous	  to	  gloss	  over	  such	  harsh	  
realities?	  	  What	  is	  to	  stop	  the	  scientists	  of	  Solomon’s	  House	  from	  abusing	  the	  power	  of	  
science	  to	  control	  not	  only	  nature,	  but	  also	  their	  fellow	  men?	  	  These	  are	  questions	  that	  are	  
not	  adequately	  answered	  within	  Bacon’s	  presentation	  or	  within	  the	  works	  of	  his	  scientistic	  
successors.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  After	  exploring	  the	  crucial	  issues	  of	  scientism	  exhibited	  in	  Bacon’s	  project,	  we	  briefly	  
examine	  a	  momentous	  occasion	  in	  the	  history	  of	  modern	  science.	  	  While	  Bacon	  had	  called	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for	  a	  transformation	  of	  society	  based	  on	  science,	  he	  provided	  no	  concrete	  “results”	  of	  the	  
new	  science’s	  efficacy.	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  Isaac	  Newton’s	  work,	  that	  science	  would	  gain	  the	  
prestige	  necessary	  to	  transcend	  the	  bounds	  of	  intellectual	  circles	  into	  popular	  acceptance.	  	  
Newton’s	  work	  revolutionized	  physics,	  but	  had	  effects	  far	  beyond	  science	  itself.	  His	  work	  
helped	  usher	  in	  a	  new	  worldview	  and	  led	  to	  unprecedented	  optimism	  within	  other	  
intellectual	  fields,	  including	  the	  social	  sciences.	  	  It	  was	  assumed	  that	  Newton’s	  method	  
could	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  fields,	  with	  similar	  success.	  	  As	  an	  example	  of	  the	  attempted	  
application	  of	  Newton’s	  method	  to	  other	  fields,	  we	  explore	  the	  project	  of	  the	  French	  
Enyclopedists.	  	  Following	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  Bacon,	  and	  capitalizing	  on	  the	  success	  of	  
Newtonian	  science,	  they	  sought	  to	  form	  a	  comprehensive	  document	  of	  human	  knowledge.	  
Like	  Bacon,	  they	  rejected	  ancient	  and	  medieval	  philosophy	  and	  saw	  their	  own	  age	  as	  the	  
true	  beginning	  of	  human	  knowledge.	  	  It	  was	  “to	  contain	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  basic	  facts	  
and	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  all	  knowledge.”30	  Reflecting	  the	  Enlightenment	  attitude,	  the	  
Encylopedists	  rejected	  traditional	  metaphysics	  and	  instead	  sought	  to	  base	  politics	  and	  
ethics	  on	  the	  model	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  	  Their	  program	  was	  based	  on	  a	  recasting	  of	  the	  
educational	  system	  (something	  Bacon	  had	  also	  called	  for)	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  18th	  
century	  their	  influence	  had	  been	  felt	  throughout	  Europe,	  and	  particularly	  in	  France.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Riding	  the	  wave	  of	  momentum	  created	  by	  the	  Enlightenment,	  their	  fellow	  countryman	  
Saint-­‐Simon	  sought	  to	  enact	  social	  reforms	  on	  scientific	  principles.	  	  Drawing	  on	  the	  prestige	  
of	  Newton,	  Saint-­‐Simon	  proposed	  the	  “Council	  of	  Newton”	  as	  the	  governing	  body	  that	  
would	  enact	  his	  desired	  reforms.	  The	  scientists	  were	  to	  organize	  themselves	  along	  the	  lines	  
of	  the	  Catholic	  clergy	  and	  direct	  the	  education	  of	  the	  masses.	  	  Furthermore,	  they	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  See	  Richards	  Schwab’s	  introduction	  to	  Jean	  Le	  Rond	  D’Alembert.	  Preliminary	  Discourse	  to	  
the	  Encyclopedia.	  (Chicago:	  	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1995)	  	  p.xxv	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“elect	  a	  scientific	  pope,	  employ	  excommunication	  for	  crimes	  against	  the	  ideology,	  and	  
institute	  a	  Newtonian	  form	  of	  baptism.”31	  Thus,	  we	  can	  see	  in	  Saint-­‐Simon	  the	  desire	  for	  a	  
complete	  transformation	  of	  society,	  not	  just	  the	  educational	  structure.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  influence,	  he	  was	  never	  able	  to	  articulate	  a	  systematic	  vision	  of	  
society	  based	  on	  “positive	  science.”	  That	  task	  was	  carried	  out	  by	  his	  most	  prominent	  
student:	  	  August	  Comte.	  	  Thus,	  we	  turn	  to	  a	  close	  examination	  of	  Comte’s	  work	  in	  Chapter	  
Four	  and	  demonstrate	  the	  scientistic	  character	  of	  his	  work.	  	  Comte	  sought	  to	  reorder	  every	  
major	  institution	  from	  the	  family	  to	  business	  to	  the	  Church	  and	  ultimately	  to	  the	  regime	  
itself.32	  He	  saw	  himself	  as	  the	  “Aristotle	  of	  Positivism”	  and	  expected	  his	  work	  to	  have	  the	  
same	  type	  of	  influence	  that	  Aristotle’s	  had;	  especially	  in	  Europe	  where	  the	  Aristotelians	  
had	  been	  so	  influential	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages.33	  Yet	  the	  disintegration	  of	  Christianity’s	  
influence	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  immanent	  materialism	  left	  more	  than	  just	  an	  intellectual	  void;	  the	  
spiritual	  void	  created	  by	  the	  new	  worldview	  was	  immense.	  Thus,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  the	  
“Aristotle	  of	  Positivism”	  and	  establishing	  a	  new	  way	  to	  study	  man	  and	  understand	  society,	  
Comte	  also	  had	  to	  mirror	  St.	  Paul	  and	  establish	  a	  new	  spiritual	  order.	  	  He	  did	  so	  by	  
founding	  the	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  as	  a	  replacement	  for	  Christianity.	  	  Our	  study	  focuses	  on	  
both	  major	  aspects	  of	  his	  work.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  begin	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  Comte’s	  Positive	  Philosophy,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  foundation	  on	  
which	  his	  later	  political	  and	  religious	  writings	  are	  based.	  	  Comte,	  like	  Bacon	  and	  the	  
Encyclopedists,	  rejects	  ancient	  and	  medieval	  philosophy.	  His	  own	  work	  represents	  the	  third	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  See	  Peyton	  Lyon.	  “Saint-­‐Simon	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Scientism	  and	  Historicism.”	  	  The	  
Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Vol.	  27,	  No.1	  (1961)	  p.62	  
32	  Andrew	  Wernick.	  Auguste	  Comte	  and	  the	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  (Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2001).	  p.3	  
33	  Ibid	  p.5	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and	  final	  phase	  of	  human	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  his	  work	  is	  based	  both	  on	  reason	  
and	  on	  the	  dictates	  of	  history	  itself.	  	  The	  Law	  of	  the	  Three	  States	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  describe	  
how	  things	  should	  progress,	  but	  rather	  how	  they	  must	  progress.	  	  The	  movement	  of	  history	  
dictates	  that	  positivism	  will	  triumph,	  and	  Comte	  is	  merely	  the	  instrument	  that	  will	  bring	  it	  
about.34	  Comte’s	  main	  achievement	  in	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  his	  work	  (represented	  by	  his	  
Positive	  Philosophy)	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  “social	  physics.”	  	  He	  seeks	  to	  do	  for	  social	  
science	  what	  Newton’s	  work	  did	  for	  natural	  science.	  	  Through	  the	  discovery	  of	  laws	  of	  
human	  action,	  Comte	  seeks	  to	  provide	  solutions	  to	  the	  perennial	  problems	  of	  order	  that	  
perplexed	  his	  predecessors	  and	  plagued	  societies	  throughout	  history.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  
establishment	  of	  social	  physics,	  Comte	  aims	  to	  unify	  all	  of	  the	  sciences	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
further	  his	  social	  aims.	  	  Keeping	  with	  the	  utilitarian	  emphasis	  of	  his	  predecessors,	  he	  
argues	  that	  all	  science	  should	  be	  directed	  toward	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  human	  condition.	  	  
Thus,	  he	  calls	  for	  “one	  more	  great	  specialty,	  consisting	  in	  the	  study	  of	  general	  scientific	  
traits.	  	  These	  scientists	  will	  determine	  the	  exact	  character	  of	  each	  science	  and	  reduce	  its	  
chief	  principles	  to	  the	  smallest	  number	  of	  laws	  or	  principles	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  
positive	  method.”35	  The	  other	  scientists,	  before	  receiving	  specialized	  training,	  should	  first	  
receive	  training	  in	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  positive	  knowledge.	  	  If	  these	  two	  conditions	  
were	  fulfilled,	  “the	  modern	  organization	  of	  the	  scientific	  world	  would	  then	  be	  
accomplished,	  and	  would	  be	  susceptible	  of	  indefinite	  development,	  while	  always	  
preserving	  the	  same	  character.”36	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Auguste	  Comte.	  Introduction	  to	  Positive	  Philosophy.	  Ed.	  Frederick	  Ferre	  (Indianapolis:	  	  
Hackett	  Publishing,	  1998)	  p.29	  	  	  
35	  Ibid	  p.17	  
36	  Ibid	  p.18	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  In	  spite	  of	  Comte’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  development	  of	  positive	  philosophy	  and	  its	  ultimate	  
triumph	  (decreed	  by	  history	  itself),	  he	  realizes	  that	  an	  intellectual	  revolution	  is	  insufficient	  
to	  the	  task	  at	  hand.	  	  People	  need	  something	  to	  believe	  in,	  and	  reason,	  no	  matter	  how	  sound,	  
is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  convince	  the	  masses.	  In	  line	  with	  his	  positive	  philosophy,	  Comte	  offers	  a	  
“demonstrable”	  religion	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  supplant	  the	  “revealed”	  religion	  of	  Christianity.	  	  
After	  serving	  as	  the	  “Aristotle	  of	  Positivism”,	  Comte	  takes	  on	  the	  mantle	  of	  St.	  Paul	  in	  the	  
founding	  of	  his	  new	  religion.	  	  To	  explore	  this	  facet	  of	  Comte’s	  work,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  
Catechism	  of	  the	  Positive	  Religion.	  As	  evident	  in	  the	  title,	  Comte	  found	  Catholic	  
organizational	  principles	  appealing,	  although	  this	  admiration	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  Catholic	  
doctrine.	  	  As	  Aldous	  Huxley	  famously	  notes,	  Comte’s	  positive	  religion	  can	  be	  characterized	  
as	  “Catholicism	  minus	  Christianity.”37	  The	  universality	  desired	  by	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  could	  
truly	  be	  achieved	  through	  a	  demonstrable,	  scientific	  religion.38	  	  Religion	  had	  historically	  
served	  as	  a	  source	  of	  order	  and	  Comte	  realized	  its	  utility	  in	  that	  regard.	  	  However,	  progress	  
could	  not	  occur	  as	  long	  as	  that	  religion	  was	  stuck	  in	  the	  outdated	  modes	  of	  metaphysical	  
and	  theological	  philosophizing.	  	  Thus,	  Comte	  set	  out	  to	  base	  his	  doctrine	  on	  positive	  
principles	  that	  could	  presumably	  be	  accepted	  by	  everyone	  since	  they	  would	  be	  
demonstrable.	  	  Faith	  in	  an	  unseen	  God	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  required;	  the	  only	  faith	  required	  
would	  be	  in	  the	  science	  upon	  which	  Comte	  based	  his	  system.	  	  Yet,	  that	  faith	  was	  not	  based	  
on	  hope,	  but	  was	  “guaranteed”	  by	  history	  itself	  since	  it	  was	  based	  on	  positive	  science.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Wernick	  p.185	  
38	  “Our	  sole	  object	  here	  is	  to	  effect,	  for	  the	  new	  religion,	  a	  general	  exposition	  equivalent	  to	  
that	  which	  formerly	  taught	  you	  Catholicism.	  This	  second	  operation	  ought	  to	  be	  even	  easier	  
than	  the	  former,	  for	  not	  only	  is	  your	  reason	  now	  mature,	  but	  the	  doctrine	  is	  by	  its	  nature,	  
more	  intelligible	  as	  always	  demonstrable.”	  See	  Auguste	  Comte.	  The	  Catechism	  of	  Positive	  
Religion.	  Trans.	  Congreve,	  3rd	  edition.	  (London:	  	  Ballantyne,	  Hanson	  and	  Co.	  Printing,	  1891)	  
p.49	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  Comte	  replaces	  the	  Christian	  God	  with	  a	  new	  deity,	  Humanity,	  which	  he	  	  
	  
defines	  as:	  	  
	  
The	  whole	  of	  human	  beings,	  past,	  present,	  and	  future.	  	  The	  word	  whole	  points	  out	  clearly	  
that	  you	  must	  not	  take	  in	  all	  men,	  but	  those	  only	  who	  are	  really	  assimilable,	  in	  virtue	  of	  a	  
real	  co-­‐operation	  towards	  the	  common	  existence.	  	  Though	  all	  are	  necessarily	  born	  children	  
of	  Humanity,	  all	  do	  not	  become	  her	  servants,	  and	  many	  remain	  in	  the	  parasitic	  state	  which	  
was	  only	  excusable	  during	  their	  education.39	  
	  
The	  true	  servants	  of	  Humanity	  are	  rewarded	  through	  commemoration	  and	  veneration	  after	  
their	  deaths,	  while	  the	  others	  are	  left	  to	  toil	  in	  eternal	  obscurity.	  	  Consistent	  with	  Baconian	  
and	  Enlightenment	  thought,	  Comte’s	  religion	  does	  not	  place	  primacy	  on	  the	  cultivation	  of	  
the	  soul,	  but	  rather	  on	  physical	  health.	  	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  incorporation	  of	  medicine	  into	  
the	  positive	  priesthood	  (a	  strikingly	  similar	  position	  as	  the	  scientists	  of	  Solomon	  House	  in	  
Bacon’s	  New	  Atlantis).	  	  Anyone	  that	  resists	  Comte’s	  project	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  
detriment	  to	  Humanity,	  and	  thus	  serious	  limits	  are	  placed	  on	  religious	  and	  political	  liberty	  
within	  his	  system.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  After	  our	  examination	  of	  Comte,	  we	  explore	  the	  scientistic	  foundations	  of	  one	  of	  
modernity’s	  most	  influential	  political	  thinkers:	  	  Karl	  Marx.	  	  While	  countless	  studies	  have	  
been	  devoted	  to	  Marx,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  foundational	  aspects	  of	  his	  work,	  and	  especially	  on	  
his	  (anti)	  philosophical	  anthropology.	  	  Our	  goal	  is	  to	  show	  continuity	  with	  his	  scientistic	  
predecessors	  and	  to	  note	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  prestige	  of	  science	  to	  Marx’s	  work.	  	  While	  
Marx	  decries	  the	  social	  philosophies	  of	  Comte	  and	  Saint-­‐Simon	  because	  of	  their	  
“utopianism”,	  Marx’s	  own	  project	  rests	  on	  a	  dogmatic	  faith	  in	  history	  and	  science.	  	  
Following	  in	  the	  anti-­‐metaphysical	  spirit	  of	  Bacon,	  Comte	  and	  the	  Enyclopedists,	  Marx	  
focuses	  on	  material	  conditions	  and	  on	  the	  biological	  survival	  of	  man.	  Like	  Comte,	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Catechism	  p.53	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realizes	  the	  human	  need	  for	  spiritual	  fulfillment.	  	  While	  Comte	  turns	  to	  the	  religion	  of	  
humanity,	  Marx	  points	  to	  communism.	  	  Marx	  realizes	  the	  skepticism	  that	  might	  follow	  from	  
a	  critical	  examination	  of	  his	  system	  and	  thus	  explicitly	  prohibits	  questions	  about	  its	  
premises.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  premises	  that	  we	  focus	  on	  is	  Marx’s	  theory	  of	  human	  nature:	  a	  theory	  
that	  receives	  its	  justification	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  history	  and	  science.	  According	  to	  Marx,	  the	  
rise	  of	  natural	  science	  has	  allowed	  for	  man’s	  true	  nature	  to	  be	  revealed.	  	  It	  has	  “invaded	  
and	  transformed	  human	  life	  all	  the	  more	  practically	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  industry,	  and	  
has	  prepared	  human	  emancipation,	  however	  directly	  and	  much	  it	  had	  to	  consummate	  
dehumanization.	  	  Industry	  is	  the	  actual,	  historical	  relation	  of	  nature,	  and	  therefore	  of	  
natural	  science,	  to	  man.”40	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  “the	  human	  essence	  of	  nature	  or	  the	  
natural	  essence	  of	  man.”41	  Therefore,	  natural	  science	  will	  become	  “the	  basis	  of	  human	  
science”	  just	  as	  it	  has	  become	  “the	  basis	  of	  actual	  human	  life,	  albeit	  in	  estranged	  form.”42	  
Man’s	  “real	  nature”	  is	  revealed	  by	  human	  history	  and	  “hence	  nature	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  be	  
through	  industry	  is	  true	  anthropological	  nature.”43	  Natural	  science	  will	  in	  time	  subsume	  
under	  itself	  the	  science	  of	  man,	  just	  as	  the	  science	  of	  man	  will	  subsume	  under	  itself	  natural	  
science:	  	  there	  will	  be	  one	  science.”44	  Man	  becomes	  the	  immediate	  object	  of	  natural	  science	  
just	  as	  nature	  becomes	  the	  immediate	  object	  of	  the	  science	  of	  man.45	  Marx	  thus	  blurs	  the	  
distinction	  between	  man	  and	  nature,	  and	  reduces	  the	  knowledge	  of	  both	  to	  sensory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Karl	  Marx.	  Economic	  and	  Philosophic	  Manuscripts	  of	  1844.	  Trans.	  Milligan	  (New	  York:	  	  
Prometheus	  Books,	  1988)	  p.110	  
41	  Ibid	  p.110	  
42	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  p.111	  
44	  Ibid	  p.111	  
45	  Ibid	  p.111	  
	   18	  
perceptions	  and	  history.	  Marx’s	  prohibition	  of	  questioning	  follows	  directly	  from	  his	  
understanding	  of	  man	  and	  nature.	  	  Man’s	  experiential	  knowledge	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  
is	  not	  a	  self-­‐created	  being,	  yet	  that	  is	  precisely	  the	  premise	  that	  Marx	  needs	  to	  uphold	  for	  
his	  system	  to	  work.	  	  Thus,	  his	  response	  to	  questions	  of	  human	  origins,	  of	  who	  begot	  the	  
first	  man,	  is	  to	  simply	  reject	  the	  question.	  	  As	  Marx	  explains:	  “for	  the	  socialist	  man	  the	  
entire	  so-­‐called	  history	  of	  the	  world	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  begetting	  of	  man	  through	  human	  
labor,	  nothing	  but	  the	  coming-­‐to-­‐be	  of	  nature	  for	  man,	  he	  has	  the	  visible,	  irrefutable	  proof	  
of	  his	  birth	  through	  himself,	  of	  his	  process	  of	  coming-­‐to-­‐be.”46	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  other	  crucial	  premise	  to	  Marx’s	  system,	  which	  also	  bears	  scientistic	  prejudices,	  is	  
that	  history	  has	  decreed	  the	  coming	  success	  of	  communism.	  	  Marx	  asks	  his	  followers	  to	  
place	  faith	  in	  the	  eventual	  victory	  of	  communism.	  	  This	  is	  crucial	  because	  the	  
transformation	  that	  Marx	  calls	  for	  will	  not	  happen	  until	  after	  a	  bloody,	  violent	  revolution.	  	  
Marx’s	  critique	  of	  social	  theorists	  such	  as	  Saint-­‐Simon	  and	  Comte	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  
the	  ends	  they	  sought,	  but	  the	  means	  with	  which	  they	  sought	  to	  accomplish	  them.	  	  He	  
thought	  it	  was	  utopian	  and	  unrealistic	  to	  expect	  a	  radical	  transformation	  of	  society	  through	  
philosophy	  or	  education	  alone.	  Therefore,	  unlike	  those	  utopian	  thinkers,	  “the	  Communists	  
disdain	  to	  conceal	  their	  views	  and	  aims.	  They	  openly	  declare	  that	  their	  ends	  can	  be	  
obtained	  only	  by	  the	  forcible	  overthrow	  of	  all	  existing	  social	  conditions.47	  While	  the	  likes	  of	  
Comte	  and	  the	  Encyclopedists	  had	  downgraded	  the	  value	  of	  the	  bios	  theoretikos,	  it	  is	  
completely	  obliterated	  within	  Marx’s	  system.	  	  Violent	  action	  is	  the	  means	  through	  which	  
peace	  will	  ultimately	  be	  won	  and	  Marx	  abhors	  any	  “abstraction”	  that	  prevents	  that	  action	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from	  occurring.	  	  Moreover,	  like	  Bacon	  and	  Comte,	  Marx’s	  vision	  is	  radically	  immanent.	  	  The	  
paradise	  of	  the	  final	  state	  of	  communism	  will	  occur	  within	  history;	  thus,	  politics	  gains	  an	  
absolute	  character.	  	  	  The	  important	  point	  for	  our	  analysis	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  fate	  of	  
Marxism	  per	  se,	  but	  instead	  on	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  and	  motivations	  behind	  its	  
implementation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Our	  final	  demonstrative	  section	  consists	  of	  a	  brief	  examination	  of	  Charles	  Darwin’s	  
evolutionary	  theory.	  	  Like	  Newton’s	  Principia,	  Darwin’s	  Origin	  of	  the	  Species	  helped	  shape	  a	  
new	  worldview.	  Because	  of	  this	  fundamental	  shift,	  Darwin’s	  theory	  has	  been	  influential	  in	  
an	  array	  of	  subjects	  including	  biology,	  genetics,	  religion,	  criminal	  justice,	  psychology,	  
philosophy,	  economics,	  and	  politics.	  However,	  like	  our	  analysis	  of	  Marx,	  we	  are	  concerned	  
with	  the	  underlying	  assumptions	  in	  Darwin’s	  work.	  We	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  reductionism	  
inherent	  in	  Darwin’s	  theory	  can	  lead	  to	  deleterious	  political	  consequences	  and	  also	  show	  
how	  it	  is	  both	  the	  product	  of,	  and	  torchbearer	  for,	  scientism.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Darwin,	  like	  Newton,	  presents	  a	  materialistic	  worldview.	  	  And	  like	  Marx,	  he	  holds	  that	  
human	  rationality,	  morality,	  and	  society	  are	  the	  “products	  of	  purely	  materialistic	  
processes.”	  	  Institutions	  such	  as	  religion	  and	  marriage	  are	  direct	  results	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  
process.48	  	  The	  primary	  difference	  between	  Darwin’s	  materialistic	  account	  and	  that	  of	  
Newton	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  appeal	  to	  design	  in	  nature.	  While	  the	  revelatory	  aspects	  of	  religion	  
had	  certainly	  taken	  a	  hit	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  Enlightenment	  thought,	  natural	  theology	  had	  
remained	  as	  an	  ally	  and	  perhaps	  last	  line	  of	  defense	  for	  Christianity.	  	  Under	  the	  natural	  
theological	  view,	  the	  intricate	  calculations	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Newton	  could	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  
perfect	  design.	  On	  Darwin’s	  own	  account,	  his	  theory	  undermines	  such	  a	  view	  of	  the	  world:	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“the	  old	  argument	  from	  design	  in	  nature,	  as	  given	  by	  Paley,	  which	  formerly	  seemed	  to	  me	  
so	  conclusive,	  fails,	  now	  that	  the	  law	  of	  natural	  selection	  has	  been	  discovered.”49	  Darwin’s	  
discovery	  of	  natural	  selection	  leads	  him	  to	  abandon	  his	  own	  sense	  of	  wonder	  and	  awe	  at	  
nature’s	  workings:	  “I	  well	  remember	  my	  conviction	  that	  there	  is	  more	  in	  man	  that	  the	  mere	  
breath	  of	  his	  body.	  	  But	  now	  the	  grandest	  scenes	  would	  not	  cause	  any	  such	  convictions	  and	  
feelings	  to	  rise	  in	  my	  mind.”50	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  new	  view	  of	  nature,	  Darwin	  also	  presents	  a	  new	  view	  of	  man.	  	  Going	  
against	  the	  traditional	  classical	  and	  Christian	  views	  of	  man	  that	  posited	  a	  special	  place	  for	  
man	  based	  on	  his	  differentia	  specifica,	  Darwin	  seeks	  to	  minimize	  such	  differences	  between	  
man	  and	  other	  beings.	  	  In	  the	  Descent	  of	  Man,	  Darwin	  demonstrates	  “there	  is	  no	  
fundamental	  difference	  between	  man	  and	  the	  higher	  mammals	  in	  mental	  faculties.”51	  	  Love,	  
courage,	  revenge,	  suspicion,	  jealousy,	  pride,	  magnanimity,	  imitation,	  imagination,	  reason,	  
and	  even	  a	  sense	  of	  humor	  can	  all	  be	  found	  in	  other	  animals.52	  Language	  can	  also	  be	  
explained	  away	  through	  an	  appeal	  to	  materialistic	  processes:	  “language	  owes	  its	  origin	  to	  
the	  imitation	  and	  modification,	  aided	  by	  signs	  and	  gestures,	  of	  various	  natural	  sounds,	  the	  
voices	  of	  other	  animals,	  and	  man’s	  own	  instinctive	  cries.”	  Such	  a	  process	  may	  have	  
originated	  with	  an	  “unusually	  wise	  ape-­‐like	  animal”	  imitating	  the	  “growl	  of	  a	  beast	  of	  prey,	  
as	  to	  indicate	  to	  his	  fellow	  monkeys	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  expected	  danger…this	  would	  have	  
been	  a	  first	  step	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  language.”53	  Darwin	  continues	  by	  dispelling	  the	  notion	  
that	  consciousness	  and	  abstract	  thought	  are	  distinctly	  human	  and	  finally	  ends	  with	  an	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attack	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  “humans	  were	  distinguished	  from	  the	  lower	  animals	  by	  a	  universal	  
belief	  in	  an	  all	  powerful	  creator.”54	  Darwin	  points	  out	  the	  fact	  that	  “numerous	  races	  have	  
existed	  and	  still	  exist	  who	  have	  no	  idea	  of	  one	  or	  more	  gods.”	  Moreover,	  he	  rejects	  the	  need	  
for	  a	  Creator	  and	  posits	  religion	  to	  be	  a	  mere	  stage	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  human	  mind.55	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  We	  argue	  that	  Darwin’s	  reductionist	  view	  of	  man	  and	  nature	  leads	  to	  deleterious	  
political	  consequences.	  	  As	  a	  concrete	  example,	  we	  examine	  the	  eugenics	  movement	  and	  
Nazi	  Race	  Theory;	  neither	  of	  which	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  new	  view	  of	  man	  
proffered	  by	  Darwin.	  Francis	  Galton,	  Darwin’s	  cousin,	  coined	  the	  term	  eugenics	  in	  1883	  and	  
the	  basic	  assumption	  was	  that	  the	  “only	  solution	  to	  social	  problems	  was	  to	  discourage	  
reproduction	  by	  those	  with	  undesirable	  traits,	  while	  encouraging	  reproduction	  by	  society’s	  
worthier	  elements.”56	  While	  “positive”	  eugenics	  was	  attempted	  initially	  (i.e.	  encouraging	  
those	  with	  desirable	  traits	  to	  reproduce),	  it	  soon	  became	  apparent	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  
enough	  to	  curtail	  the	  preponderance	  of	  those	  who	  were	  passing	  on	  less	  than	  desirable	  
traits.	  	  The	  only	  solution	  then	  would	  be	  through	  “negative”	  eugenics,	  whereby	  those	  with	  
undesirable	  traits	  would	  be	  forcibly	  prevented	  from	  procreating.	  	  By	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  
the	  eugenics	  movement	  was	  flourishing	  within	  the	  United	  States	  and	  gained	  acceptance	  
amongst	  prominent	  educators	  and	  politicians.	  Thirty	  states	  adopted	  sterilization	  laws	  by	  
1940	  and	  restrictions	  were	  placed	  on	  marriage	  and	  immigration	  as	  well.	  	  The	  power	  of	  the	  
movement	  even	  made	  its	  way	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  where	  Justice	  Oliver	  Wendell	  Holmes	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eugenics	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  evident	  in	  his	  role	  of	  President	  of	  the	  Eugenics	  Society	  in	  Britain	  (p.241).	  Thus	  
while	  Darwin	  himself	  never	  fully	  embraced	  eugenics,	  there	  is	  ample	  evidence	  that	  his	  
system	  led	  to	  its	  implementation.	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(an	  avowed	  Darwinist)	  fully	  embraced	  eugenics.	  In	  the	  1927	  case	  of	  Buck	  v.	  Bell,	  Holmes	  
wrote	  the	  opinion	  and	  upheld	  Virginia’s	  compulsory	  sterilization	  statute:	  
We	  have	  seen	  more	  than	  once	  that	  the	  public	  welfare	  may	  call	  upon	  the	  best	  citizens	  for	  
their	  lives.	  	  It	  would	  be	  strange	  if	  it	  could	  not	  call	  upon	  those	  who	  already	  sap	  the	  strength	  
of	  the	  State	  for	  these	  lesser	  sacrifices,	  often	  not	  felt	  to	  be	  such	  by	  those	  concerned,	  to	  
prevent	  our	  being	  swamped	  by	  incompetence.	  It	  is	  better	  for	  all	  the	  world	  if,	  instead	  of	  
waiting	  to	  execute	  degenerate	  offspring	  from	  crime	  or	  let	  them	  starve	  for	  their	  imbecility,	  
society	  can	  prevent	  those	  who	  are	  manifestly	  unfit	  from	  continuing	  their	  kind	  .	  .	  .three	  
generations	  of	  imbeciles	  are	  enough	  (referring	  to	  Carrie	  Buck,	  the	  woman	  who	  was	  forcibly	  
sterilized).57	  	  	  
	  
The	  chilling	  decision	  served	  to	  legitimate	  sterilization	  laws	  throughout	  the	  country	  and	  the	  
sterilization	  rate	  increased	  dramatically	  as	  a	  result.58	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  eugenics	  movement	  within	  the	  United	  States	  lost	  momentum	  largely	  because	  of	  
World	  War	  II.	  	  The	  Nazis	  had	  also	  embraced	  an	  active	  eugenics	  program,	  but	  the	  horrific	  
results	  led	  many	  to	  abandon	  eugenics;	  or	  at	  least	  distance	  themselves	  from	  its	  full	  
implications.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  super	  race	  was	  an	  overt	  goal	  of	  Nazi	  policy	  based	  on	  the	  
new	  view	  of	  man	  that	  had	  emerged	  largely	  through	  the	  work	  of	  Darwin.	  To	  understand	  
how	  this	  view	  emerged,	  we	  turn	  to	  Voegelin’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  race	  idea.	  	  Voegelin	  contends	  
that	  the	  race	  theory	  of	  the	  Nazis	  is	  “an	  image	  of	  destruction”	  and	  represents	  the	  decay	  of	  
race	  theory	  in	  general.59	  	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Race	  Idea,	  Voegelin	  
laments,	  “the	  knowledge	  of	  man	  is	  out	  of	  joint.	  	  Current	  race	  theory	  is	  characterized	  by	  
uncertainty	  about	  what	  is	  essential	  and	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  technical	  ability	  to	  grasp	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  p.138	  Darwin	  Day	  in	  America.	  	  Justice	  Butler,	  a	  Roman	  Catholic,	  was	  the	  only	  dissenter.	  
The	  case	  still	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  overturned;	  although	  Skinner	  v.	  Oklahoma	  (1942)	  is	  widely	  
acknowledged	  as	  the	  turning	  point	  in	  quelling	  negative	  eugenics	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  
58	  Ibid	  p.	  39.	  	  According	  to	  Kelves,	  it	  jumped	  fivefold	  from	  2-­‐4	  per	  one	  hundred	  thousand	  to	  
20	  per	  hundred	  thousand	  from	  1920	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1930’s.	  	  
59	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  	  History	  of	  the	  Race	  Idea:	  	  From	  Ray	  to	  Carus.	  	  Ed.	  Vondung.	  Trans.	  Hein.	  
(Baton	  Rouge:	  	  LSU	  Press,	  1998)	  p.	  23	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cognitively.”60	  Such	  a	  deficiency	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  change	  in	  the	  view	  of	  man;	  or	  in	  
Voegelin’s	  terms,	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  Christian	  primal	  image	  to	  a	  post-­‐Christian	  image.61	  The	  
shift	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  diminishment	  of	  man’s	  spiritual	  capacity,	  with	  an	  increased	  
emphasis	  on	  biological	  factors.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  source	  of	  life	  itself	  is	  placed	  within	  the	  
organism,	  diminishing	  the	  need	  for	  reliance	  on	  outside	  forces	  (i.e.	  God).	  The	  new	  image	  of	  
man	  is	  radically	  immanent	  and	  material	  and	  biological	  factors	  gain	  prominence.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  
but	  a	  small	  step,	  once	  these	  ideas	  are	  popularized	  by	  Darwin,	  towards	  an	  active	  eugenics	  
program	  and	  ultimately	  to	  the	  destructive	  Nazi	  race	  programs.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	  after	  tracing	  the	  development	  of	  scientism	  from	  Bacon	  to	  present	  day,	  we	  move	  
to	  our	  proposed	  solution.	  	  The	  argument	  throughout	  our	  study	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  
that	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  human	  nature	  is	  crucial	  to	  politics.	  	  Man	  is	  the	  proper	  
subject	  of	  politics	  and	  any	  theory	  of	  politics	  that	  rests	  on	  a	  faulty	  understanding	  of	  man	  is	  
doomed	  to	  failure.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  scientism	  is	  ultimately	  one	  of	  misplaced	  hope	  and	  
misguided	  reason.	  	  Natural	  science	  provides	  man	  with	  great	  power,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  
guidance	  as	  to	  how	  that	  power	  should	  be	  used.	  	  Only	  a	  science	  of	  human	  affairs	  can	  provide	  
such	  answers.	  	  Yet,	  the	  very	  science	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  answer	  those	  questions,	  political	  
science,	  has	  not	  escaped	  the	  debilitating	  effects	  of	  scientism.	  	  Social	  science	  was	  borne	  out	  
of	  the	  very	  environment	  that	  scientism	  helped	  shape.	  	  The	  ability	  to	  critique	  and	  form	  
political	  judgments	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  desire	  for	  certainty	  and	  mathematical	  precision.	  	  The	  
methods	  that	  were	  successfully	  used	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences	  were	  adopted	  by	  the	  social	  
sciences,	  but	  with	  the	  mistake	  of	  not	  realizing	  (or	  acknowledging)	  that	  those	  methods	  were	  
designed	  for	  different	  (and	  less	  complex)	  subject	  matter.	  	  As	  a	  corollary	  to	  the	  importation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Ibid	  p.3	  
61	  Ibid	  pp.3-­‐4	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of	  the	  methodology	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  philosophical	  questions	  were	  either	  
discouraged	  or	  banned	  outright	  since	  they	  could	  not	  be	  answered	  with	  those	  methods.	  
Modern	  political	  science	  is	  thus	  unable	  to	  address	  the	  crisis	  of	  scientism,	  not	  only	  because	  
it	  is	  a	  product	  of	  it,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  provide	  the	  diagnostic	  tools	  necessary	  to	  
even	  recognize	  the	  problem.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Our	  solution	  then	  points	  towards	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics,	  one	  rooted	  in	  the	  
philosophical	  anthropology	  provided	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  (and	  kept	  largely	  
intact	  by	  Christianity).62	  Man	  is	  the	  epitome	  of	  being	  since	  he	  participates	  in	  all	  levels	  of	  
reality	  and	  a	  science	  of	  man	  must	  take	  that	  into	  it.	  	  While	  his	  corporeal	  nature	  is	  
undoubtedly	  important,	  it	  must	  not	  be	  mistaken	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  his	  existence.	  
Apperceptive	  experience	  must	  be	  reincorporated	  into	  the	  science	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  bios	  
theoretikos,	  or	  contemplative	  life,	  must	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  	  Political	  science	  must	  be	  
studied	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  statesman	  and	  citizen:	  not	  from	  an	  imaginary	  
Archimedean	  point	  of	  neutral	  objectivity.	  	  This	  requires	  a	  change	  both	  in	  the	  spirit	  and	  
language	  of	  political	  science.	  	  Political	  science	  should	  seek	  to	  provide	  guidance	  in	  concrete	  
political	  matters.	  	  And	  if	  it	  is	  to	  successfully	  counsel	  the	  statesman	  and	  citizen,	  it	  must	  
speak	  in	  terms	  they	  can	  understand.	  	  The	  desire	  to	  be	  scientific	  is	  misdirected	  if	  understood	  
in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  particular	  method	  and	  its	  terminology.	  	  Politics	  necessitates	  flexibility:	  
both	  in	  thought	  and	  action	  and	  a	  proper	  science	  of	  politics	  must	  be	  reflective	  of	  that	  fact.	  	  
Now	  that	  we	  have	  outlined	  the	  general	  aims	  of	  our	  study,	  let	  us	  turn	  to	  the	  specifics	  and	  
explore	  the	  problem	  of	  scientism	  in	  depth.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  We	  rely	  heavily	  on	  Voegelin’s	  notion	  of	  a	  “noetic	  science.”	  For	  a	  good	  synopsis,	  see	  Ellis	  
Sandoz’s	  “Principia	  Noetica”	  in	  The	  Voegelinian	  Revolution.	  2nd	  edition	  (New	  Jersey:	  	  
Transaction	  Publishers,	  2000)	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Chapter	  2	  
Francis	  Bacon	  and	  the	  New	  Science	  
	  
“From	  these	  and	  all	  long	  Errors	  of	  the	  way,	  
In	  which	  our	  wandring	  Praedecessors	  went	  .	  .	  .	  
Bacon,	  like	  Moses,	  led	  us	  forth	  at	  last,	  
The	  barren	  Wilderness	  he	  past,	  
Did	  on	  the	  very	  Border	  stand	  
Of	  the	  Blest	  promis’d	  Land,	  
And	  from	  the	  Mountain	  Top	  of	  his	  Exalted	  Wit,	  
Saw	  it	  himself,	  and	  shewed	  us	  it.”63	  –Abraham	  Cowley	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Francis	  Bacon	  (1561-­‐1626)	  is	  undoubtedly	  one	  of	  the	  great	  minds	  of	  modern	  thought.	  	  	  
Thomas	  Jefferson	  included	  Bacon	  as	  part	  of	  his	  “trinity	  of	  the	  three	  greatest	  men	  that	  have	  
ever	  lived,	  without	  exceptions.”64	  Jean	  Jacques	  Rousseau	  referred	  to	  him	  as	  “possibly	  the	  
greatest	  philosopher.”65	  And	  John	  Dewey	  referred	  to	  him	  as	  the	  “real	  founder	  of	  modern	  
thought.”66	  	  Bacon	  was	  the	  partisan	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  within	  the	  early	  modern	  
period.	  	  Although	  he	  cannot	  be	  credited	  with	  a	  particular	  scientific	  achievement,67	  Bacon	  
helped	  establish	  the	  foundation	  on	  which	  the	  new	  science	  was	  to	  be	  built.	  He	  was	  the	  first	  
to	  outline	  the	  scientific	  method,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  experimentation	  and	  observation.68	  
And	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  he	  argued	  for	  the	  adaptation	  of	  that	  method.	  The	  benefit	  of	  
science	  was	  not	  readily	  apparent	  to	  his	  contemporaries	  and	  it	  was	  no	  small	  feat	  to	  convince	  
them	  of	  its	  utility.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Abraham	  Cowley’s	  preface	  to	  Thomas	  Sprat’s	  early	  History	  of	  the	  Royal	  Society.	  
64	  Locke	  and	  Newton	  were	  the	  other	  two.	  See	  Jefferson	  to	  John	  Trumbull,	  February	  5th,	  
1789,	  in	  Peterson,	  ed.,	  Jefferson,	  p.939.	  
65	  Jean	  Jacques	  Rousseau.	  The	  Discourses	  and	  Other	  Early	  Political	  Writings.	  Ed.	  Victor	  
Gourevitch.	  (Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997)	  p.332	  
66	  John	  Dewey.	  Reconstruction	  in	  Philosophy.	  	  (New	  York:	  Henry	  Holt	  and	  Co.	  1950)	  p.46.	  
67	  Paolo	  Rossi.	  Francis	  Bacon:	  From	  Magic	  to	  Science.	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  
1968)	  p.	  xiii	  
68	  See	  Lisa	  Jardine’s	  introduction	  to	  Francis	  Bacon’s	  The	  New	  Organon.	  	  Ed.	  Jardine	  and	  
Silverthorne.	  (Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000)	  p.xv	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  While	  Bacon	  can	  arguably	  be	  credited	  as	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  new	  science	  and	  deserves	  
our	  praise	  for	  that	  feat,	  he	  also	  must	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  of	  his	  
project.	  	  Bacon’s	  dismissal	  of	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle,	  along	  with	  his	  seemingly	  unbounded	  
optimism	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  transformative	  nature	  of	  his	  project,	  led	  him	  to	  overlook	  
important	  aspects	  of	  political	  reality.	  	  While	  he	  was	  right	  to	  criticize	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  
within	  natural	  philosophy,	  he	  too	  readily	  dismissed	  the	  political	  and	  ethical	  dimensions	  of	  
ancient	  and	  medieval	  thought.69	  Bacon	  substitutes	  his	  new	  science	  in	  the	  place	  of	  the	  
natural	  philosophy	  of	  his	  predecessors,	  but	  fails	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  politics.	  	  This	  is	  
not	  to	  say	  that	  he	  ignores	  the	  subject	  altogether.	  Instead,	  he	  subsumes	  it	  under	  the	  
umbrella	  of	  his	  new	  science:	  
It	  may	  also	  be	  doubted	  (rather	  than	  objected)	  whether	  we	  are	  speaking	  of	  perfecting	  only	  
Natural	  Philosophy	  by	  our	  method	  or	  also	  the	  other	  sciences,	  Logic,	  Ethics	  and	  Politics.	  We	  
certainly	  mean	  all	  that	  we	  have	  said	  to	  apply	  to	  all	  of	  them,	  and	  just	  as	  common	  logic,	  which	  
governs	  things	  by	  means	  of	  the	  syllogism,	  is	  applicable	  not	  only	  to	  the	  natural	  sciences	  but	  
to	  all	  the	  sciences,	  so	  also	  our	  science,	  which	  proceeds	  by	  induction,	  covers	  all.70	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  his	  method	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  every	  facet	  of	  knowledge.	  The	  problem	  with	  
this	  is	  at	  least	  twofold:	  man	  cannot	  be	  subjected	  to	  experimentation	  and	  his	  nature	  is	  not	  
exhausted	  by	  sensory	  perceptions.71	  	  The	  second	  problem	  is	  related	  to	  the	  first	  in	  that	  some	  
of	  the	  core	  questions	  of	  man’s	  existence	  are	  off	  limits.	  	  The	  experimental	  method	  is	  
designed	  to	  explain	  phenomenal	  relations	  and	  how	  things	  work.	  	  It	  does	  not	  and	  cannot	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  For	  example,	  the	  rejection	  of	  Aristotle’s	  physics	  need	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  his	  
politics.	  See	  Alasdair	  Macintyre.	  	  After	  Virtue.	  2nd	  edition	  (Indiana:	  Notre	  Dame	  Press	  1984).	  
70	  The	  New	  Organon	  (Novum	  Organum)	  p.98	  
71	  Experimentation	  on	  humans	  is	  especially	  problematic	  for	  two	  reasons.	  One	  is	  due	  to	  
epistemological	  reflexivity.	  Those	  being	  observed	  know	  they	  are	  being	  observed	  and	  thus	  
may	  react	  differently	  than	  in	  “natural”	  conditions.	  Secondly,	  there	  are	  serious	  ethical	  
constraints	  as	  to	  what	  kind	  of	  experimentation	  can	  be	  implemented.	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answer	  questions	  of	  first	  causes	  or	  of	  “substance.”72	  Furthermore,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  
guidance	  as	  to	  proper	  action,	  or	  ethics.	  	  Bacon	  explicitly	  denounces	  metaphysics	  and	  
derides	  moral	  and	  ethical	  philosophy	  (as	  it	  deals	  with	  the	  “proud	  knowledge	  of	  good	  and	  
evil”).73	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  A	  final	  troubling	  aspect	  of	  his	  thought	  is	  his	  utopianism.	  As	  evident	  in	  New	  Atlantis,	  
Bacon	  essentially	  foresees	  no	  limit	  to	  man’s	  ability	  to	  control	  his	  own	  fate	  (through	  
domination	  of	  nature).	  	  He	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  technological	  society	  that	  seemingly	  knows	  
neither	  death	  nor	  disorder—in	  other	  words,	  heaven	  on	  earth.	  	  The	  only	  precondition	  for	  
this	  earthly	  salvation	  lies	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  Bacon’s	  new	  science.	  	  Thus,	  man	  no	  longer	  
needs	  to	  rely	  on	  Providence	  for	  assistance	  or	  pin	  his	  hopes	  on	  an	  otherworldly	  existence.	  	  
Instead,	  he	  can	  manipulate	  nature	  to	  provide	  a	  seemingly	  endless	  array	  of	  earthly	  goods.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Bacon’s	  dogmatic	  emphasis	  on	  method	  (and	  the	  postulate	  that	  it	  can	  be	  utilized	  in	  all	  
areas	  of	  knowledge),	  along	  with	  his	  reductionist	  account	  of	  man	  and	  his	  utopianism,	  lead	  us	  
to	  the	  claim	  that	  he	  was	  not	  only	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  new	  science	  (as	  he	  is	  often	  credited,	  
and	  rightly	  so),	  but	  also	  that	  he	  serves	  as	  the	  founder	  of	  scientism.74	  	  To	  support	  this	  claim,	  
we	  will	  examine	  two	  of	  Bacon’s	  most	  important	  works:	  New	  Atlantis	  and	  Novum	  Organum.	  	  
Novum	  Organum	  provides	  insight	  into	  Bacon’s	  project	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  it	  gives	  us	  both	  a	  
critique	  of	  the	  past	  and	  a	  plan	  for	  the	  present	  and	  future.	  	  New	  Atlantis	  gives	  us	  a	  vision	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  We	  deal	  with	  the	  question	  of	  “substance”	  at	  length	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  
73	  Francis	  Bacon.	  The	  Advancement	  of	  Learning.	  Ed.	  Kitchin.	  (London	  and	  Melbourne:	  	  Dent	  
Publishing,	  1973)	  p.37	  
74	  This	  is	  not	  an	  altogether	  novel	  claim.	  While	  the	  likes	  of	  Dewey,	  Jefferson,	  and	  Rousseau	  
heaped	  praise	  upon	  Bacon,	  F.A.	  Hayek	  referred	  to	  him	  as	  the	  “demagogue	  of	  science.”	  See	  
F.A.	  Hayek.	  The	  Counter-­‐Revolution	  of	  Science:	  Studies	  on	  the	  Abuse	  of	  Reason.	  2nd	  edition.	  
(Indianapolis:	  	  Liberty	  Press,	  1979)	  p.21	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the	  “final	  cause”	  of	  Bacon’s	  project.	  It	  shows	  Bacon’s	  regime	  in	  action	  and	  is	  invaluable	  for	  
understanding	  his	  politics.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Before	  delving	  into	  the	  specifics,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  Bacon’s	  place	  within	  the	  history	  
of	  ideas.	  As	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  modernity,	  Bacon’s	  project	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  corrective	  to	  
the	  politics	  of	  his	  ancient	  and	  scholastic	  predecessors.	  He	  likens	  himself	  to	  Columbus	  and	  
his	  project	  serves	  as	  the	  vessel	  that	  will	  usher	  in	  a	  new	  era	  of	  peace	  and	  prosperity.	  	  
Machiavelli	  had	  also	  compared	  himself	  to	  Columbus,	  yet	  the	  two	  offered	  strikingly	  different	  
solutions	  to	  the	  political	  crises	  of	  their	  day.	  Machiavelli’s	  solution	  depended	  on	  a	  strong	  
prince	  (at	  least	  initially)	  who	  would	  take	  bold	  action	  in	  defending	  his	  people	  and	  expanding	  
his	  empire.	  	  Military	  conquest	  was	  at	  the	  forefront	  and	  war	  was	  inevitable.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  Bacon’s	  ideal	  society	  is	  one	  of	  peace	  and	  prosperity	  and	  the	  movement	  towards	  such	  
a	  society	  is	  done	  through	  educational	  reform,	  not	  through	  warfare.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  
society’s	  success	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  the	  virtue	  of	  the	  prince,	  but	  rather	  on	  a	  group	  of	  
technically	  trained	  scientists.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Fortune,	  or	  chance,	  is	  what	  ultimately	  separates	  the	  politics	  of	  Bacon	  and	  Machiavelli.	  	  
Machiavelli	  constantly	  laments	  the	  inability	  of	  man	  to	  conquer	  nature.	  The	  virtue	  of	  the	  
prince	  can	  certainly	  mitigate	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  of	  bad	  fortune,	  but	  even	  the	  most	  
virtuous	  man	  cannot	  hope	  to	  conquer	  it.	  Thus,	  Machiavelli’s	  politics	  is	  “limited”	  by	  nature.	  
He	  never	  presents	  politics	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  constant	  struggle	  for	  power	  and	  order.	  	  
Even	  if	  the	  rare	  prince	  comes	  along	  and	  restores	  order,	  that	  order	  will	  only	  be	  temporary;	  
as	  republics	  will	  eventually	  become	  corrupt	  and	  require	  another	  prince	  to	  step	  in.	  This	  
cyclical	  view	  of	  history	  keeps	  Machiavelli	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  “realism”	  as	  he	  never	  proposes	  a	  
society	  that	  cannot	  exist	  in	  practice.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Bacon’s	  proposed	  regime	  is	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“transhistorical”	  and	  is	  ultimately	  immune	  to	  the	  vicissitudes	  that	  Machiavelli	  lamented.75	  	  
Baconian	  science	  serves	  as	  the	  remedy	  to	  the	  ills	  that	  have	  plagued	  man	  throughout	  
history.	  “Whoever	  has	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  man	  may	  shape	  fortune	  almost	  at	  will…and	  
is	  born	  for	  empire.”76	  And	  by	  “vexing”	  nature,	  man	  learns	  to	  control	  it.	  Bensalem	  is	  an	  
earthly	  paradise	  that	  offers	  the	  prolongation	  of	  life	  (if	  not	  eternal	  life)	  in	  addition	  to	  
prosperity.	  	  Thus,	  Bacon’s	  thought	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  utopian.77	  Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  
specifics.	  	  	  	  	  
Bacon’s	  Method	  
	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Throughout	  his	  writings,	  Bacon	  employs	  a	  variety	  of	  methods	  to	  convey	  his	  thoughts.	  	  
Novum	  Organum	  is	  presented	  through	  aphorisms.	  Bacon’s	  use	  of	  aphorisms	  points	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  his	  project	  is	  a	  “work	  in	  progress”	  and	  is	  “susceptible	  of	  improvement	  and	  
refinement.”78	  	  As	  Bacon	  later	  explains	  in	  his	  Advancement	  of	  Learning:	  
“Delivery	  by	  aphorisms…tries	  the	  writer,	  whether	  he	  be	  light	  and	  superficial	  in	  his	  
knowledge	  or	  solid.	  	  For	  aphorisms,	  not	  to	  be	  ridiculous,	  must	  be	  made	  out	  of	  a	  pith	  and	  
heart	  of	  sciences…A	  man	  will	  not	  be	  equal	  to	  writing	  in	  aphorisms	  nor	  indeed	  will	  he	  think	  
of	  doing	  so,	  unless	  he	  feels	  he	  is	  amply	  and	  solidly	  furnished	  for	  the	  work.”79	  
	  
Bacon	  clearly	  thinks	  he	  is	  up	  to	  the	  task,	  but	  he	  also	  realizes	  the	  need	  for	  others	  to	  
contribute.	  Although	  he	  may	  be	  writing	  in	  relative	  isolation,	  the	  success	  of	  his	  project	  
demands	  a	  massive	  collaboration	  and	  his	  choice	  of	  aphorisms	  points	  to	  this	  realization.	  	  On	  
the	  whole,	  Novum	  Organum,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Great	  Instauration,	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  Bacon’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Howard	  White.	  Peace	  Among	  the	  Willows:	  The	  Political	  Philosophy	  of	  Francis	  Bacon.	  	  
(Netherlands:	  	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Press,	  1968)	  p.126	  
76	  Rossi	  p.102	  
77White	  designates	  Bacon	  as	  the	  first	  “modern	  utopian.”	  Bacon	  exhibits	  faith	  that	  the	  
unknown	  will	  be	  conquered	  via	  science.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  ancient	  utopianism	  (which	  
was	  actually	  realistic	  according	  to	  White).	  	  In	  the	  utopias	  of	  More	  and	  Plato,	  science	  serves	  
virtue	  and	  remains	  the	  handmaiden	  of	  philosophical	  wisdom.	  See	  White	  pp.97-­‐99	  
78	  Novum	  Organum	  p.xviii	  
79	  Ibid	  p.xviii	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explicit	  intentions.	  This	  makes	  sense	  given	  the	  collaborative	  nature	  of	  the	  project.	  Bacon	  
notes,	  “If	  we	  have	  too	  readily	  believed	  anything,	  if	  we	  have	  fallen	  asleep	  or	  not	  paid	  enough	  
attention,	  or	  given	  up	  on	  the	  way	  and	  stopped	  the	  inquiry	  too	  soon,	  we	  still	  present	  things	  
plainly	  and	  clearly.	  	  Hence	  our	  mistakes	  may	  be	  noted	  and	  removed	  before	  they	  infect	  the	  
body	  of	  science	  too	  deeply;	  and	  anyone	  else	  may	  easily	  and	  readily	  take	  over	  our	  
labours.”80	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  Bacon	  explicitly	  expresses	  a	  desire	  for	  clarity	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  scientific	  method,	  
he	  takes	  an	  altogether	  different	  approach	  when	  speaking	  about	  politics.	  	  Bacon	  refers	  to	  
politics	  as	  a	  “secret	  and	  retired”	  subject.81	  	  His	  Essays	  are	  marked	  with	  contradictions	  and	  
cryptic	  references	  and	  clearly	  are	  not	  intended	  for	  “mass	  consumption.”	  	  And	  arguably	  his	  
most	  political	  work,	  The	  New	  Atlantis,	  is	  presented	  via	  myth	  and	  is	  formally	  incomplete.	  	  	  
Yet,	  Bacon’s	  teachings	  on	  politics	  are	  indispensable	  to	  his	  project	  as	  a	  whole.	  A	  successful	  
implementation	  of	  his	  science	  depends	  on	  the	  general	  acceptance	  of	  society	  as	  well	  as	  	  (and	  
perhaps	  more	  importantly),	  the	  regime.	  	  Bacon	  clearly	  understands	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  
dual	  acceptance	  and	  carefully	  caters	  his	  various	  works	  to	  this	  purpose.	  	  Thus,	  to	  
comprehend	  Bacon’s	  project	  as	  a	  whole,	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  penetrate	  the	  meaning	  of	  his	  
political	  writings.82	  	  While	  not	  easy	  to	  do,	  Bacon	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  lighted	  pathway,	  albeit	  
more	  of	  a	  dimly	  lit	  candle	  than	  a	  blazing	  fire.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Ibid	  p.11	  
81	  Advancement	  of	  Learning	  p.205	  
82	  See	  Jerry	  Weinberger’s	  introduction	  to	  New	  Atlantis.	  “The	  full	  importance	  of	  Bacon’s	  
teachings	  about	  the	  new	  science	  can	  be	  seen	  only	  when	  the	  reader	  realizes	  that	  the	  center	  
of	  that	  teaching	  is	  a	  ‘secret	  and	  retired’	  political	  science.”	  This	  implies	  that	  politics	  is	  too	  
dangerous	  to	  discuss	  openly.	  From	  New	  Atlantis	  and	  The	  Great	  Instauration.	  Ed.	  
Weinberger.	  	  (Illinois:	  Harlan	  Davidson,	  1989)	  p.xii	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  Just	  as	  he	  did	  with	  his	  choice	  of	  aphorisms	  in	  Novum	  Organum,	  Bacon	  provides	  reasons	  
for	  choosing	  to	  utilize	  a	  myth	  in	  New	  Atlantis.	  	  Bacon’s	  own	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
myths	  evolved	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  writings.	  	  In	  the	  first	  version	  of	  the	  Advancement	  of	  
Learning,	  he	  seems	  to	  dismiss	  interpretations	  of	  myths	  as	  coming	  solely	  from	  the	  reader	  
noting,	  “I	  do	  rather	  think	  that	  the	  fable	  was	  first,	  and	  the	  exposition	  devised,	  than	  that	  the	  
moral	  was	  first,	  and	  thereupon	  the	  fable	  was	  formed.”83	  	  Four	  years	  later,	  in	  The	  Wisdom	  of	  
the	  Ancients,	  Bacon	  backs	  off	  his	  initial	  position	  and	  acknowledges	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  
authors	  veiled	  certain	  truths.	  “I	  do	  certainly	  for	  my	  own	  part	  (I	  freely	  and	  candidly	  confess)	  
incline	  to	  this	  opinion;	  -­‐-­‐that	  beneath	  no	  small	  number	  of	  these	  fables	  of	  the	  ancient	  poets	  
there	  lay	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  a	  mystery	  and	  an	  allegory.”84	  
	  	  	  	  	  Bacon’s	  decision	  to	  utilize	  myth	  therefore	  deserves	  the	  reader’s	  full	  attention.	  	  
Considering	  his	  admission	  that	  myths	  can	  veil	  as	  well	  as	  instruct,	  we	  must	  ask	  what	  needed	  
to	  be	  veiled	  and	  why	  this	  was	  so.	  	  One	  obvious	  answer	  is	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  protect	  himself	  
from	  the	  “old”	  guard.	  	  Bacon’s	  call	  for	  sweeping	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  science	  is	  practiced	  may	  
have	  been	  revolutionary,	  but	  it	  alone,	  provided	  no	  apparent	  threat	  to	  the	  existing	  
authorities.	  	  A	  political	  science	  that	  calls	  for	  a	  new	  organizational	  structure	  to	  society	  is	  a	  
different	  story	  altogether.	  	  For	  science	  to	  be	  truly	  advanced,	  society	  had	  to	  be	  conditioned	  
to	  accept	  it.	  	  And	  this	  required	  a	  shift	  in	  politics.	  	  Bacon	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  this	  and	  thus	  
took	  great	  care	  in	  presenting	  his	  thoughts	  on	  the	  “secret	  and	  retired”	  subject.	  	  A	  second,	  
and	  related,	  reason	  is	  that	  Bacon	  had	  to	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  attack	  the	  Church.85	  	  While	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Rossi	  p.85	  	  	  
84	  Rossi	  p.86	  
85	  This	  applies	  especially	  to	  the	  Anglican	  Church,	  although	  he	  took	  precautions	  in	  offending	  
the	  Catholic	  Church	  as	  well.	  For	  example,	  he	  took	  out	  some	  controversial	  statements	  from	  
the	  original	  Advancement	  of	  Learning	  when	  publishing	  the	  second	  edition.	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Bensalem	  is	  a	  place	  that	  seemingly	  embraces	  Christianity,	  there	  are	  several	  issues	  that	  
bring	  into	  question	  the	  importance	  of	  Christianity	  to	  Bacon’s	  scientific	  utopia.86	  If	  Bacon’s	  
vision	  had	  any	  chance	  of	  being	  successfully	  implemented,	  he	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  alienate	  
the	  Church	  or	  the	  Christian	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  A	  third	  reason	  gets	  back	  to	  the	  point	  of	  
“unfinished”	  business.	  The	  myth	  itself	  is	  formally	  incomplete	  just	  as	  Bacon’s	  project	  is	  
seemingly	  left	  unfinished.	  While	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  end	  is	  there,	  the	  means	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  
fully	  developed	  and	  will	  require	  successors	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  
methodological	  approaches	  of	  Bacon	  and	  briefly	  examined	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  their	  
implementation,	  let	  us	  turn	  to	  the	  works	  themselves.	  	  	  
Novum	  Organum	  
	  	  	  	  	  Novum	  Organum	  stands	  as	  Bacon’s	  most	  important	  philosophical	  work.	  	  It	  comprises	  the	  
second	  part	  of	  Bacon’s	  six-­‐part	  Great	  Instauration.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  designed	  to	  “equip	  the	  
human	  understanding	  to	  set	  out	  on	  the	  ocean.”87	  As	  Bacon	  notes:	  
We	  plan	  therefore,	  for	  our	  second	  part,	  an	  account	  of	  a	  better	  and	  more	  perfect	  use	  of	  
reason	  in	  the	  investigation	  of	  things	  and	  of	  the	  true	  aids	  of	  the	  intellect,	  so	  that	  (despite	  our	  
humanity	  and	  subjection	  to	  death),	  the	  understanding	  may	  be	  raised	  and	  enlarged	  to	  
overcome	  the	  difficult	  and	  dark	  things	  of	  nature…Different	  results	  follow	  from	  our	  different	  
design…we	  conquer	  nature	  by	  work.88	  
	  
From	  the	  onset,	  Bacon	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  his	  project	  is	  novel.	  He	  rejects	  the	  traditional	  
modes	  of	  investigation,	  namely	  Aristotle’s	  logic,	  for	  it	  proves	  to	  be	  “quite	  divorced	  from	  
practice	  and	  completely	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  active	  part	  of	  the	  sciences.”89	  According	  to	  Bacon,	  
the	  syllogism	  fails	  to	  get	  at	  first	  principles	  and	  cannot	  provide	  the	  insight	  into	  nature	  that	  is	  
required	  for	  true	  progress	  in	  the	  sciences.	  And	  “there	  has	  been	  no	  one	  who	  has	  spent	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  These	  issues	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  exposition	  on	  New	  Atlantis.	  
87	  Novum	  Organum	  p.15	  
88	  Ibid	  p.15-­‐16	  
89	  Ibid	  p.16	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adequate	  amount	  of	  time	  on	  things	  themselves	  and	  on	  experience.”90	  The	  solution	  lies	  in	  a	  
new	  method	  that	  will	  provide	  the	  proper	  tools	  to	  aid	  human	  understanding.	  “Before	  one	  
can	  sail	  to	  the	  more	  remote	  and	  secret	  places	  of	  nature,	  it	  is	  absolutely	  essential	  to	  
introduce	  a	  better	  and	  more	  perfect	  use	  and	  application	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  understanding.”91	  
	  	  	  	  	  To	  get	  us	  to	  the	  “secret	  places	  of	  nature”,	  Bacon	  offers	  his	  experimental	  method.	  	  The	  
experiment	  provides	  an	  “assistant	  to	  the	  senses”	  and	  therefore:	  
	  We	  do	  not	  rely	  very	  much	  on	  the	  immediate	  and	  proper	  perception	  of	  the	  senses,	  but	  we	  
bring	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  senses	  judge	  only	  of	  the	  experiment,	  the	  experiment	  
judges	  of	  the	  thing.	  Hence	  we	  believe	  that	  we	  have	  made	  the	  senses	  (from	  which,	  if	  we	  
prefer	  not	  to	  be	  insane	  we	  must	  derive	  everything	  in	  natural	  things)	  sacred	  high	  priests	  of	  
nature	  and	  skilled	  interpreters	  of	  its	  oracles;	  while	  others	  merely	  seem	  to	  respect	  and	  
honour	  the	  senses,	  we	  do	  so	  in	  actual	  fact.92	  
	  
Bacon’s	  method	  is	  designed	  to	  overcome	  the	  problems	  that	  have	  plagued	  the	  advancement	  
of	  natural	  philosophy	  up	  until	  his	  time.	  He	  claims	  not	  to	  be	  “dethroning	  the	  prevailing	  
philosophy”	  or	  disrespecting	  the	  achievements	  of	  the	  ancients,	  but	  merely	  guiding	  us	  to	  the	  
correct	  path.	  	  This	  somewhat	  guarded	  language	  in	  the	  preface	  gives	  way	  to	  a	  sharper	  
tongue	  as	  Bacon	  begins	  Book	  I.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Book	  I	  focuses	  on	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  
renewal	  of	  learning.	  	  Bacon	  asserts,	  “no	  great	  progress	  can	  be	  made	  in	  the	  doctrines	  and	  
thinking	  of	  the	  sciences,	  nor	  can	  they	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  works,	  by	  the	  methods	  
commonly	  in	  use.”93	  In	  fact,	  he	  points	  to	  only	  three	  periods	  in	  history	  where	  actual	  
progress	  was	  made	  in	  natural	  philosophy:	  	  the	  Greeks,	  Romans,	  and	  present	  day	  Western	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Europeans.94	  And	  those	  periods	  only	  saw	  limited	  progress.	  There	  are	  numerous	  reasons	  for	  
the	  lack	  of	  progress,	  but	  Bacon	  specifically	  mentions	  four	  “illusions	  of	  the	  mind”	  that	  are	  
particularly	  troublesome.95	  These	  are	  the	  idols	  of	  the	  tribe,	  idols	  of	  the	  cave,	  idols	  of	  the	  
marketplace,	  and	  idols	  of	  the	  theatre.	  	  The	  idols	  of	  the	  tribe	  “are	  founded	  in	  human	  nature	  
itself.”96	  This	  includes	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  emotions	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  senses.	  	  The	  idols	  
of	  the	  cave	  “have	  their	  origin	  in	  the	  individual	  nature	  of	  each	  man’s	  mind	  and	  body;	  and	  
also	  in	  his	  education,	  way	  of	  life	  and	  chance	  events.”97	  This	  includes	  the	  inclination	  of	  
individuals	  to	  admire	  tradition	  or	  to	  embrace	  novelty.	  The	  idols	  of	  the	  marketplace	  are	  the	  
“biggest	  nuisance	  of	  all,	  because	  they	  have	  stolen	  into	  the	  understanding	  from	  the	  covenant	  
on	  words	  and	  names.”98	  In	  other	  words,	  language	  is	  problematic.	  	  Words	  need	  to	  be	  
carefully	  defined	  and	  must	  refer	  to	  observable	  objects.99	  Finally,	  the	  idols	  of	  the	  theatre	  are	  
“openly	  introduced	  and	  accepted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  fairytale	  theories	  and	  mistaken	  rules	  of	  
proof.”100Bacon	  includes	  religious	  and	  philosophical	  sects	  in	  this	  group.	  101All	  of	  these	  idols	  
must	  be	  “rejected	  and	  renounced	  and	  the	  mind	  totally	  liberated	  and	  cleansed	  of	  them,	  so	  
that	  there	  will	  be	  only	  one	  entrance	  into	  the	  kingdom	  of	  man,	  which	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  
sciences,	  as	  there	  is	  into	  the	  kingdom	  of	  heaven.”102	  
	  	  	  	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  idols	  of	  the	  mind,	  “the	  greatest	  obstacle	  to	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  sciences	  
and	  to	  opening	  up	  new	  tasks	  and	  provinces	  within	  them	  lies	  in	  men’s	  lack	  of	  hope	  and	  in	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  p.64	  	  
95	  Ibid	  p.40	  
96	  Ibid	  p.41	  
97	  Ibid	  p.46	  
98	  Ibid	  p.48	  
99	  Ibid	  p.49	  
100	  Ibid	  p.49	  
101	  Most	  notably,	  he	  includes	  Aristotle,	  Plato,	  and	  the	  Scholastics.	  See	  pp.51-­‐53	  
102	  Ibid	  p.56	  
	   35	  
the	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  impossible.”103	  Indeed	  Bacon’s	  reliance	  on	  hope	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  
flourishing	  of	  his	  project	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  We	  must	  have	  a	  reasonable	  expectation	  that	  the	  new	  
path	  recommended	  by	  Bacon	  will	  lead	  to	  tangible	  benefits.	  Therefore,	  Bacon	  states:	  “we	  
should	  reveal	  and	  publish	  our	  conjectures,	  which	  make	  it	  reasonable	  to	  have	  hope,	  just	  as	  
Columbus	  did,	  before	  his	  wonderful	  voyage	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  Sea,	  when	  he	  gave	  reasons	  
why	  he	  was	  confident	  that	  new	  lands	  and	  continents,	  beyond	  those	  previously	  known,	  
could	  be	  found;	  reasons	  which	  were	  at	  first	  rejected	  but	  were	  afterwards	  proven	  by	  
experience,	  and	  have	  been	  the	  causes	  and	  beginnings	  of	  great	  things.”104	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  the	  past	  has	  been	  due	  to	  
human	  error.	  Men	  simply	  focused	  on	  the	  wrong	  things	  and	  did	  not	  devote	  their	  time	  
properly	  to	  the	  study	  of	  natural	  philosophy.	  	  Bacon	  notes,	  “every	  error	  that	  has	  been	  an	  
obstacle	  in	  the	  past	  is	  an	  argument	  of	  hope	  for	  the	  future.”105	  Furthermore,	  “Natural	  
philosophy	  is	  not	  yet	  found	  in	  a	  pure	  state,	  but	  contaminated	  and	  corrupted:	  in	  the	  school	  
of	  Aristotle	  by	  logic,	  in	  the	  school	  of	  Plato	  by	  natural	  theology…Better	  things	  are	  to	  be	  
hoped	  from	  natural	  philosophy	  pure	  and	  unadulterated.”106	  Bacon	  is	  the	  one	  who	  will	  
accomplish	  this	  feat	  and	  he	  fully	  expects	  posterity	  to	  reward	  him	  for	  it:	  “if	  someone	  of	  
mature	  age,	  with	  faculties	  unimpaired	  and	  mind	  cleansed	  of	  prejudice,	  applies	  himself	  
afresh	  to	  experience	  and	  particulars,	  better	  is	  to	  be	  hoped	  of	  him.	  	  And	  in	  this	  task	  we	  
promise	  ourselves	  the	  fortune	  of	  Alexander	  the	  Great;	  and	  let	  no	  one	  accuse	  us	  of	  vanity	  
before	  he	  sees	  the	  result	  of	  the	  thing,	  which	  aims	  to	  uproot	  all	  vanity.”107	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  Bacon	  again	  emphasizes	  the	  feeble	  state	  of	  natural	  philosophy,	  but	  he	  sees	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  forever	  change	  its	  course	  through	  his	  experimental	  method.	  Unlike	  the	  past	  
where	  nature	  was	  merely	  observed,	  Bacon’s	  method	  requires	  active	  participation	  and	  
manipulation	  of	  nature:	  “Just	  as	  in	  politics	  each	  man’s	  character	  and	  the	  hidden	  set	  of	  his	  
mind	  and	  passions	  is	  better	  brought	  out	  when	  he	  is	  in	  a	  troubled	  state	  than	  at	  other	  times,	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  also	  the	  secrets	  of	  nature	  reveal	  themselves	  better	  through	  harassments	  
applied	  by	  the	  arts	  than	  when	  they	  go	  their	  own	  way.”108	  Since	  this	  has	  not	  been	  tried,	  	  “it	  is	  
very	  much	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  many	  exceedingly	  useful	  things	  are	  still	  hidden	  in	  the	  bosom	  
of	  nature…which	  have	  however	  not	  yet	  been	  discovered,	  but	  without	  a	  doubt	  will	  appear	  
sometime.”109	  Since	  “men	  have	  not	  spent	  much	  time	  on	  experience”	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  reaped	  
the	  rewards	  that	  surely	  await	  us.	  Bacon	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say,	  “if	  there	  were	  anyone	  present	  
among	  us	  who	  would	  answer	  interrogators	  about	  the	  facts	  of	  nature,	  it	  would	  only	  take	  a	  
few	  years	  to	  discover	  all	  causes	  and	  all	  sciences.”110	  Bacon	  does	  not	  promise	  to	  deliver	  these	  
results	  himself	  since	  he	  is	  “the	  busiest	  man”	  of	  his	  age	  in	  political	  affairs	  and	  “not	  in	  very	  
good	  health.”111	  In	  spite	  of	  his	  limited	  time	  and	  opportunity,	  Bacon	  has	  managed	  to	  outline	  
the	  method	  that	  can	  bring	  about	  such	  discoveries.	  Therefore,	  he	  concludes	  that	  we	  should	  
have	  “an	  abundance	  of	  hope.”112	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  theme	  of	  hope	  is	  one	  that	  Bacon	  sticks	  with	  throughout	  his	  works	  and	  it	  finds	  its	  
greatest	  expression	  in	  the	  New	  Atlantis.	  	  Before	  turning	  to	  that	  work,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  note	  a	  
few	  passages	  in	  the	  Novum	  Organum	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  what	  is	  presented	  in	  the	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New	  Atlantis.	  	  Although	  Bacon	  implores	  us	  to	  have	  hope,	  he	  chides	  those	  “glib,	  fanciful	  
talkers”	  who	  promise	  more	  than	  they	  can	  deliver:	  
Promising	  and	  advertising	  longer	  life,	  postponement	  of	  old	  age,	  relief	  from	  pain,	  healing	  of	  
natural	  defects,	  temptations	  for	  the	  senses,	  enchantment	  and	  excitement	  of	  the	  passions,	  
stimulation	  and	  enlightenment	  of	  the	  intellectual	  faculties,	  transmutation	  of	  substances,	  
unlimited	  power	  and	  variety	  of	  movement,	  impressions	  and	  alterations	  of	  air,	  drawing	  and	  
control	  of	  celestial	  influences,	  divination	  of	  future	  things,	  representation	  of	  distant	  things,	  
revelation	  of	  hidden	  things	  and	  much	  more	  of	  the	  same.	  The	  right	  verdict	  on	  these	  false	  
benefactors	  is	  that	  in	  philosophical	  teaching	  there	  is	  just	  as	  much	  difference	  between	  their	  
empty	  promises	  and	  the	  true	  arts	  as	  there	  is,	  in	  the	  narratives	  of	  history,	  between	  the	  
achievements	  of	  Julius	  Caesar	  or	  Alexander	  the	  Great	  and	  the	  deeds	  of	  Amadis	  of	  Gaul	  or	  
Arthur	  of	  Britain.113	  
	  
Bacon	  claims	  that	  these	  “impostors”	  have	  caused	  prejudice	  against	  novel	  claims,	  thus	  
making	  his	  task	  even	  more	  difficult.	  What	  is	  not	  clear	  is	  whether	  Bacon	  finds	  the	  above	  
promises	  to	  be	  impossible	  outright	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  function	  of	  them	  not	  following	  
the	  correct	  method.	  	  The	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  is	  critical,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  what	  
Bacon	  says	  in	  the	  New	  Atlantis.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  A	  final	  passage	  worth	  noting	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Great	  Instauration.	  After	  Bacon	  has	  
outlined	  his	  six-­‐part	  plan,	  he	  prays,	  “May	  God	  never	  allow	  us	  to	  publish	  a	  dream	  of	  our	  
imagination	  as	  a	  model	  of	  the	  world.”114	  Four	  years	  later,	  he	  wrote	  New	  Atlantis,	  his	  last	  
major	  work	  and	  one	  of	  the	  great	  myths	  of	  modern	  times.	  	  Does	  this	  work	  violate	  the	  
principle	  outlined	  in	  the	  Great	  Instauration?	  Has	  he	  indeed	  published	  a	  dream	  of	  his	  
imagination	  as	  model	  of	  the	  world?115	  This	  gets	  back	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  possible	  
(with	  the	  correct	  method)	  and	  what	  is	  simply	  impossible.	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  and	  to	  
better	  understand	  his	  work	  as	  a	  whole,	  we	  must	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  New	  Atlantis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  Ibid	  p.72	  
114	  Ibid	  p.24	  
115	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  New	  Atlantis	  was	  not	  published	  until	  after	  his	  death.	  So	  in	  a	  
literal	  sense,	  he	  can	  be	  absolved	  of	  the	  charge.	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New	  Atlantis	  
	  	  	  	  	  Of	  all	  Bacon’s	  writings,	  the	  New	  Atlantis	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  controversial.	  	  This	  is	  not	  
surprising	  considering	  both	  the	  form	  of	  the	  work	  and	  its	  content.	  	  We	  have	  already	  
discussed	  the	  general	  reasons	  behind	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  myth,	  but	  now	  must	  delve	  
into	  further	  details.	  	  The	  formal	  incompleteness	  of	  the	  work	  seemingly	  has	  a	  simple	  
answer:	  	  Bacon	  did	  not	  have	  time	  to	  complete	  it	  before	  his	  death.	  	  This	  is	  essentially	  the	  
argument	  set	  forth	  by	  Rawley,	  Bacon’s	  secretary	  who	  oversaw	  its	  publication.116	  Yet	  some,	  
like	  Jerry	  Weinberger,	  argue	  that	  the	  work	  is	  not	  as	  incomplete	  as	  it	  appears.	  Weinberger	  
notes:	  
	  We	  must	  consider	  that	  the	  New	  Atlantis	  may	  indeed	  be	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  end	  of	  science	  as	  
anticipated	  in	  the	  sixth	  part	  of	  the	  plan,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  a	  complete	  picture	  that	  appears	  
incomplete	  because	  it	  presents	  a	  ‘secret	  and	  retired’	  teaching	  about	  politics	  that	  can	  be	  
discerned	  only	  with	  difficulty.117	  
	  
Moreover,	  the	  New	  Atlantis	  evokes	  Plato’s	  story	  of	  Atlantis,	  told	  in	  the	  Timaeus	  and	  
Critias.118	  	  Plato’s	  story	  is	  also	  formally	  incomplete	  as	  it	  breaks	  off	  before	  Zeus’s	  speech.119	  
This	  points	  to	  an	  intentional	  reason	  for	  the	  myth’s	  incompleteness	  as	  opposed	  to	  it	  merely	  
being	  an	  accident	  of	  time	  and	  circumstance.	  	  And	  the	  fact	  that	  Bacon	  went	  through	  the	  
trouble	  to	  have	  it	  published	  in	  Latin	  serves	  as	  more	  evidence	  of	  its	  importance	  to	  his	  
project.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  the	  form	  is	  obviously	  important,	  our	  main	  concern	  must	  be	  with	  the	  content.	  More	  
specifically,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  political	  aspects	  of	  the	  myth	  with	  a	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Weinberger	  p.xii	  
117	  Ibid	  p.xiii.	  While	  this	  claim	  may	  stretch	  the	  evidence,	  Weinberger’s	  overall	  assertion	  that	  
the	  work	  is	  crucial	  to	  Bacon’s	  project	  is	  well	  founded.	  
118	  See	  Plato.	  Timaeus	  and	  Critias.	  Translated	  by	  Jowett.	  (Scotts	  Valley,	  CA:	  	  IAP,	  2009)	  
119	  Ibid	  p.xiv.	  A	  speech	  that	  presumably	  would	  have	  been	  about	  why	  the	  Atlantians	  were	  to	  
be	  punished	  (i.e.	  lack	  of	  moderation).	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its	  scientistic	  character.	  We	  will	  show	  how	  Bacon	  violates	  his	  own	  principle	  by	  publishing	  
“a	  dream	  of	  our	  imagination	  as	  a	  model	  of	  the	  world.”120	  His	  seemingly	  unbounded	  
optimism	  in	  the	  power	  of	  science	  led	  him	  to	  overlook	  the	  most	  pressing	  issues	  of	  human	  
existence.	  	  The	  sobriety	  found	  in	  his	  earlier	  writings	  (in	  which	  he	  constantly	  warns	  against	  
forgetting	  our	  mortal	  condition)	  gave	  way	  to	  an	  intoxicating	  dream	  in	  his	  final	  great	  work.	  	  
Bensalem	  is	  essentially	  an	  earthly	  paradise,	  which	  is	  insulated	  from	  the	  very	  things	  that	  
have	  plagued	  every	  other	  society	  in	  history.	  The	  society	  itself	  serves	  as	  redemption	  for	  the	  
human	  race,	  and	  Bacon’s	  project	  is	  the	  vessel	  by	  which	  it	  can	  be	  accessed.	  	  Let	  us	  now	  
examine	  Bensalem	  to	  see	  exactly	  why	  it	  is	  indeed	  “a	  dream	  of	  our	  imagination”	  and	  more	  
importantly,	  why	  it	  is	  a	  dangerous	  dream.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  basic	  plot	  of	  the	  New	  Atlantis	  sees	  a	  group	  of	  European	  sailors	  land	  on	  a	  mysterious	  
island.	  	  They	  had	  been	  lost	  at	  sea	  with	  little	  hope	  of	  finding	  their	  way	  back	  and	  a	  number	  of	  
them	  were	  sick.	  Their	  prayers	  for	  land	  were	  finally	  answered,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  
immediately	  admitted	  onto	  the	  island.	  Only	  after	  they	  proclaimed	  themselves	  to	  be	  
Christians	  and	  swore	  that	  they	  had	  not	  engaged	  in	  warfare	  for	  the	  previous	  forty	  days,	  
were	  they	  allowed	  onto	  the	  island	  and	  placed	  in	  the	  Strangers’	  House.	  	  The	  opening	  scene	  is	  
important	  for	  several	  reasons.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  Bacon	  employs	  a	  recurrent	  theme	  of	  
navigation.121	  	  In	  addition	  to	  fitting	  in	  with	  the	  literature	  of	  his	  time,	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  
how	  Bacon	  views	  his	  own	  project.	  	  Having	  likened	  himself	  to	  Columbus,	  Bacon	  is	  offering	  
entrance	  into	  a	  new	  world.	  While	  hardships	  are	  not	  entirely	  absent	  from	  the	  journey	  to	  
Bensalem,	  Bacon	  minimizes	  their	  importance.	  He	  does	  not	  describe	  deaths	  of	  crewmen	  or	  
terrible	  storms.	  The	  winds	  had	  apparently	  been	  favorable	  for	  the	  first	  five	  months	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Novum	  Organum	  p.24	  
121	  Peace	  Among	  the	  Willows	  p.94	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trip,	  but	  then	  shifted	  to	  where	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  sail	  in	  their	  desired	  direction.	  This	  
rather	  peaceful	  view	  of	  the	  journey	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  the	  transition	  that	  will	  have	  to	  occur	  
in	  society	  as	  Bacon’s	  science	  is	  accepted.	  In	  other	  words,	  Bacon	  holds	  out	  hope	  for	  a	  rather	  
peaceful	  transition	  even	  though	  such	  transitions	  throughout	  history	  have	  been	  riddled	  with	  
violence.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  conditions	  for	  coming	  onto	  land	  as	  well.	  They	  both	  have	  to	  do	  
with	  religion.	  	  The	  sailors	  are	  not	  afraid	  to	  profess	  their	  Christianity	  (in	  light	  of	  seeing	  a	  
cross)	  and	  the	  officials	  there	  to	  receive	  them	  are	  pleased	  to	  hear	  so.	  Moreover,	  the	  oath	  of	  
“peace”	  for	  the	  previous	  forty	  days	  plays	  on	  Christian	  and	  Judaic	  symbolism	  and	  further	  
confirms	  the	  nature	  of	  Bensalem	  as	  a	  peaceful	  society.	  	  The	  sailors	  are	  impressed	  with	  the	  
generosity	  of	  their	  hosts	  and	  express	  a	  desire	  to	  stay	  there	  permanently	  after	  only	  a	  short	  
time	  on	  the	  island.	  	  Yet	  the	  seemingly	  hospitable	  nature	  of	  the	  hosts	  may	  not	  be	  quite	  what	  
it	  appears.	  For	  it	  is	  soon	  revealed	  that	  Bensalem	  possesses	  laws	  of	  secrecy	  that	  forbid	  
guests	  to	  visit	  the	  island	  and	  then	  impart	  their	  knowledge	  of	  it	  upon	  returning	  to	  their	  
homelands.	  The	  Governor	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Strangers	  insists	  that	  none	  have	  been	  held	  
against	  their	  will,	  but	  for	  such	  laws	  to	  be	  successful,	  it	  seems	  almost	  necessary	  that	  it	  would	  
have	  to	  be	  done	  in	  cases	  where	  visitors	  refused	  to	  stay.	  	  He	  claims	  those	  returning	  from	  the	  
island	  would	  not	  be	  believed	  even	  if	  they	  did	  divulge	  information	  upon	  their	  return,	  but	  if	  
this	  is	  truly	  the	  case,	  then	  there	  would	  be	  little	  reason	  to	  try	  to	  convince	  visitors	  to	  stay	  in	  
the	  first	  place.122	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Weinberger	  suggests	  that	  those	  unwilling	  or	  unfit	  to	  stay	  “must	  have	  been	  restrained	  by	  
force	  or	  killed.”	  	  P.	  xvi	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  Nevertheless,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  sailors	  express	  a	  genuine	  willingness	  to	  stay;	  mainly	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  their	  favorable	  impressions	  of	  the	  Strangers’	  House	  during	  the	  mandatory	  three-­‐
day	  stay:	  
So	  we	  spent	  our	  three	  days	  joyfully,	  and	  without	  care,	  in	  expectation	  what	  would	  be	  done	  
with	  us	  when	  they	  were	  expired.	  During	  which	  time,	  we	  had	  every	  hour	  joy	  of	  the	  
amendment	  of	  our	  sick,	  who	  thought	  themselves	  cast	  into	  some	  divine	  pool	  of	  healing,	  they	  
mended	  so	  kindly	  and	  so	  fast.123	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  healing	  and	  prolongation	  of	  life	  is	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  aims	  of	  
Solomon’s	  House.	  While	  death	  is	  not	  mentioned	  anywhere	  in	  the	  story,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  there	  are	  fewer	  chambers	  for	  those	  who	  have	  healed	  than	  those	  who	  are	  sick.	  
This	  implies	  that	  not	  everyone	  will	  be	  healed.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  confirms	  our	  mortal	  
condition,	  but	  Bacon	  conceals	  this	  fact	  and	  instead	  emphasizes	  the	  seemingly	  miraculous	  
recovery	  of	  the	  sick	  sailors.124	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	  is	  through	  the	  governor’s	  speech	  that	  we	  also	  discover	  something	  about	  the	  history	  of	  
Bensalem.	  The	  first	  question	  asked	  by	  the	  sailors	  is	  how	  the	  island	  came	  to	  be	  converted	  to	  
Christianity.	  	  The	  governor	  notes	  that	  twenty	  years	  after	  Christ’s	  ascension,	  a	  great	  pillar	  of	  
light	  appeared	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Renfusa.	  One	  of	  the	  wise	  men	  from	  Solomon’s	  House	  was	  
present	  and	  after	  declaring	  the	  light	  to	  be	  miraculous,	  the	  wise	  man’s	  boat	  was	  allowed	  to	  
approach	  closer	  (all	  of	  the	  other	  boats	  had	  been	  stopped	  within	  sixty	  yards	  of	  it).	  	  As	  he	  got	  
close,	  the	  pillar	  of	  light	  broke	  up,	  but	  a	  small	  chest	  was	  left	  behind.	  	  It	  contained	  all	  of	  the	  
books	  of	  the	  Old	  and	  New	  Testaments,	  in	  addition	  to	  “some	  other	  books	  of	  the	  New	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  Francis	  Bacon.	  Essays	  and	  New	  Atlantis.	  Ed.	  Gordon	  Haight.	  (New	  York:	  Walter	  Black	  
Publishing,	  1942)	  p.254	  
124	  In	  earlier	  works,	  Bacon	  had	  often	  insisted	  “that	  we	  do	  not	  place	  our	  felicity	  in	  
knowledge,	  as	  we	  forget	  our	  mortality.”	  See	  Advancement	  of	  Learning	  p.6	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Testament,	  which	  were	  not	  at	  that	  time	  written.”125	  The	  most	  striking	  part	  of	  the	  account	  is	  
that	  the	  wise	  man	  declared	  the	  pillar	  of	  light	  to	  be	  a	  miracle	  (i.e.	  reason	  judges	  revelation).	  	  
But	  what	  could	  give	  him	  such	  authority	  to	  distinguish	  a	  miracle	  from	  a	  fraud	  or	  a	  merely	  
natural	  occurrence?	  The	  probable	  answer	  is	  Baconian	  science	  for	  we	  find	  out	  that	  
Bensalem	  was	  founded	  well	  before	  the	  coming	  of	  Christ.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  Bensalem	  was	  established	  well	  before	  Christianity	  is	  interesting	  for	  several	  
reasons.	  For	  one,	  it	  shows	  that	  Bensalem’s	  success	  was	  not	  due	  to	  Christianity.	  	  Solamona,	  
the	  lawgiver	  of	  Bensalem,	  is	  described	  as	  a	  “divine	  instrument”	  who	  had	  a	  “large	  heart,	  
inscrutable	  for	  good,	  and	  was	  wholly	  bent	  to	  make	  his	  kingdom	  and	  people	  happy.”126	  
Considering	  his	  wish	  for	  continued	  prosperity,	  Solamona	  instituted	  the	  laws	  of	  secrecy	  to	  
preserve	  the	  exemplary	  nature	  of	  his	  society.	  He	  realized	  there	  were	  “a	  thousand	  ways”	  to	  
make	  it	  worse,	  but	  “scarce”	  any	  way	  to	  make	  it	  better.127	  In	  other	  words,	  Bensalem	  was	  
good	  from	  the	  start.	  It	  did	  not	  need	  anything	  else	  to	  make	  it	  better,	  but	  had	  to	  guard	  against	  
corrupting	  influences	  to	  insure	  that	  it	  stayed	  that	  way.	  
	  	  	  	  	  So	  why	  did	  Bensalem	  convert	  to	  Christianity?	  	  First,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  claim	  to	  
conversion	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  actual	  conversion.	  	  Christianity	  has	  been	  admitted	  into	  
Bensalem,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	  influence	  it	  actually	  has	  had	  in	  the	  society.	  	  Nor	  is	  it	  
clear	  how	  many	  citizens	  are	  actually	  Christian.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  symbols	  from	  Islam,	  
Judaism,	  and	  ancient	  Egypt	  present,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  characters	  in	  the	  book,	  
Joabin,	  is	  Jewish.	  Secondly,	  we	  must	  remember	  Bacon’s	  audience.	  He	  had	  to	  win	  over	  the	  
churches	  or	  at	  least	  assure	  them	  that	  his	  project	  was	  not	  a	  threat.	  Thus,	  making	  the	  island	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  New	  Atlantis	  p.260	  
126	  Ibid	  p.268	  
127	  Ibid	  p.269	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compatible	  with	  Christianity	  was	  of	  utmost	  importance.	  But	  Bacon’s	  timeline	  makes	  it	  clear	  
that	  the	  success	  of	  the	  society	  did	  not	  hinge	  on	  Christian	  revelation;	  rather	  it	  was	  derived	  
from	  science.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  religious	  symbolism	  found	  throughout	  the	  myth	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  several	  
interesting	  studies.	  	  Howard	  White	  and	  Jerry	  Weinberger	  both	  point	  to	  the	  symbols	  as	  
being	  tools	  of	  the	  regime.128	  	  They	  serve	  to	  promote	  cohesiveness	  and	  order	  within	  the	  
society.	  Stephen	  McKnight	  dismisses	  that	  claim	  as	  cynical	  and	  argues	  that	  Bacon’s	  religious	  
symbols	  were	  the	  reflection	  of	  genuinely	  held	  beliefs.129	  	  The	  evidence	  seems	  to	  suggest	  
that	  both	  arguments	  have	  merit.	  Bacon	  is	  not	  merely	  trying	  to	  create	  order,	  although	  that	  is	  
indeed	  a	  primary	  concern	  of	  his.	  He	  is	  attempting	  to	  create	  an	  earthly	  paradise	  and	  the	  
religious	  symbolism	  is	  appropriate	  to	  his	  task.	  	  Bacon	  genuinely	  believes	  that	  his	  project	  
can	  serve	  as	  redemption	  for	  mankind.	  	  Thus,	  the	  appropriation	  of	  Christian	  symbolism	  
serves	  the	  dual	  purpose	  of	  propping	  up	  the	  regime	  and	  of	  reflecting	  Bacon’s	  beliefs	  about	  
the	  transformative	  nature	  of	  his	  science.130	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Throughout	  the	  work,	  we	  are	  mainly	  relegated	  to	  getting	  information	  about	  Bensalem	  
through	  its	  official	  representatives.	  An	  exception	  is	  the	  Feast	  of	  the	  Family,	  a	  public	  
ceremony	  that	  is	  given	  to	  any	  man	  “that	  shall	  live	  to	  see	  thirty	  persons	  descended	  of	  his	  
body	  alive	  together,	  and	  all	  above	  three	  years	  old.”131	  The	  cost	  is	  incurred	  by	  the	  state.	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  See	  White’s	  Peace	  Among	  the	  Willows	  and	  Weinberger’s	  Introduction	  to	  New	  Atlantis	  
129	  Stephen	  McKnight.	  The	  Religious	  Foundations	  of	  Francis	  Bacon’s	  Thought.	  (Columbia:	  	  
University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  2006)	  p.15	  
130Consider	  one	  such	  passage:	  “We	  answered,	  after	  we	  had	  looked	  awhile	  one	  upon	  
another,	  admiring	  this	  gracious	  and	  parent-­‐like	  usage,	  that	  we	  could	  not	  tell	  what	  to	  say,	  for	  
we	  wanted	  words	  to	  express	  our	  thanks;	  and	  his	  noble	  free	  offer	  left	  us	  nothing	  to	  ask.	  It	  
seemed	  to	  us	  that	  we	  had	  before	  us	  a	  picture	  of	  our	  salvation	  in	  heaven.”	  	  (emphasis	  added)	  
see	  New	  Atlantis	  pp.255-­‐256	  
131	  Ibid	  p.274	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Since	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  any	  specific	  virtue	  of	  the	  man,	  or	  of	  any	  further	  moral	  
requirements,	  the	  feast	  appears	  to	  celebrate	  “mere	  longevity	  and	  fecundity.”132	  This	  fits	  in	  
well	  with	  the	  primary	  aims	  of	  Solomon’s	  House:	  prolongation	  of	  life	  and	  material	  comfort.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  After	  observing	  the	  Feast,	  the	  narrator	  meets	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  characters	  in	  
the	  myth,	  Joabin	  the	  merchant.	  Joabin	  is	  described	  as	  a	  “wise	  man,	  and	  learned,	  and	  of	  great	  
policy,	  and	  excellently	  seen	  in	  the	  laws	  and	  customs	  of	  that	  nation.”133	  After	  the	  narrator	  
praises	  the	  Feast	  of	  the	  Family,	  he	  inquires	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  marriage	  within	  Bensalem.	  
Joabin	  explains	  how	  the	  laws	  and	  customs	  of	  marriage	  are	  arranged	  and	  why	  they	  are	  
superior	  to	  those	  of	  Europe.	  	  Joabin	  claims	  that	  Bensalem	  is	  “the	  virgin	  of	  the	  world”	  and	  its	  
people	  are	  of	  a	  chaste	  mind.134	  Unlike	  in	  Europe,	  marriage	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  convenient	  
arrangement	  designed	  to	  quell	  “unlawful	  concupiscence.”	  Instead,	  it	  represents	  a	  “faithful	  
nuptial	  union	  of	  man	  and	  wife.”135	  Joabin	  explains	  that	  there	  is	  no	  polygamy	  and	  at	  least	  a	  
month	  must	  pass	  between	  the	  first	  meeting	  and	  marriage.	  	  The	  consent	  of	  the	  parents	  must	  
be	  given	  and	  if	  it	  is	  not,	  then	  the	  inheritance	  is	  greatly	  diminished.	  	  Furthermore,	  Joabin	  
tells	  us	  of	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  letting	  the	  married	  couple	  see	  each	  other	  naked	  before	  
the	  contract.	  Instead,	  a	  friend	  of	  the	  man	  and	  a	  friend	  of	  the	  woman	  are	  allowed	  to	  watch	  
them	  bathe	  in	  “Adam	  and	  Eve	  pools.”	  This	  is	  a	  more	  “civil”	  solution	  because	  it	  avoids	  the	  
“scorn	  to	  give	  a	  refusal	  after	  so	  familiar	  knowledge.”136	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  rites	  of	  marriage	  tell	  us	  more	  about	  Bensalem	  than	  may	  be	  apparent	  in	  a	  cursory	  
reading.	  	  It	  marks	  one	  of	  the	  only	  passages	  where	  Bacon	  explicitly	  criticizes	  a	  European	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  Weinberger	  xxiv	  
133	  Ibid	  p.65	  	  
134	  Ibid	  p.66	  
135	  Ibid	  pp.66-­‐67	  
136	  Ibid	  p.68	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institution.137	  He	  is	  also	  leveling	  a	  critique	  against	  Plato	  and	  More	  for	  both	  had	  suggested	  
the	  idea	  that	  married	  couples	  could	  see	  each	  other	  naked	  before	  marriage.	  But	  why	  is	  this	  
distinction	  important?	  We	  could	  imagine	  that	  complications	  could	  arise	  from	  the	  
arrangement	  in	  Bensalem.	  	  What	  if	  the	  friends	  became	  attracted	  to	  the	  spouses?	  Would	  not	  
there	  be	  incentive	  to	  misrepresent	  what	  was	  seen	  in	  the	  “Adam	  and	  Eve”	  pools?	  Bacon	  
seemingly	  ignores	  the	  eroticism	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  these	  situations.	  As	  White	  notes,	  “the	  
friend	  would	  have	  to	  overcome	  the	  sense	  of	  shame,	  and	  see	  them	  as	  they	  were	  before	  the	  
fall.”138	  McKnight	  argues	  that	  Bacon’s	  wish	  is	  to	  restore	  man	  to	  his	  prelapsarian	  condition,	  
and	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  pools	  could	  suggest	  that	  his	  science	  has	  indeed	  been	  
able	  to	  do	  that	  for	  Bensalem.139	  	  What	  is	  apparent	  is	  that	  marriage	  in	  Bensalem	  is	  not	  
primarily	  a	  private	  good.	  Free	  choice	  is	  minimized.140	  The	  requirement	  of	  parental	  consent	  
(with	  a	  significant	  inheritance	  penalty	  if	  not	  followed)	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Adam	  
and	  Eve	  pools	  suggest	  significant	  regulation	  of	  marriage	  by	  the	  regime.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  
conclude	  that	  marriage	  serves	  a	  public	  good	  and	  this	  is	  reinforced	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  
Feast	  of	  the	  Family,	  which	  could	  not	  be	  celebrated	  without	  a	  strong	  marital	  institution.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  final	  scene	  of	  the	  myth	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  for	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  
exactly	  what	  Baconian	  science	  can	  achieve.	  As	  we	  will	  recall,	  the	  utopian	  aim	  of	  Bacon’s	  
project	  is	  to	  conquer	  chance.	  And	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  is	  done	  through	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  
scientists	  of	  Solomon’s	  House	  in	  Bensalem.	  	  While	  Bacon	  notes	  the	  importance	  of	  
experiments	  of	  light,	  the	  true	  glory	  lies	  in	  the	  experiments	  that	  bear	  fruit.141	  Inventors	  are	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  White	  p.139	  
138	  Ibid	  p.187	  
139	  McKnight	  p.9	  
140	  White	  p.180	  
141	  Ibid	  p.106	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therefore	  revered	  since	  their	  works	  can	  benefit	  all	  of	  mankind	  and	  not	  just	  through	  the	  
span	  of	  their	  respective	  lives.	  Their	  inventions	  live	  on	  well	  after	  they	  have	  passed.142	  	  The	  
most	  important	  function	  of	  Solomon’s	  House	  is	  the	  preservation	  and	  prolongation	  of	  life	  
and	  so	  a	  great	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  medicine.143	  We	  know	  that	  the	  medicine	  serves	  its	  
function	  well	  from	  the	  account	  of	  the	  sick	  sailors	  who	  were	  healed	  in	  the	  “divine	  pool,”	  
presumably	  by	  the	  “Water	  of	  Paradise”	  referenced	  by	  one	  of	  the	  fathers	  of	  Solomon’s	  
House.144	  We	  learn	  that	  the	  scientists	  of	  Solomon’s	  House	  have	  made	  all	  sorts	  of	  discoveries	  
and	  have	  mastered	  the	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  nature	  to	  man’s	  needs.	  They	  have	  genetically	  
engineered	  beasts	  and	  birds:	  
	  By	  art	  likewise	  we	  make	  them	  greater	  or	  taller	  than	  their	  kind	  is,	  and	  contrariwise	  dwarf	  
them	  and	  stay	  their	  growth;	  we	  make	  them	  more	  fruitful	  and	  bearing	  than	  their	  kind	  is,	  and	  
contrariwise	  barren	  and	  not	  generative.	  We	  find	  means	  to	  make	  commixtures	  and	  
copulations	  of	  divers	  kinds,	  which	  have	  produced	  many	  new	  kinds,	  and	  them	  not	  barren,	  as	  
the	  general	  opinion	  is…Neither	  do	  we	  this	  by	  chance,	  but	  we	  know	  beforehand	  of	  what	  
matter	  and	  commixture,	  what	  kind	  of	  those	  creatures	  will	  arise.145	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  genetic	  engineering,	  they	  have	  discovered	  flight	  and	  perfected	  machines	  that	  
can	  imitate	  the	  motions	  of	  living	  creatures.146	  
	  	  	  	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  astonishing	  advances	  of	  Solomon’s	  House,	  we	  are	  given	  some	  insight	  as	  to	  
how	  it	  is	  organized.	  It	  is	  essentially	  a	  technological	  bureaucracy.	  	  The	  Merchants	  of	  Light	  
are	  responsible	  for	  travelling	  (under	  concealment)	  to	  other	  lands	  to	  collect	  valuable	  
information.	  The	  Depredators	  collect	  all	  known	  experiments	  from	  books.	  The	  Mystery-­‐men	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  In	  Novum	  Organum,	  Bacon	  notes	  that	  inventors	  should	  hold	  the	  highest	  rank	  in	  society.	  
They	  should	  be	  placed	  above	  political	  “heroes”	  since	  achievements	  in	  politics	  only	  extend	  
to	  particular	  societies	  whereas	  inventions	  can	  benefit	  all	  societies.	  Furthermore,	  they	  bring	  
“benefit	  without	  hurt	  or	  sorrow	  to	  anyone.”	  p.99	  
143	  White	  p.149	  
144	  New	  Atlantis	  p.290	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  Ibid	  p.292	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  Ibid	  p.298	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collect	  experiments	  of	  “all	  mechanical	  arts,	  and	  also	  of	  liberal	  sciences,	  and	  also	  of	  practices	  
which	  are	  not	  brought	  into	  arts.”	  	  The	  Pioneers	  try	  new	  experiments	  as	  they	  see	  fit.	  	  The	  
Compilers	  catalogue	  the	  experiments	  of	  the	  Pioneers.	  The	  Benefactors	  look	  for	  the	  practical	  
use	  in	  those	  experiments.	  After	  a	  meeting	  of	  “our	  whole	  number”	  the	  Lamps	  direct	  new	  
experiments	  that	  delve	  deeper	  into	  nature	  than	  the	  previous	  experiments	  did.	  	  The	  
Inoculators	  carry	  out	  these	  experiments	  and	  finally,	  the	  Interpreters	  of	  Nature,	  “raise	  the	  
former	  experiments	  into	  greater	  observations,	  axioms,	  and	  aphorisms.”147	  
	  	  	  	  After	  we	  given	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  Solomon’s	  House,	  we	  are	  told	  of	  an	  
additional	  function:	  
We	  have	  consultations,	  which	  of	  the	  inventions	  and	  experiences	  which	  we	  have	  discovered	  
shall	  be	  published,	  and	  which	  not;	  and	  take	  all	  an	  oath	  of	  secrecy	  for	  the	  concealing	  of	  those	  
which	  we	  think	  fit	  to	  keep	  secret,	  though	  some	  of	  those	  we	  do	  reveal	  sometime	  to	  the	  state,	  
and	  some	  not.148	  
	  
This	  is	  clearly	  a	  significant	  passage	  for	  it	  admits	  of	  political	  necessity.	  	  Technology	  wields	  
great	  power,	  and	  that	  power	  can	  be	  used	  for	  good	  or	  bad.	  	  Thus,	  it	  becomes	  crucial	  to	  
distinguish	  between	  helpful	  and	  potentially	  harmful	  discoveries.	  	  The	  reasons	  for	  such	  
concealment	  are	  fairly	  obvious,	  but	  Bacon	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  how	  the	  decision	  is	  made	  to	  
allow	  or	  to	  conceal	  inventions.	  	  One	  possible	  answer	  would	  be	  through	  phronesis,	  or	  the	  
practical	  wisdom	  of	  a	  statesman,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  the	  scientists	  of	  Solomon’s	  House	  
would	  possess	  it.	  	  Bacon	  does	  not	  even	  list	  politics	  as	  one	  of	  the	  subjects	  that	  is	  studied	  in	  
Solomon’s	  House	  so	  we	  must	  wonder	  from	  where	  political	  wisdom	  is	  to	  be	  derived.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  father	  of	  Solomon’s	  House	  explains	  the	  most	  impressive	  feat	  of	  the	  
institution,	  control	  of	  vicissitude:	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And	  we	  do	  also	  declare	  natural	  divinations	  of	  diseases,	  plagues,	  swarms	  of	  hurtful	  
creatures,	  scarcity,	  tempests,	  earthquakes,	  great	  inundations,	  comets,	  temperature	  of	  the	  
year,	  and	  divers	  other	  things;	  and	  we	  give	  counsel	  thereupon,	  what	  the	  people	  shall	  do	  for	  
the	  prevention	  and	  remedy	  of	  them.149	  
	  
The	  science	  of	  Bensalem	  has	  overcome	  chance	  and	  has	  insulated	  the	  society	  against	  natural	  
disasters	  (and	  divine	  revenge).	  	  With	  that	  final	  revelation,	  the	  father	  of	  Solomon’s	  House	  
gave	  his	  blessing	  to	  the	  narrator	  and	  gave	  him	  permission	  to	  publish	  it	  “for	  the	  good	  of	  
other	  nations.”150	  The	  final	  line	  further	  confirms	  the	  contention	  that	  Bacon	  viewed	  the	  
work	  as	  important	  and	  sufficient	  for	  publication.	  It	  also	  reinforces	  our	  characterization	  of	  
his	  work;	  Bacon	  clearly	  thought	  that	  his	  project	  would	  benefit	  mankind	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  not	  
just	  his	  particular	  society.	  	  The	  universalism	  of	  Baconian	  science	  transcends	  cultural	  and	  
religious	  divisions	  (as	  evident	  by	  the	  harmony	  in	  Bensalem)	  and	  provides	  an	  earthly	  
paradise	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  promised	  by	  Christianity,	  only	  in	  the	  afterlife.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  	  	  	  	  From	  our	  analyses	  of	  the	  Novum	  Organum	  and	  New	  Atlantis,	  we	  can	  point	  to	  several	  
important	  themes.	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  ancients	  (especially	  the	  Greeks)	  and	  
scholastics.151	  	  Bacon	  finds	  the	  current	  state	  of	  natural	  philosophy	  to	  be	  wholly	  inadequate	  
and	  places	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  blame	  on	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle,	  along	  with	  their	  respective	  
followers.	  	  Bacon	  sees	  himself	  as	  lighting	  a	  torch	  “in	  the	  dark	  days	  of	  philosophy.”152	  In	  the	  
New	  Atlantis,	  this	  is	  symbolized	  by	  the	  journey	  to	  Bensalem,	  as	  Bacon’s	  philosophy	  is	  the	  
vessel	  by	  which	  man’s	  estate	  can	  be	  improved.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  points	  to	  an	  improvement	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151	  He	  characterizes	  the	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  Preface	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  Great	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  p.6	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  Ibid	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of	  the	  Platonic	  myth,	  whereby	  the	  New	  Atlantis	  does	  not	  have	  to	  suffer	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  
original	  since	  it	  possesses	  Baconian	  science	  and	  can	  protect	  itself	  against	  bad	  fortune.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Another	  important	  theme	  is	  the	  novelty	  of	  Bacon’s	  project.	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  natural	  
philosophy,	  he	  deserves	  credit	  for	  developing	  and	  promoting	  the	  experimental	  method.	  As	  
such,	  he	  is	  rightly	  recognized	  as	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  modern	  science.	  	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  
politics,	  Bacon’s	  innovation	  lies	  in	  his	  reliance	  on	  hope,	  as	  opposed	  to	  fear.153	  Bacon	  realizes	  
that	  his	  project	  must	  overcome	  numerous	  obstacles	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  successful,	  and	  thus	  he	  
must	  be	  able	  to	  convince	  his	  audience	  that	  his	  science	  will	  lead	  to	  tangible	  benefits.	  	  In	  
Novum	  Organum,	  he	  states	  that	  this	  can	  be	  accomplished	  in	  part	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  
particulars	  found	  in	  his	  table	  of	  discoveries.	  These	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  “an	  interest	  payment	  for	  
the	  time	  being	  until	  the	  capital	  can	  be	  had.”154	  In	  New	  Atlantis,	  he	  goes	  a	  step	  further	  and	  
shows	  us	  what	  will	  be	  accomplished	  once	  that	  capital	  has	  been	  acquired.	  	  Yet,	  we	  must	  ask	  
how	  the	  transition	  will	  occur	  from	  Bacon’s	  contemporary	  society	  to	  one	  that	  mirrors	  
Bensalem.	  The	  symbolism	  in	  the	  story	  leads	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  transition	  will	  be	  
peaceful	  and	  relatively	  smooth.	  	  However,	  such	  a	  transition	  would	  be	  essentially	  
unprecedented	  as	  major	  transformations	  in	  society	  are	  almost	  always	  accompanied	  by	  
violence.	  	  Bacon	  assures	  us	  that	  “the	  danger	  of	  not	  trying	  and	  the	  danger	  of	  not	  succeeding	  
are	  not	  equal	  since	  the	  former	  risks	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  great	  good,	  the	  latter	  of	  a	  little	  human	  
effort.”155Indeed,	  that	  maxim	  may	  be	  considered	  the	  key	  claim	  of	  utopian	  thinkers.	  Given	  
what	  occurred	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  can	  we	  really	  accept	  such	  a	  claim	  today?	  Horrible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  For	  instance,	  Thomas	  Hobbes.	  	  Hobbes	  sees	  fear	  as	  a	  primary	  motivator	  of	  human	  action	  
and	  characterizes	  the	  man’s	  natural	  state	  as	  one	  of	  “continual	  fear	  	  and	  danger	  of	  violent	  
death.”	  See	  Thomas	  Hobbes.	  Leviathan.	  (Oxford	  and	  New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
1998)	  Chapter	  XIII,	  Paragraph	  9	  
154	  Novum	  Organum	  p.91	  
155	  Ibid	  p.88	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things	  can	  indeed	  occur	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  transform	  society	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  end	  
is	  ultimately	  achieved	  or	  not.	  Tens	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  lost	  their	  lives	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  their	  
own	  governments	  during	  the	  20th	  century.156	  	  The	  Holocaust	  and	  Gulags	  were	  implemented	  
as	  tools	  to	  bring	  about	  an	  ideal	  society.	  Marxism	  promised	  a	  world	  of	  peace,	  but	  the	  means	  
to	  getting	  there	  was	  through	  violent	  revolution.	  Likewise,	  the	  Nazis	  used	  the	  
aforementioned	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  race	  theory	  to	  justify	  the	  slaughter	  of	  millions	  of	  Jews,	  all	  
in	  the	  name	  of	  progress.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  Bacon	  would	  have	  endorsed	  either	  event.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  utopian	  principle	  that	  he	  presents	  is	  dangerous	  and	  can	  lead	  to	  less	  than	  
desirable	  consequences.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Bacon’s	  failure	  to	  account	  for	  the	  potentially	  destructive	  effects	  of	  his	  project	  (or	  at	  least	  
the	  attempt	  to	  implement	  it),	  points	  to	  a	  larger	  problem	  within	  his	  work.	  In	  spite	  of	  his	  own	  
extensive	  experience	  in	  politics,	  where	  he	  rose	  to	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  political	  
positions	  in	  all	  of	  England	  (Lord	  Chancellor),	  Bacon	  seems	  to	  minimize	  the	  importance	  of	  
political	  science.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  he	  does	  not	  even	  include	  it	  in	  the	  subjects	  studied	  in	  
Solomon’s	  House.	  And	  he	  derides	  classical	  political	  science	  through	  his	  critiques	  of	  Plato	  
and	  Aristotle	  in	  Novum	  Organum	  and	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Learning.	  	  In	  Novum	  Organum,	  he	  
seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  politics	  can	  be	  studied	  using	  the	  same	  method	  set	  forth	  for	  the	  
natural	  sciences.	  	  Yet,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  that	  assumption	  proves	  to	  be	  problematic	  since	  
human	  beings	  cannot	  be	  subjected	  to	  experimentation	  and	  because	  their	  experiences	  
extend	  beyond	  mere	  sensory	  perceptions.	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  Book	  I	  of	  Novum	  Organum,	  
Bacon	  anticipates	  a	  critique	  of	  his	  vision:	  “if	  anyone	  objects	  that	  the	  sciences	  and	  arts	  have	  
been	  perverted	  to	  evil	  and	  luxury	  and	  such	  like,	  the	  objection	  should	  convince	  no	  one…Just	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  See	  R.J.	  Rummel.	  Death	  by	  Government.	  (New	  Jersey:	  	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1994)	  p.4	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let	  man	  recover	  the	  right	  over	  nature	  which	  belongs	  to	  him	  by	  God’s	  gift,	  and	  give	  it	  scope;	  
right	  reason	  and	  sound	  religion	  will	  govern	  its	  use.”157	  While	  this	  may	  be	  true,	  we	  must	  
wonder	  who	  will	  exhibit	  right	  reason	  and	  how	  this	  can	  be	  assured.	  Without	  a	  program	  for	  
political	  education,	  it	  seems	  dubious	  that	  “right	  reason”	  will	  be	  exhibited.	  This	  is	  why	  Plato	  
and	  Aristotle	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  education.	  	  
Even	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  a	  society	  like	  Bensalem	  can	  exist,	  we	  still	  must	  wonder	  what	  guides	  
the	  decisions	  of	  the	  scientists	  from	  a	  political	  and	  ethical	  standpoint.	  	  What	  standard	  is	  
used	  to	  decide	  whether	  a	  particular	  invention	  or	  discovery	  will	  be	  disclosed	  to	  the	  public,	  
or	  even	  the	  state?	  And	  who	  decides	  how	  it	  can	  be	  used	  and	  by	  whom?	  These	  questions	  
cannot	  be	  adequately	  addressed	  without	  some	  sort	  of	  political	  knowledge,	  but	  Bacon	  gives	  
us	  little	  guidance	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  science	  has	  progressed	  as	  far	  as	  it	  has	  makes	  a	  satisfactory	  political	  science	  
even	  more	  necessary.	  	  Our	  control	  over	  nature	  has	  vested	  us	  with	  great	  power.	  And	  with	  
that	  greater	  power	  must	  come	  greater	  responsibility.	  	  Yet,	  political	  science	  in	  its	  current	  
state	  is	  unable	  to	  offer	  much	  guidance.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  of	  
scientism	  on	  the	  social	  sciences.	  	  Too	  much	  emphasis	  has	  been	  put	  on	  the	  method	  used	  to	  
acquire	  knowledge	  and	  certain	  forms	  of	  knowledge,	  particularly	  ethical	  and	  political,	  are	  
discounted	  completely	  unless	  they	  conform	  to	  the	  methodological	  expectations	  of	  
positivistic	  science.	  	  This	  type	  of	  attitude	  has	  all	  but	  erased	  metaphysics	  from	  the	  
curriculum	  of	  political	  education,	  and	  the	  decline	  of	  moral	  philosophy	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  
same	  source.	  	  Perhaps	  “sound	  religion”	  is	  the	  corrective	  to	  that	  decline,	  but	  how	  can	  we	  
expect	  to	  have	  sound	  religion	  when	  theology	  has	  also	  been	  degraded?	  	  New	  Atlantis	  points	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  Novum	  Organum	  p.101	  (emphasis	  added)	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to	  a	  civil	  religion,	  but	  we	  are	  left	  with	  little	  direction	  as	  to	  how	  it	  is	  to	  be	  formed	  and	  what	  
principles	  should	  guide	  it.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  Bacon	  himself	  possesses	  a	  strong	  moral	  sense,	  as	  
his	  project	  ultimately	  aims	  at	  the	  relief	  of	  man’s	  estate	  and	  on	  charitable	  and	  beneficial	  
inventions.	  	  Yet,	  he	  derides	  the	  moral	  philosophy	  of	  the	  classics	  and	  scholastics	  and	  fails	  to	  
offer	  a	  suitable	  replacement.	  Science	  may	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  power	  to	  control	  
nature,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  how	  to	  use	  that	  power.	  	  Only	  a	  science	  of	  man,	  freed	  from	  
scientistic	  reductionism,	  can	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  wisdom	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  make	  such	  
decisions.	  	  Bacon	  was	  prescient	  in	  his	  realization	  of	  the	  magnificent	  power	  that	  could	  be	  
derived	  from	  science.	  And	  advances	  in	  medicine	  and	  technology	  have	  indeed	  helped	  to	  
relieve	  man’s	  estate.	  Yet,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  speak	  of	  restoring	  science	  to	  its	  rightful	  place,	  we	  
must	  first	  restore	  political	  science	  to	  its	  rightful	  place	  as	  the	  master	  science	  of	  human	  
affairs.158	  	  Before	  we	  outline	  what	  such	  a	  science	  must	  encompass,	  we	  must	  first	  explore	  
some	  of	  the	  major	  developments	  in	  politics	  and	  science	  from	  Bacon’s	  time	  to	  the	  present.	  	  
Our	  main	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  how	  the	  developments	  in	  science	  (especially	  through	  the	  works	  
of	  Isaac	  Newton	  and	  Charles	  Darwin)	  have	  impacted	  politics,	  with	  a	  particular	  influence	  on	  
the	  concurrent	  rise	  of	  scientism.	  	  Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  Bacon’s	  great	  English	  successor,	  Sir	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  As	  Aristotle	  claimed	  it	  to	  be	  over	  two	  millennia	  ago.	  	  See	  Aristotle.	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  
Trans.	  Ostwald.	  (New	  Jersey:	  	  Prentice	  Hall	  Publishing,	  1999)	  p.4	  (Book	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  Section	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Let	  There	  be	  Light:	  The	  Newtonian	  Age	  	  
	  
“Nature	  and	  Nature’s	  laws	  lay	  hid	  in	  night;	  God	  said,	  Let	  Newton	  be!	  And	  all	  was	  light.”159	  	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  Francis	  Bacon	  deserves	  credit	  for	  founding	  the	  New	  Science,	  the	  true	  impact	  of	  
modern	  science	  was	  not	  felt	  politically	  until	  Isaac	  Newton.	  	  As	  Eric	  Voegelin	  notes,	  “the	  
advancement	  of	  the	  science	  for	  which	  Newton	  is	  the	  great,	  representative	  genius	  has	  
profoundly	  affected	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  structure	  of	  the	  Western	  world.”160	  	  Indeed,	  
Voegelin	  cites	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  after	  1700	  as	  the	  “most	  important	  single	  factor	  
in	  changing	  the	  structure	  of	  power	  and	  wealth	  on	  the	  global	  scene.”161	  That	  advancement	  
can	  be	  tied	  directly	  to	  Newton’s	  two	  major	  works,	  the	  Principia	  and	  the	  Opticks.	  	  Newton’s	  
magnum	  opus	  is	  inarguably	  the	  Principia,	  or	  Mathematical	  Principles	  of	  Natural	  
Philosophy.162	  	  It	  revolutionized	  physics	  and	  helped	  lay	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  broad	  and	  
cooperative	  scientific	  research	  agenda.	  More	  importantly,	  it	  changed	  the	  way	  that	  the	  
world,	  and	  man’s	  place	  in	  it,	  was	  viewed.	  	  To	  use	  Thomas	  Kuhn’s	  language,	  Newton’s	  work	  
ushered	  in	  a	  new	  paradigm.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  English	  poet	  Alexander	  Pope’s	  famous	  epitaph.	  
160	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  The	  English	  Quest	  for	  the	  Concrete.	  	  Volume	  24	  of	  the	  Collected	  Works	  of	  
Eric	  Voegelin:	  History	  of	  Political	  Ideas	  Volume	  VI:	  Revolution	  and	  the	  New	  Science.	  Ed.	  
Barry	  Cooper	  (Columbia:	  	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  1998)	  p.205	  
161	  Ibid	  p.206	  
162	  Bernard	  Cohen	  notes	  that	  Newton’s	  use	  of	  the	  vernacular	  for	  the	  Opticks	  instead	  of	  Latin	  
shows	  that	  he	  regarded	  it	  as	  a	  less	  systematic	  and	  scientific	  work,	  mainly	  because	  it	  had	  not	  
been	  mathematized.	  Furthermore,	  he	  failed	  to	  include	  his	  name	  on	  the	  title	  page	  of	  the	  
Opticks.	  	  xxvii	  	  	  See	  I.	  Bernard	  Cohen.	  “The	  Case	  of	  the	  Missing	  Author:	  	  The	  Title	  Page	  of	  
Newton’s	  Opticks	  (1704)	  in	  Isaac	  Newton’s	  Natural	  Philosophy.	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  	  MIT	  Press,	  
2004)	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  Newton	  was	  undoubtedly	  a	  scientist	  par	  excellence,	  and	  his	  philosophical	  works	  were	  
often	  tempered	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  humility.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  Newton’s	  work	  was	  the	  
separation	  of	  physics	  and	  philosophy,	  yet	  Newton	  himself	  operated	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  
both.163	  	  He	  was	  careful	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two,	  but	  he	  realized	  the	  importance	  of	  
asking	  philosophical	  questions,	  even	  though	  he	  knew	  they	  could	  not	  be	  answered	  with	  any	  
level	  of	  certainty	  akin	  to	  those	  given	  in	  the	  physical	  sciences.	  	  Newton’s	  success	  created	  a	  
sense	  of	  hope	  and	  optimism	  within	  European	  intellectual	  circles.	  	  It	  was	  thought	  that	  his	  
method	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  knowledge	  with	  equal	  success.	  	  For	  instance,	  
David	  Hume	  explicitly	  attempted	  to	  introduce	  the	  experimental	  method	  of	  Newton	  into	  
moral	  subjects.164	  	  While	  Bacon	  had	  roughly	  outlined	  a	  new,	  unifying	  method,	  Newton’s	  
method	  was	  the	  first	  to	  actually	  garner	  the	  widespread	  support	  of	  practicing	  scientists	  and	  
laymen	  alike.	  We	  must	  ask	  why	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  Newton’s	  method	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  
other	  fields	  of	  knowledge,	  as	  the	  likes	  of	  David	  Hume	  had	  assumed.	  The	  answer	  lies	  in	  the	  
Principia	  and	  it	  is	  to	  that	  work	  that	  we	  now	  must	  briefly	  turn.	  	  
Principia	  
	  	  	  	  The	  Principia	  stands	  as	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  scientific	  works	  in	  human	  history.	  	  Its	  
influence	  on	  science	  is	  indisputable,	  but	  some	  have	  overlooked	  just	  how	  much	  it	  impacted	  
Western	  thought	  as	  a	  whole.	  Newton’s	  work	  extends	  beyond	  the	  intellectual	  into	  the	  
spiritual	  and	  political.	  It	  revolutionized	  physics,	  but	  also	  brought	  a	  whole	  new	  worldview	  
into	  focus.	  	  The	  Principia	  mathematized	  the	  physical	  world	  and	  outlined	  immutable	  laws	  of	  
nature.	  	  Newton	  famously	  refused	  to	  offer	  hypotheses	  in	  the	  same	  way	  his	  contemporaries	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  See	  Andrew	  Janiaks	  introduction.	  	  Isaac	  Newton.	  	  Philosophical	  Writings.	  Ed.	  Janiak.	  
(Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  p.	  xii	  
164	  The	  subtitle	  of	  his	  Treatise	  on	  Human	  Nature	  of	  1739	  is	  “An	  Attempt	  to	  Introduce	  the	  
Experimental	  Method	  of	  Reasoning	  into	  Moral	  Subjects.”	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and	  predecessors	  had:	  “hypotheses	  non	  fingo.”165	  In	  refusing	  to	  feign	  hypotheses,	  Newton	  
meant	  to	  avoid	  making	  statements	  that	  could	  not	  be	  supported	  by	  independent	  empirical	  
support:	  “For	  whatever	  is	  not	  deduced	  from	  the	  phenomena	  must	  be	  called	  a	  hypothesis,	  
and	  hypotheses,	  whether	  metaphysical	  or	  physical,	  or	  based	  on	  occult	  qualities,	  or	  
mechanical,	  have	  no	  place	  in	  experimental	  philosophy.”166	  While	  Newton	  himself	  did	  offer	  
hypotheses,	  he	  was	  careful	  to	  separate	  those	  from	  his	  scientific	  findings.167	  	  He	  was	  
reacting	  against	  the	  likes	  of	  Descartes	  and	  Leibniz;	  both	  of	  whom	  he	  thought	  had	  let	  
metaphysical	  suppositions	  interfere	  with	  their	  natural	  philosophy.168	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  Newton	  continued	  to	  realize	  the	  importance	  of	  metaphysical	  questions	  himself,	  
the	  effect	  of	  his	  work	  was	  to	  further	  minimize	  its	  importance.169	  As	  Voegelin	  notes,	  the	  
Principia	  became	  the	  representative	  document	  for	  the	  materialization	  of	  the	  external	  
world.	  “By	  materialization	  of	  the	  external	  world	  we	  mean	  the	  misapprehension	  that	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  external	  world	  as	  it	  is	  constituted	  in	  the	  system	  of	  mathematized	  physics	  is	  
the	  ontologically	  real	  structure	  of	  the	  world.”170	  	  Voegelin	  continues:	  
The	  impact	  of	  this	  masterful	  systematization	  of	  mechanics	  on	  his	  contemporaries,	  coming	  
at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  sources	  of	  an	  active	  faith	  were	  drying	  up,	  must	  have	  had	  a	  force	  that	  is	  
difficult	  to	  reproduce	  imaginatively	  today.	  To	  a	  spiritually	  feeble	  and	  confused	  generation,	  
this	  event	  transformed	  the	  universe	  into	  a	  huge	  machinery	  of	  dead	  matter,	  running	  its	  
course	  by	  the	  inexorable	  laws	  of	  Newton’s	  mechanics.	  	  The	  earth	  was	  an	  insignificant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Ibid	  p.xxiv	  
166	  Ibid	  p.xxvi	  
167	  Such	  as	  in	  the	  Queries	  of	  the	  Opticks.	  
168	  The	  mixing	  of	  metaphysics	  and	  natural	  philosophy	  was	  something	  that	  Bacon	  had	  
adamantly	  opposed	  as	  well.	  Yet	  as	  we	  can	  see	  by	  Newton’s	  criticisms,	  the	  practice	  had	  
continued	  well	  after	  Bacon’s	  time.	  	  
169	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  Kuhn’s	  observation	  that	  those	  who	  offer	  in	  a	  new	  paradigm	  
usually	  work	  within	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  existing	  paradigm.	  Newton	  directly	  engaged	  a	  
variety	  of	  philosophical	  and	  theological	  questions	  in	  spite	  of	  his	  insistence	  on	  purging	  such	  
queries	  from	  natural	  philosophy.	  	  p.xii	  
170	  English	  Quest	  for	  the	  Concrete.	  p.164	  	  
	   56	  
corner	  in	  this	  vast	  machinery,	  and	  the	  human	  self	  was	  a	  still	  more	  insignificant	  atom	  in	  this	  
corner.171	  
	  
Voegelin	  finishes	  his	  analysis	  by	  noting	  that	  the	  Principia	  “is	  at	  least	  as	  important	  as	  the	  
cause	  of	  the	  great	  schism	  in	  Western	  thought	  as	  it	  is	  important	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  
science.”172	  
	  	  	  	  	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  from	  Voegelin’s	  analysis	  is	  the	  spiritual	  dimension	  to	  Newton’s	  
work.	  	  The	  decline	  of	  Christianity	  and	  rejection	  of	  Scholasticism	  had	  led	  to	  a	  spiritual	  crisis.	  	  
The	  void	  that	  had	  formerly	  been	  filled	  by	  God	  could	  now	  be	  filled	  by	  science.	  “A	  new	  world-­‐
filling	  reality,	  emerging	  from	  Galilean	  and	  Cartesian	  physics	  and	  systematized	  in	  
Newtonian	  mechanics,	  is	  ready	  to	  substitute	  for	  God	  and	  his	  creation.”173	  God	  becomes	  a	  
mere	  hypothesis	  and	  as	  the	  “mechanism	  of	  matter	  extends	  infinitely…God	  has	  been	  
squeezed	  out	  of	  his	  world.”174	  
	  	  	  	  We	  must	  recall	  some	  of	  the	  key	  features	  of	  scientism	  and	  demonstrate	  how	  Newton’s	  
work	  fits	  into	  that	  framework.	  The	  Royal	  Society,	  of	  which	  Newton	  became	  the	  great	  
representative	  figure,	  was	  in	  large	  part	  modeled	  after	  Solomon’s	  House.175	  	  Bacon	  would	  
have	  been	  pleased	  to	  know	  that	  such	  an	  influential	  organization	  would	  be	  formed,	  whereby	  
science	  could	  be	  advanced	  through	  a	  cooperative	  effort	  of	  scientists.	  However,	  we	  should	  
be	  careful	  not	  to	  ascribe	  to	  Newton	  the	  same	  attitude	  that	  Bacon	  carried	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Ibid	  p.165	  
172	  Ibid	  p.	  165.	  Drawing	  from	  Whitehead,	  the	  schism	  Voegelin	  is	  referring	  to	  is	  between	  
those	  who	  submit	  to	  the	  “fallacy	  of	  misplaced	  concreteness”	  and	  those	  who	  can	  free	  
themselves	  of	  it.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  former	  far	  outnumber	  the	  latter	  in	  influence.	  	  
173	  Ibid	  p.183	  
174	  Ibid	  p.183	  
175	  Glanville	  argues	  that	  the	  New	  Atlantis	  served	  as	  the	  model	  for	  the	  Royal	  Society.	  Without	  
a	  doubt,	  its	  founders	  were	  influenced	  heavily	  by	  Bacon.	  Jardine	  notes	  that	  Bacon	  was	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  “figurehead,	  patron	  saint	  and	  Father	  of	  Modern	  Science”	  by	  the	  early	  
Royal	  Society.	  See	  Francis	  Bacon.	  The	  New	  Organon.	  	  Ed.	  Jardine	  and	  Silverthorne	  
(Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000)	  p.xviii	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transformative	  nature	  of	  science.	  	  Newton	  did	  not	  prescribe	  anything	  like	  Bacon	  did	  in	  the	  
New	  Atlantis	  nor	  did	  he	  intend	  for	  his	  work	  to	  displace	  Christianity	  or	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  new	  
spiritual	  foundation	  for	  society.176	  His	  goals	  were	  generally	  restricted	  to	  his	  scientific	  
endeavors.	  	  Even	  though	  he	  may	  not	  have	  intended	  to	  do	  so,	  Newton’s	  own	  work	  served	  to	  
at	  least	  partially	  bring	  about	  the	  type	  of	  transformation	  that	  Bacon	  had	  yearned	  for,	  but	  
failed	  to	  achieve	  through	  his	  own	  works.	  	  However,	  the	  explanation	  for	  Newton’s	  success	  
conveniently	  fits	  into	  Bacon’s	  scheme.	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  Bacon	  could	  not	  be	  
credited	  with	  a	  single	  scientific	  achievement.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Newton	  had	  countless	  
achievements.177	  	  Newton	  gained	  such	  respect	  because	  of	  the	  utility	  of	  his	  work.	  	  Bacon’s	  
emphasis	  on	  useful	  knowledge	  had	  permeated	  Europe	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Newton.	  Thus,	  it	  came	  
as	  no	  surprise	  that	  Newton	  would	  be	  revered	  for	  his	  tangible	  results	  and	  could	  bring	  about	  
a	  transformation	  that	  Bacon	  had	  only	  dreamed	  of.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Newton’s	  astonishing	  success	  led	  to	  reverence	  among	  many	  of	  his	  peers	  (as	  well	  as	  
predictable	  jealousy	  from	  rivals)	  and	  rightly	  so.	  Yet,	  some	  failed	  to	  realize	  the	  limits	  of	  
Newton’s	  work,	  even	  though	  he	  was	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  his	  inability	  to	  answer	  certain	  
questions.178	  The	  inability	  of	  Newtonian	  science	  to	  answer	  those	  questions	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  Newton	  intentionally	  wrote	  the	  Principia	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  make	  it	  nearly	  impossible	  
for	  a	  layman	  to	  understand.	  The	  original	  work	  was	  in	  Latin	  and	  his	  use	  of	  propositions	  
required	  a	  mathematical	  background.	  He	  did	  not	  allow	  an	  English	  translation	  until	  the	  last	  
year	  of	  his	  life.	  See	  Michael	  White.	  Isaac	  Newton:	  	  The	  Last	  Sorcerer.	  (Reading,	  MA:	  	  Perseus	  
Books,	  1997)	  p.216	  
177	  For	  instance,	  his	  Principia	  outlined	  the	  three	  laws	  of	  motion	  as	  well	  as	  the	  theory	  of	  
universal	  gravitation.	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  reconcile	  Galileo’s	  mechanics	  with	  
Kepler’s.	  p.216	  	  	  	  
178	  For	  instance,	  he	  could	  not	  outline	  the	  cause	  of	  gravitation.	  This	  gets	  back	  to	  a	  primary	  
difference	  between	  modern	  science	  and	  the	  previous	  framework.	  Questions	  of	  first	  and	  
final	  causes	  were	  generally	  eschewed	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  modern	  science.	  Thus,	  Newton’s	  
work	  tells	  us	  how	  things	  work,	  but	  remains	  silent	  on	  why.	  Explanation	  is	  essentially	  
relegated	  to	  description.	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skepticism.	  Instead,	  the	  questions	  that	  could	  not	  be	  answered	  within	  Newton’s	  framework	  
were	  to	  be	  considered	  meaningless,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  worthy	  of	  serious	  attention.	  	  This	  
assertion	  was	  the	  necessary	  result	  of	  elevation	  of	  Newton’s	  method.	  	  Bacon’s	  emphasis	  on	  
method	  had	  indeed	  been	  influential	  and	  the	  success	  of	  Newton’s	  method	  to	  answer	  
questions	  that	  had	  thereunto	  been	  unanswerable,	  led	  to	  a	  dogmatic	  acceptance	  of	  that	  
method.	  	  There	  were	  at	  least	  two	  consequences	  that	  followed:	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  method	  
could	  successfully	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  realms	  of	  knowledge	  and	  whatever	  could	  not	  be	  
examined	  with	  the	  method	  became	  irrelevant.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  assumption	  that	  Newton’s	  method	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  realms	  of	  knowledge	  was	  
mainly	  a	  result	  of	  the	  mechanistic	  worldview	  presented	  in	  the	  Principia.	  	  The	  view	  of	  the	  
world	  as	  a	  machine,	  with	  inexorable	  laws,	  led	  to	  the	  widespread	  acceptance	  of	  quantitative	  
methods.	  	  While	  Newton	  may	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  answer	  what	  makes	  a	  body	  fall,	  he	  was	  
able	  to	  describe	  exactly	  how	  it	  falls,	  and	  with	  mathematical	  precision:	  at	  an	  acceleration	  of	  
thirty-­‐two	  feet	  per	  second.179	  And	  such	  mathematical	  formulations	  could	  be	  verified	  
through	  experimentation.	  That	  level	  of	  precision	  is	  something	  that	  the	  ancients	  had	  been	  
unable	  to	  offer,	  and	  it	  is	  what	  ultimately	  provided	  the	  impetus	  to	  the	  wide	  scale	  acceptance	  
of	  the	  method.	  As	  Gordon	  Clark	  notes:	  
The	  rapid	  advances	  of	  the	  new	  scientific	  method—not	  only	  on	  the	  grand	  celestial	  scale	  of	  
Kepler	  and	  Newton,	  but	  as	  well	  in	  the	  innumerable	  details	  of	  the	  pendulum	  and	  small	  
machines,	  atmospheric	  pressure,	  physical	  optics,	  thermodynamics,	  and	  the	  atomic	  
theory—confirmed	  the	  limitless	  power	  of	  mathematics	  and	  the	  fruitfulness	  of	  quantitative	  
measurement.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  thesis	  was	  inevitable	  that	  all	  natural	  phenomena	  are	  
amenable	  to	  this	  method.180	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  Gordon	  Clark.	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  and	  Belief	  in	  God.	  (Trinity	  Foundation,	  1964)	  
p.37	  
180	  Ibid	  p.42	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  Newton’s	  astonishing	  success	  transcended	  the	  bounds	  of	  natural	  philosophy	  and	  
profoundly	  impacted	  the	  educational	  system	  within	  Europe.	  	  The	  assumption	  that	  
Newton’s	  method	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  fields	  lead	  to	  a	  re-­‐prioritization	  of	  subjects	  to	  
be	  studied.	  	  Traditional	  subjects	  such	  as	  metaphysics	  and	  theology	  took	  a	  backseat	  to	  the	  
likes	  of	  physics,	  biology,	  astronomy,	  and	  mathematics.	  	  Bacon’s	  Advancement	  of	  Learning	  
had	  called	  for	  a	  restructuring	  of	  education	  and	  was	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  universal	  
method.	  	  However,	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  provide	  the	  tangible	  results	  to	  convince	  others	  of	  the	  
efficacy	  of	  that	  method.	  Newton’s	  success	  provided	  the	  impetus	  for	  such	  a	  change	  to	  occur.	  	  
And	  while	  an	  Englishman	  ultimately	  succeeded	  in	  proving	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  a	  
method,	  the	  French	  became	  the	  torchbearers	  of	  Bacon’s	  vision.	  	  	  
The	  Encyclopedists	  
	  	  	  	  	  Inspired	  by	  the	  “English	  philosophy”	  of	  Bacon,	  Newton,	  and	  Locke,	  the	  Encylopedists	  
established	  themselves	  as	  an	  intellectual	  and	  political	  force	  within	  France.181	  	  They	  
consisted	  of	  prominent	  members	  of	  the	  philosophes,	  including	  D’Alembert,	  Diderot,	  
Rousseau,	  and	  Condillac.	  	  D’Alembert’s	  Preliminary	  Discourse	  to	  the	  Encyclopedia	  is	  perhaps	  
the	  representative	  document	  of	  the	  Enlightenment.182	  It	  was	  a	  declaration	  of	  principles	  that	  
“represented	  the	  views	  of	  a	  party	  of	  men	  of	  letters	  who	  were	  convinced	  that	  through	  their	  
combined	  efforts	  they	  could	  substantially	  contribute	  to	  the	  progress	  of	  humanity.”183	  It	  
served	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  cooperation	  that	  Bacon	  had	  called	  for	  in	  his	  Great	  Instauration.	  	  The	  
Encyclopedia	  was	  “to	  contain	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  basic	  facts	  and	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  See	  Richards	  Schwab’s	  introduction	  to	  Jean	  Le	  Rond	  D’Alembert.	  Preliminary	  Discourse	  
to	  the	  Encyclopedia.	  (Chicago:	  	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1995)	  p.xxii	  
182	  Ibid	  p.xi.	  Eric	  Voegelin	  calls	  it	  “the	  revolutionary	  manifesto	  of	  a	  new	  attitude	  towards	  
man	  and	  society.”	  See	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution	  (Durham:	  	  Duke	  
University	  Press,	  1975)	  p.76	  
183	  Schwab	  p.xi	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knowledge.”184	  It	  represented	  “a	  new	  summa	  of	  all	  the	  branches	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  light	  of	  
the	  major	  discoveries	  that	  had	  been	  made	  in	  the	  past	  one	  hundred	  years—a	  synthesis	  
based	  upon	  secular	  and	  naturalistic	  principles	  rather	  than	  upon	  a	  traditional	  theological	  
teleology.”185	  The	  foundation	  of	  such	  an	  effort	  was	  to	  be	  found	  in	  a	  unifying	  method,	  one	  
borrowed	  from	  Newton.	  	  The	  method	  and	  system	  envisaged	  “was	  designed	  to	  organize	  all	  
our	  valid	  information	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  facilitate	  the	  discovery	  of	  more	  facts	  and	  
principles	  that	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  humanity.”186	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  influence	  of	  Bacon	  is	  apparent	  throughout	  the	  Discourse.	  D’Alembert	  does	  not	  
hesitate	  to	  acknowledge	  his	  indebtedness	  to	  Bacon:	  
One	  would	  be	  tempted	  to	  regard	  him	  as	  the	  greatest,	  the	  most	  universal,	  and	  the	  most	  
eloquent	  of	  the	  philosophers,	  considering	  his	  sound	  and	  broad	  views,	  the	  multitude	  of	  
objects	  to	  which	  his	  mind	  turned	  itself,	  and	  the	  boldness	  of	  his	  style,	  which	  everywhere	  
joined	  the	  most	  sublime	  images	  with	  the	  most	  rigorous	  precision.	  Born	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  
most	  profound	  night,	  Bacon	  was	  aware	  that	  philosophy	  did	  not	  yet	  exist.187	  
	  	  
Some	  of	  the	  key	  features	  of	  D’Alembert’s	  philosophy	  were	  taken	  directly	  from	  Bacon:	  “for	  
Bacon’s	  intellectual	  utilitarianism,	  for	  his	  doctrine	  that	  knowledge	  is	  power,	  for	  his	  vision	  
of	  mutual	  cooperation	  of	  all	  scholars	  in	  the	  progress	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  for	  his	  rejection	  of	  
scholastic	  teleology,	  D’Alembert	  saluted	  him	  as	  a	  kindred	  spirit	  and	  great	  pioneer.”188	  
While	  D’Alembert	  ultimately	  rejects	  Bacon’s	  “extreme”	  inductive	  method,	  the	  spirit	  of	  
Bacon’s	  work	  is	  echoed	  throughout	  the	  Discourse	  and	  the	  Encylopedia.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Encyclopedists	  closely	  mirrored	  those	  of	  Bacon,	  the	  methods	  
employed	  were	  primarily	  Newtonian.	  	  D’Alembert	  sought	  to	  unify	  the	  “rationalism”	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  Ibid	  p.xxv	  
185	  Ibid	  p.xxxi	  
186	  Ibid	  p.xxxi	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
187	  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution.	  p.74	  
188	  Schwab	  p.xxxiii	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Descartes	  with	  the	  “empiricism”	  of	  Locke	  and	  Bacon	  and	  used	  Newton’s	  method	  to	  do	  so.189	  	  
As	  Schwab	  notes:	  
He	  put	  forth	  as	  the	  supreme	  method	  of	  achieving	  truth	  a	  combination	  of	  rationalism	  and	  
empiricism	  closely	  paralleling	  the	  scientific	  method	  of	  the	  great	  Newton,	  which	  started	  
with	  sense	  evidences,	  or	  “facts,”	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  discovery	  of	  all	  laws	  or	  principles,	  
and	  which	  undertook	  to	  analyze	  each	  object	  or	  problem	  of	  the	  physico-­‐mathematical	  
sciences	  into	  its	  simplest	  elements	  and	  thereby	  to	  discover	  the	  essential	  principles	  behind	  
it.	  The	  assumptions	  of	  the	  unity,	  simplicity,	  and	  continuity	  of	  phenomena	  in	  no	  way	  prevent	  
the	  unprejudiced	  study	  of	  the	  facts	  presented	  by	  the	  senses.190	  
	  
D’Alembert	  also	  shared	  Newton’s	  misgivings	  about	  mixing	  metaphysics	  with	  science.	  	  
Indemonstrable,	  apriori	  assumptions,	  such	  as	  those	  offered	  by	  Descartes	  and	  Leibniz,	  were	  
rejected	  outright	  as	  having	  no	  place	  in	  true	  science.191	  However,	  while	  Newton	  did	  address	  
such	  questions	  and	  realized	  their	  importance,	  D’Alembert	  eschews	  them	  completely	  and	  
seeks	  to	  apply	  Newton’s	  method	  to	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  human	  knowledge;	  something	  
Newton	  never	  intended.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  application	  of	  Newton’s	  method	  to	  other	  fields	  of	  knowledge	  follows	  Bacon’s	  vision	  
of	  a	  unifying	  method,	  but	  the	  prestige	  associated	  with	  Newton	  had	  drastically	  enhanced	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  such	  an	  idea.	  	  One	  such	  field	  that	  was	  particularly	  influenced	  by	  the	  new	  
science	  and	  its	  unifying	  method	  was	  ethics.	  	  D’Alembert	  outlines	  a	  purely	  materialistic	  
ethical	  system,	  one	  divorced	  from	  any	  metaphysical	  foundations.	  The	  worldview	  presented	  
closely	  mirrors	  that	  presented	  by	  Voegelin	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  Newton’s	  Principia.	  The	  
universe	  now	  simply	  consisted	  of	  a	  “huge	  machinery	  of	  dead	  matter,	  running	  its	  course	  by	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the	  inexorable	  laws	  of	  Newton’s	  mechanics.”192	  Such	  a	  universe	  has	  no	  need	  of	  God	  and	  
thus	  man	  becomes	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  the	  universe.	  	  Under	  such	  conditions,	  self-­‐preservation	  
in	  the	  Hobbesian	  sense	  becomes	  paramount.193	  	  Man	  can	  shape	  his	  own	  destiny,	  but	  needs	  
security	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so.	  D’Alembert	  essentially	  reduces	  ethics	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  pleasure	  
and	  the	  avoidance	  of	  pain.	  	  The	  root	  of	  evil	  lies	  not	  in	  man’s	  fallen	  nature,	  but	  in	  the	  
unequal	  distribution	  of	  wealth;	  something	  that	  can	  be	  corrected	  by	  a	  reorganization	  of	  
society.194	  His	  failure	  to	  recognize	  God	  as	  the	  source	  of	  order	  for	  his	  ethical	  system	  drew	  
the	  ire	  of	  orthodox	  Christians,	  but	  generally	  reflected	  the	  outlook	  of	  Enlightenment	  
thought.	  	  Moral	  conscience	  was	  shaped,	  not	  by	  the	  divine,	  or	  by	  an	  unwavering	  natural	  law,	  
but	  by	  the	  “cumulative	  historical	  experience	  of	  mankind.”195	  D’Alembert	  and	  his	  
counterparts	  could	  “turn	  to	  history	  and	  isolate	  the	  essentials	  of	  human	  moral	  nature,	  and	  
thus	  the	  essentials	  of	  moral	  and	  political	  science,	  through	  the	  accumulation	  and	  
comparison	  of	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  cases	  of	  human	  moral	  behavior.”196	  
	  	  	  	  The	  turn	  to	  history	  for	  guidance	  marks	  another	  significant	  development	  to	  arise	  from	  the	  
French	  Enlightenment.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  previous	  thinkers	  had	  not	  utilized	  history	  as	  
a	  guide	  to	  action,197	  but	  the	  movement	  of	  mundane	  history	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  progress	  is	  
something	  that	  can	  directly	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  Enyclopedists	  and	  philosophes.	  	  The	  
discovery	  of	  the	  unifying	  method	  meant	  that	  progress	  was	  inevitable;	  man	  had	  finally	  
found	  the	  key	  to	  controlling	  nature	  and	  the	  old	  impediments	  to	  knowledge	  (such	  as	  
theology	  and	  metaphysics)	  would	  wither	  away	  as	  enlightenment	  spread.	  	  A	  practical	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implication	  of	  such	  a	  turn	  was	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  “authoritative	  present.”	  As	  
Voegelin	  succinctly	  notes,	  “When	  the	  intellectual	  and	  spiritual	  sources	  of	  order	  in	  human	  
and	  social	  life	  dry	  up,	  there	  is	  not	  much	  left	  as	  a	  source	  of	  order	  except	  the	  historically	  
factual	  situation.”198	  But	  that	  order	  requires	  a	  source	  of	  legitimacy,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  progress	  
supplies	  it:	  
The	  idea	  of	  progress	  through	  several	  phases	  of	  history,	  supported	  by	  an	  array	  of	  materials	  
which	  show	  the	  increase	  in	  value	  through	  the	  successive	  phases,	  furnished	  the	  basis	  for	  
this	  first	  necessary	  assumption.	  The	  idea	  of	  progress,	  however,	  creates	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  
present	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  evokes	  its	  superiority	  over	  the	  past.	  Hence,	  typically	  in	  the	  
doctrine,	  a	  second	  idea	  recurs	  which	  is	  destined	  to	  protect	  the	  present	  against	  invalidation	  
by	  the	  future…the	  present	  is	  considered	  the	  last	  phase	  of	  human	  history;	  no	  situation	  of	  the	  
future	  ought	  to	  differ	  in	  substance	  from	  the	  situation	  envisaged	  as	  the	  desirable	  present.199	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  future	  may	  provide	  a	  more	  perfect	  realization	  of	  the	  principles	  
set	  forth	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  D’Alembert	  and	  Diderot,	  they	  will	  forever	  be	  remembered	  as	  having	  
set	  humanity	  on	  the	  path	  to	  progress.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Along	  with	  the	  protection	  against	  invalidation	  by	  the	  future,	  the	  present	  holds	  vast	  
superiority	  over	  the	  past.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  man	  only	  began	  to	  find	  the	  true	  path	  
with	  the	  light	  of	  modern	  science,	  and	  more	  specifically	  with	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Francis	  
Bacon.	  Just	  as	  Bacon	  had	  lamented	  the	  fruitlessness	  of	  classical	  and	  medieval	  philosophy,	  
the	  Encyclopedists	  found	  little	  value	  in	  consulting	  Christian	  or	  classical	  sources	  for	  
guidance.	  	  In	  fact,	  they	  sought	  to	  justify	  the	  exclusion	  of	  such	  sources	  from	  education	  
altogether.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  several	  factors,	  but	  the	  most	  important	  lies	  in	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  
bios	  theoretikos,	  or	  contemplative	  life.	  	  Following	  Bacon,	  D’Alembert	  considered	  true	  
knowledge	  to	  be	  useful	  knowledge.	  	  To	  have	  relevance	  in	  his	  system,	  knowledge	  must	  lead	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to	  some	  fulfillment	  of	  human	  needs,	  and	  due	  to	  the	  mechanistic	  worldview,	  this	  primarily	  
meant	  material	  needs.	  	  Voegelin	  notes:	  
D’Alembert,	  apparently,	  has	  never	  experienced	  either	  the	  desire	  for,	  or	  the	  obligation	  to	  
pursue,	  that	  life	  of	  contemplation,	  which	  Aristotle	  describes	  as	  the	  bios	  theoretikos.	  	  He	  
ignores	  the	  fact,	  or	  does	  not	  know,	  that	  the	  life	  of	  man	  does	  not	  exhaust	  its	  meaning	  on	  the	  
level	  of	  utilitarian	  desires	  and	  needs,	  and	  that	  the	  life	  of	  contemplation,	  resulting	  in	  the	  
understanding	  of	  man	  himself	  and	  of	  his	  place	  in	  the	  universe,	  is	  a	  fundamental	  spiritual	  
obligation	  quite	  independent	  of	  its	  contribution	  to	  “useful”	  activities.200	  
	  
In	  short,	  the	  reductionism	  inherent	  in	  D’Alembert’s	  philosophical	  anthropology	  has	  
consequences	  that	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  in	  utilitarian	  terms.	  	  The	  spiritual	  dimension	  of	  
man,	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  both	  classical	  and	  especially	  Christian	  philosophy,	  is	  essentially	  
ignored	  by	  D’Alembert.	  And	  the	  advancement	  of	  science,	  while	  certainly	  beneficial	  in	  
regards	  to	  material	  well-­‐being,	  does	  nothing	  to	  fill	  the	  spiritual	  void	  left	  by	  the	  
abandonment	  of	  classical	  philosophy	  and	  Christianity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  D’Alembert	  does	  realize	  that	  religion	  is	  a	  necessary	  feature	  for	  order	  within	  a	  society,	  
but	  reduces	  it	  to	  a	  few	  basic	  tenets:	  “One	  would	  do	  a	  great	  service	  to	  mankind	  if	  one	  could	  
make	  men	  forget	  the	  dogmas;	  if	  one	  would	  simply	  preach	  them	  a	  God	  Who	  rewards	  and	  
punishes	  and	  Who	  frowns	  on	  superstition,	  Who	  detests	  intolerance	  and	  expects	  no	  other	  
cult	  of	  man	  than	  mutual	  love	  and	  support.”201	  	  Moreover,	  “some	  truths	  to	  be	  believed,	  a	  
small	  number	  of	  precepts	  to	  be	  practiced;	  such	  are	  the	  essentials	  to	  which	  Revealed	  
religion	  is	  reduced.”202	  Man,	  not	  God,	  sits	  at	  the	  center	  of	  D’Alembert’s	  philosophy.	  	  God	  is	  
nothing	  more	  than	  “an	  abstraction	  reasoned	  naturally	  from	  the	  senses”	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
mention	  of	  the	  need	  for	  salvation,	  of	  miracles,	  or	  the	  importance	  of	  Scripture.203	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D’Alembert’s	  call	  for	  a	  “reasonable”	  religion	  fits	  well	  into	  the	  scheme	  first	  outlined	  by	  
Bacon.	  And	  like	  Bacon,	  he	  presents	  it	  as	  a	  return	  to	  primitive	  Christianity,	  not	  as	  a	  radical	  
break	  from	  it.	  	  But	  as	  Voegelin	  points	  out:	  
This	  reform	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  renovatio	  evangelica.	  	  It	  does	  not	  have	  its	  source	  in	  a	  mystical	  
experience	  and	  it	  implies	  no	  more	  than	  rationalist	  purification	  of	  Christian	  symbols,	  
including	  the	  divinity	  of	  Christ,	  so	  that	  in	  the	  end	  Jesus	  appears	  as	  a	  “sort	  of	  philosopher”	  
who	  counsels	  mutual	  love	  and	  support	  without	  any	  intelligible	  authority	  or	  foundation	  for	  
such	  counsels.	  We	  can	  observe	  here	  in	  formation	  the	  highly	  important	  merger	  of	  spiritual	  
obscurantism	  with	  the	  apprehension	  that	  a	  religious	  substitute	  for	  Christianity	  might	  be	  
necessary,	  and	  that	  the	  substitute	  would	  even	  have	  to	  include	  a	  cult.204	  
	  
D’Alembert	  fails	  to	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  such	  a	  cult,	  but	  his	  philosophy	  prefigures	  the	  cults	  
of	  Saint	  Simon	  and	  Comte.205	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Before	  moving	  on	  to	  those	  towering	  figures,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  one	  final	  feature	  of	  
D’Alembert’s	  Discourse	  and	  the	  Encylcopedia:	  	  the	  emphasis	  on	  technology.	  	  The	  
Encyclopedia	  was	  designed	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  general	  population.	  	  This	  is	  in	  part,	  because	  the	  
transformation	  of	  society	  would	  require	  their	  political	  support.	  But	  perhaps	  more	  
importantly,	  D’Alembert	  and	  Diderot	  recognized	  the	  role	  that	  technology	  could	  play	  in	  that	  
transformation.	  This	  is	  evident	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  manual	  arts	  and	  trades	  in	  the	  
Encyclopedia.	  	  The	  tradesman	  and	  artisan	  were	  not	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  “beneath”	  the	  realm	  of	  
philosophy,	  but	  had	  to	  be	  included	  as	  integral	  parts	  of	  any	  movement	  to	  transform	  
society.206	  The	  emphasis	  on	  utility,	  and	  rejection	  of	  the	  bios	  theoretikos	  led	  to	  the	  effusive	  
praise	  of	  the	  mechanical	  arts.	  And	  like	  Bacon,	  D’Alembert	  thought	  it	  was	  important	  to	  
honor	  those	  who	  provided	  humanity	  with	  useful	  inventions.	  	  D’Alembert	  notes:	  
The	  contempt	  in	  which	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  are	  held	  seems	  to	  have	  affected	  to	  some	  degree	  
even	  their	  inventors.	  The	  names	  of	  these	  benefactors	  of	  humankind	  are	  almost	  all	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unknown,	  whereas	  the	  history	  of	  its	  destroyers,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  of	  the	  conquerors,	  is	  known	  
to	  everyone.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  in	  the	  artisan	  that	  one	  must	  seek	  the	  most	  admirable	  
evidences	  of	  the	  sagacity,	  the	  patience,	  and	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  mind	  .	  .	  .Why	  are	  not	  those	  
to	  whom	  we	  owe	  the	  fusee,	  the	  escapement,	  the	  repeating-­‐works	  of	  watches	  equally	  
esteemed	  with	  those	  who	  have	  worked	  successively	  to	  perfect	  algebra?207	  
	  
The	  implication	  of	  course	  is	  that	  if	  inventors	  were	  to	  be	  honored	  properly,	  society	  would	  
benefit.	  	  And	  moreover,	  those	  who	  did	  not	  provide	  society	  with	  useful	  knowledge	  would	  be	  
condemned	  to	  obscurity:	  “all	  occupations	  with	  purely	  speculative	  subjects	  should	  be	  
excluded	  from	  a	  healthy	  state	  as	  profitless	  pursuits.”208	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  This	  type	  of	  attitude	  led	  to	  a	  reorganization	  of	  the	  educational	  system	  in	  France,	  and	  
perhaps	  no	  institution	  reflected	  that	  change	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Ecole	  Polytechnique.	  Hayek	  calls	  
it	  the	  “source	  of	  scientistic	  hubris”	  and	  explains	  the	  drastic	  change	  in	  curriculum:	  
In	  conformity	  with	  the	  ruling	  spirit	  and	  by	  an	  overviolent	  reaction	  against	  the	  older	  
schools,	  the	  teaching	  in	  the	  new	  institutions	  was	  for	  some	  years	  confined	  almost	  
exclusively	  to	  the	  scientific	  subjects.	  Not	  only	  the	  ancient	  languages	  were	  reduced	  to	  a	  
minimum	  and	  in	  practice	  almost	  entirely	  neglected,	  even	  the	  instruction	  in	  literature,	  
grammar	  and	  history	  was	  very	  inferior,	  and	  moral	  and	  religious	  instruction,	  of	  course,	  
completely	  absent.209	  
	  
Saint-­‐Simon,	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  educational	  system,	  notes,	  “in	  the	  not	  so	  
distant	  days,	  if	  one	  wanted	  to	  know	  whether	  a	  person	  had	  received	  a	  distinguished	  
education,	  one	  asked:	  Does	  he	  know	  his	  Greek	  and	  Latin	  authors	  well?	  Today	  one	  asks:	  Is	  
he	  good	  at	  mathematics?”210	  This	  was	  exactly	  the	  type	  of	  change	  that	  D’Alembert	  and	  his	  
fellow	  collaborators	  had	  hoped	  for	  when	  composing	  the	  Encylopedia	  a	  mere	  sixty	  years	  
earlier.	  	  And	  it	  was	  further	  confirmation	  that	  Newton’s	  method	  had	  gained	  widespread	  
acceptance,	  not	  only	  in	  intellectual	  circles,	  but	  also	  among	  the	  general	  population.	  Yet,	  the	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new	  method	  still	  lacked	  the	  spiritual	  authority	  necessary	  to	  truly	  convince	  others	  to	  act.	  	  
Saint-­‐Simon	  took	  that	  to	  be	  his	  task	  and	  it	  is	  to	  his	  work	  that	  we	  must	  briefly	  turn.	  	  
Saint-­‐Simon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Henri	  de	  Saint-­‐Simon	  (1760-­‐1825),	  writing	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  was	  
hoping	  to	  re-­‐unify	  society	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  science.	  	  He	  was	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  the	  
Encylopedia	  and	  philosophes,	  but	  drew	  the	  most	  inspiration	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Isaac	  Newton.	  
He	  praised	  the	  “positive	  sciences”	  and	  thought	  that	  the	  science	  of	  man	  should	  follow	  suite.	  
Since	  society	  was	  still	  governed	  by	  those	  who	  do	  not	  understand	  the	  general	  laws	  that	  rule	  
the	  universe:	  
It	  is	  necessary	  that	  the	  physiologists	  chase	  from	  their	  company	  the	  philosophers,	  moralists,	  
and	  metaphysicians	  just	  as	  the	  astronomers	  have	  chased	  out	  the	  astrologers	  and	  the	  
chemists	  have	  chased	  out	  the	  alchemists	  .	  .	  .we	  are	  organized	  bodies;	  and	  it	  is	  by	  regarding	  
our	  social	  relationships	  as	  physiological	  phenomena	  that	  I	  have	  conceived	  the	  project	  
which	  I	  present	  to	  you.211	  
	  
Hayek	  points	  out	  that	  the	  “physiologists	  themselves	  are	  not	  yet	  quite	  scientific	  enough”	  
since	  “they	  have	  yet	  to	  discover	  how	  their	  science	  can	  reach	  the	  perfection	  of	  astronomy	  by	  
basing	  itself	  on	  the	  single	  law	  to	  which	  God	  has	  subjected	  the	  universe,	  the	  law	  of	  universal	  
gravitation.”212	  That	  task	  is	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Newton,	  “by	  exercising	  its	  
spiritual	  power	  to	  make	  people	  understand	  this	  law.”213	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  Council	  of	  Newton	  would	  consist	  of	  twenty-­‐one	  scholars	  and	  be	  presided	  
over	  by	  the	  mathematician	  who	  had	  received	  the	  most	  votes.214	  	  The	  Council	  would	  serve	  
as	  “the	  representatives	  of	  God	  on	  earth,	  who	  would	  deprive	  the	  pope,	  cardinals,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  Ibid	  p.220	  	  	  
212	  Ibid	  p.220	  
213	  Ibid	  p.221,	  emphasis	  added.	  
214	  Ibid	  p.219.	  	  Note	  that	  the	  top	  position	  is	  to	  be	  held	  by	  a	  mathematician.	  This	  further	  
reflects	  the	  influence	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bishops,	  and	  the	  priests	  of	  their	  office	  because	  they	  do	  not	  understand	  the	  divine	  science	  
which	  God	  has	  entrusted	  to	  them	  and	  which	  some	  day	  will	  again	  turn	  earth	  into	  
paradise.”215	  	  And	  what	  happens	  to	  those	  who	  do	  not	  go	  along	  with	  Saint	  Simon’s	  plan?	  
“Anybody	  who	  does	  not	  obey	  the	  orders	  will	  be	  treated	  by	  the	  others	  as	  a	  quadruped.”216	  	  
This	  is	  because	  “the	  law	  of	  human	  progress	  guides	  and	  dominates	  all;	  men	  are	  only	  its	  
instruments.”217	  
	  	  	  	  	  To	  say	  that	  Saint-­‐Simon	  rejected	  the	  tenets	  of	  liberalism	  would	  be	  an	  understatement.	  	  
Diversity,	  especially	  in	  ideologies,	  would	  only	  lead	  to	  civil	  strife	  as	  in	  the	  French	  
Revolution.	  Saint-­‐Simon	  notes,	  “the	  vague	  and	  metaphysical	  idea	  of	  liberty…impedes	  the	  
action	  of	  the	  masses	  on	  the	  individual…and	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  development	  of	  civilization	  
and	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  system.”218	  Individual	  liberty	  must	  give	  way	  to	  
collective	  necessity,	  especially	  if	  the	  desired	  ideological	  uniformity	  is	  to	  be	  achieved.	  	  Saint-­‐
Simon	  recognized	  the	  utility	  of	  religion	  in	  bringing	  about	  this	  uniformity,	  but	  just	  as	  the	  
Encylopedists	  had	  noted,	  the	  old	  forms	  of	  Christianity	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  sufficient.	  	  All	  
religion	  had	  to	  be	  brought	  in	  line	  with	  “positive	  science”	  to	  be	  considered	  legitimate.	  	  While	  
he	  generally	  rejected	  the	  teachings	  of	  Christian	  doctrine,	  he	  found	  worth	  in	  the	  institutional	  
structure	  of	  the	  Church.	  The	  scientists	  were	  to	  organize	  themselves	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  
Catholic	  clergy	  and	  direct	  the	  education	  of	  the	  masses.	  	  Furthermore,	  they	  should	  “elect	  a	  
scientific	  pope,	  employ	  excommunication	  for	  crimes	  against	  the	  ideology,	  and	  institute	  a	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Newtonian	  form	  of	  baptism.”219	  	  Thus,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  implications	  of	  the	  
scientistic	  attitude.	  	  It	  is	  not	  merely	  enough	  to	  promote	  science	  as	  a	  good	  for	  society;	  
instead,	  it	  becomes	  the	  good	  and	  political,	  economic,	  and	  even	  religious	  institutions	  must	  
reflect	  its	  principles.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Saint-­‐Simon,	  reflecting	  on	  his	  work	  a	  few	  months	  before	  his	  death,	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  
succinct	  summary	  of	  his	  efforts:	  
Like	  all	  the	  world,	  I	  wanted	  to	  systematize	  the	  philosophy	  of	  God.	  I	  wanted	  to	  descend	  
successively	  from	  the	  phenomena	  of	  the	  universe	  to	  the	  phenomena	  of	  the	  solar	  system,	  
further	  on	  to	  the	  terrestrial	  phenomena,	  and	  finally	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  species	  considered	  
as	  a	  subdivision	  of	  sublunar	  phenomena;	  from	  this	  study	  I	  wanted	  to	  derive	  the	  laws	  of	  
social	  organization,	  the	  original	  and	  essential	  object	  of	  my	  enquiry.220	  
	  
As	  Voegelin	  notes,	  “Saint-­‐Simon	  confesses	  a	  dream	  that	  was	  inspired	  by	  Newtonian	  physics,	  
the	  dream	  of	  expanding	  the	  type	  of	  science	  that	  had	  evolved	  in	  mathematical	  physics	  to	  
embrace	  systematically	  the	  whole	  world,	  including	  human	  society.”221	  Yet,	  as	  Saint-­‐Simon	  
laments,	  that	  dream	  was	  never	  able	  to	  come	  to	  fruition	  because	  he	  found	  it	  impossible	  to	  
extend	  Newton’s	  fundamental	  law	  to	  other	  fields.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  failure	  to	  find	  a	  unifying	  law	  led	  him	  to	  change	  his	  approach:	  
	  
He	  will	  no	  longer	  pursue	  this	  aim	  (the	  exploration	  of	  the	  social	  organization)	  by	  searching	  
for	  a	  social	  law	  of	  gravitation,	  rather,	  he	  will	  pursue	  it	  by	  the	  development	  of	  blueprints	  for	  
a	  society	  in	  the	  age	  of	  Newtonian	  science,	  technology,	  and	  industry.	  	  Scientists	  and	  
philosophers	  have	  the	  “positive”	  function	  of	  developing	  the	  systematic	  body	  of	  knowledge	  
that	  will	  guarantee	  human	  domination	  over	  nature.	  	  The	  social	  organization	  will	  abolish	  the	  
old	  domination	  of	  man	  over	  man	  and	  replace	  it	  by	  a	  government	  of	  scientists,	  engineers	  
and	  industrialists	  who	  secure	  and	  increase	  the	  domination	  of	  man	  over	  nature	  for	  the	  
benefits	  of	  society	  at	  large.222	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219	  See	  Peyton	  Lyon.	  “Saint-­‐Simon	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Scientism	  and	  Historicism.”	  	  The	  
Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science,	  Vol.	  27,	  No.1	  (1961)	  p.62	  
220	  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution	  p.190	  	  
221	  Ibid	  p.191	  
222	  Ibid	  p.191	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In	  other	  words,	  government	  is	  dominated	  by	  technocrats	  and	  becomes	  administrative	  and	  
managerial	  in	  nature.	  This	  of	  course	  partially	  prefigures	  what	  would	  later	  come	  with	  Engels	  
and	  Marx,	  but	  it	  also	  represents	  a	  continuation	  of	  Bacon’s	  program.	  	  Solomon’s	  House	  was	  
composed	  of	  scientists	  who	  would	  ultimately	  decide	  political	  issues	  and	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  
Council	  of	  Newton	  serves	  a	  strikingly	  similar	  purpose.	  More	  importantly,	  those	  institutions	  
would	  also	  provide	  spiritual	  guidance.	  	  	  
	  	  	  Although	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  project	  represents	  the	  scientistic	  attitude	  and	  carries	  on	  the	  
tradition	  started	  by	  Bacon	  and	  continued	  by	  the	  Encylopedists,	  his	  work	  is	  less	  than	  
systematic.	  	  And	  while	  he	  often	  espoused	  the	  great	  benefits	  of	  science	  and	  of	  a	  scientific	  
education,	  he	  was	  not	  formally	  trained	  in	  any	  particular	  science	  and	  offered	  no	  scientific	  
discoveries.	  He	  can	  be	  generously	  characterized	  as	  a	  partisan	  for	  science;	  he	  saw	  positive	  
science	  as	  a	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  factions	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  French	  Revolution.	  	  He	  
wanted	  to	  unify	  society	  using	  positive	  science,	  but	  simply	  could	  not	  devise	  a	  coherent	  
program	  to	  accomplish	  that	  task.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  his	  own	  inability	  to	  do	  so,	  Saint-­‐Simon	  had	  an	  
appreciable	  influence	  on	  several	  younger	  scholars.	  	  The	  most	  notable	  of	  these,	  Auguste	  
Comte,	  was	  able	  to	  systematize	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Saint-­‐Simon.	  	  Comte	  was	  much	  more	  
versed	  in	  philosophical	  matters	  than	  his	  mentor	  and	  had	  a	  much	  better	  command	  of	  
history.	  	  More	  importantly,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  express	  his	  ideas	  coherently	  through	  his	  
writings.	  	  He	  sought	  to	  “positivize”	  the	  study	  of	  man	  and	  extend	  Bacon’s	  method	  beyond	  
natural	  philosophy	  to	  social	  philosophy.	  	  While	  others	  had	  spoken	  of	  the	  need	  for	  a	  positive	  
science	  of	  man,	  Comte	  was	  the	  first	  to	  explicitly	  sketch	  such	  a	  science.	  	  Drawing	  from	  the	  
vision	  of	  Bacon,	  the	  mathematical	  precision	  of	  Newton,	  the	  ambition	  of	  the	  philosophes,	  and	  
the	  spiritual	  impetus	  of	  Saint-­‐Simon,	  Comte	  outlines	  a	  unified,	  totalizing	  positive	  system	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that	  encompasses	  all	  aspects	  of	  human	  life.	  	  	  His	  work	  is	  representative	  of	  the	  drastic	  
changes	  accompanying	  French,	  and	  moreover	  European,	  society.	  It	  represents	  an	  
intellectual	  and	  spiritual	  revolution.	  And	  thus	  it	  is	  to	  Comte	  that	  we	  now	  must	  turn.	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Chapter	  4	  
Auguste	  Comte’s	  Scientistic	  Politics	  
“In	  the	  name	  of	  the	  past	  and	  the	  future,	  the	  theoretical	  servants	  and	  the	  practical	  servants	  of	  Humanity	  
assume	  befittingly	  the	  general	  leadership	  of	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  earth	  in	  order	  to	  construct,	  at	  last,	  the	  true	  
providence,	  moral,	  intellectual	  and	  material;	  they	  irrevocably	  exclude	  from	  political	  supremacy	  all	  the	  various	  
slaves	  of	  God,	  Catholics,	  Protestants,	  or	  Deists,	  since	  they	  are	  retrogrades	  as	  well	  as	  pertubators.”223	  –August	  
Comte	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Auguste	  Comte	  (1798-­‐1857)	  stands	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  figures	  of	  the	  19th	  
century.	  	  As	  part	  of	  the	  generation	  to	  directly	  follow	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  Comte’s	  
primary	  concern	  was	  to	  restore	  political	  order	  and	  to	  find	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  
retrograde	  and	  revolutionary	  forces	  within	  French	  society.	  	  Comte	  thought	  a	  return	  to	  pre-­‐
Revolutionary	  principles	  to	  be	  impossible,	  yet	  only	  saw	  destruction	  in	  the	  principles	  
espoused	  by	  the	  Revolutionaries.	  Furthermore,	  any	  solution	  that	  failed	  to	  take	  into	  account	  
all	  of	  society’s	  primary	  institutions	  would	  be	  insufficient.	  The	  political	  situation	  called	  for	  a	  
complete	  reordering	  of	  society	  and	  its	  institutions,	  and	  Comte’s	  system	  provided	  the	  
blueprint.	  	  Comte	  sought	  to	  reorder	  every	  major	  institution	  from	  the	  family	  to	  business	  to	  
the	  Church	  and	  ultimately	  to	  the	  regime	  itself.224	  Comte	  saw	  himself	  as	  the	  “Aristotle	  of	  
Positivism”	  and	  expected	  his	  work	  to	  have	  the	  same	  type	  of	  impact	  that	  Aristotle’s	  had,	  
especially	  in	  Europe	  where	  the	  Aristotelians	  had	  been	  so	  influential	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages.225	  
Yet	  the	  disintegration	  of	  Christianity’s	  influence	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  immanent	  materialism	  left	  
more	  than	  just	  an	  intellectual	  void;	  the	  spiritual	  void	  created	  by	  the	  “new”	  worldview	  was	  
immense.	  Thus,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  the	  “Aristotle	  of	  Positivism”	  and	  establishing	  a	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  Taken	  from	  Auguste	  Comte’s	  Preface	  to	  The	  Catechism	  of	  Positive	  Religion.	  	  Cited	  in	  Eric	  
Voegelin.	  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution	  (Durham:	  	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1975)	  p.141	  
224	  Andrew	  Wernick.	  	  Auguste	  Comte	  and	  the	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  (Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press)	  2001.	  p.3	  
225	  Ibid	  p.5	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way	  to	  study	  man	  and	  understand	  society,	  Comte	  also	  had	  to	  mirror	  St.	  Paul	  and	  establish	  a	  
new	  spiritual	  order.	  	  He	  did	  so	  by	  founding	  the	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  as	  a	  replacement	  for	  
Christianity.	  	  Comte’s	  synthesis	  of	  a	  systematization	  of	  science	  and	  a	  “humanistic,	  
demystified”	  religion	  is	  what	  sets	  him	  apart	  from	  his	  predecessors.226	  While	  some	  have	  
tried	  to	  separate	  those	  two	  elements,	  to	  do	  so	  is	  to	  miss	  the	  spirit	  of	  Comte’s	  work	  and	  to	  
artificially	  implement	  a	  division	  that	  he	  rejected.227	  Viewed	  in	  that	  light,	  we	  will	  explore	  
both	  elements	  of	  his	  work	  and	  demonstrate	  the	  continuity	  inherent	  in	  his	  philosophy.	  
Moreover,	  we	  will	  demonstrate	  its	  scientistic	  character	  and	  to	  borrow	  from	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  
we	  will	  show	  how	  Comte	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  “intramundane	  eschatologist.”228	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Before	  delving	  into	  the	  works	  themselves,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  some	  of	  the	  major	  
influences	  on	  Comte,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  place	  within	  the	  history	  of	  political	  ideas.	  	  Comte	  was	  
born	  into	  a	  devout	  Roman	  Catholic	  family	  with	  royalist	  leanings.	  	  By	  the	  age	  of	  14,	  he	  had	  
become	  an	  atheist	  and	  placed	  himself	  firmly	  in	  the	  camp	  of	  the	  republicans.229	  He	  was	  
initially	  denied	  entrance	  into	  the	  esteemed	  Ecole	  Polytechnique	  because	  of	  his	  young	  age,	  
but	  was	  eventually	  allowed	  admission.	  	  However,	  just	  two	  years	  into	  his	  tenure,	  he	  was	  
among	  the	  many	  expelled	  for	  “radicalism.”230	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  Comte	  entered	  into	  one	  of	  
the	  most	  important	  relationships	  of	  his	  life.	  He	  became	  secretary	  for	  the	  renowned	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226	  Ibid	  p.20	  
227	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  and	  Emile’	  Littre’	  both	  rejected	  the	  “later”	  Comte.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  
Congreve,	  Mill	  lamented,	  “It	  is	  M.	  Comte	  himself,	  who,	  in	  my	  judgment,	  has	  thrown	  ridicule	  
on	  his	  own	  philosophy	  by	  the	  extravagance	  of	  his	  later	  writings.”	  As	  quoted	  in	  Wernick.	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  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution.	  p.145	  
229Auguste	  Comte.	  Introduction	  to	  Positive	  Philosophy.	  Ed.	  Frederick	  Ferre	  (Indianapolis:	  	  
Hackett	  Publishing,	  1998)	  p.vii	  	  
230According	  to	  Kolakowski,	  he	  was	  part	  of	  a	  group	  that	  greeted	  Napoleon’s	  return	  “too	  
enthusiastically.”	  See	  Leszek	  Kolakowski.	  	  The	  Alienation	  of	  Reason:	  A	  History	  of	  Positivist	  
Thought.	  Trans	  Norbert	  Guterman	  	  (New	  York:	  	  Anchor	  Books,	  1969)	  p.46	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theorist,	  Henri	  de	  Saint-­‐Simon.231	  	  Comte	  spent	  seven	  years	  under	  the	  tutelage	  of	  Saint-­‐
Simon,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  an	  acrimonious	  break,	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  influence	  remained	  with	  Comte	  
throughout	  his	  career.	  	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  call	  for	  a	  “positive”	  science	  of	  man	  and	  for	  a	  
reorganization	  of	  society	  based	  on	  scientific	  principles	  greatly	  appealed	  to	  Comte,	  as	  did	  his	  
philosophy	  of	  history.	  	  Although	  these	  ideas	  resonated	  with	  Comte,	  he	  “grew	  increasingly	  
unhappy	  about	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  weakness	  in	  technical	  rigor	  and	  what	  Comte	  saw	  as	  a	  
scandalous	  disregard	  for	  scientific-­‐empirical	  modes	  of	  argument.”232	  Shortly	  after	  the	  
break	  with	  Saint-­‐Simon,	  Comte	  set	  about	  to	  correct	  that	  deficiency	  by	  establishing	  a	  new	  
foundation	  for	  philosophy.	  	  Unlike	  the	  works	  of	  his	  predecessor,	  the	  Cours	  de	  philosophie	  
positive	  would	  represent	  a	  systematic,	  scientific	  exposition	  of	  positive	  philosophy.	  	  Perhaps	  
more	  importantly,	  it	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  capstone	  of	  a	  movement	  started	  two	  centuries	  
earlier	  by	  Francis	  Bacon.	  	  Before	  continuing	  to	  Comte’s	  works,	  let	  us	  first	  note	  the	  Baconian	  
influence	  on	  Comte’s	  project.	  	  
Bacon	  and	  Comte	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  Comte’s	  project	  serves	  as	  the	  continuation	  of	  Bacon’s	  Great	  Instauration.	  
As	  Andrew	  Wernick	  notes:	  
The	  guiding	  aim	  of	  this	  current	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  grand	  synthesis	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  
through	  systematically	  mapping	  its	  results	  and	  principles.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  would	  provide	  a	  
basis	  both	  for	  a	  naturalistic	  understanding	  of	  humanity’s	  place	  in	  the	  cosmos,	  and	  for	  
forging	  an	  intellectual	  instrument	  for	  extending	  human	  control.	  	  In	  historical	  terms,	  the	  
project	  presented	  itself	  as	  a	  correction	  of	  Aristotle—particularly	  the	  Aristotle	  of	  the	  
Scholastics—in	  light	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  If	  the	  initial	  target	  was	  
Aristotelianism,	  however,	  the	  principal	  thought-­‐opponent	  was	  Plato,	  and	  by	  extension	  all	  
aprioristic,	  idealist,	  in	  short	  ‘metaphysical’	  forms	  of	  reason.	  	  Comte’s	  contribution	  was	  to	  
apply	  this	  critique	  to	  the	  rationalist	  political	  and	  moral	  theory	  of	  the	  philosophes	  so	  that,	  by	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  Ibid	  p.viii	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means	  of	  a	  real	  ‘science	  of	  Man’,	  the	  Baconian	  matrix	  could	  be	  fully	  positivized	  as	  the	  
subject	  and	  object	  of	  its	  own	  gaze.233	  
	  
Bacon	  had	  been	  the	  first	  to	  call	  for	  a	  radical	  reorganization	  of	  both	  education	  and	  society	  
based	  on	  the	  new	  science.	  	  Bacon’s	  experimental	  method	  had	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  a	  new	  
way	  of	  approaching	  the	  world.	  	  Moreover,	  his	  vision	  of	  a	  scientific	  utopia,	  presented	  in	  the	  
New	  Atlantis,	  had	  provided	  a	  goal	  to	  aspire	  to.	  	  While	  Bacon	  provided	  little,	  if	  anything,	  in	  
regards	  to	  actual	  scientific	  discoveries,	  his	  advocacy	  of	  the	  experimental	  method	  had	  a	  
profound	  influence.	  Newton’s	  emergence	  might	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  if	  not	  for	  Bacon’s	  
efforts.	  Bacon’s	  influence	  was	  readily	  apparent	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Royal	  Society	  and	  in	  
the	  writings	  of	  Comte’s	  French	  predecessors,	  particularly	  the	  Encylopedists.	  	  Let	  us	  now	  
explore	  some	  of	  the	  key	  themes	  that	  Comte	  takes	  from	  Bacon,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  few	  points	  on	  
which	  they	  diverge.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  both	  thought	  that	  medieval	  and	  classical	  philosophy	  had	  not	  led	  to	  the	  
type	  of	  progress	  that	  humanity	  was	  capable	  of	  achieving.	  	  The	  impoverishment	  of	  natural	  
philosophy	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  these	  flawed	  modes	  of	  thought;	  and	  society	  had	  suffered	  
as	  a	  result.	  	  The	  solution	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  new	  way	  of	  thinking;	  one	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  
tangible	  results	  and	  admits	  of	  demonstration.	  	  But	  before	  the	  new	  philosophy	  could	  take	  
hold,	  an	  explanation	  had	  to	  be	  given	  as	  to	  why	  the	  previous	  modes	  were	  inadequate.	  	  
Bacon’s	  primary	  argument	  is	  that	  those	  modes	  provided	  humanity	  with	  very	  little	  useful	  
knowledge.	  	  Metaphysical	  speculations	  were	  fruitless;	  the	  questions	  asked	  were	  never	  
answered	  adequately	  as	  the	  different	  camps	  would	  simply	  stick	  to	  their	  preferred	  dogmas.	  
And	  even	  if	  the	  questions	  had	  been	  answered,	  they	  left	  little	  room	  for	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  
improving	  man’s	  condition.	  Comte	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  previous	  modes	  of	  philosophizing	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were	  fruitless,	  but	  he	  further	  “strengthens”	  his	  position	  through	  his	  law	  of	  the	  three	  states.	  	  
Bacon	  had	  argued	  against	  the	  theological	  and	  metaphysical	  modes	  of	  thought,	  but	  simply	  
relied	  on	  reason	  (and	  hope)	  to	  make	  his	  case.	  	  Comte	  appeals	  to	  an	  invariable	  law	  and	  to	  
the	  authority	  of	  History	  itself.	  	  He	  does	  not	  simply	  suggest	  a	  new	  mode	  of	  philosophizing;	  
he	  outlines	  a	  system	  that	  must	  be	  accepted.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Once	  the	  previous	  modes	  of	  thought	  have	  been	  refuted	  and	  a	  case	  has	  been	  made	  for	  the	  
adoption	  of	  the	  new	  science,	  the	  question	  of	  implementation	  becomes	  paramount.	  	  Both	  
Bacon	  and	  Comte	  outline	  a	  dramatic	  restructuring	  of	  education.	  Bacon	  does	  so	  primarily	  
through	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Learning,	  while	  Comte	  utilizes	  the	  Cours	  de	  positive	  
philosophie.	  	  Bacon’s	  restructuring	  significantly	  downgrades	  the	  formerly	  prominent	  roles	  
of	  theology	  and	  metaphysics	  and	  promotes	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  	  Comte’s	  scheme	  seeks	  to	  
eradicate	  the	  theological	  and	  metaphysical	  philosophies	  completely	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  six	  
positive	  sciences	  (mathematics,	  astronomy,	  physics,	  chemistry,	  biology,	  sociology).	  	  Both	  
outline	  a	  new	  method	  and	  claim	  that	  it	  can	  be	  applied	  universally	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  knowledge.	  
In	  fact,	  the	  method	  used	  is	  one	  of	  the	  two	  main	  criteria,	  the	  other	  being	  utility,	  that	  
determine	  if	  something	  constitutes	  true	  knowledge	  or	  not.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  both	  realized	  that	  educational	  reform	  was	  a	  primary	  requisite	  for	  the	  
transformation	  of	  society,	  but	  it	  alone	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  for	  a	  successful	  social	  
reorganization.	  	  A	  spiritual	  change	  had	  to	  accompany	  the	  intellectual	  or	  there	  would	  be	  no	  
sufficient	  impetus	  for	  action.	  	  This	  is	  an	  area	  where	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  diverge,	  but	  perhaps	  
more	  in	  method	  than	  in	  spirit.	  	  Bacon’s	  society	  was	  firmly	  entrenched	  in	  Christian	  
principles	  and	  the	  Church	  held	  significant	  power.	  	  The	  new	  science	  was	  just	  emerging	  and	  
tangible	  benefits	  were	  not	  readily	  apparent.	  	  The	  great	  light	  of	  Newton	  had	  not	  yet	  arrived	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so	  Bacon	  had	  to	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  disturb	  the	  prevailing	  powers.	  	  He	  was	  cautious	  in	  
presenting	  his	  political	  ideas	  and	  did	  so	  primarily	  through	  cryptic	  aphorisms	  (as	  in	  the	  
Essays)	  and	  through	  myth.	  	  And	  even	  in	  the	  New	  Atlantis,	  an	  overtly	  “fictional”	  work,	  Bacon	  
was	  sure	  to	  include	  Christianity	  in	  his	  presentation.	  	  His	  proposed	  solution,	  a	  society	  based	  
on	  scientific	  principles,	  had	  to	  appear	  friendly	  to	  Christianity,	  both	  for	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  
primarily	  Christian	  population	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  regime.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
Comte	  did	  not	  have	  to	  provide	  much	  evidence	  as	  to	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  new	  science,	  and	  he	  
certainly	  did	  not	  have	  to	  mince	  his	  words	  in	  regards	  to	  religion.	  	  Christianity	  was	  on	  the	  
decline	  as	  Enlightenment	  principles	  had	  taken	  firm	  hold,	  especially	  within	  French	  society.	  
Thus,	  an	  attack	  on	  Christianity	  was	  nothing	  new	  and	  Comte	  did	  not	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  the	  
kind	  of	  negative	  consequences	  that	  Bacon	  did	  in	  regards	  to	  his	  stance	  on	  religion.	  	  As	  a	  
result	  of	  this,	  Comte	  did	  not	  have	  to	  conceal	  his	  intentions	  through	  myth	  or	  aphorism,	  and	  
he	  could	  explicitly	  outline	  the	  precepts	  of	  a	  new	  religion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  method	  was	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  both	  Comte	  and	  
Bacon’s	  projects,	  but	  they	  also	  shared	  a	  view	  of	  the	  ends	  sought	  through	  that	  method.	  Both	  
wanted	  to	  improve	  man’s	  condition	  and	  to	  reorganize	  the	  social	  structure.	  	  Thus,	  utility	  
became	  of	  paramount	  importance.	  	  The	  method	  was	  intended	  to	  produce	  useful	  
knowledge.234	  	  Bacon	  makes	  this	  clear	  by	  promoting	  experiments	  of	  “fruit”	  and	  praising	  
inventors	  as	  demi-­‐gods	  within	  New	  Atlantis.235	  Likewise,	  Comte	  praises	  the	  positive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234	  Comte	  directly	  imports	  the	  Baconian	  maxim	  that	  true	  knowledge	  is	  useful	  knowledge.	  	  
235	  In	  Novum	  Organum,	  Bacon	  notes	  that	  inventors	  should	  hold	  the	  highest	  rank	  in	  society.	  
They	  should	  be	  placed	  above	  political	  “heroes”	  since	  achievements	  in	  politics	  only	  extend	  
to	  particular	  societies	  whereas	  inventions	  can	  benefit	  all	  societies.	  Furthermore,	  they	  bring	  
“benefit	  without	  hurt	  or	  sorrow	  to	  anyone.”	  See	  Francis	  Bacon.	  The	  New	  Organon.	  	  Ed.	  
Jardine	  and	  Silverthorne	  (Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000)	  p.99	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philosophy	  for	  its	  ability	  to	  bring	  about	  tangible	  benefits	  to	  society	  and	  honors	  inventors	  
throughout	  his	  Positivist	  Calendar.236	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  corollary	  to	  the	  emphasis	  on	  utility	  was	  the	  diminishment	  of	  the	  bios	  theoretikos,	  or	  
contemplative	  life.	  	  Bacon	  places	  blame	  on	  the	  ancients,	  particularly	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle,	  for	  
the	  feeble	  state	  of	  natural	  philosophy.237	  He	  characterizes	  the	  Greeks	  as	  engaging	  in	  a	  “kind	  
of	  childish	  stage	  of	  science…too	  ready	  to	  talk,	  but	  too	  weak	  and	  immature	  to	  produce	  
anything.”238	  Likewise,	  Comte	  likens	  the	  theological	  and	  metaphysical	  stages	  of	  philosophy	  
to	  childhood	  and	  immaturity.239	  Aside	  from	  their	  flawed	  methodology,	  these	  systems	  
produced	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  tangible	  benefits	  to	  society,	  the	  primary	  criterion	  for	  success	  
in	  the	  eyes	  of	  both	  Bacon	  and	  Comte.	  	  	  The	  lack	  of	  practical	  results	  can	  largely	  be	  attributed	  
to	  the	  questions	  asked	  by	  the	  ancients.	  	  They	  were	  either	  unanswerable	  (i.e.	  questions	  of	  
first	  principles)	  or	  “fruitless.”240	  While	  they	  disagreed	  on	  the	  role	  of	  such	  questions,	  it	  is	  
clear	  that	  both	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  left	  little	  room	  for	  them	  within	  their	  own	  
projects.241Bacon’s	  project	  was	  aimed	  to	  help	  “relieve	  man’s	  estate”	  and	  science	  was	  the	  
means	  through	  which	  that	  task	  could	  be	  accomplished.	  	  Similarly,	  Comte	  sought	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236	  For	  instance,	  the	  ninth	  month	  is	  named	  for	  Gutenberg.	  	  
237	  Particularly	  Aristotle’s	  logic	  and	  Plato’s	  theology.	  Both	  hampered	  development	  in	  the	  
“practical”	  sciences.	  For	  instance,	  Aristotle’s	  logic	  is	  “quite	  divorced	  from	  practice	  and	  
completely	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  active	  part	  of	  the	  sciences.”	  Ibid	  p.16	  	  
238	  See	  preface	  to	  the	  Great	  Renewal	  Ibid	  p.6	  
239	  As	  Comte	  notes	  of	  his	  own	  development,	  he	  was	  “a	  theologian	  in	  childhood,	  a	  
metaphysician	  in	  youth.”	  See	  Introduction	  to	  Positive	  Philosophy	  p.4	  
240	  For	  instance,	  “empty	  and	  endless	  discussions	  between,	  e.g.,	  divine	  right	  and	  the	  
sovereignty	  of	  the	  people.”	  Ibid	  p.12	  
241	  Bacon	  saw	  them	  purely	  as	  destructive	  hindrances.	  Comte	  recognized	  their	  futility,	  but	  
thought	  they	  were	  necessary	  steps	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  mind.	  See	  Wernick	  p.40	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reorganize	  society	  on	  positive	  science;	  societal	  needs	  drive	  the	  project	  and	  a	  true	  science	  is	  
one	  that	  fulfills	  these	  needs.242	  	  
	  	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  their	  similarities,	  Comte	  faced	  a	  major	  challenge	  that	  Bacon	  had	  not	  been	  
forced	  to	  deal	  with.	  	  Bacon	  had	  based	  his	  project	  on	  two	  primary	  assumptions:	  that	  humans	  
were	  entitled	  to	  (and	  capable	  of)	  dominion	  over	  nature	  and	  that	  the	  fruits	  of	  that	  dominion	  
should	  benefit	  all.243	  Bacon	  took	  care	  to	  fit	  his	  project	  into	  the	  Christian	  framework	  and	  
appealed	  to	  charity	  to	  do	  so.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  advancement	  of	  knowledge	  
“has	  somewhat	  of	  the	  serpent,	  and	  puffeth	  up,”	  Bacon	  argued	  that	  the	  “proud	  knowledge	  of	  
good	  and	  evil”	  had	  led	  to	  the	  fall.244	  God	  had	  intended	  for	  man’s	  dominion	  over	  nature	  and	  
the	  new	  science	  provided	  the	  means	  to	  do	  so.	  As	  long	  as	  that	  dominion	  of	  nature	  was	  used	  
to	  the	  benefit	  of	  mankind,	  it	  fit	  comfortably	  in	  the	  confines	  of	  Christian	  principles.	  	  Without	  
such	  a	  principle	  underlying	  the	  project	  however,	  the	  domination	  of	  man	  over	  nature	  could	  
easily	  drift	  into	  the	  domination	  of	  man	  over	  man.245	  In	  the	  two	  centuries	  that	  elapsed	  
between	  Bacon	  and	  Comte,	  the	  influence	  of	  Christianity	  had	  waned.	  Thus,	  Comte	  had	  to	  
find	  a	  new	  moral	  foundation.	  As	  Wernick	  notes:	  
With	  the	  declining	  credibility	  of	  revealed	  religion,	  techno-­‐progressive	  thinking	  faced	  a	  
dilemma.	  	  Either	  the	  moral	  grounding	  of	  a	  world-­‐mastering	  science	  would	  have	  to	  be	  left	  
unsecured—letting	  the	  enterprise	  float,	  in	  principle	  and	  de	  facto,	  among	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  
world,	  or	  some	  non-­‐supernatural	  way	  would	  have	  to	  be	  found	  to	  legitimate	  the	  
philanthropic	  ethic	  which	  had	  been	  shored	  up,	  in	  the	  old	  religion,	  by	  the	  word	  of	  God.246	  
	  
The	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  was	  intended	  to	  do	  just	  that	  as	  Comte	  looked	  to	  not	  only	  replace	  
the	  Christian	  foundation	  that	  had	  been	  displaced,	  but	  to	  improve	  upon	  it.	  	  The	  new	  religion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  Introduction	  to	  Positive	  Philosophy	  p.12	  	  
243	  Wernick	  p.47	  
244	  Ibid	  p.47	  
245	  Ibid	  p.48	  
246	  Ibid	  p.48	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would	  be	  based	  on	  positive	  science,	  the	  triumph	  of	  which	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  by	  History.	  
Given	  its	  scientific	  foundation,	  it	  would	  be	  “demonstrable”	  and	  thus	  truly	  universal.	  Let	  us	  
now	  turn	  to	  Comte’s	  works	  and	  examine	  both	  the	  scientific	  foundation	  (established	  in	  the	  
Cours	  de	  positive	  philosophie)	  and	  the	  new	  religion	  itself.	  	  
Cours	  de	  positive	  philosophie	  
	  	  	  	  While	  we	  cannot	  explore	  every	  detail	  in	  the	  massive,	  six-­‐volume	  work	  that	  constitutes	  
the	  Cours,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  work	  and	  to	  explore	  its	  central	  
arguments.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  great	  advances	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  especially	  since	  Newton’s	  
time,	  Comte	  lamented	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  such	  
stagnation	  was	  that	  the	  method	  that	  had	  been	  successfully	  utilized	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  physics,	  
astronomy,	  and	  chemistry	  had	  not	  been	  applied	  to	  the	  social.	  	  The	  science	  of	  man	  had	  yet	  to	  
be	  “positivized”	  and	  Comte	  set	  out	  to	  continue	  the	  “philosophical	  impulse	  of	  Bacon	  and	  
Descartes”	  by	  establishing	  a	  “social	  physics.”247	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Before	  outlining	  the	  characteristics	  of	  such	  a	  science,	  Comte	  had	  to	  first	  explain	  why	  a	  
change	  was	  necessary	  and	  why	  the	  previous	  modes	  of	  exploring	  social	  questions	  were	  
deficient.	  To	  do	  so,	  he	  posited	  a	  “great	  fundamental	  law,	  to	  which	  the	  mind	  is	  subjected	  by	  
an	  invariable	  necessity.”248	  The	  law	  of	  three	  states	  (or	  stages)	  can	  be	  “demonstrated	  both	  
by	  reasoned	  proofs	  furnished	  by	  a	  knowledge	  of	  our	  mental	  organization,	  and	  by	  historical	  
verification	  due	  to	  an	  attentive	  study	  of	  the	  past.”249	  Comte	  continues:	  
This	  law	  consists	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  of	  our	  principal	  conceptions,	  each	  branch	  of	  our	  
knowledge,	  passes	  in	  succession	  through	  three	  different	  theoretical	  states:	  	  the	  theological	  
or	  fictitious	  state,	  the	  metaphysical	  or	  abstract	  state,	  and	  the	  scientific	  or	  positive	  state.	  	  In	  
other	  words,	  the	  human	  mind—by	  its	  very	  nature—makes	  use	  successively	  in	  each	  of	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247	  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution.	  	  p.147	  
248	  Introduction	  to	  Positive	  Philosophy.	  p.1	  
249	  Ibid	  p.1	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researches	  of	  three	  methods	  of	  philosophizing,	  whose	  characters	  are	  essentially	  different	  
and	  even	  radically	  opposed	  to	  each	  other.	  We	  have	  first	  the	  theological	  method,	  then	  the	  
metaphysical,	  and	  finally	  the	  positive	  method.	  Hence,	  there	  are	  three	  kinds	  of	  philosophy	  or	  
general	  systems	  of	  conceptions	  on	  the	  aggregate	  of	  phenomena,	  which	  are	  mutually	  
exclusive	  of	  each	  other.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  necessary	  starting	  point	  of	  human	  intelligence;	  the	  
third	  represents	  its	  fixed	  and	  definitive	  state;	  the	  second	  is	  destined	  to	  serve	  only	  as	  a	  
transitional	  method.250	  
	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  law	  of	  the	  three	  states	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  describe	  how	  things	  
should	  progress,	  but	  rather	  how	  they	  must	  progress.	  	  The	  movement	  of	  history	  dictates	  that	  
positivism	  will	  triumph	  and	  Comte	  is	  merely	  the	  instrument	  that	  will	  bring	  it	  about.251	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  first	  state,	  the	  theological,	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  “human	  mind	  directs	  its	  researches	  
mainly	  towards	  the	  inner	  nature	  of	  beings,	  and	  toward	  the	  first	  and	  final	  causes	  of	  all	  the	  
phenomena	  that	  it	  observes—in	  a	  word,	  toward	  absolute	  knowledge.	  It	  therefore	  
represents	  these	  phenomena	  as	  being	  produced	  by	  the	  direct	  and	  continuous	  action	  of	  
more	  or	  less	  numerous	  supernatural	  agents,	  whose	  arbitrary	  intervention	  explains	  all	  the	  
apparent	  anomalies	  of	  the	  universe.”252	  It	  corresponds	  to	  theocracy	  and	  includes	  the	  
movement	  from	  fetishism	  to	  polytheism	  and	  finally	  to	  monotheism.253	  It	  represents	  an	  
“embryonic”	  form	  of	  knowledge	  and	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  search	  “for	  the	  hidden	  nature	  
of	  things”	  as	  the	  mind	  tries	  to	  find	  out	  why	  things	  happen	  as	  they	  do	  with	  the	  ultimate	  
explanation	  coming	  from	  a	  divinity	  created	  in	  man’s	  image.254	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  second	  state,	  the	  metaphysical,	  represents	  a	  transitory	  stage	  whereby	  the	  
theological	  state	  is	  modified	  through	  the	  replacement	  of	  supernatural	  agents	  by	  “abstract	  
forces,	  real	  entities	  or	  personified	  abstractions,	  inherent	  in	  the	  different	  beings	  of	  the	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world.”255	  The	  mind	  “still	  wants	  to	  know	  the	  ‘why’	  of	  phenomena,	  but	  it	  accounts	  for	  what	  
happens	  differently,	  by	  creating	  secular	  or	  natural	  divinities,	  as	  it	  were,	  which	  man	  now	  
holds	  responsible	  for	  the	  observed	  facts:	  	  forces,	  qualities,	  powers,	  properties	  and	  other	  
such	  constructs.”256	  As	  Kolakowski	  notes,	  “the	  metaphysical	  state	  undergoes	  a	  
development	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  preceding	  state,	  culminating	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  secular	  
monotheism,	  which	  compresses	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  occult	  powers	  into	  the	  single	  over-­‐all	  
concept	  of	  ‘nature,’	  regarded	  as	  capable	  of	  accounting	  for	  all	  the	  facts.”257	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  until	  the	  third	  state,	  the	  positive,	  that	  the	  human	  mind	  finally	  reaches	  its	  
potential:	  
Finally,	  in	  the	  positive	  state,	  the	  mind,	  recognizing	  the	  impossibility	  of	  obtaining	  absolute	  
truth,	  gives	  up	  the	  search	  after	  the	  origin	  and	  hidden	  causes	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  a	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  final	  causes	  of	  phenomena.	  	  It	  endeavours	  now	  only	  to	  discover,	  by	  a	  
well-­‐combined	  use	  of	  reasoning	  and	  observation,	  the	  actual	  laws	  of	  phenomena—that	  is	  to	  
say,	  their	  invariable	  relations	  of	  succession	  and	  likeness.	  The	  explanation	  of	  facts,	  thus	  
reduced	  to	  its	  real	  terms,	  consists	  henceforth	  only	  in	  the	  connection	  established	  between	  
different	  particular	  phenomena	  and	  some	  general	  facts,	  the	  number	  of	  which	  the	  progress	  
of	  science	  tends	  more	  and	  more	  to	  diminish.258	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  positive	  philosophy	  rejects	  questions	  of	  formal	  and	  final	  causes,	  and	  
concerns	  itself	  instead	  with	  material	  and	  efficient	  causes.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  seeks	  to	  reduce	  
those	  causes	  to	  the	  fewest	  number	  of	  laws	  possible	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  unify	  knowledge.	  As	  
Kolakowski	  points	  out,	  “it	  asks	  how	  phenomena	  arise	  and	  what	  course	  they	  take;	  it	  collects	  
facts	  and	  is	  ready	  to	  submit	  to	  facts;	  it	  does	  not	  permit	  deductive	  thinking	  to	  be	  carried	  too	  
far	  and	  subjects	  it	  to	  the	  continuous	  control	  of	  ‘objective’	  facts.”259	  The	  positive	  phase	  is	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characterized	  by	  certainty	  and	  seeks	  to	  discover	  invariable	  universal	  laws.260	  Observation,	  
experiment,	  and	  calculation	  are	  the	  means	  to	  finding	  such	  laws.	  Any	  question	  that	  cannot	  
be	  explored	  through	  such	  means	  is	  deemed	  unimportant	  or	  superfluous	  in	  the	  positive	  
state	  of	  philosophy,	  and	  utility	  is	  the	  criterion	  for	  what	  constitutes	  knowledge.	  	  The	  
ultimate	  goal	  is	  the	  improvement	  of	  man’s	  condition	  (not	  individually,	  but	  collectively)	  and	  
anything	  that	  does	  not	  contribute	  to	  that	  end	  is	  useless.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  the	  law	  of	  three	  states	  applies	  to	  all	  fields	  of	  knowledge,	  it	  progresses	  at	  different	  
rates.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  two	  factors:	  complexity	  and	  generality.	  	  The	  least	  complex	  and	  most	  
general	  science,	  Mathematics,	  was	  the	  first	  to	  become	  positive.	  	  This	  is	  because	  it	  deals	  with	  
quantity	  and	  every	  measurable	  relationship	  between	  phenomena.261	  Astronomy	  was	  the	  
second	  field	  to	  become	  positivized.	  	  Its	  range	  is	  more	  limited	  than	  that	  of	  mathematics	  (i.e.	  
it	  is	  less	  generalizable),	  but	  it	  is	  “richer	  for	  bringing	  within	  the	  range	  of	  science	  a	  further	  
feature:	  	  force.”262	  Physics	  is	  next	  in	  the	  ordering	  of	  sciences	  and	  introduces	  qualitative	  
features	  such	  as	  heat	  and	  light.	  	  Chemistry	  follows	  suite	  with	  “qualitatively	  differentiated	  
substances.”263	  Biology	  constitutes	  the	  final	  science	  to	  be	  positivized	  before	  Comte’s	  
founding	  of	  social	  physics.	  It	  is	  characterized	  by	  “an	  even	  greater	  number	  of	  qualities”	  than	  
chemistry,	  but	  with	  a	  narrower	  range	  of	  subject	  matter	  and	  investigates	  organic	  
structures.264	  Finally,	  social	  physics	  (or	  sociology)	  represents	  the	  last	  field	  and	  crowning	  
achievement	  of	  science.	  Its	  object,	  human	  beings	  and	  their	  society,	  is	  the	  most	  complex	  and	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least	  universal	  of	  all	  the	  subjects	  to	  be	  studied.265	  	  Unlike	  the	  preceding	  sciences,	  social	  
physics	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  constituted	  and	  Comte’s	  primary	  task	  was	  to	  do	  just	  that.	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	  Kolakowski	  notes,	  the	  ordering	  of	  sciences	  is	  “at	  once	  logical,	  historical,	  and	  
pedagogical.	  	  That	  it	  is	  logical	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  based	  on	  mutually	  
consistent	  principles.	  We	  realize	  it	  is	  historical	  when	  we	  observe	  that	  each	  science	  reached	  
the	  positive	  stage	  at	  a	  different	  point	  in	  time.”	  And	  it	  is	  pedagogical	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  
Comte	  intends	  for	  the	  “sciences	  to	  be	  taught	  in	  the	  order	  of	  their	  development,	  so	  that	  they	  
may	  form	  a	  coherent	  system	  in	  the	  student’s	  mind.”266	  Comte	  not	  only	  recommends	  such	  a	  
program;	  he	  finds	  it	  essential	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge.	  According	  to	  this	  assumption,	  
one	  cannot	  learn	  astronomy	  without	  first	  learning	  mathematics	  or	  chemistry	  without	  first	  
having	  studied	  mathematics,	  astronomy,	  and	  physics.	  	  Thus,	  social	  physics	  would	  require	  
the	  most	  strenuous	  work	  since	  it	  not	  only	  contains	  the	  most	  complex	  subject,	  but	  also	  the	  
study	  of	  mathematics,	  astronomy,	  physics,	  chemistry,	  and	  biology	  as	  prerequisites.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  a	  few	  other	  consequences	  of	  Comte’s	  ordering	  of	  sciences.	  	  As	  
Kolakowski	  points	  out,	  Comte	  “rejects	  the	  doctrine	  that	  would	  reduce	  all	  disciplines	  to	  
lower	  ones.”	  While	  Comte	  readily	  acknowledges,	  “the	  more	  complex	  sciences	  presuppose	  
the	  less	  complex	  ones,”	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  “complex	  phenomena	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  
irreducible	  laws	  of	  their	  own.”267	  The	  unity	  of	  science	  therefore	  is	  achieved	  not	  by	  reducing	  
the	  higher	  to	  the	  lower,	  but	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  interdependence	  of	  the	  sciences.	  	  This	  
interdependence	  requires	  those	  in	  each	  discipline	  not	  to	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  whole	  or	  in	  other	  
words,	  not	  to	  over-­‐specialize.	  	  The	  unity	  implied	  in	  such	  an	  ordering	  has	  to	  do	  not	  only	  with	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the	  methods	  employed,	  but	  the	  ends	  sought.	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  usefulness	  is	  the	  
fundamental	  criterion	  of	  the	  value	  of	  knowledge	  and	  those	  in	  each	  science	  must	  be	  
constantly	  reminded	  of	  this	  fact.268	  Societal	  needs	  are	  the	  driving	  force	  of	  science	  properly	  
constituted	  and	  this	  can	  be	  obscured	  if	  those	  within	  each	  science	  do	  not	  appreciate	  the	  
interdependence	  of	  their	  discipline	  on	  others.	  	  As	  Kolakowski	  notes:	  
If	  it	  is	  not	  to	  bog	  down	  in	  fruitless	  speculation	  and	  waste	  man’s	  intellectual	  energies,	  
science	  must	  continually	  be	  reminded	  of	  its	  social	  tasks,	  which	  in	  the	  last	  analysis	  
determine	  its	  value.	  	  This	  practical	  control	  of	  knowledge	  has	  a	  historical	  and	  social	  
character;	  it	  is	  not	  effected	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  individual	  scientists,	  but	  is	  effected	  continuously	  
by	  the	  human	  species	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  In	  the	  last	  analysis,	  then,	  what	  science	  needs	  is	  what	  
society	  needs,	  namely,	  the	  ability	  to	  predict	  events	  and	  to	  influence	  them	  practically.269	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  Comte’s	  law	  of	  the	  three	  states	  and	  subsequent	  ordering	  of	  the	  sciences	  calls	  for	  a	  
dramatic	  overhaul	  of	  both	  the	  social	  and	  educational	  institutions	  of	  society,	  but	  why	  should	  
we	  accept	  such	  a	  program?	  According	  to	  Comte,	  the	  law	  of	  the	  three	  states	  is	  proven	  by	  
history.	  	  That	  each	  science	  passes	  through	  three	  stages	  is	  simply	  an	  empirical	  fact.	  
Furthermore,	  Comte	  appeals	  to	  individual	  experience	  and	  asks:	  “does	  not	  each	  of	  us	  in	  
contemplating	  his	  own	  history	  recollect	  that	  he	  has	  been	  successively—as	  regards	  the	  most	  
important	  ideas—a	  theologian	  in	  childhood,	  a	  metaphysician	  in	  youth,	  and	  a	  natural	  
philosopher	  in	  manhood?”270	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Assuming	  Comte	  is	  right	  about	  the	  historical	  progression	  of	  the	  sciences,	  we	  still	  have	  
yet	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	  it	  is	  the	  way	  things	  should	  continue	  to	  progress.	  	  Is	  such	  a	  
progression	  actually	  good	  for	  humanity?	  To	  such	  questions,	  Comte	  tersely	  replies:	  
“whether	  this	  is	  a	  good	  or	  a	  bad	  thing	  matters	  little;	  the	  general	  fact	  cannot	  be	  denied,	  and	  
that	  is	  sufficient.	  	  We	  may	  deplore	  the	  fact,	  but	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  destroy	  it;	  nor	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consequently,	  can	  we	  neglect	  it,	  on	  pain	  of	  giving	  ourselves	  up	  to	  illusory	  speculations.”271	  
In	  other	  words,	  certain	  questions	  are	  prohibited	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  progress.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  If	  one	  is	  left	  unsatisfied	  by	  the	  “proofs	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  this	  law	  furnished	  by	  direct	  
observation	  of	  the	  race	  of	  the	  individual”,	  Comte	  offers	  further	  theoretical	  considerations	  
that	  show	  its	  necessity.272	  Comte	  continues:	  
The	  most	  important	  of	  these	  considerations	  arises	  from	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  subject	  itself.	  
It	  consists	  in	  the	  need	  at	  every	  epoch	  of	  having	  some	  theory	  to	  connect	  the	  facts,	  while,	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  clearly	  impossible	  for	  the	  primitive	  human	  mind	  to	  form	  theories	  
based	  on	  observation.	  All	  competent	  thinkers	  agree	  with	  Bacon	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  real	  
knowledge	  except	  that	  which	  rests	  upon	  observed	  facts.	  	  This	  fundamental	  maxim	  is	  
evidently	  indisputable	  if	  it	  is	  applied,	  as	  it	  ought	  to	  be,	  to	  the	  mature	  state	  of	  our	  
intelligence.273	  
	  
Comte	  does	  not	  condemn	  those	  in	  the	  past	  for	  not	  thinking	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  because	  they	  
were	  stuck	  in	  the	  primitive	  stages	  of	  knowledge,	  dictated	  by	  the	  movement	  of	  history	  itself.	  	  
The	  theological	  conceptions	  were	  necessary	  for	  the	  primitive	  mind	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  
world	  and	  the	  metaphysical	  conceptions	  served	  their	  purpose	  of	  bridging	  the	  gap	  between	  
the	  theological	  and	  positive	  stages.274	  Yet	  once	  the	  positive	  stage	  has	  been	  reached,	  there	  is	  
no	  going	  back.	  	  Thus,	  Comte	  can	  assert	  that	  “all	  competent	  thinkers”	  must	  agree	  with	  
Bacon’s	  theory	  of	  knowledge.	  	  	  And	  that	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  explicitly	  denounces	  
metaphysical	  and	  theological	  speculations	  as	  being	  “fruitless.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Once	  positive	  philosophy	  has	  enabled	  the	  “irrevocable	  break	  from	  those	  fruitless	  
doctrines	  and	  provisional	  methods	  that	  were	  suited	  only	  to	  its	  first	  flight”,	  the	  potential	  for	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  being	  of	  a	  hybrid	  character,	  were	  eminently	  fitted	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  gradual	  
transition.”	  p.7	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man	  to	  improve	  his	  condition	  is	  limitless.275	  	  But	  that	  cannot	  be	  accomplished	  until	  the	  
positive	  philosophy	  encompasses	  all	  classes	  of	  phenomena.	  	  On	  Comte’s	  account,	  the	  
omission	  of	  social	  phenomena	  from	  the	  positive	  stage	  is	  what	  has	  ultimately	  prevented	  
society	  from	  being	  successfully	  organized.	  	  While	  theological	  and	  metaphysical	  methods	  
have	  been	  expunged	  from	  investigations	  of	  other	  classes	  of	  phenomena,	  those	  “discarded	  
methods	  are,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  still	  used	  exclusively	  for…everything	  that	  concerns	  social	  
phenomena,	  although	  their	  insufficiency	  in	  this	  respect	  has	  been	  fully	  felt	  by	  all	  good	  
minds,	  such	  men	  being	  tired	  of	  these	  empty	  and	  endless	  discussions	  between,	  e.g.,	  divine	  
right	  and	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  people.”276	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  explicit	  prohibition	  of	  questioning	  stands	  as	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  features	  of	  Comte’s	  
system.	  	  Questions	  regarding	  individual	  rights	  and	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  people	  are	  
fundamental	  to	  politics,	  but	  they	  are	  prohibited	  in	  Comte’s	  construction.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  that	  
Comte	  refuses	  to	  answer	  them;	  he	  bans	  them	  outright.	  	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  this.	  	  
One	  is	  that	  such	  questions	  cannot	  be	  answered	  by	  the	  positive	  method.	  	  Yet,	  one	  of	  the	  
primary	  justifications	  given	  for	  adopting	  that	  method	  is	  because	  of	  the	  vast	  success	  it	  has	  
created	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  Instead	  of	  admitting	  any	  type	  of	  limitation	  to	  the	  method,	  
Comte	  prefers	  to	  simply	  ban	  any	  questions	  that	  it	  cannot	  answer.	  	  Another	  reason	  for	  the	  
prohibition	  of	  questions	  is	  that	  Comte	  has	  a	  manic	  desire	  for	  unity.	  	  This	  is	  something	  that	  
nearly	  every	  scholar	  of	  Comte	  agrees	  on.277	  	  He	  wants	  unity	  of	  method	  and	  of	  ends,	  and	  
cannot	  allow	  for	  questions	  that	  would	  either	  lead	  to	  different	  ends	  or	  require	  different	  
methods.	  Comte	  fails	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  mere	  asking	  of	  those	  questions	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constitutes	  a	  fundamental	  element	  of	  human	  existence.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  a	  consensus	  in	  the	  
answers	  to	  such	  questions	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  questions	  should	  not	  be	  
asked	  or	  that	  they	  hold	  no	  value.	  	  To	  the	  contrary,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  most	  meaningful	  
questions	  in	  human	  life	  are	  ultimately	  unanswerable.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  That	  the	  prohibition	  of	  questioning	  can	  lead	  to	  deleterious	  effects	  is	  something	  that	  
Comte	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  fully	  appreciate.	  As	  Voegelin	  notes:	  
Today,	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  totalitarian	  terror,	  we	  are	  perhaps	  inclined	  to	  think	  primarily	  
of	  the	  physical	  forms	  of	  opposition.	  But	  they	  are	  not	  the	  most	  successful.	  The	  opposition	  
becomes	  truly	  radical	  and	  dangerous	  only	  when	  philosophical	  questioning	  is	  itself	  called	  
into	  question,	  when	  doxa	  takes	  on	  the	  appearance	  of	  philosophy,	  when	  it	  arrogates	  itself	  to	  
the	  name	  of	  science	  and	  prohibits	  science	  as	  nonscience.	  	  Only	  if	  this	  prohibition	  can	  be	  made	  
socially	  effective	  will	  the	  point	  have	  been	  reached	  where	  ratio	  can	  no	  longer	  operate	  as	  a	  
remedy	  for	  spiritual	  disorder.278	  
	  
Voegelin	  points	  to	  Comte	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  thinker	  who	  explicitly	  employs	  such	  a	  
prohibition.	  	  According	  to	  Voegelin,	  Comte	  knows	  his	  system	  cannot	  stand	  up	  under	  critical	  
examination	  and	  therefore	  bans	  questions	  about	  its	  premises.	  	  The	  “conscious,	  deliberate,	  
and	  painstakingly	  elaborated	  obstruction	  of	  ratio	  constitutes	  a	  new	  phenomenon.”279	  Those	  
who	  ask	  questions	  about	  “the	  nature,	  calling,	  and	  destiny	  of	  man	  may	  be	  temporarily	  
ignored,”	  but	  later	  on,	  once	  positivism	  has	  taken	  hold	  in	  society,	  such	  people	  “will	  have	  to	  
be	  silenced	  by	  appropriate	  measures.”280	  Here	  we	  can	  recall	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  “solution”	  to	  
those	  who	  do	  not	  go	  along	  with	  the	  plan:	  “Anybody	  who	  does	  not	  obey	  the	  orders	  will	  be	  
treated	  by	  the	  others	  as	  a	  quadruped.”281	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  After	  establishing	  the	  need	  for	  a	  social	  physics,	  Comte	  turns	  to	  the	  positive	  philosophy	  as	  
a	  whole	  and	  seeks	  to	  unify	  the	  sciences.	  	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  Comte	  thinks	  that	  the	  end	  of	  
each	  science	  is	  ultimately	  the	  same:	  to	  improve	  the	  social	  condition.	  	  Although	  the	  sciences	  
have	  been	  positivized,	  they	  have	  not	  reached	  their	  full	  potential	  and	  this	  is	  due	  mainly	  to	  a	  
lack	  of	  an	  overall,	  organizing	  structure.	  	  Comte	  thinks	  that	  the	  sciences	  have	  become	  too	  
specialized,	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  they	  have	  lost	  sight	  of	  the	  primary	  goal:	  	  
improvement	  of	  the	  human	  condition.	  	  Comte	  notes,	  
The	  majority	  of	  scientists	  already	  confine	  themselves	  entirely	  to	  the	  isolated	  consideration	  
of	  a	  more	  or	  less	  extensive	  section	  of	  a	  particular	  science,	  without	  concerning	  themselves	  
much	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  their	  special	  work	  and	  the	  general	  system	  of	  positive	  
knowledge.	  	  Let	  us	  hasten	  to	  remedy	  this	  evil	  before	  it	  becomes	  more	  serious.	  	  Let	  us	  take	  
care	  that	  the	  human	  mind	  does	  not	  lose	  its	  way	  in	  a	  mass	  of	  detail.	  We	  must	  not	  conceal	  
from	  ourselves	  that	  this	  is	  the	  essentially	  weak	  side	  of	  our	  system,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  the	  point	  
on	  which	  the	  partisans	  of	  theological	  and	  metaphysical	  philosophy	  may	  still	  attack	  the	  
positive	  philosophy	  with	  some	  hope	  of	  success.282	  
	  
The	  remedy	  for	  this	  situation	  is	  to	  create	  “one	  more	  great	  specialty,	  consisting	  in	  the	  study	  
of	  general	  scientific	  traits.	  	  These	  scientists	  will	  determine	  the	  exact	  character	  of	  each	  
science	  and	  reduce	  its	  chief	  principles	  to	  the	  smallest	  number	  of	  laws	  or	  principles	  within	  
the	  confines	  of	  the	  positive	  method.”283	  The	  other	  scientists,	  before	  receiving	  specialized	  
training,	  should	  first	  receive	  training	  in	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  positive	  knowledge.	  	  If	  
these	  two	  conditions	  were	  fulfilled,	  “the	  modern	  organization	  of	  the	  scientific	  world	  would	  
then	  be	  accomplished,	  and	  would	  be	  susceptible	  of	  indefinite	  development,	  while	  always	  
preserving	  the	  same	  character.”284	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Having	  established	  “the	  general	  spirit”	  of	  positive	  philosophy,	  Comte	  outlines	  the	  four	  
fundamental	  qualities	  of	  the	  positive	  philosophy.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  study	  of	  positive	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philosophy	  “furnishes	  us	  with	  the	  only	  really	  rational	  means	  of	  exhibiting	  the	  logical	  laws	  
of	  the	  human	  mind,	  which	  have	  hitherto	  been	  sought	  by	  methods	  so	  ill	  calculated	  to	  reveal	  
them.”285	  The	  method	  of	  the	  positive	  philosophy	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  discover	  laws	  that	  can	  
directly	  benefit	  human	  society.	  	  The	  second	  result	  of	  the	  positive	  philosophy	  is	  the	  “general	  
recasting	  of	  our	  educational	  system.”286	  As	  Comte	  states:	  
Competent	  judges	  are	  already	  unanimous	  in	  recognizing	  the	  necessity	  of	  replacing	  our	  
European	  education,	  which	  is	  still	  essentially	  theological,	  metaphysical,	  and	  literary,	  by	  a	  
positive	  education	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  our	  time	  and	  adapted	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  
modern	  civilization.287	  
	  
The	  problem	  is	  that	  “exclusive	  specialty”	  and	  “too	  rigid	  isolation”	  has	  inhibited	  the	  teaching	  
of	  the	  sciences:	  “an	  intelligent	  person	  who	  wishes	  at	  the	  present	  day	  to	  study	  the	  principal	  
branches	  of	  natural	  philosophy…is	  obliged	  to	  study	  each	  separate	  science	  in	  the	  same	  way	  
and	  with	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  detail	  as	  if	  he	  wished	  to	  become	  an	  astronomical	  or	  chemical	  
specialist,	  etc.”288	  This	  prohibits	  the	  type	  of	  general	  education	  that	  is	  required	  for	  society	  to	  
progress.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  “indispensable	  that	  the	  different	  sciences	  of	  which	  it	  is	  
composed…should	  first	  be	  reduced	  to	  what	  constitutes	  their	  essence—that	  is	  to	  their	  
principal	  methods	  and	  most	  important	  results.”289	  Once	  this	  is	  done,	  a	  truly	  rational,	  
general	  education	  can	  be	  provided	  to	  the	  masses	  and	  scientists	  alike.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  reorganization	  of	  education	  leads	  to	  the	  third	  fundamental	  property:	  the	  progress	  of	  
the	  different	  positive	  sciences.	  	  The	  generalizing	  effect	  of	  the	  new	  educational	  system	  will	  
help	  to	  quell	  the	  over-­‐specialization	  found	  in	  each	  particular	  science.	  	  The	  artificial	  
divisions	  created	  by	  such	  specialization	  hinder	  progress	  and	  prevent	  the	  advancements	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that	  could	  be	  taking	  place	  were	  they	  not	  present.	  	  As	  an	  example	  of	  this,	  Comte	  points	  to	  
Descartes	  and	  analytical	  geometry.	  	  The	  genius	  of	  Descartes	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  simply	  
established	  “a	  closer	  connection	  between	  two	  sciences	  that	  had	  hitherto	  been	  regarded	  
from	  separate	  standpoints.”290	  Likewise,	  Comte	  suggests	  that	  other	  sciences	  will	  have	  to	  
interact.	  For	  instance:	  
It	  will	  be	  indispensable	  to	  unite	  the	  chemical	  with	  the	  physiological	  point	  of	  view.	  This	  is	  
shown	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  even	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  illustrious	  chemists	  who	  have	  most	  
powerfully	  contributed	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  this	  doctrine,	  the	  utmost	  that	  can	  be	  said	  is	  that	  
it	  is	  always	  verified	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  inorganic	  bodies;	  but	  it	  is	  no	  less	  constantly	  at	  
fault	  in	  the	  case	  of	  organic	  compounds,	  to	  which	  up	  to	  the	  present	  it	  seems	  quite	  impossible	  
to	  extend	  the	  doctrine…an	  entirely	  new	  order	  of	  considerations,	  belonging	  equally	  to	  
chemistry	  and	  physiology,	  is	  evidently	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  finally,	  in	  some	  way	  or	  other,	  
this	  great	  question	  of	  natural	  philosophy.291	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  fourth	  fundamental	  property	  of	  the	  positive	  philosophy	  is	  the	  most	  important:	  	  it	  
serves	  as	  the	  “only	  solid	  basis	  of	  the	  social	  reorganization	  that	  must	  terminate	  the	  crisis	  in	  
which	  the	  most	  civilized	  nations	  have	  found	  themselves	  for	  so	  long.”292	  Comte	  bases	  this	  
assumption	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  “the	  whole	  social	  mechanism	  rests	  finally	  on	  opinions.”293The	  
great	  political	  and	  moral	  crisis	  of	  existing	  societies	  is	  ultimately	  due	  to	  intellectual	  
anarchy.294	  In	  fact,	  he	  calls	  such	  a	  divergence	  of	  opinion	  the	  “gravest	  evil”	  and	  notes	  that	  its	  
persistence	  causes	  an	  “essentially	  revolutionary	  state,	  in	  spite	  of	  all	  the	  political	  palliatives	  
that	  may	  be	  adopted.”295	  	  The	  solution	  of	  course	  is	  to	  create	  an	  agreement	  on	  first	  
principles	  and	  once	  obtained,	  “the	  appropriate	  institutions	  will	  follow,	  without	  giving	  rise	  
to	  any	  grave	  shock;	  for	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  the	  disorder	  will	  have	  been	  already	  dissipated	  by	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the	  mere	  fact	  of	  agreement.”296	  Again,	  we	  must	  recall	  that	  the	  disagreement	  on	  first	  
principles	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  mutually	  exclusive,	  incompatible	  nature	  of	  the	  theological,	  
metaphysical,	  and	  positive	  philosophies.	  That	  empirical	  fact,	  on	  Comte’s	  argument,	  leaves	  
us	  with	  the	  solution	  of	  choosing	  one,	  and	  discarding	  the	  other	  two.	  But	  we	  need	  not	  quibble	  
over	  which	  path	  to	  choose	  because	  history	  has	  chosen	  it	  for	  us;	  the	  positive	  philosophy	  will	  
prevail.297	  
	  	  	  	  	  Before	  moving	  on	  to	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  Comte’s	  work,	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  Religion	  of	  
Humanity,	  we	  should	  recall	  a	  few	  of	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  Cours,	  which	  served	  as	  the	  
cornerstone	  of	  Comte’s	  overall	  philosophy.	  	  The	  Cours	  represents	  an	  intellectual	  revolution,	  
but	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  it	  is	  only	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  reorganization	  of	  society.	  	  The	  
fractured	  nature	  of	  French	  society,	  and	  arguably	  of	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole,	  caused	  Comte	  to	  
seek	  a	  unifying	  principle	  and	  he	  found	  that	  in	  his	  “discovery”	  of	  the	  law	  of	  the	  three	  states.	  	  
He	  then	  used	  that	  law	  to	  justify	  the	  founding	  of	  social	  physics	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  
triumph	  of	  positive	  philosophy	  over	  the	  theological	  and	  metaphysical	  philosophies.	  	  In	  
doing	  so,	  he	  set	  forth	  a	  progressive	  theory	  of	  history,	  following	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  fellow	  
countrymen	  such	  as	  Saint-­‐Simon,	  Condorcet,	  Turgot,	  and	  D’Alembert.	  	  The	  intellectual	  
victory	  of	  positivism	  was	  guaranteed	  by	  history	  itself	  and	  questions	  about	  the	  premises	  of	  
the	  system	  were	  not	  permitted.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  Comte’s	  supreme	  confidence	  in	  the	  ultimate	  
supremacy	  of	  the	  positive	  philosophy,	  he	  realized	  that	  it	  would	  be	  insufficient	  to	  enact	  the	  
drastic	  social	  reforms	  he	  so	  desired.	  	  The	  intellectual	  revolution	  would	  provide	  the	  
foundation,	  but	  a	  spiritual	  revolution	  would	  be	  required	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  positive	  
polity.	  	  Thus,	  we	  must	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  second	  “phase”	  of	  Comte’s	  thought.	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Religion	  of	  Humanity	  
	  	  	  	  	  What	  ultimately	  separates	  Comte	  from	  his	  predecessors	  is	  not	  his	  call	  for	  a	  positive	  
science	  or	  his	  articulation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  three	  states;	  the	  likes	  of	  Saint-­‐Simon,	  D’Alembert,	  
Diderot,	  and	  Turgot	  had	  all	  expressed	  similar	  ideas.	  Comte’s	  founding	  of	  the	  Religion	  of	  
Humanity	  and	  his	  own	  “religiousness”	  is	  what	  truly	  separates	  him	  from	  his	  predecessors:	  
Pseudo-­‐prophetic	  charisma	  is	  the	  strength	  of	  Comte,	  and	  while	  his	  church	  was	  not	  much	  of	  
a	  success,	  his	  religious	  enthusiasm	  was	  strong	  enough	  to	  endow	  a	  body	  of	  ideas,	  although	  
of	  dubious	  scientific	  value,	  with	  the	  glow	  of	  a	  revelation	  on	  whose	  acceptance	  depends	  the	  
salvation	  of	  mankind.	  	  Comte	  has	  not	  added	  much	  as	  a	  thinker	  to	  the	  complex	  of	  Positivist	  
ideas;	  he	  has	  added	  to	  them	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  a	  religious	  founder	  by	  shifting	  them	  to	  the	  
level	  of	  a	  dogmatic	  religion.298	  	  
	  
The	  new	  worldview,	  first	  brought	  about	  by	  Newton’s	  Principia,	  had	  left	  a	  spiritual	  void	  and	  
Comte	  recognized	  the	  necessity	  of	  filling	  that	  void.	  	  His	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  was	  designed	  
to	  replace	  Christianity;	  and	  just	  as	  the	  new	  science	  had	  displaced	  the	  old	  through	  empirical	  
verification,	  so	  too	  would	  the	  new	  religion	  take	  its	  rightful	  place.	  	  In	  line	  with	  his	  positivist	  
philosophy,	  Comte	  offered	  a	  “demonstrable”	  religion	  that	  would	  supplant	  the	  “revealed”	  
religion	  of	  Christianity.	  	  After	  serving	  as	  the	  “Aristotle	  of	  Positivism”,	  Comte	  took	  on	  the	  
mantle	  of	  St.	  Paul	  in	  the	  founding	  of	  his	  new	  religion.	  	  Let	  us	  now	  explore	  the	  fundamentals	  
of	  this	  religion,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  primary	  motivations	  behind	  its	  implementation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Comte’s	  emphasis	  on	  unity	  in	  the	  Cours	  extends	  to	  his	  System	  of	  Positive	  Polity	  and	  the	  
Religion	  of	  Humanity.	  	  The	  two	  dominant	  political	  forces	  in	  France,	  the	  “retrogrades”	  and	  
“progressives”,	  had	  failed	  to	  establish	  a	  satisfactory	  political	  order.	  	  As	  Wernick	  notes,	  the	  
retrograde	  party	  consisted	  mainly	  of	  “royalist	  counter-­‐revolutionaries	  attached	  to	  the	  
illusory	  absolutisms	  of	  Catholic	  dogma.”299	  Opposing	  them	  were	  those	  who	  had	  triumphed	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  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution.	  p.90	  
299	  Wernick	  p.34	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in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution	  and	  “who	  subscribed	  to	  a	  metaphysical	  belief	  
that	  individuals	  could	  spin	  workable	  utopias	  out	  of	  their	  individual	  brains.	  Divided	  by	  a	  
one-­‐sided	  attachment	  either	  to	  reason	  and	  progress,	  or	  to	  faith	  and	  order,	  both	  camps	  were	  
equally	  doctrinaire	  and	  equally	  incapable	  of	  thinking	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  shattered	  
social	  order	  in	  line	  with	  its	  actual	  laws	  and	  requirements.”300	  Comte’s	  proposed	  solution	  
then	  was	  to	  synthesize	  the	  two	  primary	  elements	  of	  each:	  	  order	  and	  progress.	  	  Comte’s	  
establishment	  of	  sociology	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  scientific	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  enact	  this	  
solution	  and	  the	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  primary	  ordering	  source	  within	  
society.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Although	  Comte	  had	  a	  disdain	  for	  the	  theological	  principles	  of	  the	  retrograde	  party,	  he	  
had	  an	  appreciation	  for	  the	  order	  that	  religious	  uniformity	  could	  bring	  about.	  	  Comte	  
especially	  found	  Catholic	  organizational	  principles	  appealing,	  although	  this	  admiration	  did	  
not	  extend	  to	  Catholic	  doctrine.	  	  As	  Huxley	  famously	  notes,	  Comte’s	  positive	  religion	  can	  be	  
characterized	  as	  “Catholicism	  minus	  Christianity.”301	  The	  universality	  desired	  by	  the	  
Catholic	  Church	  could	  truly	  be	  achieved	  through	  a	  demonstrable,	  scientific	  religion.302	  	  
Religion	  had	  historically	  served	  as	  a	  source	  of	  order	  and	  Comte	  realized	  its	  utility	  in	  that	  
regard.	  	  However,	  progress	  could	  not	  occur	  as	  long	  as	  that	  religion	  was	  stuck	  in	  the	  
outdated	  modes	  of	  metaphysical	  and	  theological	  philosophizing.	  	  Thus,	  Comte	  set	  out	  to	  
base	  his	  doctrine	  on	  positive	  principles	  that	  could	  be	  accepted	  by	  everyone	  since	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300	  Ibid	  p.34	  
301	  Ibid	  p.185	  
302	  “Our	  sole	  object	  here	  is	  to	  effect,	  for	  the	  new	  religion,	  a	  general	  exposition	  equivalent	  to	  
that	  which	  formerly	  taught	  you	  Catholicism.	  This	  second	  operation	  ought	  to	  be	  even	  easier	  
than	  the	  former,	  for	  not	  only	  is	  your	  reason	  now	  mature,	  but	  the	  doctrine	  is	  by	  its	  nature,	  
more	  intelligible	  as	  always	  demonstrable.”	  See	  Auguste	  Comte.	  The	  Catechism	  of	  Positive	  
Religion.	  Trans.	  Congreve,	  3rd	  edition.	  (London:	  	  Ballantyne,	  Hanson	  and	  Co.	  Printing,	  1891)	  
p.49	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would	  be	  demonstrable.	  	  Faith	  in	  an	  unseen	  God	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  required;	  the	  only	  faith	  
required	  would	  be	  in	  the	  science	  upon	  which	  Comte	  based	  his	  system.	  	  But	  since	  History	  
had	  already	  determined	  its	  triumph,	  there	  was	  little	  room	  for	  doubt;	  both	  positivism	  and	  
the	  subsequent	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  were	  destined	  to	  prevail.	  And	  just	  as	  Comte	  had	  
served	  as	  the	  mouthpiece	  for	  the	  new	  philosophy,	  he	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  new	  
religion.	  	  Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  main	  principles	  of	  the	  new	  religion.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Comte’s	  new	  religion	  was	  to	  be	  based	  on	  three	  primary	  institutions:	  	  a	  doctrine,	  a	  moral	  
rule,	  and	  a	  system	  of	  worship.	  All	  of	  these	  would	  be	  organized	  and	  coordinated	  by	  the	  
Positivist	  church.303	  The	  doctrine	  had	  already	  been	  formulated	  through	  Comte’s	  own	  
writings,	  although	  he	  never	  was	  able	  to	  complete	  important	  aspects	  of	  his	  project	  (such	  as	  
science	  of	  morals).	  	  The	  moral	  rule,	  or	  regime,	  would	  follow	  the	  framework	  set	  forth	  in	  
Positive	  Polity,	  and	  the	  cult	  would	  be	  formed	  from	  the	  initial	  members	  of	  his	  new	  church.	  	  
As	  Wernick	  notes,	  “the	  Positivist	  System	  would	  provide	  the	  scientific-­‐humanist	  equivalent	  
to	  what	  systematic	  theology	  had	  been	  in	  the	  high	  Middle	  Ages:	  	  it	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  
intellectually	  unifying	  basis	  of	  the	  new	  industrial	  order.”304	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  first	  step	  in	  implementing	  the	  new	  Religion	  would	  be	  to	  disseminate	  the	  doctrine.	  	  
This	  would	  be	  done	  primarily	  through	  a	  recasting	  of	  the	  educational	  system;	  something	  
Comte	  had	  initially	  called	  for	  in	  the	  Cours.	  	  The	  individual’s	  education	  was	  to	  start	  at	  
mother’s	  knee,	  “continue	  in	  the	  schools	  with	  a	  revamped	  curriculum	  under	  teacher-­‐priests,	  
and	  persist	  in	  the	  sermons	  and	  ceremonies	  which	  Positive	  Religion	  would	  install	  in	  a	  
systematic	  and	  pervasive	  ritual	  round.”305	  Those	  ceremonies	  included	  the	  sacraments	  of	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  Wernick	  p.2	  	  
304	  Ibid	  p.2	  
305	  Ibid	  p.2	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the	  new	  religion,	  which	  were	  designed	  to	  accompany	  each	  stage	  of	  life	  and	  “through	  which	  
each	  servant	  of	  Humanity	  would	  solemnly	  rededicate	  himself	  to	  a	  life	  of	  service.”306	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  A	  sweeping	  reform	  of	  education,	  while	  helpful,	  would	  be	  insufficient	  to	  the	  task	  of	  
implementing	  the	  new	  religion;	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  individual,	  the	  major	  institutions	  of	  
society	  had	  to	  be	  reordered.	  	  This	  included	  the	  family,	  the	  economic	  system,	  and	  the	  polity,	  
in	  addition	  to	  the	  obvious	  reconstitution	  of	  the	  Church:	  
The	  family:	  	  role-­‐divided,	  chivalric,	  extended,	  replete	  with	  children,	  servants	  and	  animals.	  	  
The	  sphere	  of	  production:	  	  cooperative,	  functionally	  ordered,	  justly	  meritocratic.	  	  The	  
polity:	  	  reduced	  to	  the	  humanly	  manageable	  scale	  of	  a	  small	  republic,	  oriented	  to	  
production	  not	  war,	  and	  linked	  to	  others	  in	  an	  ultimately	  global	  confederation.	  	  
Overarching	  direction	  would	  be	  provided	  by	  a	  complementary	  leadership	  of	  temporal	  and	  
spiritual	  authorities.	  	  The	  former	  was	  to	  consist	  of	  bankers,	  industrialists	  and	  engineers	  
from	  whom,	  in	  each	  republic,	  a	  committee	  of	  thirty,	  topped	  by	  a	  triumvirate,	  would	  be	  
selected	  to	  direct	  the	  state.	  	  The	  new	  ‘Spirituals,’	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  would	  be	  the	  scientists-­‐
philosophers-­‐teachers-­‐pastors	  encadred	  in	  the	  Positivist	  priesthood	  itself.307	  
	  
Borrowing	  from	  the	  medieval,	  Catholic	  model,	  the	  “two	  leading	  powers	  of	  industrial	  society	  
were	  to	  be	  not	  only	  functionally	  distinct:	  	  each	  was	  to	  have	  its	  own	  form	  of	  rule.”308	  The	  
priests	  of	  the	  Positivist	  church	  were	  to	  hold	  a	  purely	  moral,	  directive	  power.	  	  Unlike	  the	  
Catholic	  priests	  however,	  the	  priests	  of	  the	  Positivist	  church	  were	  to	  care	  not	  only	  for	  souls,	  
but	  bodies	  also.309	  	  This	  is	  because	  they	  now	  held	  the	  power	  of	  modern	  science;	  something	  
the	  medieval	  Catholics	  did	  not	  possess.310The	  lay	  elites,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  would	  hold	  
coercive	  power	  and	  coordinate	  production	  and	  distribution.311	  The	  latter	  would	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306	  Ibid	  p.2	  
307	  Ibid	  p.3	  
308	  Ibid	  p.3	  
309	  “It	  is	  quite	  as	  easy	  to	  see	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  every	  priesthood	  which	  aims	  at	  guiding	  the	  
soul	  whilst	  taking	  no	  account	  of	  its	  subordination	  to	  the	  body.	  This	  separation…must	  cease,	  
once	  for	  all,	  by	  a	  wise	  reincorporation	  of	  medicine	  into	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  priesthood.”	  See	  
Catechism	  p.36	  
310	  Note	  the	  similarities	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Solomon	  in	  Bacon’s	  New	  Atlantis.	  
311	  Wernick	  p.3	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overrun	  their	  bounds	  because	  the	  church	  would	  hold	  the	  support	  of	  the	  proletariats	  and	  
women.312	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  third	  institution	  of	  the	  new	  religion	  was	  the	  cult:	  	  “the	  organized	  yet	  effusive	  
worship	  of	  Humanity.	  	  Under	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  new	  priesthood,	  this	  was	  to	  be	  conducted	  
through	  public	  festivals,	  through	  worship	  at	  the	  family	  hearth	  and	  ancestral	  tomb,	  and	  
through	  thrice-­‐daily	  private	  devotions.”313	  Such	  festivals	  would	  follow	  the	  Positivist	  
Calendar	  provided	  by	  Comte,	  which	  was	  modeled	  after	  Humanity’s	  greatest	  
achievements.314	  	  As	  Wernick	  notes,	  “	  if	  the	  doctrine	  was	  designed	  to	  synthesize	  the	  
understanding,	  and	  the	  regime	  to	  synergize	  action,	  the	  cult	  was	  to	  mobilize	  and	  canalize	  
that	  benevolent	  harmonization	  of	  the	  instincts	  Comte	  called	  sympathie,	  as	  the	  proper	  
inspiration	  of	  the	  other	  two.”315	  	  
	  	  	  	  The	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  “subjective”	  complement	  to	  the	  “objective”	  
foundation	  of	  positive	  philosophy	  that	  had	  been	  established	  in	  the	  Cours.	  	  This	  required	  a	  
shift	  in	  emphasis	  from	  the	  intellectual	  to	  the	  emotional.	  	  Sentiment	  would	  be	  the	  driving	  
force	  of	  the	  new	  religion.	  As	  Wernick	  points	  out:	  
Positivism	  took	  sentiments,	  especially	  those	  of	  the	  most	  elevated	  forms	  of	  love,	  to	  be	  the	  
essence	  of	  religion.	  In	  Comte’s	  general	  formula:	  	  feeling	  guides	  action	  in	  line	  with	  practical	  
knowledge	  supplied	  by	  the	  intellect.	  The	  worship	  of	  Humanity	  was	  to	  fix	  in	  its	  adherents	  a	  
lively	  impression	  of	  such	  harmonious	  coordination	  of	  the	  whole	  human	  being.	  The	  
effusions	  of	  its	  rituals	  would	  also	  strengthen	  the	  altruistic	  impulses	  seen	  as	  vital	  for	  the	  
correct	  orientation	  of	  thinking	  and	  action.316	  
	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312	  As	  Comte	  notes,	  women	  and	  proletariats	  will	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  moral	  government	  
because	  their	  “good	  sense	  has	  been	  left	  unimpaired	  by	  our	  vicious	  system	  of	  education.”	  	  
Ibid	  p.3	  
313	  Ibid	  p.4	  
314	  The	  Positivist	  Calendar	  includes	  the	  likes	  of	  Shakespeare,	  Bacon,	  Newton,	  Descartes,	  
Anaximander,	  Dante,	  St.	  Paul,	  and	  Caesar.	  	  
315	  Wernick	  p.4	  
316	  Ibid	  p.4	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It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  shift	  from	  an	  objective	  to	  subjective	  synthesis	  does	  not	  
represent	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  Comte’s	  project.	  His	  end	  goal	  remained	  the	  same:	  to	  
reorganize	  society	  on	  positive	  principles.	  	  The	  Cours	  was	  never	  intended	  to	  be	  the	  final	  
word	  on	  the	  subject,	  something	  that	  Comte	  made	  clear	  both	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  composition	  
and	  in	  his	  later	  works.	  Yet,	  we	  also	  must	  not	  ignore	  the	  impetus	  that	  caused	  Comte’s	  later	  
works	  to	  take	  on	  the	  character	  that	  they	  did.	  He	  knew	  all	  along	  that	  a	  purely	  intellectual	  
approach	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  and	  that	  people	  would	  have	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  project,	  but	  it	  
was	  unclear	  just	  how	  he	  would	  accomplish	  that	  in	  his	  early	  works.	  The	  period	  between	  
1844-­‐1846	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  when	  Comte	  finally	  formulated	  the	  character	  of	  the	  
subjective	  synthesis.	  His	  “brief,	  passionate	  ‘but	  morally	  pure’	  affair	  with	  the	  ineligible	  
Clotilde	  de	  Vaux”	  led	  Comte	  to	  value	  sentiment	  more	  than	  ever	  before	  and	  seems	  to	  have	  
provided	  the	  motivation	  necessary	  to	  found	  his	  new	  religion.317	  Immediately	  following	  her	  
untimely	  death,	  Comte	  proclaimed	  himself	  Pope	  of	  Humanity	  and	  began	  systematically	  
constructing	  the	  religion.318	  It	  is	  to	  Clotilde	  that	  Comte	  dedicates	  his	  later	  works	  and	  she	  is	  
given	  a	  primary	  role	  in	  the	  new	  religion.319	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  specifics	  of	  the	  Religion	  of	  Humanity	  are	  outlined	  in	  the	  Catechism	  of	  Positive	  
Religion.	  	  While	  we	  need	  not	  delve	  into	  every	  detail,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  some	  of	  the	  main	  
features	  of	  the	  work.	  	  The	  first	  point	  worth	  noting	  is	  the	  form	  of	  the	  work.	  Comte	  presents	  
us	  with	  a	  dialogue,	  a	  form	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  especially	  suited	  for	  religious	  instruction:	  
The	  dialogue,	  the	  proper	  form	  of	  all	  real	  communication,	  is	  reserved	  for	  the	  setting	  forth	  of	  
such	  conceptions	  as	  are	  at	  once	  important	  enough	  and	  ripe	  enough	  to	  demand	  it.	  This	  is	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  Ibid	  p.24	  
318	  Ibid	  p.24	  
319	  “Without	  her	  I	  should	  have	  never	  been	  able	  to	  practically	  make	  the	  career	  or	  St.	  Paul	  
follow	  on	  that	  of	  Aristotle,	  by	  founding	  the	  universal	  religion	  on	  true	  philosophy,	  after	  I	  had	  
extracted	  the	  latter	  from	  real	  science.”	  See	  Catechism	  p.13	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why,	  in	  all	  times,	  religious	  instruction	  is	  given	  in	  the	  form	  of	  conversation	  and	  not	  of	  simple	  
statement.	  	  Far	  from	  betraying	  a	  negligence	  excusable	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  secondary	  
importance,	  this	  form,	  rightly	  managed,	  is,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  only	  mode	  of	  exposition	  
which	  is	  really	  didactic:	  it	  suits	  every	  intelligence.320	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  Comte	  chose	  Clotilde	  as	  the	  interlocutress,	  with	  an	  unnamed	  Priest	  (presumably	  Comte	  
himself)	  of	  the	  new	  religion	  providing	  the	  answers.	  	  The	  choice	  of	  Clotilde	  represents	  
another	  acknowledgment	  of	  her	  influence	  on	  Comte,	  but	  more	  importantly,	  it	  represents	  
the	  elevated	  role	  of	  women	  in	  the	  new	  religion.	  	  While	  the	  objective	  synthesis	  of	  the	  Cours	  
was	  designed	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  intellect	  of	  the	  proletariats,	  the	  subjective	  synthesis	  appealed	  
to	  the	  feelings,	  or	  sentiments,	  of	  women.321	  	  Women	  were	  to	  hold	  a	  central	  place	  in	  the	  
reorganization	  of	  society	  by	  providing	  the	  initial	  moral	  education	  of	  its	  citizens.	  The	  
education	  at	  “mother’s	  knee”	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  proper	  development	  of	  the	  moral	  sense	  
required	  by	  the	  new	  religion.	  	  Comte	  saw	  his	  “elevation”	  of	  women	  as	  a	  crucial	  step	  in	  the	  
restructuring	  of	  society:	  
Man	  ought	  to	  maintain	  woman,	  in	  order	  that	  she	  may	  be	  able	  to	  discharge	  her	  holy	  
function.	  This	  Catechism	  will,	  I	  hope,	  make	  sensible	  the	  intimate	  connection	  of	  such	  a	  
condition	  with	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  great	  renovation,	  not	  merely	  moral,	  but	  also	  mental,	  and	  
even	  material.	  	  Influenced	  by	  the	  holy	  reaction	  of	  this	  revolution	  in	  the	  position	  of	  women,	  
the	  revolution	  of	  the	  proletariat	  will	  by	  itself	  clear	  itself	  of	  the	  subversive	  tendencies	  which	  
as	  yet	  neutralize	  it.	  	  Women’s	  object	  being	  everywhere	  to	  secure	  the	  legitimate	  supremacy	  
of	  moral	  force,	  she	  visits	  with	  especial	  reprobation	  all	  collective	  violence.322	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  primary	  function	  of	  providing	  moral	  guidance,	  the	  social	  influence	  of	  this	  
elevation	  will	  “facilitate	  the	  advent	  to	  political	  power	  of	  the	  industrial	  patriciate	  and	  of	  the	  
Positive	  priesthood,	  by	  leading	  both	  to	  dissociate	  themselves	  once	  and	  for	  all	  from	  the	  
heterogeneous	  and	  ephemeral	  classes	  which	  directed	  the	  transition	  in	  its	  negative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320	  Ibid	  p.11	  
321	  As	  we	  will	  recall,	  the	  proletariats	  and	  women	  make	  up	  the	  primary	  audience	  for	  Comte’s	  
project	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
322	  Ibid	  p.24	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phase.”323	  This	  will	  culminate	  in	  the	  peaceful	  termination	  of	  the	  revolution	  in	  the	  West,	  
under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  “true	  servants	  of	  Humanity.”324	  The	  retrograde	  and	  anarchical,	  or	  
revolutionary,	  parties	  will	  be	  eradicated	  as	  “all	  persistence	  in	  the	  theological	  or	  
metaphysical	  state”	  will	  be	  “treated	  as	  a	  weakness	  of	  brain	  incapacitating	  for	  
government.”325	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  the	  role	  of	  women	  is	  primarily	  domestic,	  the	  priest	  functions	  to	  cultivate	  civic	  
morality.	  	  Comte	  bases	  his	  whole	  system	  on	  the	  “concurrence	  of	  feeling	  with	  reason	  to	  
regulate	  activity.”326	  The	  dialogue	  between	  Clotilde	  and	  the	  priest	  represents	  this	  union	  
between	  the	  heart	  and	  the	  intellect,	  between	  the	  emotional	  and	  rational.	  	  As	  Comte	  notes:	  
The	  woman	  and	  priest	  are,	  in	  fact,	  the	  two	  indispensable	  elements	  of	  the	  true	  moderating	  
power,	  which	  is	  at	  once	  domestic	  and	  civic.	  	  In	  organizing	  this	  holy	  coalition	  in	  the	  interests	  
of	  society,	  each	  constituent	  proceeds	  here	  in	  conformity	  with	  its	  true	  nature:	  	  the	  heart	  
states	  the	  questions,	  the	  intellect	  answers	  them.	  	  Thus	  the	  very	  form	  of	  this	  Catechism	  
points	  at	  once	  to	  the	  great	  central	  idea	  of	  Positivism:	  	  man	  thinking	  under	  the	  inspiration	  of	  
woman,	  to	  bring	  synthesis	  into	  constant	  harmony	  with	  sympathy	  in	  order	  to	  regularize	  
synergy.327	  
	  
The	  emphasis	  on	  unity	  is	  once	  again	  apparent	  as	  Comte	  looks	  to	  reconcile	  the	  private	  and	  
public,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intellectual	  and	  emotional,	  within	  his	  system.	  	  And	  to	  Comte	  religion,	  
rightly	  constructed,	  can	  provide	  the	  ultimate	  unifying	  force	  within	  society.	  	  
	  	  	  	  While	  religion	  provides	  the	  means	  to	  unification,	  the	  structure	  and	  character	  of	  the	  
previous	  religions	  proved	  inadequate	  to	  truly	  create	  a	  universal	  order.	  	  As	  Comte	  points	  
out,	  every	  religious	  system	  “necessarily	  rests	  on	  some	  explanation	  or	  other	  of	  the	  world	  
and	  of	  man,	  the	  twofold	  object	  at	  all	  times	  of	  our	  thoughts,	  whether	  speculative	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323	  Ibid	  p.25	  
324	  Comte	  is	  vague	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  how	  this	  transition	  will	  occur	  in	  practice.	  It	  
is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Comte	  thinks	  this	  can	  take	  place	  without	  a	  violent	  revolution.	  	  
325	  Ibid	  p.25	  
326	  Ibid	  p.18	  
327	  Ibid	  p.18	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practical.”328	  What	  separates	  the	  Positive	  religion	  from	  its	  predecessors	  is	  that	  it	  can	  
answer	  such	  questions	  adequately:	  
The	  Positive	  faith	  sets	  forth	  directly	  the	  real	  laws	  of	  the	  different	  phenomena	  observable,	  
whether	  internal	  or	  external;	  i.e.,	  their	  unvarying	  relations	  of	  succession	  and	  resemblance,	  
which	  enables	  us	  to	  foresee	  some	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  others.	  	  It	  puts	  aside,	  as	  absolutely	  
beyond	  our	  reach	  and	  essentially	  idle,	  all	  inquiry	  into	  causes	  properly	  so-­‐called,	  first	  or	  
final,	  of	  any	  events	  whatever.	  	  In	  its	  theoretical	  conceptions	  it	  always	  explains	  the	  how,	  
never	  the	  why.	  	  But	  when	  it	  is	  pointing	  out	  the	  means	  of	  guiding	  our	  activity,	  it	  on	  the	  
contrary	  makes	  consideration	  of	  the	  end	  constantly	  paramount;	  as	  the	  practical	  result	  is	  
then	  certainly	  due	  to	  an	  intelligent	  will.329	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  remarkable	  passage	  in	  that	  Comte	  boldly	  eschews	  ultimate	  questions	  from	  
religion.	  	  In	  the	  Cours,	  Comte	  had	  rejected	  such	  questions	  as	  falling	  outside	  the	  appropriate	  
parameters	  of	  positive	  philosophy.	  	  This	  was	  primarily	  because	  they	  produced	  little,	  or	  no,	  
practical	  results	  and	  did	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  methodology	  of	  positive	  science.	  	  However,	  the	  
realm	  of	  religion	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  precisely	  where	  such	  questions	  would	  be	  of	  paramount	  
importance.	  	  While	  we	  may	  not	  have	  any	  “use”	  for	  knowing	  the	  cause	  of	  gravity,	  we	  can	  
certainly	  benefit	  from	  knowing	  how	  it	  operates.	  But	  in	  religion,	  it	  does	  indeed	  matter	  why	  
things	  work	  the	  way	  they	  do.	  Human	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  undoubtedly	  impacted	  by	  such	  
questions,	  as	  is	  human	  action.	  	  If	  we	  are	  created	  Imago	  Dei,	  by	  an	  omniscient	  and	  
benevolent	  God,	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  approach	  society	  in	  a	  different	  manner	  than	  if	  we	  are	  
simply	  the	  result	  of	  a	  mechanical	  act	  of	  nature.	  	  But	  Comte	  does	  not	  permit	  such	  questions	  
because	  they	  reflect	  a	  “retrograde”	  mode	  of	  thought	  and	  tend	  to	  lead	  to	  discord.330	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  shift	  then	  to	  a	  purely	  immanent	  religion	  is	  what	  separates	  Comte’s	  Religion	  of	  
Humanity	  from	  its	  predecessors.	  	  The	  classical	  and	  medieval	  emphasis	  on	  the	  cultivation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328	  Ibid	  p.41	  
329	  Ibid	  p.41	  
330	  Since	  such	  questions	  belong	  to	  the	  outmoded	  theological	  and	  metaphysical	  phases,	  they	  
can	  no	  longer	  be	  asked.	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the	  soul	  is	  set	  aside	  in	  favor	  a	  materialistic	  view	  that	  places	  primacy	  on	  physical	  health.	  	  
This	  is	  evident	  in	  Comte’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  incorporation	  of	  medicine	  into	  the	  priesthood.	  	  
Without	  an	  eternal	  soul	  to	  worry	  about,	  or	  an	  afterlife	  to	  ponder,	  the	  emphasis	  falls	  on	  the	  
only	  existence	  science	  assures	  of,	  our	  bodily	  existence.	  This	  elevates	  politics	  to	  first-­‐rate	  
importance	  and	  the	  paradise	  that	  used	  to	  be	  reserved	  for	  the	  afterlife	  must	  be	  implemented	  
on	  earth,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  realized	  at	  all.	  To	  get	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  this	  shift,	  let	  us	  explore	  
the	  new	  deity	  of	  Comte’s	  religion,	  Humanity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  subsequent	  actions	  that	  are	  
intended	  to	  honor	  and	  strengthen	  it.331	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Comte	  defines	  the	  new	  deity,	  Humanity,	  as:	  
	  The	  whole	  of	  human	  beings,	  past,	  present,	  and	  future.	  	  The	  word	  whole	  points	  out	  clearly	  
that	  you	  must	  not	  take	  in	  all	  men,	  but	  those	  only	  who	  are	  really	  assimilable,	  in	  virtue	  of	  a	  
real	  co-­‐operation	  towards	  the	  common	  existence.	  	  Though	  all	  are	  necessarily	  born	  children	  
of	  Humanity,	  all	  do	  not	  become	  her	  servants,	  and	  many	  remain	  in	  the	  parasitic	  state	  which	  
was	  only	  excusable	  during	  their	  education.332	  
	  
This	  understanding	  of	  Humanity	  has	  several	  practical	  consequences	  worth	  noting.	  	  The	  
first	  is	  that	  although	  everyone	  “belongs”	  to	  Humanity	  in	  the	  proper	  sense,	  some	  will	  be	  
counterproductive	  to	  its	  flourishing.	  	  This	  group	  surely	  includes	  the	  retrogrades	  and	  
revolutionaries,	  as	  well	  as	  anyone	  else	  who	  persists	  in	  asking	  theological	  or	  metaphysical	  
questions.	  The	  corollary	  to	  this	  is	  that	  a	  select	  group	  of	  people	  will	  truly	  serve	  Humanity	  
and	  it	  is	  upon	  this	  group	  that	  Comte	  wishes	  to	  bestow	  the	  greatest	  honors.	  	  The	  historical	  
nature	  of	  Humanity	  also	  means	  that	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  time,	  the	  present	  generation	  will	  
contribute	  less	  to	  Humanity	  than	  it	  will	  receive	  from	  it.	  This	  indebtedness	  to	  the	  past	  leads	  
to	  “a	  tendency	  to	  strengthen	  the	  power	  of	  the	  dead	  over	  the	  living	  in	  every	  actual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331	  For	  a	  pertinent	  contemporary	  example	  of	  this	  conception	  of	  Humanity,	  see	  James	  
Ceaser’s	  “The	  Roots	  of	  Obama	  Worship.”	  Weekly	  Standard.	  	  Vol.	  15,	  No.	  18.	  January	  25,	  
2010.	  	  http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/roots-­‐obama-­‐worship	  
332	  Catechism	  p.53	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operation.”333	  	  In	  place	  of	  the	  classical	  and	  Christian	  distinction	  between	  the	  soul	  and	  body,	  
Comte	  designates	  an	  objective	  and	  subjective	  aspect	  to	  our	  lives.	  	  The	  objective	  simply	  
refers	  to	  our	  bodily	  existence,	  the	  “temporary,	  but	  conscious”	  span	  of	  time	  that	  we	  are	  on	  
earth.	  	  The	  subjective	  is	  the	  “noble	  immortality,	  necessarily	  disconnected	  with	  the	  body”	  
and	  refers	  to	  the	  “sum	  of	  our	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  functions.”334Comte	  even	  uses	  the	  term	  
soul	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  subjective,	  but	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  no	  corresponding	  entity	  
involved.	  	  The	  immortality	  of	  the	  subjective	  is	  due	  to	  commemoration	  of	  the	  dead	  by	  the	  
living.335	  	  Those	  who	  have	  contributed	  to	  Humanity	  thus	  live	  on	  forever	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  
subsequent	  generations	  that	  benefit	  from	  their	  achievements.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Comte	  insures	  that	  the	  true	  servants	  of	  Humanity	  will	  be	  justly	  rewarded	  in	  the	  new	  
religion.	  The	  Positive	  Calendar,	  composed	  of	  13	  months	  (28	  days	  each),	  is	  the	  most	  
prominent	  example	  of	  this	  emphasis.	  	  Each	  month	  is	  named	  after	  a	  great	  servant	  of	  
Humanity	  (and	  follows	  a	  certain	  theme),	  and	  the	  days	  within	  each	  month	  are	  named	  after	  
someone	  who	  likewise	  contributed	  to	  that	  field.336	  So	  for	  instance,	  the	  first	  month	  is	  named	  
after	  Moses	  (with	  the	  theme	  of	  “First	  Theocracy”)	  and	  includes	  days	  named	  after	  Solomon,	  
Cyrus,	  Buddha,	  Romulus,	  and	  Muhammad.	  	  The	  calendar	  serves	  as	  a	  daily	  reminder	  of	  the	  
contributions	  made	  by	  our	  ancestors	  and	  reinforces	  the	  notion	  that	  great	  acts	  will	  be	  
rewarded	  well	  after	  the	  termination	  of	  our	  “objective”	  existence.	  	  Public	  and	  private	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  p.55	  
334	  p.55	  
335	  According	  to	  Comte’s	  instructions,	  we	  should	  “forget	  the	  defects	  of	  the	  dead	  in	  order	  to	  
recall	  only	  their	  good	  qualities…for	  if	  our	  Divinity	  only	  incorporates	  into	  herself	  the	  really	  
worthy	  dead,	  she	  also	  takes	  away	  from	  each	  the	  imperfections	  which	  in	  all	  cases	  dimmed	  
their	  objective	  life.”	  P.72	  
336	  Moses,	  Homer,	  Aristotle,	  Archimedes,	  Caesar,	  St.	  Paul,	  Charlemagne,	  Dante,	  Gutenberg,	  
Shakespeare,	  Descartes,	  Frederick	  II,	  and	  Bichat	  (a	  French	  anatomist/physiologist)	  are	  the	  
thirteen	  months.	  See	  Table	  D	  in	  Catechism	  
	   104	  
worship	  are	  intended	  to	  reinforce	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  “subjective”	  existence	  and	  to	  
encourage	  due	  submission	  to	  Humanity,	  or	  the	  Great	  Being.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  become	  a	  “true	  organ	  of	  the	  Goddess”	  of	  Humanity,	  the	  “worthy	  servant”	  
must	  pass	  through	  9	  successive	  stages,	  or	  social	  sacraments.337	  These	  include	  presentation,	  
initiation,	  admission,	  destination,	  marriage,	  maturity,	  retirement,	  transformation,	  and	  
incorporation.	  	  Presentation	  simply	  consists	  of	  a	  promise	  by	  the	  parents	  to	  prepare	  their	  
child	  properly	  to	  serve	  Humanity.	  	  Drawing	  from	  Catholicism,	  it	  also	  requires	  the	  selection	  
of	  an	  “artificial”	  couple	  to	  offer	  further	  spiritual	  protection	  of	  the	  child.338	  	  Initiation	  
represents	  the	  transition	  to	  public	  life	  as	  the	  child	  passes	  from	  his	  mother’s	  education	  to	  
the	  systematic	  education	  of	  the	  priesthood,	  at	  age	  fourteen.	  	  After	  seven	  years	  of	  
instruction	  under	  the	  priest,	  the	  young	  disciple	  then	  receives	  the	  sacrament	  of	  admission.339	  
At	  this	  point,	  the	  person	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  service	  of	  Humanity,	  but	  has	  not	  chosen	  a	  
specific	  profession.	  	  By	  the	  age	  of	  twenty-­‐eight,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  a	  specific	  path	  would	  
have	  been	  chosen	  and	  at	  that	  point,	  destination	  is	  received.	  	  Comte	  emphasizes	  that	  all	  
useful	  professions,	  whether	  public	  or	  private,	  are	  considered	  viable	  options.340	  It	  should	  be	  
noted	  that	  this	  timeline	  is	  intended	  for	  males.	  Females	  do	  receive	  some	  of	  the	  same	  
sacraments,	  but	  “their	  vocation	  being	  always	  known	  and	  happily	  uniform,”	  destination	  
coincides	  with	  admission.341	  Thus,	  the	  fifth	  sacrament	  of	  marriage	  can	  be	  taken	  by	  women	  
at	  age	  21,	  while	  men	  must	  be	  at	  least	  28.	  	  By	  the	  age	  of	  42,	  maturity	  should	  be	  have	  been	  
reached	  and	  this	  is	  when	  the	  “second	  objective	  life”	  begins.	  This	  is	  the	  stage	  “on	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337	  Ibid	  p.90	  
338	  Ibid	  p.90	  
339	  Ibid	  p.91	  
340	  Ibid	  p.92	  
341	  Women	  do	  not	  receive	  the	  sacraments	  of	  destination,	  maturity,	  or	  retirement	  due	  to	  
their	  relegation	  to	  private,	  moral	  teachers.	  	  Ibid	  p.93	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alone	  depends	  his	  subjective	  immortality.	  	  Till	  then,	  our	  life,	  mainly	  preparatory,	  had	  
naturally	  given	  rise	  to	  mistakes	  at	  times	  of	  a	  serious	  character,	  but	  never	  beyond	  
reparation.	  	  Henceforth,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  faults	  we	  commit	  can	  hardly	  ever	  fully	  repair,	  
whether	  in	  reference	  to	  others	  or	  to	  ourselves.”342	  After	  twenty-­‐one	  years	  of	  maturity,	  the	  
seventh	  sacrament	  of	  retirement	  follows.	  At	  that	  point,	  the	  man	  is	  to	  name	  his	  successor,	  
subject	  to	  the	  sanction	  of	  his	  superior,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  continuity.	  343	  The	  eighth	  
sacrament,	  transformation,	  marks	  the	  end	  of	  the	  objective	  life,	  or	  bodily	  death.	  	  Finally,	  
seven	  years	  after	  death,	  the	  priesthood	  determines	  if	  subjective	  incorporation	  will	  take	  
place.	  Incorporation	  is	  reserved	  for	  those	  who	  have	  truly	  served	  Humanity	  and	  if	  initiated,	  
the	  person	  is	  buried	  in	  a	  sacred	  place	  with	  “due	  pomp.”344	  Those	  who	  are	  denied	  
incorporation	  are	  buried	  in	  a	  “waste	  place”	  amongst	  those	  who	  have	  died	  “by	  the	  hand	  of	  
justice,	  by	  their	  own	  hand,	  or	  in	  duel.”345	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  sacraments	  reflect	  Comte’s	  systematic	  emphasis	  on	  unity	  and	  continuity	  and	  further	  
strengthen	  his	  insistence	  on	  immanent	  fulfillment.	  	  The	  “immortality”	  offered	  by	  Comte	  is	  
strictly	  contingent	  on	  the	  commemoration	  of	  the	  dead	  by	  the	  living	  so	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  the	  
public	  and	  private	  ceremonies	  proceed	  as	  Comte	  suggests.	  	  We	  should	  not	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  
ultimate	  end	  of	  Comte’s	  religion:	  	  social	  order.	  	  The	  individual	  holds	  worth	  only	  as	  an	  
instrument	  of	  Humanity	  and	  private	  worship	  is	  designed	  to	  inculcate	  public	  virtue.	  	  Those	  
who	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  new	  religion	  will	  necessarily	  be	  seen	  as	  enemies	  to	  Humanity	  and	  to	  
progress;	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  religious	  toleration	  within	  Comte’s	  system.	  	  As	  Comte	  notes,	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“true	  liberty	  is	  essentially	  the	  result	  of	  due	  submission.”346	  Anyone	  who	  fails	  to	  submit	  to	  
the	  dictates	  of	  the	  new	  religion	  is	  resisting	  the	  movement	  of	  History	  itself.	  	  Comte’s	  
rigidness	  in	  this	  regard	  led	  Voegelin	  to	  call	  him	  a	  “spiritual	  dictator	  of	  mankind.”347	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  	  	  	  	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  examined	  the	  two	  main	  currents	  of	  Comte’s	  work,	  let	  us	  point	  to	  a	  few	  
recurring	  themes	  within	  his	  system	  and	  draw	  out	  the	  political	  consequences.	  	  The	  
foundation	  of	  Comte’s	  whole	  system	  is	  rooted	  in	  his	  philosophy	  of	  history.	  	  Comte’s	  
assumptions	  about	  the	  movement	  of	  history,	  and	  more	  specifically	  the	  law	  of	  three	  states,	  
led	  him	  to	  create	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  system.	  	  The	  disorder	  within	  his	  society	  made	  the	  
creation	  of	  order	  a	  primary	  concern,	  yet	  the	  character	  of	  that	  order	  mattered.	  	  His	  
understanding	  of	  history	  precluded	  him	  from	  turning	  to	  the	  “retrograde”	  solution	  for	  
order;	  a	  return	  to	  pre-­‐Revolutionary	  principles	  was	  simply	  not	  an	  option.	  And	  while	  
religion	  had	  served	  as	  a	  source	  of	  order,	  Comte	  found	  the	  major	  religions,	  especially	  
Christianity,	  lacking	  in	  several	  areas.	  	  They	  were	  based	  on	  an	  outdated,	  retrograde	  mode	  of	  
philosophizing	  and	  failed	  to	  create	  a	  universal	  consensus.	  	  Thus,	  Comte’s	  challenge	  was	  to	  
create	  a	  new	  order;	  and	  not	  just	  any	  order,	  but	  one	  that	  followed	  the	  dictates	  of	  History	  and	  
progress.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  create	  such	  an	  order,	  Comte	  had	  to	  restructure	  the	  major	  institutions	  of	  
society.	  	  The	  first	  step	  was	  to	  establish	  the	  superiority	  of	  positivism	  and	  reorganize	  the	  
educational	  system	  on	  those	  principles.	  	  Comte	  again	  used	  his	  theory	  of	  history	  to	  establish	  
the	  justification	  for	  such	  a	  move,	  but	  he	  also	  appealed	  to	  utility.	  	  The	  positive	  method	  of	  
philosophizing	  had	  led	  to	  great	  advances	  within	  the	  natural	  sciences	  and	  Comte	  used	  that	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to	  justify	  its	  expansion	  to	  the	  social.	  	  Comte’s	  whole	  system	  is	  presented	  as	  scientific,	  and	  
the	  success	  of	  Newtonian	  science	  had	  given	  an	  especially	  strong,	  authoritative	  position	  to	  
science	  within	  society.	  	  Nobody	  could	  deny	  the	  material,	  tangible	  benefits	  that	  had	  resulted	  
from	  the	  new	  science.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  Comte	  had	  a	  distinct	  advantage	  over	  Bacon.	  	  Bacon’s	  
call	  for	  a	  society	  based	  on	  scientific	  principles	  was	  a	  harder	  sell	  to	  a	  population	  that	  had	  not	  
yet	  experienced	  the	  transformative	  power	  of	  science.	  	  But	  what	  Bacon	  did	  have	  was	  a	  
society	  that	  generally	  embraced	  Christianity.	  Comte	  not	  only	  had	  to	  promote	  a	  new	  mode	  
of	  philosophizing,	  he	  had	  to	  found	  a	  new	  spiritual	  order.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Comte	  realized	  that	  the	  founding	  of	  a	  new	  religion	  required	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  
approach	  that	  had	  established	  the	  superiority	  of	  positivism	  within	  the	  
intellectual/educational	  realm.	  	  Yet,	  he	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  religion	  was	  based	  on	  
scientific,	  positive	  principles.	  	  The	  new,	  universal	  religion	  was	  to	  be	  founded	  on	  “true	  
philosophy,”	  extracted	  from	  “real	  science.”348	  The	  principles	  of	  the	  religion	  were	  not	  based	  
on	  revelation,	  but	  on	  science	  itself.	  	  Thus,	  it	  was	  demonstrable	  and	  would	  necessarily	  appeal	  
to	  everyone,	  with	  the	  obvious	  exception	  of	  those	  still	  stuck	  in	  the	  theological	  and	  
metaphysical	  modes	  of	  philosophizing.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Politically,	  Comte’s	  dogmatic	  insistence	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  positivism	  meant	  that	  
toleration	  would	  have	  serious	  limits.	  Censorship	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  keep	  the	  
retrograde	  and	  anarchical	  forces	  from	  disrupting	  order	  within	  society.	  	  Philosophical	  
questions	  about	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  system,	  or	  about	  any	  first	  or	  final	  causes,	  would	  also	  be	  
quelled.	  Moreover,	  traditional	  religions	  could	  not	  be	  allowed	  since	  they	  were	  necessarily	  
based	  on	  theological	  and	  metaphysical	  foundations.	  The	  new	  religion	  would	  provide	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immanent	  fulfillment.	  	  There	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  need	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  “next	  life”	  or	  to	  any	  
transcendent	  realm	  of	  being.	  	  Science	  would	  provide	  the	  instrument	  necessary	  to	  improve	  
the	  material	  wealth	  of	  society,	  while	  the	  new	  religion	  would	  provide	  the	  spiritual	  
foundation	  necessary	  for	  order.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  So	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  Comte’s	  system	  in	  light	  of	  contemporary	  politics?	  Why	  
concern	  ourselves	  with	  an	  influential,	  but	  often	  ridiculed,	  thinker	  from	  the	  19th	  century?	  
The	  primary	  reason	  for	  Comte’s	  relevance	  today	  lies	  in	  his	  scientistic	  attitude.	  	  Since	  
Comte’s	  time,	  the	  prestige	  of	  science	  has	  only	  continued	  to	  grow	  (and	  for	  good	  reason).	  	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  rightly	  earned	  respect	  of	  legitimate	  science	  also	  has	  been	  conferred	  
upon	  politically	  motivated,	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  endeavors.	  	  Taking	  a	  cue	  from	  Comte,	  
politicians	  have	  learned	  to	  use	  science	  as	  a	  powerful	  rhetorical	  tool.	  	  If	  one	  wishes	  to	  
advance	  a	  particular	  agenda,	  an	  appeal	  to	  science	  can	  be	  an	  especially	  effective	  strategy.	  	  In	  
the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  explore	  concrete	  cases	  of	  such	  appeals	  in	  the	  form	  of	  eugenics	  and	  
Nazi	  race	  theory.	  Once	  science	  is	  viewed	  as	  being	  on	  the	  “side”	  of	  a	  particular	  issue,	  there	  is	  
little	  room	  left	  for	  debate.	  Comte	  was	  certainly	  not	  original	  in	  his	  advocacy	  of	  scientific	  
ideas,	  but	  he	  was	  the	  first	  to	  endow	  it	  with	  a	  religious	  character.	  	  Science	  was	  no	  longer	  
meant	  to	  be	  a	  mere	  tool	  or	  instrument,	  but	  instead	  it	  was	  to	  be	  the	  ultimate	  authority	  
within	  society.	  Positivism	  was	  not	  merely	  an	  alternative	  mode	  of	  philosophizing;	  it	  
represented	  a	  necessary	  progression	  dictated	  by	  History	  itself.	  And	  as	  such,	  it	  could	  not	  be	  
questioned.	  	  Once	  philosophical	  questioning	  has	  been	  quelled,	  along	  with	  such	  
inconveniences	  as	  liberty	  of	  conscience	  and	  popular	  sovereignty,	  the	  path	  to	  tyranny	  is	  
paved.	  	  	  
	  




The	  Evolution	  of	  Scientism:	  	  Marx,	  Darwin,	  and	  Eugenics	  
	  
“The	  philosophers	  have	  only	  interpreted	  the	  world	  in	  various	  ways;	  the	  point	  however	  is	  to	  change	  it.”	  –Karl	  
Marx	  
	  
“I	  well	  remember	  my	  conviction	  that	  there	  is	  more	  in	  man	  that	  the	  mere	  breath	  of	  his	  body.	  	  But	  now	  the	  
grandest	  scenes	  would	  not	  cause	  any	  such	  convictions	  and	  feelings	  to	  rise	  in	  my	  mind.”	  –Charles	  Darwin	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  Before	  moving	  to	  the	  constructive	  part	  of	  our	  study,	  we	  must	  note	  two	  contemporaneous	  
figures	  in	  the	  history	  of	  scientism:	  Karl	  Marx	  (1818-­‐83)	  and	  Charles	  Darwin	  (1809-­‐82).	  	  
Marx’s	  political	  influence	  is	  well	  known,	  but	  the	  scientistic	  character	  of	  his	  work	  is	  often	  
overlooked.	  While	  the	  continuity	  between	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  is	  apparent,	  the	  jump	  to	  Marx	  
requires	  a	  little	  more	  explanation.	  That	  an	  explanation	  is	  needed	  is	  primarily	  a	  result	  of	  
Marx’s	  explicit	  rejection	  of	  “social	  utopians”	  such	  as	  Auguste	  Comte	  and	  Saint-­‐Simon.349	  	  
Yet,	  the	  critique	  leveled	  against	  those	  theorists	  is	  motivated	  primarily	  by	  pragmatic	  
concerns	  regarding	  the	  means	  required	  to	  achieve	  their	  respective	  ends.	  	  Marx	  simply	  
rejects	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  revolution	  of	  the	  mind	  can	  transform	  society.350	  	  Marx’s	  new	  men	  will	  
come	  after	  the	  revolution.351	  	  Unlike	  Bacon	  and	  Comte,	  he	  pays	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  
educational	  system	  or	  to	  the	  state	  of	  philosophy	  per	  se.	  	  He	  is	  concerned	  with	  action,	  and	  
violent	  revolution,	  not	  a	  new	  mode	  of	  philosophizing,	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  society	  will	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349	  “Historical	  action	  is	  to	  yield	  to	  their	  personal	  inventive	  action…to	  an	  organization	  of	  
society	  specially	  contrived	  by	  these	  inventors.	  	  Future	  history	  resolves	  itself,	  in	  their	  eyes,	  
into	  the	  propaganda	  and	  the	  practical	  carrying	  out	  of	  their	  social	  plans.”	  They	  possess	  a	  
“fanatical	  and	  superstitious	  belief	  in	  the	  miraculous	  effects	  of	  their	  social	  science.”	  See	  Karl	  
Marx	  and	  Frederick	  Engels.	  Communist	  Manifesto.	  Trans.	  Milligan	  (New	  York:	  	  Prometheus	  
Books,	  1988)	  pp.239-­‐241	  	  	  
350	  Revolution	  can	  only	  occur	  when	  class	  antagonisms	  have	  fully	  formed	  and	  the	  material	  
conditions	  dictate	  it.	  p.240	  	  
351	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution	  (Durham:	  	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  
1975)	  p.242	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transformed.352	  	  For	  purposes	  of	  our	  study,	  we	  need	  not	  delve	  into	  the	  intricacies	  of	  Marx’s	  
program	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  What	  interests	  us	  is	  the	  underlying	  motivation	  behind	  Marx’s	  work	  
and	  the	  foundation	  upon	  which	  it	  rests.	  In	  that	  regard,	  Marx’s	  scientific	  socialism	  falls	  much	  
closer	  to	  the	  likes	  of	  Comte	  and	  Saint-­‐Simon	  than	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  admit.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  we	  will	  recall,	  the	  main	  features	  of	  scientism	  include	  the	  dogmatic	  faith	  in	  the	  
methods	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  a	  materialistic	  worldview,	  rejection	  of	  the	  bios	  theoretikos,	  
the	  prohibition	  of	  philosophical	  questions,	  and	  an	  emphasis	  on	  immanent	  fulfillment.	  	  
Marx’s	  system	  includes	  all	  of	  these	  aspects,	  as	  did	  those	  of	  his	  scientistic	  predecessors.	  	  
What	  makes	  Marx’s	  system	  unique	  is	  the	  political	  efficacy	  of	  his	  work.	  	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  
were	  both	  influential	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  ideas	  (i.e.	  philosophy),	  but	  Marx’s	  program	  had	  a	  
political	  influence	  that	  is	  perhaps	  unrivaled	  within	  modernity.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  inquiring	  why	  
Marx’s	  program	  was	  embraced	  on	  such	  a	  large	  scale,	  while	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  were	  
essentially	  left	  with	  a	  handful	  of	  disciples.	  	  According	  to	  Voegelin,	  Marx’s	  success	  lies	  not	  in	  
the	  inherent	  superiority	  of	  his	  ideas,	  but	  rests	  in	  the	  state	  of	  his	  audience:	  “Only	  because	  
the	  idea	  was	  the	  manifestation	  of	  a	  profound	  spiritual	  disease,	  only	  because	  it	  carried	  the	  
disease	  to	  a	  new	  extreme,	  could	  it	  fascinate	  the	  masses	  of	  a	  diseased	  society.”353	  In	  other	  
words,	  the	  ideas	  proffered	  by	  Marx’s	  scientistic	  predecessors	  had	  finally	  permeated	  society	  
to	  the	  point	  of	  popular	  acceptance.	  	  Marx	  did	  not	  have	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  re-­‐education	  of	  society	  
because	  such	  a	  process,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  had	  already	  occurred.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352	  “The	  philosophers	  have	  only	  interpreted	  the	  world	  in	  various	  ways;	  the	  point	  however	  
is	  to	  change	  it.”	  	  From	  Marx’s	  Theses	  on	  Feuerbach.	  Cited	  in	  John	  Hallowell.	  	  Main	  Currents	  in	  
Modern	  Political	  Thought.	  (New	  York:	  	  Henry	  Holt	  and	  Co.,	  1950)	  p.406	  
353	  Marx’s	  program	  had	  an	  obvious	  practical	  appeal	  since	  workers	  were	  indeed	  being	  
exploited.	  However,	  Voegelin’s	  explanation	  gets	  at	  the	  existential	  crisis	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  such	  a	  program.	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution	  p.255	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Dialectical	  Materialism	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Marx,	  like	  Comte,	  grounds	  his	  system	  in	  the	  dual	  authority	  of	  science	  and	  history.	  His	  
dialectical	  materialism	  reflects	  both	  of	  these	  aspects.	  	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  famously	  claim	  to	  
have	  turned	  Hegel	  upside	  down,	  in	  order	  to	  put	  dialectics	  on	  its	  feet.354	  Put	  simply,	  Hegel’s	  
assertion	  that	  reality	  consists	  in	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  Idea	  is	  rejected	  outright	  by	  Marx	  who	  
claims,	  “the	  ideal	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  material	  transformed	  and	  translated	  in	  the	  head	  of	  
man.”355	  In	  other	  words,	  material	  conditions	  serve	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  Marx’s	  system	  and	  
anything	  else	  is	  simply	  an	  abstraction	  from	  reality.356	  According	  to	  Voegelin,	  Marx	  is	  not	  
merely	  rejecting	  Hegel,	  but	  philosophy	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  He	  reaches	  this	  conclusion	  because	  of	  
Marx’s	  failure	  to	  provide	  a	  critical	  foundation	  for	  his	  theory	  of	  reality.	  	  Marx’s	  “refutation”	  
of	  Hegel	  consists	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  his	  own	  vision	  of	  political	  reality,	  
but	  that	  vision	  is	  not	  justified	  through	  philosophical	  reasoning,	  it	  is	  simply	  assumed.357	  
How	  can	  this	  “unphilosophical”	  position	  be	  justified	  under	  the	  Marxian	  framework?	  Engels	  
provides	  the	  answer	  through	  his	  appeal	  to	  the	  new,	  materialistic	  science:	  
Modern	  materialism	  recognizes	  history	  as	  the	  evolutionary	  process	  of	  mankind	  and	  tries	  to	  
discover	  the	  laws	  of	  its	  movement	  .	  .	  .and	  also	  recognizes	  nature	  as	  process	  and	  evolution	  
under	  discoverable	  laws.	  With	  regard	  to	  history	  as	  well	  as	  nature,	  modern	  materialism	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354	  Ibid	  p.257	  
355	  Ibid	  p.256	  
356	  Voegelin	  suggests	  that	  Marx	  fundamentally	  misunderstood	  Hegel	  and	  that	  such	  a	  
misunderstanding	  was	  not	  due	  to	  an	  intellectual	  error,	  but	  was	  deliberate.	  “The	  Idea	  is	  for	  
Hegel,	  of	  course,	  not	  the	  demiurge	  of	  the	  ‘real’	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  Marx	  understands	  the	  
term,	  that	  is	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  empirical	  reality.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  the	  demiurge	  of	  the	  ‘real’	  only	  
insofar	  as	  reality	  is	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  Idea…it	  is	  precisely	  because	  empirical	  reality	  and	  
the	  reality	  of	  the	  Idea	  are	  not	  identical	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Idea	  arises.”	  	  p.257	  
357	  Voegelin	  points	  to	  the	  comments	  made	  by	  the	  editors	  of	  Marx’s	  early	  writings	  as	  further	  
proof	  of	  this:	  “He	  tacitly	  argues	  from	  a	  position	  that	  is	  unphilosophical	  on	  principle”	  and	  
the	  justification	  of	  this	  position	  “is	  simply	  assumed.”	  Furthermore,	  “by	  simply	  referring	  to	  
what	  in	  common	  parlance	  is	  called	  reality,	  the	  philosophical	  question	  concerning	  the	  
nature	  of	  reality	  is	  cut	  off.”	  	  p.	  258.	  From	  Siegfried	  Landshut’s	  and	  J.P.	  Mayer’s	  introduction	  
to	  Karl	  Marx.	  Der	  Historiche	  Materalismus.	  Volume	  1.	  (Leipzig,	  1932)	  p.xxii	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essentially	  dialectic	  and	  no	  longer	  needs	  a	  philosophy	  above	  the	  other	  sciences.	  This	  is	  for	  
Engels	  the	  decisive	  point:	  	  when	  science	  is	  occupied	  with	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  
process	  and	  evolution,	  philosophy	  becomes	  superfluous	  .	  .	  .All	  that	  remains	  of	  philosophy	  
as	  we	  know	  it	  is	  the	  science	  of	  thinking	  and	  its	  laws—that	  is	  formal	  logic	  and	  dialectics.	  	  
Everything	  else	  is	  dissolved	  in	  the	  positive	  science	  of	  nature	  and	  history.358	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  the	  distinction	  between	  what	  Engels	  refers	  to	  as	  “modern	  materialism”	  
and	  mechanistic	  materialism.359	  	  The	  primary	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  lies	  in	  the	  
relationship	  between	  matter	  and	  motion.	  	  Mechanistic	  materialism	  separates	  the	  two,	  
while	  dialectical	  materialism	  regards	  them	  as	  inseparable.360	  As	  Engels	  notes:	  
Motion	  is	  the	  mode	  of	  existence	  of	  matter.	  Never	  anywhere	  has	  there	  been	  matter	  without	  
motion,	  nor	  can	  there	  be.	  .	  .Matter	  without	  motion	  is	  just	  as	  unthinkable	  as	  motion	  without	  
matter.	  	  Motion	  is	  therefore	  as	  uncreatable	  and	  indestructible	  as	  matter	  itself.361	  
	  
As	  Hallowell	  explains,	  “ultimate	  reality	  is	  matter	  in	  motion,	  a	  process.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  is	  a	  
dialectical	  process,	  the	  reconciliation	  of	  opposing	  movements	  in	  an	  endless	  effort	  to	  
achieve	  a	  more	  perfect	  harmony.”362	  The	  world	  is	  still	  governed	  by	  inexorable	  laws,	  as	  in	  
the	  mechanistic	  view,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  constant	  evolution	  involved	  as	  matter	  is	  seen	  as	  “self-­‐
moving”	  and	  “self-­‐determining.”363	  The	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  more	  on	  process	  than	  structure.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  Marx’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  Hegelian	  dialectic,	  he	  accepts	  Hegel’s	  progressive	  view	  
of	  history.	  But	  that	  progress	  will	  not	  take	  place	  in	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  Idea;	  instead,	  it	  takes	  
place	  within	  empirical	  reality.	  The	  ultimate	  meaning	  of	  the	  Idea	  is	  transferred	  into	  
intramundane	  reality,	  giving	  ordinary	  politics	  an	  absolute	  character.	  	  The	  logos	  of	  the	  
Marxian	  system	  is	  the	  “knowledge	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  possibility,	  based	  on	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358	  Ibid	  p.260	  	  
359	  The	  shift	  can	  best	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Spencer	  and	  Darwin.	  
360	  Main	  Currents	  in	  Modern	  Political	  Thought.	  p.408	  
361	  Ibid	  p.408	  	  
362	  Ibid	  p.408	  
363	  Ibid	  p.408	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knowledge,	  of	  ‘letting	  them	  operate	  according	  to	  plan	  for	  definite	  aims.’364	  On	  this	  account,	  
“freedom	  of	  the	  will	  means	  nothing	  but	  the	  ability	  of	  making	  decisions	  based	  on	  expert	  
knowledge.”365	  But	  how	  are	  the	  ends	  to	  be	  determined?	  According	  to	  Voegelin,	  the	  problem	  
of	  the	  ends	  is	  solved	  by	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  convergence	  of	  freedom	  and	  necessity:	  
The	  freer	  the	  judgment	  of	  a	  man	  is	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  certain	  question,	  the	  greater	  will	  be	  the	  
necessity,	  which	  determines	  the	  content	  of	  the	  judgment.	  Insecurity	  of	  decision	  has	  its	  
source	  in	  lack	  of	  knowledge;	  freedom	  of	  choice	  is	  truly	  unfreedom	  because	  in	  such	  
indecision	  man	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  object,	  which	  he	  ought	  to	  dominate	  in	  turn.	  	  Freedom,	  
thus,	  consists	  in	  the	  domination	  of	  man	  over	  himself	  and	  external	  nature	  that	  is	  based	  on	  his	  
knowledge	  of	  necessity…	  The	  freedom	  of	  man	  advances	  with	  technological	  discoveries	  .	  .	  
.The	  incarnation	  of	  the	  logos	  has	  become	  the	  advancement	  of	  pragmatic	  knowledge	  to	  the	  
point	  where	  it	  has	  absorbed	  into	  its	  system,	  and	  dissolved,	  the	  mystery	  of	  human	  
existence.366	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  approach	  are	  wide-­‐ranging.	  	  The	  tendency	  to	  diminish	  the	  bios	  
theoretikos,	  as	  evident	  from	  Bacon	  through	  the	  Encyclopedists	  to	  Comte,	  is	  taken	  to	  its	  
logical	  conclusion	  by	  Marx	  and	  Engels.	  “The	  life	  of	  the	  spirit	  and	  the	  bios	  theoretikos	  are	  not	  
merely	  pushed	  into	  the	  background,	  they	  are	  definitely	  eliminated.	  	  Man	  will	  be	  free	  when	  
he	  has	  achieved	  perfect	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world	  and	  with	  perfect	  knowledge	  the	  
problem	  of	  purpose,	  which	  causes	  indecision,	  will	  have	  disappeared…The	  destruction	  of	  
the	  substance	  of	  man	  becomes	  the	  declared	  program	  as	  a	  last	  consequence	  of	  the	  scandal	  of	  
the	  Encylopedists.”367	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  transformation	  that	  occurs	  is	  not	  one	  of	  degree;	  it	  is	  a	  qualitative	  change	  that	  will	  
extend	  beyond	  society	  and	  into	  human	  nature	  itself.	  The	  “problem	  of	  the	  purpose”,	  along	  
with	  questions	  of	  man’s	  ultimate	  place	  in	  the	  cosmos	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  permitted,	  as	  they	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  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution.	  p.266	  
365	  Ibid	  p.266	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  Ibid	  p.267	  
367	  p.268.	  	  While	  Voegelin	  is	  right	  to	  point	  out	  the	  indebtedness	  to	  the	  Encyclopedists,	  I	  
think	  the	  case	  can	  be	  made	  that	  the	  impulse	  was	  started	  by	  Bacon’s	  project.	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will	  have	  become	  superfluous.	  	  Marx	  makes	  this	  abundantly	  clear	  in	  his	  Economic	  and	  
Philosophic	  Manuscripts	  of	  1844.	  	  The	  rise	  of	  natural	  science	  has	  allowed	  for	  man’s	  true	  
nature	  to	  be	  revealed.	  	  It	  has	  “invaded	  and	  transformed	  human	  life	  all	  the	  more	  practically	  
through	  the	  medium	  of	  industry,	  and	  has	  prepared	  human	  emancipation,	  however	  directly	  
and	  much	  it	  had	  to	  consummate	  dehumanization.	  	  Industry	  is	  the	  actual,	  historical	  relation	  
of	  nature,	  and	  therefore	  of	  natural	  science,	  to	  man.”368	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  “the	  
human	  essence	  of	  nature	  or	  the	  natural	  essence	  of	  man.”369	  Therefore,	  natural	  science	  will	  
become	  “the	  basis	  of	  human	  science”	  just	  as	  it	  has	  become	  “the	  basis	  of	  actual	  human	  life,	  
albeit	  in	  estranged	  form.”370	  Man’s	  “real	  nature”	  is	  revealed	  by	  human	  history	  and	  “hence	  
nature	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  be	  through	  industry	  is	  true	  anthropological	  nature.”371	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Much	  like	  Comte,	  Marx	  considers	  sensory	  perception	  to	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  true	  science.	  	  
Science	  must	  proceed	  directly	  from	  nature	  and	  history	  constitutes	  a	  “real	  part	  of	  natural	  
history—of	  nature’s	  coming	  to	  be	  man.	  	  Natural	  science	  will	  in	  time	  subsume	  under	  itself	  
the	  science	  of	  man,	  just	  as	  the	  science	  of	  man	  will	  subsume	  under	  itself	  natural	  science:	  	  
there	  will	  be	  one	  science.”372	  Man	  becomes	  the	  immediate	  object	  of	  natural	  science	  just	  as	  
nature	  becomes	  the	  immediate	  object	  of	  the	  science	  of	  man.373	  Marx	  thus	  blurs	  the	  
distinction	  between	  man	  and	  nature,	  and	  reduces	  the	  knowledge	  of	  both	  to	  sensory	  
perceptions	  and	  history.	  Marx’s	  prohibition	  of	  questioning	  follows	  directly	  from	  his	  
understanding	  of	  man	  and	  nature.	  	  Marx	  responds	  to	  an	  imaginary	  interlocutor	  who	  wants	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  Karl	  Marx.	  Economic	  and	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  Manuscripts	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  Trans.	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  (New	  York:	  	  
Prometheus	  Books,	  1988)	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  Ibid	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to	  know	  	  “who	  begot	  the	  first	  man,	  and	  nature	  as	  a	  whole?”	  	  Marx	  answers	  that	  the	  question	  
itself	  is	  an	  abstraction:	  	  “Ask	  yourself	  whether	  that	  progression	  as	  such	  exists	  for	  a	  
reasonable	  mind.	  	  When	  you	  ask	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  nature	  and	  man,	  you	  are	  abstracting,	  
in	  so	  doing,	  from	  man	  and	  nature.”374	  	  He	  thus	  concludes	  that	  the	  interlocutor	  should	  give	  
up	  his	  abstraction	  and	  “you	  will	  also	  give	  up	  your	  question.”375	  If	  the	  interlocutor	  responds	  
that	  he	  wants	  to	  know	  about	  the	  genesis	  (or	  first	  cause)	  of	  nature	  itself,	  Marx	  replies:	  
Since	  for	  the	  socialist	  man	  the	  entire	  so-­‐called	  history	  of	  the	  world	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  
begetting	  of	  man	  through	  human	  labor,	  nothing	  but	  the	  coming-­‐to-­‐be	  of	  nature	  for	  man,	  he	  
has	  the	  visible,	  irrefutable	  proof	  of	  his	  birth	  through	  himself,	  of	  his	  process	  of	  coming-­‐to-­‐be.	  	  
Since	  the	  real	  existence	  of	  man	  and	  nature	  has	  become	  practical,	  sensuous	  and	  
perceptible—since	  man	  has	  become	  for	  man	  as	  the	  being	  of	  nature,	  and	  nature	  for	  man	  as	  
the	  being	  of	  man—the	  question	  about	  an	  alien	  being,	  about	  a	  being	  above	  nature	  and	  
man—a	  question	  which	  implies	  the	  admission	  of	  the	  inessentiality	  of	  nature	  and	  of	  man—
has	  become	  impossible	  in	  practice.376	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  telling	  passage	  for	  it	  gives	  us	  a	  glimpse	  into	  the	  motivation	  behind	  Marx’s	  
system.	  	  Man	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  dependent	  on	  anything	  but	  himself;	  he	  is	  a	  self-­‐created	  
being.	  Owing	  his	  existence	  to	  himself,	  man	  no	  longer	  needs	  God	  because	  he	  has	  become	  
one.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  Marx	  leaves	  no	  role	  for	  religion	  in	  his	  system.	  Marx	  explains:	  
Man	  makes	  religion;	  religion	  does	  not	  make	  man.	  	  Religion,	  indeed,	  is	  the	  self-­‐
consciousness	  and	  the	  self-­‐feeling	  of	  man	  who	  either	  has	  not	  yet	  found	  himself,	  or	  else	  
(having	  found	  himself)	  has	  lost	  himself	  once	  more…This	  State,	  this	  society,	  produce	  
religion,	  produce	  a	  perverted	  world	  consciousness,	  because	  they	  are	  a	  perverted	  
world…The	  people	  cannot	  be	  really	  happy	  until	  it	  has	  been	  deprived	  of	  illusory	  happiness	  
by	  the	  abolition	  of	  religion…Thus	  it	  is	  the	  mission	  of	  history,	  after	  the	  other-­‐worldly	  truth	  
has	  disappeared	  to	  establish	  the	  truth	  of	  this	  world.377	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Along	  with	  private	  property	  and	  the	  family,	  religion	  will	  come	  to	  an	  end	  after	  the	  
revolution.	  	  On	  this	  point,	  Marx	  can	  be	  accused	  of	  naivety	  since	  these	  institutions	  have	  been	  
prevalent	  throughout	  all	  of	  human	  history	  and	  seem	  to	  reflect	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  
human	  nature.	  Yet	  Marx	  holds	  that	  “true”	  human	  nature	  will	  only	  emerge	  once	  the	  
revolution	  has	  occurred.	  Man	  has	  been	  estranged	  and	  alienated	  not	  only	  from	  his	  labor,	  but	  
also	  from	  himself.	  	  To	  look	  at	  man	  in	  his	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  state	  is	  to	  look	  at	  a	  different	  
being	  in	  kind	  than	  the	  one	  that	  will	  emerge	  after	  the	  revolution.378	  Religion	  is	  a	  symptom	  of	  
the	  disease	  that	  will	  be	  cured	  through	  revolutionary	  action.	  	  Once	  deprived	  of	  its	  authority,	  
man	  will	  be	  able	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  truly	  counts;	  happiness	  in	  this	  world.	  	  Thus,	  just	  as	  was	  
the	  case	  with	  Comte	  and	  Bacon,	  politics	  assumes	  an	  absolute	  character.	  	  	  
Revolutionary	  Action	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  Marx’s	  method	  of	  carrying	  out	  his	  vision	  varies	  greatly	  from	  the	  
programs	  of	  Bacon	  and	  Comte.	  	  Yet	  the	  essential	  distinction	  upon	  which	  it	  is	  based,	  that	  
between	  thought	  and	  action,	  is	  one	  that	  is	  embraced	  by	  both	  thinkers.	  	  Bacon	  emphasizes	  
the	  importance	  of	  experiments	  of	  light,	  but	  reserves	  his	  highest	  praise	  for	  experiments	  that	  
produce	  fruit	  or	  practical	  utility.	  	  His	  ideal	  society	  is	  one	  based	  on	  the	  precepts	  of	  the	  new	  
science	  (developed	  through	  his	  own	  experimental	  method)	  and	  the	  transition	  to	  that	  
society	  is	  presented	  as	  peaceful.	  	  The	  revolution	  is	  thus	  intellectual.	  	  Likewise,	  Comte	  
eschews	  the	  contemplative	  life	  in	  favor	  of	  practical	  utility.	  He	  criticizes	  his	  medieval	  and	  
ancient	  predecessors	  for	  not	  focusing	  on	  the	  questions	  that	  matter	  most	  and	  outlines	  a	  
unifying	  method	  that	  will	  advance	  science	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  directly	  benefit	  society.	  His	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378	  “Only	  in	  a	  communist	  society	  where	  every	  man	  can	  develop	  himself	  in	  any	  way	  he	  
chooses	  will	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  man	  be	  revealed.	  Historical	  man…has	  no	  absolute	  value.	  
Society	  alone	  can	  produce	  the	  true	  man.”	  	  Ibid	  p.	  405	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positive	  polity	  will	  come	  into	  existence	  through	  the	  intellectual	  revolution	  of	  his	  positive	  
philosophy	  and	  the	  complementary	  Religion	  of	  Humanity.	  	  Although	  Comte	  and	  Bacon	  both	  
emphasize	  practical	  utility	  over	  contemplation,	  Marx	  radicalizes	  the	  distinction	  to	  the	  point	  
of	  abolishing	  the	  latter.	  	  Comte	  and	  Bacon	  erred	  by	  assuming	  that	  philosophy	  or	  science	  
could	  transform	  society;	  true	  change	  can	  only	  result	  through	  violent	  action.	  	  Marx	  makes	  
this	  point	  clear	  on	  several	  occasions.	  In	  the	  Communist	  Manifesto,	  he	  concludes:	  
The	  Communists	  disdain	  to	  conceal	  their	  views	  and	  aims.	  They	  openly	  declare	  that	  their	  
ends	  can	  be	  obtained	  only	  by	  the	  forcible	  overthrow	  of	  all	  existing	  social	  conditions.	  	  Let	  the	  
ruling	  classes	  tremble	  at	  a	  Communist	  revolution.	  	  The	  proletarians	  have	  nothing	  to	  lose	  
but	  their	  chains.	  They	  have	  a	  world	  to	  win.	  Working	  men	  of	  all	  countries,	  unite!379	  
	  
In	  his	  Poverty	  of	  Philosophy,	  he	  echoed	  the	  sentiment	  asking,	  “would	  it,	  moreover,	  be	  a	  
matter	  for	  astonishment	  if	  a	  society	  based	  upon	  the	  antagonism	  of	  classes	  should	  lead	  
ultimately	  to	  a	  brutal	  conflict,	  to	  a	  hand-­‐to	  hand	  struggle	  as	  its	  final	  denouement?”380	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Marx’s	  realization	  that	  violent	  revolution	  is	  the	  only	  means	  through	  which	  his	  end	  can	  be	  
accomplished	  tends	  to	  distort	  his	  utopianism.	  	  For	  a	  view	  that	  recognizes	  the	  necessity	  of	  
conflict	  and	  warfare	  is	  generally	  regarded	  as	  realistic.	  	  Marx	  chides	  the	  likes	  of	  Saint	  Simon	  
and	  Comte	  for	  being	  utopian	  precisely	  because	  they	  ignore	  or	  downplay	  the	  necessity	  of	  
action,	  and	  more	  specifically	  violent	  action,	  to	  achieve	  their	  ends.	  	  Likewise,	  Bacon’s	  New	  
Atlantis	  is	  considered	  utopian	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  peaceful	  transition	  that	  occurs	  from	  
the	  old	  society	  to	  Bensalem.	  	  Yet,	  while	  the	  means	  presented	  by	  Marx	  may	  not	  be	  utopian,	  
the	  ends	  cannot	  be	  absolved	  of	  such	  a	  charge.	  	  Marx	  does	  not	  present	  us	  with	  as	  clear	  of	  a	  
picture	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  freedom	  (the	  end	  state	  of	  his	  system)	  as	  he	  does	  with	  the	  realm	  of	  
necessity.	  	  As	  Voegelin	  notes,	  his	  focus	  shifts	  almost	  exclusively	  to	  “tactics”	  so	  it	  is	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379	  Communist	  Manifesto	  p.243	  (emphasis	  added)	  
380	  Main	  Currents	  in	  Modern	  Political	  Thought	  p.428	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surprising	  that	  most	  of	  the	  emphasis	  of	  Marxian	  scholarship	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  revolutionary	  
action	  itself.381	  	  But	  for	  our	  purposes,	  the	  intention	  behind	  such	  action	  matters,	  as	  do	  the	  
practical	  effects.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  noted,	  Marx	  foresees	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  man	  emerging	  after	  the	  successful	  revolution.	  	  
Once	  the	  means	  of	  production	  are	  no	  longer	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  and	  man	  is	  no	  
longer	  alienated	  from	  his	  labor,	  he	  will	  be	  able	  to	  experience	  true	  freedom.	  	  Under	  the	  
dictatorship	  of	  the	  proletariat	  (the	  last	  step	  before	  true	  communism),	  private	  property,	  
religion,	  and	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  family	  will	  all	  be	  abolished.	  	  As	  Engels	  notes,	  “the	  care	  
and	  education	  of	  children	  becomes	  a	  public	  affair;	  society	  looks	  after	  all	  children	  equally,	  
whether	  they	  are	  legitimate	  or	  not.”382	  	  Religion	  is	  the	  opium	  of	  the	  people	  and	  provides	  
illusory	  happiness	  and	  therefore	  must	  be	  abolished.	  	  Likewise,	  pre-­‐existing	  moral	  systems	  
must	  be	  abolished	  since	  they	  reflect	  “class	  morality”	  and	  a	  “human	  morality,	  which	  
transcends	  class	  antagonisms,”	  will	  take	  its	  place.383	  Finally,	  after	  the	  dictatorship	  of	  the	  
proletariat	  has	  successfully	  expunged	  the	  “bourgeois	  mentality”,	  true	  communism	  will	  be	  
ushered	  in.	  	  It	  is	  at	  this	  point	  that	  “the	  government	  of	  persons	  is	  replaced	  by	  the	  
administration	  of	  things.”384	  The	  coercive	  function	  of	  government	  is	  no	  longer	  needed;	  it	  is	  
relegated	  to	  managerial	  and	  administrative	  functions.	  	  As	  Hallowell	  notes:	  
In	  the	  new	  society,	  class	  conflict	  will	  disappear	  since	  there	  will	  be	  only	  one	  class,	  the	  
proletariat.	  	  Here	  all	  the	  contradictions	  of	  history	  will	  be	  resolved.	  	  Exploitation	  will	  end.	  
Everyone’s	  wants	  will	  be	  satisfied.	  	  Man	  becomes	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	  master	  of	  his	  
destiny.385	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381	  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution	  p.253	  	  
382	  Main	  Currents	  in	  Modern	  Political	  Thought	  p.432	  
383	  The	  specifics	  of	  such	  a	  morality	  are	  not	  given,	  as	  they	  can	  only	  be	  determined	  after	  the	  
revolution.	  pp.433-­‐434	  
384	  Ibid	  p.435	  
385	  Ibid	  p.436	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  Marx’s	  vision	  then	  is	  one	  where	  man	  finally	  becomes	  his	  own	  master.	  	  By	  uncovering	  the	  
true	  laws	  of	  history	  and	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  necessity,	  man	  is	  able	  to	  find	  true	  
freedom.	  Communism	  represents:	  
The	  positive	  transcendence	  of	  private	  property,	  as	  human	  self-­‐estrangement,	  and	  therefore	  
as	  the	  real	  appropriation	  of	  the	  human	  essence	  by	  and	  for	  man;	  communism	  therefore	  as	  
the	  complete	  return	  of	  man	  to	  himself	  as	  a	  social	  (i.e.	  human)	  being—a	  return	  become	  
conscious,	  and	  accomplished	  within	  the	  entire	  wealth	  of	  previous	  development.	  	  This	  
communism,	  as	  fully-­‐developed	  naturalism,	  equals	  humanism,	  and	  as	  fully-­‐developed	  
humanism	  equals	  naturalism;	  it	  is	  the	  genuine	  resolution	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  man	  and	  
nature	  and	  between	  man	  and	  man—the	  true	  resolution	  of	  the	  strife	  between	  existence	  and	  
essence,	  between	  objectification	  and	  self-­‐confirmation,	  between	  freedom	  and	  necessity,	  
between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  species.	  Communism	  is	  the	  riddle	  of	  history	  solved,	  and	  it	  
knows	  itself	  to	  be	  this	  solution.386	  
	  
The	  end	  state	  of	  communism	  is	  nothing	  short	  of	  paradise	  on	  earth.	  	  There	  is	  no	  need	  for	  a	  
coercive	  government	  because	  there	  will	  not	  be	  any	  conflict.	  	  With	  material	  conditions	  
adequately	  fulfilled,	  there	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  need	  for	  divisive	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  
family,	  marriage,	  or	  religion.	  	  Man	  will	  be	  free	  to	  realize	  his	  true	  nature	  and	  pursue	  
whatever	  ends	  he	  desires.	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  problem	  with	  such	  a	  construction	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  practically	  realizable	  and	  to	  
pretend	  otherwise	  can	  lead	  to	  horrendous	  political	  consequences.387	  	  Human	  nature	  does	  
not	  magically	  change	  just	  because	  Marx	  wants	  it	  to.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  Marx	  constructs	  his	  
system	  is	  particularly	  troubling.	  	  Violent	  revolution	  is	  to	  occur	  prior	  to	  any	  of	  the	  positive	  
changes	  taking	  place.	  	  As	  Voegelin	  notes:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386	  Economic	  and	  Philosophic	  Manuscripts	  pp.102-­‐3	  (emphasis	  added)	  
387	  As	  Leszek	  Kolakowski	  notes,	  Marx’s	  “philosophy	  entailed	  some	  practical	  consequences	  
that	  would	  bring	  indescribable	  misery	  and	  suffering	  to	  mankind:	  	  private	  property	  and	  the	  
market	  were	  to	  be	  abolished	  and	  replaced	  by	  universal	  and	  all-­‐encompassing	  planning—an	  
utterly	  impossible	  project.”	  See	  Main	  Currents	  of	  Marxism.	  (New	  York:	  	  W.W.	  Norton	  and	  
Company,	  2005)	  p.vi	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Marx	  did	  not,	  like	  earlier	  sectarians,	  create	  a	  “People	  of	  God”	  with	  changed	  hearts	  and	  then	  
lead	  the	  People	  into	  a	  revolution.	  	  He	  wanted	  the	  revolution	  to	  happen	  first	  and	  then	  let	  the	  
“People	  of	  God”	  spring	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  revolution.	  	  While	  for	  Marx	  personally	  
the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  was	  senseless	  unless	  the	  revolution	  produced	  the	  change	  
of	  heart,	  the	  historical	  proof	  that	  the	  overthrow	  was	  not	  the	  proper	  method	  for	  producing	  
such	  a	  change	  would	  only	  come	  after	  the	  revolution	  had	  occurred.	  	  The	  
pneumapathological	  nonsense	  of	  the	  idea	  could	  not	  break	  on	  the	  rock	  of	  reality	  before	  the	  
damage	  had	  been	  done.	  	  In	  the	  meantime	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  disturbance	  and	  
destruction	  could	  be	  engineered,	  animated	  by	  the	  pathos	  of	  eschatological	  heroism	  and	  
inspired	  by	  the	  vision	  of	  a	  terrestial	  paradise.388	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  Marx’s	  system	  led	  to	  less	  than	  desirable	  consequences.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  
violent	  revolution	  could	  serve	  as	  the	  impetus	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  new	  world	  led	  to	  the	  
unfortunate	  legitimization	  of	  violent	  action.389	  	  And	  such	  action	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  
of	  new	  men;	  it	  led	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  millions	  of	  men.390	  
	  	  	  	  	  So	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  Marx’s	  system	  in	  light	  of	  contemporary	  politics	  and	  why	  
should	  we	  continue	  to	  concern	  ourselves	  with	  a	  movement	  that	  has	  seemingly	  lost	  its	  mass	  
appeal?	  Marxism,	  as	  a	  viable	  political	  ideology,	  has	  certainly	  been	  on	  the	  decline	  over	  the	  
past	  few	  decades,	  but	  that	  is	  due	  primarily	  to	  the	  repeated	  failures	  to	  successfully	  
implement	  it.391	  The	  underlying	  assumptions	  have	  not	  met	  the	  same	  fate.	  	  The	  scientistic	  
aspects	  on	  which	  the	  system	  is	  based	  have	  continued	  to	  permeate	  the	  political	  sphere.392	  	  
The	  prestige	  of	  science	  has	  only	  increased	  since	  Marx’s	  time,	  giving	  even	  more	  credence	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388	  From	  Enlightenment	  to	  Revolution	  p.242	  
389	  As	  Kolakowski	  notes,	  in	  spite	  of	  Marx’s	  intentions	  to	  create	  a	  utopian	  end	  state,	  “the	  
Marxist	  doctrine	  was	  a	  good	  blueprint	  for	  converting	  human	  society	  into	  a	  giant	  
concentration	  camp.”	  Main	  Currents	  of	  Marxism	  p.vi	  
390	  Under	  Stalin’s	  regime,	  tens	  of	  millions	  died	  in	  the	  gulags.	  Whether	  Marx	  would	  have	  
wanted	  such	  results	  is	  irrelevant.	  The	  actual	  consequences	  of	  his	  ideas	  are	  what	  we	  must	  
be	  concerned	  with.	  	  For	  instance,	  Rummel	  estimates	  that	  62	  million	  Russians	  died	  at	  the	  
hands	  of	  their	  own	  government	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  See	  R.	  J.	  Rummel.	  	  Death	  by	  Government.	  	  
(New	  Jersey:	  	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1994)	  p.24	  
391	  For	  instance,	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  PRC	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  
392	  And	  as	  Kolakowski	  points	  out,	  “the	  virus	  (of	  Marxism)	  is	  dormant,	  waiting	  for	  the	  next	  
opportunity.	  Dreams	  about	  the	  perfect	  society	  belong	  to	  the	  enduring	  stock	  of	  our	  
civilization.”	  Main	  Currents	  of	  Marxism	  p.vi	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policies	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  being	  scientifically	  based.	  	  In	  fact,	  a	  contemporaneous	  
revolution	  in	  science,	  led	  by	  Charles	  Darwin,	  had	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  an	  unparalleled	  
merger	  between	  science	  and	  policy.	  	  It	  is	  to	  Darwin’s	  work	  that	  we	  now	  must	  turn.	  	  
Darwinian	  Evolution	  	  
	  	  	  	  While	  countless	  innovations	  have	  been	  made	  within	  science	  over	  the	  past	  century	  and	  a	  
half,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  anyone’s	  work	  has	  surpassed	  the	  social	  influence	  of	  Charles	  
Darwin	  (1809-­‐82).	  	  Darwin’s	  evolutionary	  theory,	  while	  not	  entirely	  original,	  had	  far	  
reaching	  effects	  within	  science	  and	  society	  that	  have	  continued	  to	  this	  day.393	  	  Much	  as	  
Isaac	  Newton’s	  Principia	  helped	  shape	  a	  new	  worldview,	  so	  too	  did	  Darwin’s	  work	  
fundamentally	  change	  the	  way	  humans	  viewed	  the	  world	  and	  their	  place	  within	  it.	  Because	  
of	  this	  fundamental	  shift,	  Darwin’s	  theory	  found	  import	  into	  an	  array	  of	  subjects	  including	  
eugenics,	  religion,	  criminal	  justice,	  psychology,	  economics,	  and	  politics.	  Volumes	  could	  be	  
filled	  on	  Darwin’s	  influence	  in	  both	  academics	  and	  society,	  but	  what	  concerns	  us	  here	  are	  
the	  fundamental	  presuppositions	  underlying	  his	  theory	  and	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  it.	  
For	  our	  purposes,	  what	  Darwin’s	  theory	  purports	  to	  explain	  is	  almost	  of	  secondary	  
importance	  to	  what	  it	  cannot	  (or	  fails	  to)	  explain.	  	  We	  shall	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  
reductionism	  inherent	  in	  Darwin’s	  theory	  can	  lead	  to	  deleterious	  political	  consequences	  
and	  also	  show	  how	  it	  is	  both	  the	  product	  of,	  and	  torchbearer	  for,	  scientism.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393	  Darwin	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Herbert	  Spencer	  and	  Thomas	  Malthus.	  
Spencer	  originally	  coined	  the	  term	  “survival	  of	  the	  fittest”,	  which	  Darwin	  conceded	  to	  be	  
more	  accurate	  than	  his	  term	  of	  “natural	  selection.”	  Malthus’s	  economic	  theory	  of	  
population	  growth	  is	  what	  inspired	  Darwin	  to	  develop	  his	  theory	  of	  natural	  selection.	  
Darwin	  claimed	  his	  own	  theory	  was	  merely	  “the	  doctrine	  of	  Malthus	  applied	  with	  manifold	  
force	  to	  the	  whole	  animal	  and	  vegetable	  kingdoms.”	  See	  John	  West.	  Darwin	  Day	  in	  America.	  
(Wilmington,	  DE:	  	  ISI	  Books,	  2007)	  pp.106-­‐109	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Phenomenalism	  and	  the	  Loss	  of	  Substance	  
	  	  	  	  	  From	  the	  onset,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  title	  of	  his	  most	  famous	  work,	  
On	  the	  Origin	  of	  the	  Species,	  Darwin	  fails	  to	  explain	  the	  substantive	  origin	  of	  the	  species	  (or	  
of	  any	  living	  being	  for	  that	  matter).	  Darwin	  demonstrates	  how	  living	  forms	  have	  evolved	  
over	  time	  without	  ever	  tackling	  the	  question	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  those	  beings	  or	  the	  
ultimate	  origin	  of	  their	  existence.394	  	  As	  Voegelin	  notes,	  the	  answers	  furnished	  by	  
evolutionary	  theory	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  “the	  two	  fundamental	  ontological	  questions	  of	  
Leibniz:	  Why	  is	  there	  something,	  not	  nothing?	  And	  why	  is	  the	  something	  as	  it	  is.”395	  
Voegelin	  continues:	  
By	  the	  time	  of	  Kant	  the	  problem	  of	  evolution	  was	  reduced	  to	  its	  phenomenal	  proportions.	  	  
And	  now,	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  as	  if	  nothing	  had	  happened,	  a	  new	  phenomenal	  theory	  
of	  evolution,	  operating	  with	  the	  conceptions	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  life,	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  
fittest,	  natural	  selection,	  etc.,	  had	  a	  popular	  success	  and	  became	  a	  mass	  creed	  for	  the	  
semieducated.	  	  A	  theory,	  that	  assuming	  that	  it	  was	  empirically	  tenable,	  could	  at	  best	  furnish	  
an	  insight	  into	  the	  mechanics	  of	  evolution	  without	  touching	  its	  substance	  was	  accepted	  as	  a	  
revelation	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  life	  and	  as	  compelling	  a	  reorientation	  of	  our	  views	  
concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  man	  and	  his	  position	  in	  the	  cosmos.396	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  problem	  then	  is	  not	  theoretical	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  logical	  flaw	  in	  the	  system	  or	  faulty	  
empirics.	  	  It	  is	  with	  the	  fundamental	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
phenomenal	  relations	  and	  substance.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Darwin’s	  theory,	  it	  represents	  the	  
reduction	  of	  substance	  to	  phenomenal	  knowledge.	  Voegelin	  labels	  this	  type	  of	  attitude	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394	  In	  fact,	  Darwin	  took	  great	  care	  not	  to	  speculate	  on	  these	  issues,	  especially	  in	  his	  public	  
works.	  He	  ambiguously	  spoke	  of	  a	  Creator,	  but	  never	  did	  endorse	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  story	  
of	  Genesis.	  However,	  in	  his	  private	  correspondence,	  Darwin	  expressed	  regret	  that	  he	  
“truckled	  to	  public	  opinion,	  and	  used	  the	  Pentateuchal	  term	  of	  creation”	  when	  he	  really	  
meant	  “appeared	  by	  some	  wholly	  unknown	  process.”	  	  P.37	  	  See	  also	  John	  Brooke.	  “Darwin	  
and	  Victorian	  Christianity”	  in	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Darwin.	  2nd	  edition,	  Ed.	  Hodge	  and	  
Radick	  (Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  p.206	  	  
395	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  The	  New	  Order	  and	  Last	  Orientation.	  	  Volume	  25	  of	  the	  Collected	  Works	  of	  
Eric	  Voegelin.	  Ed.	  Gebhardt	  and	  Hollweck.	  (Columbia:	  	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  1999)	  
p.184	  
396	  Ibid	  p.185	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phenomenalism.	  	  The	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  phenomenal	  aspects	  of	  the	  world,	  stressed	  in	  
the	  natural	  sciences,	  has	  led	  to	  the	  “atrophy	  of	  awareness	  of	  the	  substantiality	  of	  man	  and	  
the	  universe.”397	  Voegelin	  continues,	  “a	  theory	  that	  in	  itself	  might	  contribute	  to	  our	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  unfolding	  of	  a	  substance	  is	  perverted	  into	  a	  philosophy	  of	  
substance;	  the	  causal	  relationship	  of	  phenomena	  is	  understood	  as	  an	  explanation	  on	  the	  
level	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  life.”398	  To	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  this	  occurs,	  let	  us	  more	  closely	  
explore	  the	  tenets	  of	  Darwinism	  and	  note	  some	  concrete	  examples	  of	  its	  effects.399	  	  
Materialism	  and	  Evolutionary	  Biology	  
	  	  	  	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  Darwin’s	  work	  represented	  the	  popularization	  of	  ideas	  that	  had	  
already	  been	  formulated	  to	  a	  large	  extent.	  	  Malthus’s	  Essay	  on	  the	  Principle	  of	  Population	  
asserted	  the	  “perpetual	  tendency	  in	  the	  race	  of	  man	  to	  increase	  beyond	  the	  means	  of	  
subsistence	  is	  one	  of	  the	  general	  laws	  of	  animated	  nature	  which	  we	  can	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  
expect	  to	  change.”400	  The	  “struggle	  for	  existence”	  then	  was	  a	  natural	  condition	  of	  life,	  but	  
Darwin	  did	  not	  necessarily	  view	  this	  as	  a	  negative	  feature:	  “it	  at	  once	  struck	  me	  that	  under	  
these	  circumstances	  favourable	  variations	  would	  tend	  to	  be	  preserved	  and	  unfavourable	  
ones	  to	  be	  destroyed.	  	  The	  result	  of	  this	  would	  be	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  species.”401	  	  To	  
this	  general	  process,	  Darwin	  gave	  the	  name	  “natural	  selection.”	  Herbert	  Spencer,	  a	  
sociologist,	  had	  applied	  the	  same	  principle	  to	  human	  society	  and	  coined	  the	  popular	  
phrase,	  “survival	  of	  the	  fittest,”	  which	  later	  came	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  Darwin’s	  work.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397	  Ibid	  p.178.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Voegelin	  does	  not	  consider	  phenomenalism	  to	  be	  
a	  necessary	  result	  of	  the	  advancement	  of	  science,	  but	  also	  points	  out	  that	  its	  rise	  is	  hardly	  
conceivable	  without	  it.	  	  
398	  Ibid	  p.185	  
399	  We	  will	  more	  fully	  explore	  the	  historical	  shift	  to	  “phenomenalism”	  in	  the	  subsequent	  
section	  on	  the	  “race	  idea.”	  	  
400	  West	  p.109	  
401	  Ibid	  p.109	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Spencer	  concluded	  that	  the	  government	  should	  not	  interfere	  with	  that	  process	  by	  helping	  
the	  poor	  as	  “the	  whole	  effort	  of	  nature	  is	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  such,	  to	  clear	  the	  world	  of	  them,	  and	  
make	  room	  for	  better.”402	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  specific	  influences	  of	  Malthus	  and	  Spencer,	  Darwin	  embraced	  the	  
widely	  accepted	  materialistic	  outlook	  of	  his	  time.	  As	  West	  notes,	  under	  this	  view,	  human	  
rationality,	  morality,	  and	  society	  are	  the	  “products	  of	  purely	  materialistic	  processes.”	  	  
Institutions	  such	  as	  religion	  and	  marriage	  were	  direct	  results	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  
process.403	  	  The	  primary	  difference	  between	  Darwin’s	  materialistic	  account	  and	  that	  of	  
Newton,	  or	  even	  Malthus,	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  appeal	  to	  design	  in	  nature.	  	  While	  the	  
revelatory	  aspects	  of	  religion	  had	  certainly	  taken	  a	  hit	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  Enlightenment	  
thought,	  natural	  theology	  had	  remained	  as	  an	  ally	  and	  perhaps	  last	  line	  of	  defense	  for	  
Christianity.	  	  Natural	  theology	  took	  reason,	  as	  opposed	  to	  revelation,	  as	  its	  basis.	  As	  Brooke	  
notes:	  	  
In	  England	  especially,	  confidence	  had	  often	  been	  placed	  in	  arguments	  for	  design,	  
comparing	  intricate	  organic	  structures	  and	  their	  marvelous	  adaptive	  functions	  with	  the	  
work	  of	  human	  artisans,	  as	  in	  the	  design	  of	  magnificent	  clocks.	  Such	  analogies	  pointed	  to	  
the	  wisdom	  and	  power	  of	  God,	  the	  refinement	  of	  whose	  creatures	  far	  transcended	  anything	  
mere	  mortals	  could	  make	  .	  .	  .	  This	  argument	  for	  design	  had	  often	  incorporated	  the	  latest	  
science	  and	  had	  been	  reinforced	  by	  it	  .	  .	  .	  For	  Robert	  Boyle	  the	  way	  the	  Creator	  had	  packed	  
life	  into	  the	  merest	  mite	  was	  awe-­‐	  inspiring.	  	  The	  physical	  sciences	  had	  also	  testified	  to	  
divine	  precision—in	  the	  exquisite	  calculations	  made	  by	  Isaac	  Newton’s	  God	  to	  ensure	  that	  
the	  planets	  had	  gone	  into	  stable	  orbits.404	  
	  
On	  Darwin’s	  own	  account,	  his	  theory	  undermined	  such	  a	  view	  of	  the	  world:	  “the	  old	  
argument	  from	  design	  in	  nature,	  as	  given	  by	  Paley,	  which	  formerly	  seemed	  to	  me	  so	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conclusive,	  fails,	  now	  that	  the	  law	  of	  natural	  selection	  has	  been	  discovered.”405	  As	  West	  
notes,	  “Darwin	  was	  no	  longer	  filled	  with	  the	  ‘higher	  feelings	  of	  wonder,	  admiration	  and	  
devotion’	  when	  looking	  at	  nature.”406	  	  Darwin’s	  own	  account	  of	  this	  transformation	  in	  his	  
Autobiography	  is	  telling:	  “I	  well	  remember	  my	  conviction	  that	  there	  is	  more	  in	  man	  that	  the	  
mere	  breath	  of	  his	  body.	  	  But	  now	  the	  grandest	  scenes	  would	  not	  cause	  any	  such	  
convictions	  and	  feelings	  to	  rise	  in	  my	  mind.”407	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  the	  greatest	  insight	  into	  Darwin’s	  view	  of	  man	  can	  be	  found	  in	  The	  Descent	  of	  
Man.408	  The	  Christian	  view	  of	  man	  was	  obviously	  out	  of	  the	  question	  since	  Darwin	  rejected	  
the	  need	  for	  a	  Creator	  and	  thought	  religion	  to	  be	  a	  mere	  stage	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  human	  
mind.409	  	  And	  even	  if	  such	  convictions	  existed	  within	  our	  minds,	  how	  could	  we	  trust	  them:	  
“With	  me	  the	  horrid	  doubt	  always	  arises	  whether	  the	  convictions	  of	  man’s	  mind	  which	  has	  
been	  developed	  from	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  lower	  animals,	  are	  of	  any	  value	  or	  at	  all	  trustworthy.	  	  
Would	  any	  one	  trust	  in	  the	  convictions	  of	  a	  monkey’s	  mind,	  if	  there	  are	  any	  convictions	  in	  
such	  a	  mind?”410	  Likewise,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  soul	  for	  “Brain	  
makes	  thought”	  and	  thought	  is	  produced	  “as	  soon	  as	  the	  brain	  is	  developed	  .	  .	  .no	  soul	  
superadded.”411	  In	  Chapter	  Two	  of	  the	  Descent,	  Darwin	  further	  confirms	  this	  view	  by	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406	  Earlier	  in	  his	  life,	  Darwin	  was	  an	  admitted	  theist	  because	  he	  saw	  the	  “impossibility	  of	  
conceiving	  the	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  and	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  .	  .	  .	  as	  the	  result	  of	  blind	  
chance	  or	  necessity.”	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  Darwin	  generally	  remained	  ambivalent	  on	  the	  
issue	  in	  his	  public	  statements	  even	  after	  the	  change,	  undoubtedly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  political	  
prudence.	  Darwin	  Day	  in	  America	  pp.38-­‐39	  
407	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408	  It	  is	  in	  this	  work	  that	  Darwin	  explicitly	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  the	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  of	  human	  evolution.	  He	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  a	  discussion	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  On	  the	  Origin	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  the	  Species.	  
409	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  universe	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  mind	  of	  man,	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demonstrating	  “there	  is	  no	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  man	  and	  the	  higher	  mammals	  
in	  mental	  faculties.”412	  	  Love,	  courage,	  revenge,	  suspicion,	  jealousy,	  pride,	  magnanimity,	  
imitation,	  imagination,	  reason,	  and	  even	  a	  sense	  of	  humor	  could	  all	  be	  found	  in	  other	  
animals.413	  Language	  could	  also	  be	  explained	  away	  through	  an	  appeal	  to	  materialistic	  
processes:	  “language	  owes	  its	  origin	  to	  the	  imitation	  and	  modification,	  aided	  by	  signs	  and	  
gestures,	  of	  various	  natural	  sounds,	  the	  voices	  of	  other	  animals,	  and	  man’s	  own	  instinctive	  
cries.”	  Such	  a	  process	  may	  have	  originated	  with	  an	  “unusually	  wise	  ape-­‐like	  animal”	  
imitating	  the	  “growl	  of	  a	  beast	  of	  prey,	  as	  to	  indicate	  to	  his	  fellow	  monkeys	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
expected	  danger…this	  would	  have	  been	  a	  first	  step	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  language.”414	  Darwin	  
continues	  by	  dispelling	  the	  notion	  that	  consciousness	  and	  abstract	  thought	  are	  distinctly	  
human	  and	  finally	  ends	  with	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  “humans	  were	  distinguished	  by	  the	  
lower	  animals	  by	  a	  universal	  belief	  in	  an	  all	  powerful	  creator.”415	  Darwin	  points	  out	  the	  fact	  
that	  “numerous	  races	  have	  existed	  and	  still	  exist	  who	  have	  no	  idea	  of	  one	  or	  more	  gods.”	  As	  
West	  notes:	  	  
Darwin	  was	  willing	  to	  admit	  that	  there	  was	  an	  “almost	  universal”	  belief	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  
spiritual	  world	  among	  primitive	  peoples,	  but	  he	  placed	  such	  beliefs	  on	  the	  level	  of	  a	  dog	  
who	  barks	  and	  growls	  upon	  seeing	  an	  open	  parasol	  moved	  by	  the	  wind.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  dog	  
mistakenly	  believes	  that	  some	  intelligent	  agent	  moved	  the	  parasol,	  primitive	  peoples	  
surmised	  that	  unseen	  beings	  were	  behind	  all	  manner	  of	  natural	  phenomena.416	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  man’s	  mental	  and	  physical	  faculties	  being	  reduced	  to	  biological	  and	  
materialistic	  processes,	  his	  moral	  sense	  was	  included.	  	  Morality	  arises	  because	  it	  aids	  in	  the	  
struggle	  for	  survival:	  “the	  origin	  of	  the	  moral	  sense	  lies	  in	  the	  social	  instincts,	  including	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sympathy;	  and	  these	  instincts	  no	  doubt	  were	  primarily	  gained,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  lower	  
animals,	  through	  natural	  selection.”417	  Morality	  then	  depends	  not	  on	  a	  set	  of	  eternal,	  
immutable	  natural	  laws,	  but	  on	  material	  conditions.	  	  A	  preferable	  morality	  is	  one	  that	  
maximizes	  biological	  survival.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  question	  of	  free	  will	  and	  human	  
responsibility	  becomes	  paramount.	  	  Darwin’s	  failure	  to	  find	  a	  differentia	  specifica	  
essentially	  means	  that	  one	  cannot	  judge	  human	  action	  differently	  from	  that	  of	  animals.	  	  As	  
Darwin	  notes,	  “at	  the	  moment	  of	  action,	  man	  will	  no	  doubt	  be	  apt	  to	  follow	  the	  stronger	  
impulse;	  and	  though	  this	  may	  occasionally	  prompt	  him	  to	  the	  noblest	  deeds,	  it	  will	  far	  more	  
commonly	  lead	  him	  to	  gratify	  his	  own	  desires	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  men.”	  	  In	  his	  
unpublished	  notebooks,	  Darwin	  drew	  out	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  view:	  “the	  general	  
delusion	  about	  free	  will	  is	  obvious	  .	  .	  .one	  deserves	  no	  credit	  for	  anything	  .	  .	  .nor	  ought	  one	  
to	  blame	  others”	  and	  the	  punishment	  of	  criminals	  is	  “solely	  to	  deter	  others—not	  because	  
they	  did	  something	  blameworthy.”418	  As	  West	  notes,	  Darwin	  did	  not	  think	  such	  a	  fatalistic	  
view	  would	  harm	  society	  because	  “ordinary	  people	  would	  never	  be	  ‘fully	  convinced	  of	  its	  
truth’	  and	  the	  enlightened	  few	  who	  did	  embrace	  it	  could	  be	  trusted.”419	  	  
Eugenics	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  Darwin’s	  cautiousness	  in	  fully	  drawing	  out	  the	  implications	  of	  his	  system	  in	  
his	  public	  works,	  others	  were	  not	  so	  reluctant.	  Perhaps	  there	  is	  one	  advantage	  man	  
possesses	  over	  other	  animals:	  	  Man	  understands	  the	  law	  of	  nature	  and	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  
control	  its	  effects.	  	  Through	  this	  knowledge,	  man	  has	  been	  able	  to	  “aid”	  nature	  through	  
selective	  breeding	  of	  animals,	  and	  with	  great	  success.	  If	  the	  difference	  between	  man	  and	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animal	  is	  merely	  one	  of	  degree	  and	  not	  of	  kind,	  then	  why	  should	  not	  this	  principle	  be	  
applied	  to	  human	  society?	  	  And	  if	  human	  action	  is	  primarily	  understood	  to	  be	  biologically	  
determined	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  exertion	  of	  free	  will,	  then	  problems	  such	  as	  crime	  and	  poverty	  
can	  conceivably	  be	  eradicated	  through	  selective	  breeding.	  	  These	  assumptions,	  which	  
Darwin	  certainly	  left	  room	  for,	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  field:	  	  eugenics.	  	  Francis	  Galton,	  
Darwin’s	  cousin,	  coined	  the	  term	  in	  1883	  and	  the	  basic	  assumption	  was	  that	  the	  “only	  
solution	  to	  social	  problems	  was	  to	  discourage	  reproduction	  by	  those	  with	  undesirable	  
traits,	  while	  encouraging	  reproduction	  by	  society’s	  worthier	  elements.”420	  As	  Paul	  notes,	  
the	  movement	  would	  soon	  gain	  a	  wide	  and	  enthusiastic	  following	  that	  cut	  across	  party	  
lines.	  	  The	  evidence	  seemed	  to	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  with	  undesirable	  traits	  were	  
“outbreeding”	  those	  with	  better	  traits.	  Human	  intervention	  had	  helped	  to	  nullify	  natural	  
selection	  as	  those	  who	  would	  have	  undoubtedly	  perished	  if	  left	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves	  (i.e.	  
the	  poor,	  sick),	  were	  able	  to	  survive	  through	  charity.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  failure	  of	  social	  
reforms	  to	  correct	  the	  situation	  only	  served	  to	  lend	  credence	  to	  the	  
hereditary/deterministic	  view.	  Thus,	  the	  only	  solution	  to	  social	  problems	  was	  to	  be	  found	  
in	  selective	  breeding.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Initially,	  it	  was	  thought	  that	  “positive”	  eugenics	  could	  solve	  the	  problem.	  This	  is	  the	  
approach	  Galton	  took	  as	  he	  encouraged	  the	  talented	  to	  have	  large	  families	  and	  outbreed	  
those	  with	  less	  desirable	  traits.	  	  But	  it	  soon	  became	  apparent	  that	  such	  measures	  would	  be	  
insufficient	  to	  enact	  any	  meaningful	  change.	  	  Simply	  encouraging	  the	  talented	  to	  produce	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large	  families	  did	  nothing	  to	  stop	  those	  with	  “undesirable	  traits”	  from	  procreating.	  	  Thus,	  
the	  focus	  turned	  to	  “negative”	  eugenics	  and	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  “new	  views	  of	  
heredity	  had	  converged	  with	  a	  heightened	  sense	  of	  danger	  and	  changing	  attitudes	  towards	  
the	  state	  to	  make	  active	  intervention	  more	  acceptable.”421	  While	  Darwin	  himself	  was	  “too	  
imbued	  with	  Whig	  distrust	  of	  government	  to	  propose	  that	  it	  restrict	  human	  breeding,”	  the	  
increasing	  legitimacy	  of	  “collectivist-­‐oriented	  reform”	  made	  government	  intervention	  more	  
acceptable.422	  Initially,	  government	  intervention	  took	  the	  form	  of	  segregating	  “defectives”	  
during	  their	  reproductive	  years,	  but	  as	  Paul	  points	  out,	  this	  became	  too	  costly	  and	  it	  was	  
found	  to	  be	  much	  more	  efficient	  to	  simply	  sterilize	  those	  with	  undesirable	  traits.423	  
	  	  	  	  The	  popularity	  of	  eugenics	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  Britain:	  	  “By	  1940,	  sterilization	  laws	  had	  
been	  passed	  by	  thirty	  American	  states,	  three	  Canadian	  provinces,	  a	  Swiss	  canton,	  Germany,	  
Estonia,	  all	  of	  the	  Scandinavian	  and	  most	  of	  the	  Eastern	  European	  countries,	  Cuba,	  Turkey,	  
and	  Japan.”424	  Eugenics	  was	  especially	  prominent	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  movement	  
would	  not	  have	  gained	  such	  momentum	  without	  the	  fundamental	  shift	  in	  American	  
political	  development	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  
fully	  embraced	  Darwinism	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  using	  it	  as	  justification	  for	  a	  new	  interpretation	  
of	  society:	  “in	  our	  own	  day,	  whenever	  we	  discuss	  the	  structure	  or	  development	  of	  a	  thing	  .	  .	  
.	  we	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously	  follow	  Mr.	  Darwin.”425	  West	  continues:	  
According	  to	  Wilson,	  the	  Constitution	  betrayed	  the	  Founders’	  “Newtonian”	  view	  that	  
government	  was	  built	  on	  unchanging	  laws	  like	  “the	  law	  of	  gravitation.”	  	  In	  truth,	  however,	  
government	  “falls,	  not	  under	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  universe,	  but	  under	  the	  theory	  of	  organic	  life.	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It	  is	  accountable	  to	  Darwin,	  not	  Newton.	  It	  is	  modified	  by	  its	  environment,	  necessitated	  by	  
its	  tasks,	  shaped	  to	  its	  functions	  by	  the	  sheer	  pressure	  of	  life.”	  Hence,	  “living	  political	  
constitutions	  must	  be	  Darwinian	  in	  structure	  and	  in	  practice.	  	  Society	  is	  a	  living	  organism	  
and	  must	  obey	  the	  laws	  of	  Life	  .	  .	  .	  It	  must	  develop.”	  	  Wilson	  averred	  that	  “all	  that	  
progressives	  ask	  or	  desire	  is	  permission—in	  an	  era	  when	  ‘development,’	  ‘evolution,’	  is	  the	  
scientific	  word—to	  interpret	  the	  Constitution	  according	  to	  the	  Darwinian	  principle.”426	  
	  
West	  argues	  that	  this	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  “much	  greater	  regulation	  of	  business	  and	  the	  
economy,	  eventually	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  New	  Deal”	  and	  that	  it	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  idea	  
that	  government	  	  “should	  scientifically	  plan	  and	  regulate	  even	  the	  most	  intimate	  questions	  
of	  family	  life.”427	  Whether	  this	  followed	  directly	  from	  Wilson’s	  progressivism	  may	  be	  
debatable,	  but	  the	  acceptance	  of	  eugenics,	  with	  its	  Darwinian	  justification,	  is	  undeniable.	  
Let	  us	  now	  explore	  a	  few	  concrete	  examples	  of	  its	  subsequent	  impact	  in	  America.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  eugenics	  began	  to	  gain	  popular	  approval	  as	  early	  as	  1912.	  	  Henry	  
Goddard’s	  book,	  The	  Kallikak	  Family:	  	  A	  Study	  in	  Feeble-­‐Mindedness,	  “was	  received	  with	  
acclaim	  by	  the	  public	  and	  by	  much	  of	  the	  scientific	  community”	  and	  “interest	  was	  
expressed	  in	  turning	  it	  into	  a	  Broadway	  play.”428Goddard’s	  case	  study	  was	  designed	  to	  
show	  that	  the	  underclass	  owed	  its	  suffering	  to	  heredity,	  not	  environment.	  	  Goddard	  traced	  
hundreds	  of	  relatives	  and	  found	  “conclusive	  proof”	  that	  one	  hundred	  and	  forty-­‐three	  “were	  
or	  are	  feeble	  minded,	  while	  only	  forty-­‐six	  have	  been	  found	  normal.	  	  The	  rest	  are	  unknown	  
or	  doubtful.”429	  Goddard	  posited	  that	  people	  as	  these	  were	  especially	  dangerous	  to	  the	  
racial	  “stock”	  because	  “a	  large	  proportion	  of	  those	  who	  are	  considered	  feeble-­‐minded	  in	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this	  study	  are	  persons	  who	  would	  not	  be	  recognized	  as	  such	  by	  the	  untrained	  observer.”430	  
Thus,	  for	  Goddard,	  social	  problems	  had	  to	  be	  solved	  through	  heredity,	  not	  charity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Goddard	  certainly	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  his	  beliefs.	  	  Prominent	  politicians,	  scientists,	  doctors,	  
and	  even	  religious	  leaders	  adopted	  similar	  views.	  	  At	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Public	  
Health	  Association,	  a	  doctor	  suggested	  that	  all	  American	  schoolchildren	  be	  given	  a	  
Eugenics	  inspection:	  	  “As	  soon	  as	  the	  2	  to	  3	  percent	  of	  all	  children	  who	  are	  hereditarily	  
defective	  are	  determined	  they	  should	  be	  given	  such	  a	  training	  as	  will	  fit	  them	  for	  the	  part	  
they	  are	  likely	  to	  play	  in	  life.	  	  Then	  they	  should	  either	  be	  segregated	  or	  sterilized.”431	  A	  
professor	  at	  John	  Hopkins	  University	  delivered	  a	  similar	  message	  a	  few	  days	  later	  in	  an	  
address	  for	  the	  International	  Hygiene	  Congress,	  noting	  importance	  of	  “providing	  for	  the	  
birth	  of	  children	  endowed	  with	  good	  qualities”	  while	  “denying	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  the	  
privilege	  of	  parenthood	  to	  the	  manifestly	  unfit.”432	  West	  points	  out	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  
eugenics	  even	  spread	  to	  the	  churches,	  noting	  the	  announcement	  by	  the	  Episcopal	  hierarchy	  
in	  Chicago	  that	  “no	  persons	  will	  be	  married	  at	  the	  cathedral	  unless	  they	  present	  a	  
certificate	  of	  health	  from	  a	  reputable	  physician	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  they	  are	  normally	  
physically	  and	  mentally	  and	  have	  neither	  an	  incurable	  nor	  a	  communicable	  disease.”433	  
	  	  	  	  	  Politically,	  the	  increased	  popularity	  of	  eugenics	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  
organizations	  promoting	  its	  implementation.	  	  The	  American	  Breeder’s	  Association,	  
Eugenics	  Record	  Office,	  and	  American	  Eugenics	  Society	  all	  emerged	  as	  prominent	  
organizations.	  What	  they	  all	  had	  in	  common	  was	  the	  firm	  belief	  in	  the	  scientific	  grounding	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of	  their	  cause.	  	  Their	  legitimacy	  arose	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  from	  the	  pronouncements	  of	  
prominent	  scientists	  at	  the	  nation’s	  finest	  institutions.	  	  Edward	  East,	  a	  Harvard	  biologist,	  
lent	  his	  support	  for	  negative	  eugenics:	  	  
Nature	  eliminates	  the	  unfit	  and	  preserves	  the	  fit	  .	  .	  .	  Her	  fool-­‐killing	  devices	  were	  highly	  
efficient	  in	  the	  olden	  days	  before	  civilization	  came	  to	  thwart	  her.	  	  It	  is	  man,	  not	  Nature,	  who	  
has	  caused	  all	  the	  trouble.	  	  He	  has	  put	  his	  whole	  soul	  to	  saving	  the	  unfit,	  and	  has	  timidly	  
failed	  to	  do	  the	  other	  half	  of	  his	  duty	  by	  preventing	  them	  from	  perpetuating	  their	  traits.434	  
	  
East	  was	  hardly	  alone	  in	  his	  views.	  	  The	  return	  to	  a	  primitive	  state	  of	  nature	  was	  out	  of	  the	  
question	  so	  man	  would	  have	  to	  correct	  the	  problem	  through	  eugenics.	  	  And	  since	  “man	  is	  
an	  organism-­‐-­‐an	  animal”	  and	  “all	  life	  is	  conditioned	  by	  the	  same	  fundamental	  laws	  of	  
nature”,	  then	  the	  “same	  methods	  that	  man	  now	  employs	  in	  producing	  a	  high	  quality	  breed	  
of	  dogs,	  or	  birds,	  or	  cattle,	  or	  horses,	  he	  must	  apply	  to	  himself.”435	  Even	  prominent	  inventor	  
Alexander	  Graham	  Bell	  was	  on	  board:	  “all	  recognize	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  heredity	  which	  
apply	  to	  animals	  also	  apply	  to	  man;	  and	  that	  therefore	  the	  breeder	  of	  animals	  is	  fitted	  to	  
guide	  public	  opinion	  on	  questions	  relating	  to	  human	  heredity.”436	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  utopianism	  inherent	  in	  the	  eugenics	  movement	  was	  nothing	  short	  of	  astounding.	  	  
West	  catalogues	  a	  number	  of	  striking	  examples	  of	  this	  seemingly	  unbounded	  optimism.	  
Galton	  had	  promised	  that	  eugenics	  would	  gradually	  raise	  “the	  present	  miserably	  low	  
standard	  of	  the	  human	  race	  to	  one	  in	  which	  the	  Utopias	  in	  the	  dreamland	  of	  philanthropists	  
may	  become	  practical	  possibilities.”437	  	  In	  America,	  proponents	  noted,	  “the	  Garden	  of	  Eden	  
is	  not	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  in	  the	  future.”438	  	  Proper	  breeding	  would	  mean	  “little	  suffering,	  
weakness,	  sickness,	  crime	  or	  vice.”	  And	  those	  who	  truly	  embraced	  eugenics	  would	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434	  Ibid	  p.129	  (emphasis	  added)	  
435	  Ibid	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empowered	  like	  never	  before:	  “the	  people	  who	  make	  eugenics	  part	  of	  their	  religion	  and	  are	  
loyal	  to	  its	  truth	  .	  .	  .	  will	  have	  found	  the	  fountain	  of	  youth.”	  A	  new	  type	  of	  human	  would	  
emerge	  in	  the	  process:	  “it	  will	  take	  but	  two	  or	  three	  close-­‐linked	  generations	  to	  make	  
human	  beings	  far	  more	  superior	  to	  us	  than	  we	  are	  to	  the	  apes.”439	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  gaining	  popularity	  of	  such	  positions	  led	  to	  concrete	  political	  changes.	  As	  mentioned	  
previously,	  thirty	  states	  adopted	  sterilization	  laws	  by	  1940	  and	  restrictions	  were	  placed	  on	  
marriage	  and	  immigration	  as	  well.	  	  The	  power	  of	  the	  movement	  even	  made	  its	  way	  to	  the	  
Supreme	  Court,	  where	  Justice	  Oliver	  Wendell	  Holmes	  (an	  avowed	  Darwinist)	  fully	  
embraced	  eugenics.	  In	  the	  1927	  case	  of	  Buck	  v.	  Bell,	  Holmes	  wrote	  the	  opinion	  and	  upheld	  
Virginia’s	  compulsory	  sterilization	  statute:	  
We	  have	  seen	  more	  than	  once	  that	  the	  public	  welfare	  may	  call	  upon	  the	  best	  citizens	  for	  
their	  lives.	  	  It	  would	  be	  strange	  if	  it	  could	  not	  call	  upon	  those	  who	  already	  sap	  the	  strength	  
of	  the	  State	  for	  these	  lesser	  sacrifices,	  often	  not	  felt	  to	  be	  such	  by	  those	  concerned,	  to	  
prevent	  our	  being	  swamped	  by	  incompetence.	  It	  is	  better	  for	  all	  the	  world	  if,	  instead	  of	  
waiting	  to	  execute	  degenerate	  offspring	  from	  crime	  or	  let	  them	  starve	  for	  their	  imbecility,	  
society	  can	  prevent	  those	  who	  are	  manifestly	  unfit	  from	  continuing	  their	  kind	  .	  .	  .three	  
generations	  of	  imbeciles	  are	  enough	  (referring	  to	  Carrie	  Buck,	  the	  woman	  who	  was	  forcibly	  
sterilized).440	  	  
	  
The	  chilling	  decision	  served	  to	  legitimate	  sterilization	  laws	  throughout	  the	  country	  and	  the	  
sterilization	  rate	  increased	  dramatically	  as	  a	  result.441	  Eugenics	  eventually	  lost	  momentum	  
in	  the	  1940’s,	  but	  the	  event	  that	  would	  ultimately	  sway	  public	  opinion	  against	  it	  took	  place	  
not	  on	  American	  soil,	  but	  in	  Nazi	  Germany.	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  Ibid	  p.138.	  	  Justice	  Butler,	  a	  Roman	  Catholic,	  was	  the	  only	  dissenter.	  The	  case	  still	  has	  
yet	  to	  be	  overturned;	  although	  Skinner	  v.	  Oklahoma	  (1942)	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  as	  the	  
turning	  point	  in	  quelling	  negative	  eugenics	  in	  the	  United	  States.	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  hundred	  thousand	  from	  1920	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1930’s.	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Nazi	  Race	  Theory	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  most	  striking	  example	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  eugenics	  took	  place	  in	  Hitler’s	  
Germany.	  	  The	  stage	  had	  been	  set	  for	  its	  acceptance	  well	  before	  Hitler’s	  reign	  however,	  and	  
so	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  context	  from	  which	  it	  developed.	  As	  Diane	  Paul	  notes:	  
Nowhere	  did	  the	  Origin	  have	  a	  greater	  initial	  impact	  than	  Germany,	  where	  the	  book	  
appeared	  in	  translation	  within	  a	  year	  of	  publication	  in	  English.	  	  Many	  scientists	  endorsed	  
Darwin’s	  theory,	  which	  was	  also	  widely	  popularized,	  most	  effectively	  the	  by	  University	  of	  
Jena	  zoologist	  Ernst	  Haeckel.	  Both	  liberals	  and	  Marxists	  were	  enthusiastic.	  Indeed,	  Karl	  
Marx’s	  friend	  Wilhelm	  Liebknecht	  reported	  that,	  following	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Origin,	  he	  
and	  his	  comrades	  ‘spoke	  for	  months	  of	  nothing	  else	  but	  Darwin	  and	  the	  revolutionizing	  
power	  of	  his	  scientific	  conquests.’	  The	  response	  in	  Germany	  was	  so	  enthusiastic	  that	  in	  
1868	  Darwin	  wrote	  that,	  ‘the	  support	  which	  I	  receive	  from	  Germany	  is	  my	  chief	  ground	  for	  
hoping	  that	  our	  views	  will	  ultimately	  prevail.’442	  
	  
While	  Darwinism	  was	  used	  to	  justify	  everything	  from	  the	  socialism	  to	  laissez-­‐faire,	  by	  the	  
turn	  of	  the	  century,	  it	  had	  become	  increasingly	  reactionary.443	  The	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  
the	  “necessity	  of	  competitive	  struggle”	  and	  “modern	  society	  was	  now	  seen	  as	  counter-­‐
selective;	  degeneration	  could	  be	  reversed	  only	  through	  the	  active	  efforts	  of	  the	  state.”444	  
The	  First	  World	  War	  served	  to	  reinforce	  the	  “view	  of	  war	  as	  nature’s	  way	  of	  ensuring	  the	  
survival	  of	  the	  fittest.”	  	  According	  to	  an	  American	  evolutionist	  who	  served	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
civilian	  aid	  group	  in	  the	  headquarters	  of	  the	  German	  army	  in	  France	  and	  Belgium,	  the	  
German	  officers	  defended	  aggressive	  militarism	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  Darwinism:	  
The	  creed	  of	  the	  Allmacht	  of	  a	  natural	  selection	  based	  on	  violent	  and	  competitive	  struggle	  is	  
the	  gospel	  of	  the	  German	  intellectuals;	  all	  else	  is	  illusion	  and	  anathema	  .	  .	  .	  as	  with	  the	  
different	  ant	  species,	  struggle—bitter,	  ruthless	  struggle—is	  the	  rule	  among	  the	  different	  
human	  groups.	  	  This	  struggle	  not	  only	  must	  go	  on,	  for	  that	  is	  the	  natural	  law,	  but	  it	  should	  
go	  on,	  so	  that	  this	  natural	  law	  may	  work	  out	  in	  its	  cruel,	  inevitable	  way	  the	  salvation	  of	  the	  
human	  species.445	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  With	  Hitler’s	  rise	  to	  power,	  the	  eugenics	  movement	  in	  Germany	  gained	  unprecedented	  
support.	  Paul	  continues:	  
The	  most	  extensive	  and	  brutal	  eugenic	  measures	  were	  adopted	  in	  Germany.	  	  The	  1933	  Law	  
for	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Genetically	  Diseased	  Offspring,	  passed	  soon	  after	  Hitler’s	  ascent	  to	  
power,	  encompassed	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  ostensibly	  heritable	  conditions,	  and	  applied	  also	  to	  
the	  non-­‐institutionalized;	  it	  ultimately	  affected	  about	  400,000	  people	  (compared	  with	  
about	  60,000	  in	  the	  United	  States).	  But	  German	  Rassenhygiene	  involved	  much	  more	  than	  a	  
massive	  programme	  of	  sterilization.	  	  The	  Nuremberg	  Laws	  barred	  Jewish-­‐German	  
marriages.	  	  The	  Lebensborn	  programme	  encouraged	  racially	  ‘pure’	  German	  women,	  both	  
single	  and	  married,	  to	  bear	  the	  children	  of	  SS	  officers.	  	  The	  Aktion	  T-­‐4	  programme	  and	  its	  
various	  sequels	  ‘euthanised’	  (the	  euphemism	  for	  murder	  by	  gassing,	  starvation	  and	  lethal	  
injection)	  up	  to	  200,000	  of	  the	  country’s	  institutionalized	  mentally	  and	  physically	  disabled,	  
sometimes	  with	  the	  tacit	  consent	  of	  their	  families.	  	  The	  penal	  system	  was	  reformed	  so	  that	  
many	  minor	  offenders	  were	  punished	  with	  death	  in	  order	  to	  counter	  the	  dysgenic	  effects	  of	  
war.446	  
	  
Such	  measures	  were	  unfortunately	  but	  a	  prelude	  to	  the	  systematic	  extermination	  of	  
millions	  of	  Jews	  that	  would	  follow	  in	  subsequent	  years	  under	  Hitler’s	  reign.	  	  But	  we	  must	  
ask	  how	  such	  a	  system	  could	  be	  accepted	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  	  What	  allowed	  eugenics	  and	  
social	  Darwinism	  to	  rise	  to	  such	  prominence?	  	  In	  short,	  the	  answer	  lies	  in	  the	  “new”	  view	  of	  
man,	  in	  biological	  reductionism,	  which	  posits	  man	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  product	  of	  
mechanical	  and	  biological	  processes.	  To	  understand	  how	  this	  transformation	  occurred,	  let	  
us	  turn	  to	  Voegelin’s	  penetrating	  analysis	  of	  the	  “race	  idea.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  Writing	  in	  Hitler’s	  Germany,	  Voegelin	  had	  the	  “benefit”	  of	  directly	  observing	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  various	  eugenics	  programs.	  	  Astonishingly	  enough,	  Voegelin	  was	  
able	  to	  publish	  two	  books	  in	  Hitler’s	  first	  year	  in	  power	  (1933,	  Race	  and	  State,	  The	  History	  
of	  the	  Race	  Idea)	  in	  which	  he	  heavily	  criticized	  the	  ideas	  that	  the	  Nazis	  used	  to	  justify	  their	  
programs.447	  	  Voegelin	  contended	  that	  the	  race	  theory	  of	  the	  Nazis	  was	  “an	  image	  of	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  The	  books	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  available	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  a	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  harsh	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destruction”	  and	  represented	  the	  decay	  of	  race	  theory	  in	  general.448	  	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  
The	  History	  of	  the	  Race	  Idea,	  Voegelin	  laments,	  “the	  knowledge	  of	  man	  is	  out	  of	  joint.	  	  
Current	  race	  theory	  is	  characterized	  by	  uncertainty	  about	  what	  is	  essential	  and	  a	  decline	  in	  
the	  technical	  ability	  to	  grasp	  it	  cognitively.”449	  Such	  a	  deficiency	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  
change	  in	  the	  view	  of	  man;	  or	  in	  Voegelin’s	  terms,	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  Christian	  primal	  image	  to	  
a	  post-­‐Christian	  image.450	  	  Voegelin	  explains	  the	  character	  of	  the	  Christian	  image:	  
The	  Christian	  image	  raises	  man	  out	  of	  nature;	  though	  it	  presents	  him	  as	  a	  creature	  among	  
other	  creatures,	  as	  a	  finite	  being	  among	  others,	  it	  nevertheless	  juxtaposes	  him	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  
nature;	  he	  stands	  between	  God	  and	  the	  subhuman	  world.	  	  This	  intermediate	  status	  is	  not	  
determined	  by	  a	  unique	  formative	  law	  that	  would	  constitute	  man	  as	  a	  self-­‐contained	  
existence	  but	  by	  his	  participation	  in	  both	  the	  higher	  and	  lower	  world.	  	  By	  virtue	  of	  his	  soul,	  
man	  is	  united	  with	  the	  divine	  pneuma;	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  body,	  his	  sarx,	  he	  partakes	  of	  the	  
transitoriness;	  his	  existence	  is	  “inauthentic.”	  The	  condition	  of	  his	  existence	  is	  that	  of	  being	  
lost,	  an	  existence	  from	  which	  he	  must	  be	  freed	  in	  order	  to	  ascend	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  his	  true	  
existence	  with	  his	  “authentic”	  nature.451	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  an	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  man’s	  ability	  to	  transcend	  his	  bodily	  existence.	  	  
Man	  is	  characterized	  by	  his	  ability	  to	  commune	  with	  God	  and	  the	  care	  of	  his	  soul	  is	  what	  
ultimately	  matters,	  as	  the	  body	  represents	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  transitory	  hindrance	  to	  his	  
true	  end.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  shift	  from	  a	  Christian	  to	  post-­‐Christian	  image	  of	  man	  is	  “not	  marked	  by	  a	  sharp	  
break,	  a	  clear	  end	  and	  a	  new	  beginning;	  rather,	  it	  is	  a	  blending	  of	  one	  image	  into	  another,	  a	  
fading	  out	  of	  one	  and	  simultaneous	  intensifying	  of	  the	  other.”452	  According	  to	  Voegelin,	  the	  
shift	  begins	  with	  the	  “new	  understanding	  of	  living	  nature”	  that	  results	  from	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ray	  to	  Carus.	  	  Ed.	  Vondung.	  Trans.	  Hein.	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  Press,	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proliferation	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences;	  especially	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  zoology	  and	  botany.453	  The	  
systematic	  classification	  of	  living	  nature	  leads	  to	  the	  “question	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  
body	  and	  its	  diverse	  forms	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  man.”454	  Should	  man’s	  essence	  be	  
defined	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  animals	  or	  as	  something	  unique?	  Can	  a	  systematic,	  “natural”	  
classification	  of	  man	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  Christian	  view?	  As	  Voegelin	  notes,	  these	  are	  the	  
prominent	  questions	  that	  first	  arose	  with	  the	  systems	  of	  Linneaus	  and	  Buffon	  and	  were	  
subsequently	  explored	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Kant,	  Blumenbach,	  and	  von	  Herder.455	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Voegelin	  argues	  that	  the	  newfound	  knowledge	  of	  nature,	  along	  with	  the	  questions	  it	  
raised,	  led	  to	  a	  new	  way	  of	  viewing	  man	  and	  his	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Voegelin	  distinguishes	  
two	  phases	  in	  this	  process:	  
In	  the	  first	  phase,	  the	  Christian	  image	  of	  nature	  was	  dissolved.	  	  Plants	  and	  animals	  had	  
been	  seen	  as	  creatures	  of	  God,	  as	  materials	  shaped	  and	  ensouled	  by	  the	  hand	  of	  a	  master	  
craftsman.	  	  The	  living	  substance	  presented	  itself	  as	  the	  medium	  in	  which	  a	  plan	  had	  been	  
realized;	  organized	  matter	  was	  understood	  as	  a	  construct,	  a	  machine,	  an	  instrument	  
embodying	  the	  ingenious	  idea	  of	  its	  builder	  and	  moving	  according	  to	  this	  idea.	  In	  the	  
eighteenth	  century	  this	  image	  of	  the	  machine	  was	  gradually	  changed	  into	  that	  of	  a	  
substance	  carrying	  the	  law	  of	  its	  construction	  within	  it,	  a	  substance	  that	  is	  not	  created	  or	  
animated	  from	  outside	  but	  that	  is	  itself	  a	  primary	  force,	  a	  substance	  that	  is	  not	  given	  its	  life	  
from	  the	  outside	  but	  lives	  out	  of	  the	  wellsprings	  of	  its	  own	  aliveness.	  	  
	  
To	  this	  first	  stage,	  Voegelin	  appropriates	  the	  phrase	  “internalization	  of	  the	  body.”	  	  The	  
“formative	  drive”	  takes	  precedence	  as	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  phenomenal	  aspects	  of	  
life.	  	  The	  life	  of	  the	  body	  thus	  gains	  primacy	  over	  the	  life	  of	  the	  spirit.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Prior	  to	  this	  stage,	  the	  “development	  of	  the	  organic	  form”	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  primary	  
phenomenon,	  but	  as	  a	  “machine	  put	  together	  from	  the	  outside.”	  Voegelin	  points	  to	  the	  work	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of	  English	  botanist	  and	  zoologist,	  John	  Ray	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this	  viewpoint.456	  Ray	  refused	  
to	  take	  a	  position	  on	  the	  question	  “of	  whether	  all	  individuals	  are	  already	  present	  in	  the	  first	  
individual,	  with	  the	  act	  of	  procreation	  being	  merely	  the	  impetus	  to	  their	  growth,	  or	  
whether	  God	  intervenes	  each	  time	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  conception	  to	  ensoul	  the	  matter	  that	  in	  
itself	  is	  lifeless,”	  but	  considered	  both	  views,	  preformation	  and	  epigenesis,	  to	  be	  potentially	  
valid.457	  	  According	  to	  Voegelin,	  what	  these	  views	  share	  in	  common	  is	  much	  more	  
important:	  	  they	  both	  assert	  that	  the	  “living	  form	  is	  not	  alive	  out	  of	  the	  wellspring	  of	  its	  
own	  vitality.”458	  The	  organism	  is	  considered	  as	  an	  “artifact”	  and	  owes	  its	  creation	  to	  
rationally	  planned	  reason.459	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  shift	  to	  the	  “internalization	  of	  the	  body”	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  reinterpretation	  of	  
mechanism	  as	  organism	  and	  in	  “finitization.”460	  Whereas	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  
century,	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  organism	  was	  tied	  firmly	  to	  mechanism,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
century,	  organism	  had	  acquired	  a	  new	  meaning.	  	  Voegelin	  demonstrates	  this	  gradual	  
change	  by	  examining	  the	  works	  of	  Leibniz,	  Wolff,	  and	  Oken.	  The	  transcendental	  element	  is	  
still	  firmly	  present	  in	  Leibniz’s	  work,	  “God	  alone	  stands	  above	  all	  matter	  since	  he	  is	  its	  
creator,”	  but	  while	  the	  body	  is	  still	  a	  “species	  of	  divine	  machine”,	  the	  distinction	  between	  
the	  plan	  and	  the	  material	  in	  which	  it	  is	  executed	  is	  lost.461	  This	  is	  due	  to	  Leibniz’s	  idea	  of	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  pp.32-­‐33	  
457	  Ibid	  p.93	  
458	  Ibid	  p.93	  
459	  Ibid	  p.93	  
460	  Ibid	  p.90	  
461	  Ibid	  p.109	  	  
	   139	  
monads,	  which	  were	  understood	  as	  the	  organizing	  principle	  of	  the	  body.462	  Voegelin	  
explains	  the	  consequences	  of	  such	  a	  construction:	  
The	  monad	  is	  neither	  body	  nor	  soul—that	  is,	  neither	  dead	  matter	  nor	  ensouling	  principle—
but	  living	  body,	  an	  entity	  that	  does	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  categories	  of	  body	  and	  soul	  but	  that	  
Leibniz	  has	  to	  comprehend	  in	  terms	  of	  these	  categories.	  	  That	  is	  why	  he	  ends	  up	  with	  the	  
curious	  construction	  in	  which	  the	  organism	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  composite	  of	  material	  
elements	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  a	  soul	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  both	  the	  material	  elements	  and	  the	  
soul	  are	  also	  monads—that	  is,	  neither	  material	  nor	  soul	  but	  the	  desired	  third	  element,	  the	  
unities	  of	  life.	  	  Thus,	  a	  machine	  in	  the	  mechanical	  sense	  emerges	  in	  these	  speculations	  that	  
in	  its	  inner	  structure	  is	  not	  a	  machine	  in	  this	  sense	  after	  all;	  instead	  it	  is	  an	  organism.463	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  Wolff,	  writing	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  maintains	  the	  language	  of	  
transcendence	  in	  his	  construction	  (i.e.	  referring	  to	  an	  immaterial	  soul),	  but	  the	  emphasis	  is	  
shifted	  to	  the	  “strong	  inner	  animation”	  of	  the	  immanent	  body.	  Wolff,	  while	  still	  maintaining	  
a	  quasi-­‐	  Cartesian	  dualism,	  “questions	  whether	  there	  can	  be	  any	  doubt	  that	  the	  mechanical	  
actions	  are	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  insignificant	  appendage	  of	  the	  animal	  itself.”464	  The	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  inner	  drive	  of	  the	  organism	  itself	  however,	  represents	  a	  bold	  step	  towards	  
the	  internalization	  of	  the	  body.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  internalization	  of	  the	  body	  was	  
nearly	  complete.	  	  Voegelin	  refers	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Oken	  to	  illustrate	  this	  shift.	  	  Oken	  works	  
within	  the	  basic	  framework	  provided	  by	  Leibniz,	  but	  replaces	  the	  notion	  of	  monads	  with	  
protozoa	  (or	  infusoria).	  	  Like	  the	  monads,	  “the	  protozoa	  are	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  organic	  
world	  of	  which	  all	  higher	  animals	  are	  composed.”	  But	  the	  protozoa,	  unlike	  Leibniz’s	  
monads,	  “are	  not	  considered	  the	  simple	  substances	  of	  being	  as	  a	  whole	  but	  are	  specific	  
organic	  elements.”	  Oken,	  although	  struggling	  to	  break	  out	  of	  the	  mechanical	  language	  of	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462	  The	  monads	  are	  imperishable	  and	  divinely	  created.	  According	  to	  Leibniz,	  there	  is	  no	  
substance	  except	  for	  monadic	  substance.	  	  The	  monad	  is	  “both	  body	  and	  soul	  at	  the	  same	  
time.”	  p.108	  
463	  Ibid	  p.109	  
464	  Ibid	  p.104	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time,	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  his	  formulation	  is	  organic,	  not	  mechanistic:	  “The	  union	  of	  protozoa	  
in	  the	  flesh	  should	  not	  be	  pictured	  like	  a	  mechanical	  adhesion	  of	  one	  tiny	  animal	  to	  another,	  
as	  in	  a	  heap	  of	  sand	  where	  the	  grains	  are	  not	  connected	  in	  any	  other	  way	  than	  simply	  lying	  
next	  to	  each	  other—no!	  Analogous	  to	  the	  disappearance	  of	  hydrogen	  and	  oxygen	  in	  water,	  
mercury	  and	  sulfur	  in	  cinnabar,	  this	  union	  is	  a	  genuine	  interpenetration,	  a	  growing	  
together,	  a	  fusion	  of	  all	  these	  protozoa.”465	  While	  Oken	  retains	  certain	  aspects	  of	  Leibniz’s	  
system,	  the	  natural	  unity	  of	  the	  organism	  has	  become	  much	  more	  “inward.”	  The	  organic	  
idea	  represents	  a	  fusion	  of	  the	  two	  “realities”	  originally	  explored	  by	  Ray:	  “the	  essence	  as	  
operative	  cause	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  and	  the	  essence	  as	  the	  essentiality	  that	  is	  discernible	  
for	  the	  observer	  in	  the	  traits	  that	  form	  the	  type.”466	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  organism	  carries	  its	  
own	  design	  from	  within	  and	  possesses	  an	  internal	  generative	  principle.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  With	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  organism	  (from	  transcendent	  to	  immanent)	  came	  a	  new	  
understanding	  of	  the	  species	  and	  its	  “constancy	  through	  the	  generations.”	  	  Formerly,	  the	  
transcendent	  view	  had	  ascribed	  a	  fixed	  beginning	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  species.	  	  The	  “fixity”	  
of	  the	  species	  could	  easily	  be	  explained	  under	  this	  view	  as	  the	  manifestation	  of	  the	  will	  of	  a	  
Creator.467	  When	  the	  Christian	  worldview	  began	  to	  dissolve,	  the	  “starting	  point”	  of	  the	  
species	  was	  lost.	  	  As	  Voegelin	  notes:	  
	  And	  while	  the	  similarity	  of	  individuals	  had	  been	  understood	  as	  caused	  by	  a	  similar	  
pressure	  of	  the	  divine	  hand,	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  fixity	  of	  the	  species	  was	  now	  also	  shaken.	  	  
The	  succession	  of	  generations	  no	  longer	  had	  a	  finite	  beginning	  in	  the	  creation	  or	  an	  origin	  
of	  its	  specific	  laws;	  instead,	  the	  succession	  could	  be	  traced	  from	  any	  individual	  back	  into	  
infinity	  without	  this	  regression	  coming	  up	  against	  a	  point	  of	  origin	  for	  the	  law	  of	  the	  
species.	  	  The	  result	  was	  a	  peculiar,	  undecided	  state.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  creation	  was	  replaced	  
by	  the	  idea	  of	  infinity.468	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  Ibid	  p.112	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  Ibid	  p.114	  
467	  Voegelin	  points	  to	  Linnaeus’s	  work	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this	  view.	  	  p.115	  
468	  Ibid	  pp.115-­‐116	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According	  to	  Voegelin,	  the	  idea	  of	  infinity	  was	  quickly	  discarded	  because	  it	  rendered	  the	  
idea	  of	  a	  fixed	  law	  (formerly	  posited	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  creation)	  nonsensical.	  	  The	  search	  
for	  a	  beginning	  would	  merely	  lead	  to	  an	  infinite	  regress.	  	  This	  dilemma	  led	  to	  the	  
“speculative	  leap	  to	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  the	  species	  as	  a	  real	  cause	  that	  is	  at	  work	  in	  all	  
individuals	  of	  a	  species,	  thus	  necessarily	  also	  in	  the	  one	  currently	  under	  observation,	  
without	  having	  to	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  preceding	  ones.”	  	  Voegelin	  refers	  to	  this	  process	  as	  the	  
“finitization	  of	  the	  law	  of	  the	  species.”	  The	  convenience	  of	  such	  a	  concept	  is	  that	  it	  fits	  well	  
with	  the	  new	  concept	  of	  organism	  that	  had	  developed	  throughout	  the	  18th	  century.	  	  The	  
unity	  of	  the	  species	  and	  of	  the	  individual	  organisms	  that	  compose	  it	  is	  thus	  explained	  
through	  an	  “inner	  law.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  second	  phase	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  Christian	  to	  post-­‐Christian	  image	  of	  man	  is	  
characterized	  by	  the	  “internalization	  of	  the	  person,”	  as	  the	  “image	  of	  man	  as	  an	  earthly,	  
self-­‐contained,	  unified	  figure	  develops.”469	  Voegelin	  points	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  physician,	  
Carl	  Gustav	  Carus,	  to	  show	  how	  the	  new	  image	  of	  man	  is	  taken	  to	  its	  logical	  conclusion.	  	  
Using	  Goethe	  as	  his	  model,	  Carus	  posits	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  “well-­‐born”	  man.	  	  The	  soul	  and	  
body	  are	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  oppositional	  figures,	  but	  as	  complements	  to	  the	  edification	  of	  
the	  whole	  person.	  	  The	  body	  is	  seen	  not	  as	  a	  transitory	  hindrance,	  but	  as	  the	  “foundation	  
without	  whose	  good	  constitution	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	  free	  unfolding	  of	  the	  spirit	  is	  
impossible.”470	  	  Carus’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  Goethean	  ideal	  extends	  beyond	  the	  man	  
himself	  to	  “the	  line	  that	  begat	  him:”	  
The	  competent,	  somewhat	  pedantic,	  but	  thoroughly	  distinguished	  and	  honorable	  nature	  of	  
the	  father,	  the	  delicately	  humorous,	  genuinely	  feminine	  character	  of	  the	  mother	  who	  was	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  Ibid	  p.8	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more	  or	  less	  high-­‐spirited	  and	  lively	  into	  old	  age,	  have	  laid	  a	  basis	  here	  that	  could	  well	  
become	  the	  element	  for	  allowing	  an	  idea	  of	  life	  to	  express	  itself	  that	  at	  one	  time	  could	  
prove	  itself	  in	  many	  respects	  one	  of	  the	  perfect	  blossoms	  of	  humanity;	  Goethe	  was	  indeed	  
what	  is	  said	  of	  so	  many	  but	  what	  so	  few	  truly	  are—a	  well-­‐born	  man.471	  
	  
Voegelin	  is	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  Carus,	  unlike	  the	  contemporary	  race	  theoreticians,	  
understands	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  well-­‐born	  man	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  “far	  removed	  
from	  the	  barbaric	  natural	  scientific	  dogmatizations	  of	  modern	  eugenics,	  which	  narrows	  the	  
concept	  to	  apply	  only	  to	  particular	  physical	  conditions.”472	  Carus	  is	  concerned	  with	  both	  
physical	  and	  spiritual	  health	  and	  posits	  that	  a	  disease	  in	  one	  can	  hinder	  the	  other.	  	  The	  
well-­‐born	  man	  is	  one	  who	  can	  overcome	  diseases	  of	  the	  spirit	  and	  body,	  through	  his	  own	  
inner	  strength	  and	  fortitude.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  political	  implications	  of	  Carus’s	  well-­‐born	  man	  are	  far	  reaching.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  such	  a	  
man	  exists,	  concretely	  in	  the	  person	  of	  Goethe,	  presents	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  exploration	  of	  
the	  genetic	  inequality	  of	  men.	  	  And	  since	  Goethe’s	  well-­‐born	  existence	  depends	  significantly	  
on	  his	  ancestry,	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  particular	  race	  could	  have	  inherent	  advantages	  over	  
others	  is	  not	  far	  behind.	  	  For	  Carus,	  race	  theory	  could	  help	  us	  understand	  “how	  such	  a	  
powerful	  individuality	  as	  that	  of	  our	  Goethe	  could	  emerge	  only	  from	  one	  tribe,	  which	  in	  
itself	  was	  already	  a	  higher	  one	  and	  which	  therefore	  generally	  already	  promised	  its	  
members	  an	  outstanding	  and	  powerful	  spiritual	  development.”473	  Carus	  finds,	  among	  the	  
numerous	  races,	  a	  rank	  ordering	  of	  development	  of	  physical	  and	  spiritual	  capacities.	  	  Once	  
it	  is	  accepted	  that	  all	  races	  are	  not	  equal,	  and	  that	  the	  development	  of	  great	  individuals	  
depends	  to	  an	  appreciable	  extent	  on	  ancestry,	  the	  “jump”	  to	  eugenics	  becomes	  much	  more	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  Carus,	  as	  cited	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  Voegelin.	  Ibid	  pp.169-­‐170	  
472	  Ibid	  p.170	  
473	  Ibid	  p.178	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intelligible.	  	  The	  assertion	  of	  an	  über	  mensch,	  of	  a	  man	  that	  stands	  above	  the	  rest,	  led	  to	  the	  
dream	  of	  a	  super	  race,	  with	  disastrous	  results	  for	  humanity.	  	  
Darwinism	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  apparent	  failure	  of	  the	  eugenics	  movement,	  many	  of	  the	  assumptions	  on	  
which	  it	  was	  based	  are	  still	  present	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  	  Although	  advances	  have	  
been	  made	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  genetics,	  biology,	  and	  other	  related	  life	  sciences,	  Darwinism	  
remains	  prevalent.	  	  In	  fact,	  some	  of	  the	  debates	  that	  Darwin	  encountered	  in	  the	  19th	  
century	  are	  still	  raging	  today,	  especially	  in	  America.	  	  More	  specifically,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  
evolution	  actually	  explains	  has	  become	  paramount.	  	  The	  result	  of	  the	  confusion	  is	  in	  large	  
part	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  scientism.	  	  Darwin	  never	  explained	  the	  origin	  of	  life	  itself	  
(although	  he	  held	  out	  hope	  that	  the	  question	  could	  be	  answered	  someday).474	  His	  theory	  
merely	  explains	  how	  life,	  once	  given,	  evolves.	  	  It	  speaks	  to	  phenomenal	  relations	  and	  
remains	  silent	  on	  questions	  of	  substantive	  origins.	  But	  the	  emphasis	  on	  biological	  
determinism,	  along	  with	  the	  new	  view	  of	  man,	  leads	  to	  the	  misidentification	  of	  parts	  for	  the	  
whole.475	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  biological,	  or	  the	  physical,	  leads	  to	  a	  devaluation	  of	  the	  
spiritual.	  	  Darwin,	  while	  not	  denying	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  spiritual	  element	  in	  man,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474	  “In	  what	  manner	  the	  mental	  powers	  were	  first	  developed	  in	  the	  lower	  organisms,	  is	  as	  
hopeless	  an	  enquiry	  as	  how	  life	  itself	  first	  originated.	  These	  are	  problems	  for	  the	  distant	  
future,	  if	  they	  are	  ever	  to	  be	  solved	  by	  man.”	  Charles	  Darwin.	  The	  Descent	  of	  Man.	  (New	  
York:	  	  Penguin	  Books,	  2004)	  p.87	  
475	  Stephen	  Gould	  offers	  a	  scientific	  refutation	  of	  biological	  determinism	  in	  The	  Mismeasure	  
of	  Man.	  	  Gould	  recognizes	  the	  dangers	  inherent	  with	  such	  a	  view:	  “we	  must	  never	  forget	  the	  
human	  meanings	  of	  lives	  diminished	  by	  these	  false	  arguments—and	  we	  must,	  primarily	  for	  
this	  reason,	  never	  flag	  in	  our	  resolve	  to	  expose	  the	  fallacies	  of	  science	  misused	  for	  alien	  
social	  purposes.”	  Gould	  specifically	  targets	  measures	  of	  IQ	  and	  points	  to	  the	  negative	  
political	  consequences	  of	  such	  enterprises	  (such	  as	  the	  forced	  sterilization	  of	  “imbeciles”).	  
Gould	  argues	  that	  cultural	  evolution	  is	  what	  explains	  changes	  and	  differences	  amongst	  
societies,	  not	  genetics.	  	  Biological	  changes	  occur	  very	  slowly	  and	  simply	  offer	  potentialities	  
(not	  determinants)	  for	  action.	  See	  Stephen	  Jay	  Gould.	  The	  Mismeasure	  of	  Man.	  Revised	  and	  
Expanded	  Edition	  (New	  York	  and	  London:	  	  W.W.	  Norton,	  1996)	  p.50	  and	  p.355	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nevertheless	  attributes	  its	  development	  to	  biological	  processes.476	  Indeed,	  as	  noted	  
previously,	  Darwin	  goes	  through	  a	  long	  list	  of	  attributes	  that	  had	  been	  posited	  as	  reasons	  
for	  man’s	  uniqueness	  and	  shows	  that	  each	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  his	  theory	  of	  natural	  
selection.	  The	  annihilation	  of	  a	  differentia	  specifica,	  along	  with	  the	  undermining	  of	  natural	  
theology	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  Creator,	  exemplifies	  the	  new	  view	  of	  man	  that	  Voegelin	  had	  
outlined	  in	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Race	  Idea.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Darwin’s	  work	  served	  to	  legitimate	  and	  popularize	  the	  “biological”	  view	  of	  man.477	  As	  we	  
saw	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  eugenics	  movement,	  that	  view	  of	  man	  led	  to	  less	  than	  desirable	  
consequences.	  	  It	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  place	  blame	  on	  Darwin	  for	  the	  horrendous	  actions	  of	  
the	  Nazis,	  or	  the	  embarrassingly	  inhumane	  sterilization	  laws	  in	  America,	  but	  it	  is	  less	  of	  a	  
jump	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  view	  of	  man	  proffered	  by	  his	  work	  was	  heavily	  influential	  in	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  such	  policies.	  	  What	  is	  more	  striking	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  content	  of	  
Darwin’s	  work,	  but	  the	  prestige	  that	  was	  ascribed	  to	  it.	  Nearly	  every	  political	  faction	  
appealed	  to	  Darwin’s	  work	  in	  some	  way	  to	  justify	  its	  positions.	  	  Everything	  from	  laissez-­‐
faire	  to	  progressivism	  to	  Marxism	  to	  Leninism	  sought	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Darwin.	  	  It	  
was	  not	  uncommon	  to	  see	  both	  sides	  of	  a	  particular	  issue	  bolstered	  by	  Darwinian	  appeals.	  
The	  reason	  for	  those	  appeals	  is	  apparent:	  	  science	  offers	  legitimization.	  	  The	  rhetorical	  
power	  of	  science	  can	  hardly	  be	  overstated.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Darwinism	  remains	  a	  dominant	  force	  today.	  	  Advances	  in	  genetics,	  such	  as	  the	  discovery	  
of	  DNA,	  have	  fit	  rather	  comfortably	  into	  the	  Darwinian	  framework.	  While	  eugenics	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476	  Darwin	  repeatedly	  refers	  to	  natural	  selection	  as	  the	  probable	  cause	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  
these	  traits.	  	  Although	  he	  concedes	  that	  “conscience”	  is	  what	  sets	  man	  most	  apart	  from	  the	  
lower	  animals,	  he	  nonetheless	  posits	  that	  certain	  animals	  possess	  sympathy	  and	  exhibit	  
love.	  Descent	  of	  Man	  pp.120-­‐130	  
477	  This	  is	  what	  Voegelin	  refers	  to	  as	  “biological	  phenomenalism.”	  See	  The	  New	  Order	  and	  
Last	  Orientation	  p.184	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fallen	  out	  of	  favor	  (more	  so	  in	  terminology	  than	  in	  spirit),	  the	  idea	  of	  human	  control	  over	  
genetics	  has	  only	  increased.	  	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  “gene	  therapy”	  and	  in	  pre-­‐natal	  tests,	  which	  
allow	  for	  the	  diagnostics	  of	  harmful	  traits	  or	  diseases.	  	  The	  Human	  Genome	  Project	  will	  
offer	  “thousands	  of	  pre-­‐natal	  tests	  within	  the	  next	  decade	  or	  so”	  and	  presumably	  such	  
information	  will	  allow	  couples	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  terminate	  life	  or	  continue	  the	  
pregnancy	  based	  on	  that	  genetic	  information.478	  This	  offers	  much	  more	  “control”	  over	  
transmitted	  traits	  than	  mere	  sterilization,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  “negative”	  eugenics	  of	  the	  early	  
20th	  century.	  	  The	  problem	  remains	  as	  to	  how	  these	  decisions	  should	  be	  made.	  	  If	  biological	  
reductionism	  and	  determinism	  remains	  prevalent,	  then	  a	  strong	  case	  can	  be	  made	  for	  fully	  
embracing	  these	  advances.	  	  What	  is	  to	  stop	  private	  individuals,	  or	  even	  governments,	  from	  
intervening	  and	  preventing	  certain	  traits	  from	  being	  transmitted?	  	  Crude	  measures	  such	  as	  
forced	  sterilization	  and	  population	  extermination	  may	  give	  way	  to	  “gentler”	  procedures,	  
but	  the	  underlying	  principle	  remains.	  	  The	  field	  of	  Bioethics	  is	  designed	  to	  help	  address	  
such	  questions,	  but	  can	  a	  field	  borne	  out	  of	  the	  intellectual	  climate	  that	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  
of	  eugenics	  be	  expected	  to	  quell	  the	  effects?	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  questions	  regarding	  science’s	  role	  in	  the	  twenty	  first	  century	  are	  not	  unlike	  those	  
raised	  in	  our	  initial	  exploration	  of	  Bacon’s	  New	  Atlantis.	  	  In	  an	  age	  of	  unprecedented	  
technological	  advances,	  the	  questions	  have	  only	  gained	  importance.	  Should	  all	  scientific	  
exploration	  be	  permitted	  or	  are	  certain	  innovations	  to	  be	  discouraged?	  And	  if	  so,	  on	  what	  
basis	  can	  that	  decision	  be	  made?	  	  The	  power	  offered	  to	  man	  by	  technology	  is	  undeniable,	  
but	  the	  question	  remains	  as	  to	  how	  that	  power	  is	  used.	  	  To	  the	  question	  of	  who	  gets	  to	  
decide,	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  would	  certainly	  point	  to	  the	  “scientific”	  statesman.	  	  And	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478	  See	  Philip	  Kitchener’s	  “Giving	  Darwin	  his	  due.”	  In	  Cambridge	  Companion.	  p.472	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20th	  century,	  a	  strong	  push	  was	  made	  to	  let	  “managerial	  experts”	  make	  such	  decisions.479	  
But	  in	  light	  of	  the	  events	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  we	  can	  rightly	  question	  the	  efficacy	  of	  such	  
leadership.	  The	  solution	  lies	  in	  political	  science,	  the	  discipline	  designed	  to	  provide	  the	  
practical	  wisdom	  necessary	  to	  make	  such	  decisions.	  	  Yet,	  modern	  political	  science	  has	  
generally	  modeled	  itself	  on	  the	  very	  sources	  that	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  
scientism.	  	  It	  has	  taken	  the	  model	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  as	  its	  own	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  has	  lost	  
its	  way.	  	  In	  order	  to	  confront	  the	  problems	  of	  our	  age,	  and	  more	  specifically	  scientism,	  a	  
new	  science	  of	  politics	  is	  necessary.480	  	  Thus,	  let	  us	  now	  focus	  our	  attention	  on	  that	  task	  
and	  outline	  what	  such	  a	  science	  would	  need	  to	  encompass	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  concrete	  
political	  problems	  of	  our	  age.	  	  
	  
	  















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479	  See	  Alasdair	  Macintyre.	  	  After	  Virtue.	  2nd	  edition	  (Indiana,	  Notre	  Dame	  Press	  1984).	  	  
Macintyre	  traces	  the	  rise	  of	  managerial	  expertise	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  to	  Enlightenment	  
principles.	  pp.79-­‐87	  	  
480	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  contemporary	  political	  science	  is	  radically	  deficient.	  Rather,	  it	  
simply	  cannot	  answer	  certain	  types	  of	  questions;	  some	  of	  which	  are	  critically	  important	  to	  
politics.	  Scientism	  represents	  such	  a	  case.	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Chapter	  6	  
	  
Towards	  a	  New	  Science	  of	  Man	  
	  
“So	  we	  must	  examine	  the	  conclusions	  we	  have	  reached	  so	  far	  by	  applying	  them	  to	  the	  actual	  facts	  of	  life:	  	  if	  
they	  are	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  facts	  we	  must	  accept	  them,	  and	  if	  they	  clash	  we	  must	  assume	  that	  they	  are	  mere	  
words.”481	  –Aristotle	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  Before	  outlining	  what	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics	  should	  encompass,	  let	  us	  first	  outline	  the	  
reasons	  why	  such	  a	  seemingly	  radical	  step	  is	  necessary.	  	  The	  central	  argument	  of	  this	  work	  
is	  that	  scientism	  stands	  as	  the	  key	  crisis	  of	  our	  age.	  	  Yet,	  as	  we	  have	  shown	  through	  our	  
analysis,	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  a	  new	  one.	  	  Scientism	  is	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  modern	  project,	  as	  
we	  demonstrated	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  modernity,	  Francis	  Bacon.	  	  The	  
political	  problem	  of	  scientism	  did	  not	  become	  acute	  until	  science	  itself	  had	  gained	  sufficient	  
prestige	  within	  society.	  	  Newton’s	  work	  served	  as	  the	  impetus	  for	  this	  transformation	  and	  
the	  French,	  beginning	  with	  the	  Encylopedists	  through	  Saint	  Simon	  and	  finally	  to	  Comte,	  
fully	  capitalized	  on	  the	  situation.	  	  Riding	  the	  wave	  of	  momentum	  created	  by	  Newton,	  they	  
proposed	  a	  radical	  recasting	  of	  the	  educational	  system.	  	  As	  part	  of	  that	  reconstitution,	  the	  
study	  of	  man	  was	  “positivized.”	  	  Natural	  science	  served	  as	  the	  model	  on	  which	  all	  science,	  
human	  affairs	  included,	  was	  to	  be	  based.	  	  This	  shift	  led	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  law-­‐like	  
generalizations	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  	  It	  also	  meant	  that	  certain	  types	  of	  
questions	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  asked,	  as	  we	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  Comte’s	  
Cours.	  The	  diminishment	  of	  the	  bios	  theoretikos,	  along	  with	  the	  prohibition	  of	  philosophical	  
questioning,	  led	  to	  a	  new	  view	  of	  man.	  	  No	  longer	  grounded	  in	  a	  classical	  or	  Christian	  
philosophical	  anthropology,	  the	  new	  view	  of	  man	  found	  its	  bearings	  in	  natural	  science.	  	  
Popularized	  by	  Darwin,	  the	  “biological”	  view	  of	  man	  led	  to	  deleterious	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  Book	  X,	  1179A	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consequences.	  	  Natural	  science	  provides	  the	  knowledge	  necessary	  to	  modify,	  and	  to	  an	  
extent	  control,	  nature.	  	  To	  that	  end,	  it	  has	  been	  incredibly	  successful.	  One	  needs	  look	  no	  
further	  than	  modern	  medicine	  and	  technology	  to	  realize	  the	  indebtedness	  to	  science.	  	  
However,	  natural	  science	  does	  not	  provide	  us	  with	  guidelines	  on	  how	  that	  power	  is	  to	  be	  
wielded	  (nor	  does	  it	  aim	  to).	  	  The	  same	  technology	  that	  can	  light	  a	  whole	  city	  can	  also	  be	  
used	  to	  destroy	  that	  very	  city.	  	  What	  is	  needed	  then	  is	  a	  science	  of	  human	  affairs,	  one	  that	  
nurtures	  the	  practical	  wisdom	  necessary	  to	  make	  such	  decisions.	  	  Properly	  speaking,	  such	  
issues	  belong	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  political	  science.482	  Yet,	  as	  we	  have	  noted,	  contemporary	  
political	  science	  has	  found	  itself	  impotent	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  address	  such	  questions.	  	  Let	  us	  
first	  say	  more	  about	  why	  contemporary	  political	  science	  is	  not	  up	  to	  the	  task	  and	  then	  we	  
shall	  address	  the	  primary	  question	  of	  what	  its	  replacement	  must	  encompass.483	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Contemporary	  political	  science	  owes	  its	  origin	  to	  Enlightenment	  thought,	  and	  more	  
specifically,	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Auguste	  Comte.	  	  The	  overall	  assumption	  was	  that	  law-­‐like	  
generalizations	  of	  social	  behavior	  could	  be	  discovered,	  just	  as	  they	  had	  been	  in	  physics	  by	  
Newton.	  	  If	  mechanical	  laws	  could	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  nature,	  it	  was	  
assumed	  that	  they	  could	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  humans.	  	  Following	  Bacon’s	  lead,	  the	  
Aristotelian	  framework	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  human	  action	  was	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  
the	  model	  of	  natural	  science.	  	  No	  longer	  would	  human	  action	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482	  Clearly	  social	  science	  aims	  to	  meet	  these	  demands.	  But	  political	  science	  is	  primarily	  
concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  who	  rules	  and	  the	  well	  being	  of	  society	  is	  directly	  impacted	  
by	  such	  a	  decision.	  	  
483	  We	  readily	  acknowledge	  that	  such	  a	  task	  would	  require	  a	  full-­‐length	  study.	  This	  chapter	  
is	  meant	  to	  provide	  a	  preliminary	  outline	  or	  sketch	  of	  what	  a	  science	  of	  politics	  would	  need	  
to	  include	  if	  it	  is	  to	  successfully	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  scientism.	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“intentionality”	  or	  “purpose.”484	  	  The	  teleological	  nature	  of	  Aristotle’s	  work	  fails	  because	  it	  
relies	  on	  final	  causes;	  something	  that	  the	  model	  of	  natural	  science	  does	  not	  concern	  itself	  
with.485	  Once	  questions	  of	  purpose	  are	  excluded,	  ethics	  loses	  its	  grounding.486	  	  The	  very	  
questions	  that	  were	  crucial	  to	  the	  health	  of	  the	  polity	  under	  Aristotle’s	  account	  become	  
meaningless	  under	  the	  new	  model	  of	  social	  science	  proffered	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  D’Alembert	  
and	  Comte.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  aims	  of	  those	  thinkers	  are	  not	  noble;	  indeed,	  the	  
motivation	  behind	  the	  new	  science	  is	  directed	  towards	  the	  creation	  a	  peaceful,	  prosperous	  
society.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  those	  aims	  cannot	  be	  met	  and	  this	  is	  due	  to	  a	  fundamental	  
misunderstanding	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  newly	  created	  “social	  physics.”	  
In	  other	  words,	  social	  science	  cannot	  do	  what	  it	  aims	  to	  do.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  social	  sciences	  in	  general,	  and	  for	  our	  purposes	  political	  science,	  have	  not	  
been	  able	  to	  produce	  the	  law-­‐like	  generalizations	  akin	  to	  the	  natural	  sciences	  is	  in	  itself	  not	  
a	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  replace	  the	  paradigm.487	  	  The	  reasons	  why	  it	  has	  not	  been	  successful	  
are	  what	  we	  must	  focus	  on.	  	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre’s	  argument	  on	  this	  account	  is	  one	  worth	  
examining.	  MacIntyre	  addresses	  the	  two	  most	  common	  defenses	  offered	  on	  behalf	  of	  social	  
science’s	  progress	  (or	  lack	  thereof):	  	  that	  social	  sciences	  are	  “young”	  and	  that	  they	  are	  
merely	  “probabilistic.”	  	  To	  the	  first	  defense,	  MacIntyre	  simply	  appeals	  to	  the	  historical	  
record	  and	  shows	  that	  social	  science	  has	  been	  around	  for	  hundreds	  of	  years	  and	  has	  failed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484	  Alasdair	  Macintyre.	  	  After	  Virtue.	  2nd	  edition	  (Indiana,	  Notre	  Dame	  Press	  1984).	  pp.82-­‐
83.	  Without	  such	  explanations,	  action	  becomes	  the	  result	  of	  mechanical/physiological	  
factors.	  	  	  
485	  Instead,	  it	  relies	  on	  material	  and	  efficient	  causes.	  	  It	  aims	  to	  describe	  how	  things	  work.	  
486	  Both	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Classical	  and	  Christian	  ethics.	  	  “Ethical”	  behavior	  is	  reduced	  to	  
materialistic	  causes	  or	  ascribed	  to	  selfish	  impulses.	  See	  Hobbes,	  Diderot,	  Darwin.	  	  
487	  “To	  explain	  is	  on	  their	  view	  to	  invoke	  a	  law-­‐like	  generalization	  retrospectively;	  to	  
predict	  is	  to	  invoke	  a	  similar	  generalization	  prospectively.”	  Social	  science	  has	  clearly	  failed	  
to	  accomplish	  these	  goals.	  After	  Virtue	  P.92	  
	   150	  
to	  produce	  anywhere	  close	  to	  the	  record	  that	  has	  been	  produced	  in	  any	  given	  natural	  
science.488	  To	  the	  claim	  that	  social	  science	  only	  seeks	  to	  produce	  probabilistic	  
generalizations	  (and	  thus	  that	  counter	  factuals	  do	  not	  discredit	  the	  theory),	  MacIntyre	  
asserts	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  generalizations	  that	  are	  actually	  produced	  are	  nothing	  like	  those	  in	  
the	  natural	  sciences.	  	  For	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences	  they	  offer	  probabilistic	  generalizations,	  but	  
they	  do	  so	  with	  “universal	  quantifiers—quantification	  is	  over	  sets	  not	  individuals—they	  
entail	  well-­‐defined	  sets	  of	  counter-­‐factual	  conditionals	  and	  they	  are	  refuted	  by	  counter-­‐
examples.”489	  Without	  such	  conditions,	  there	  is	  nothing	  “law-­‐like”	  about	  the	  
generalizations,	  whether	  they	  are	  posited	  as	  probabilistic	  or	  not.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  qualify	  MacIntyre’s	  argument	  lest	  it	  appear	  that	  he	  is	  simply	  impugning	  
the	  whole	  enterprise	  and	  its	  practitioners.	  	  Social	  science	  practitioners	  are	  not	  failing	  to	  
produce	  the	  law-­‐like	  generalizations	  that	  they	  hope	  to	  because	  of	  any	  intellectual	  
deficiency	  or	  lack	  of	  effort.	  	  Their	  task	  is	  simply	  impossible	  because	  the	  assumptions	  on	  
which	  social	  science	  is	  based	  are	  faulty.	  	  Those	  assumptions	  can	  be	  traced	  all	  the	  way	  back	  
to	  Bacon.	  	  As	  we	  will	  recall	  in	  our	  previous	  discussion	  of	  Bacon	  and	  Machiavelli,	  the	  
primary	  difference	  between	  their	  philosophies,	  on	  our	  account,	  is	  the	  way	  they	  view	  
fortuna,	  or	  chance.	  	  Machiavelli	  laments	  the	  impact	  that	  chance	  plays	  in	  human	  life	  and	  
points	  out	  how	  even	  the	  most	  virtuous	  prince	  can	  fail	  because	  of	  it.	  	  While	  Machiavelli	  does	  
allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  humans	  to	  minimize	  its	  impact,	  he	  realizes	  that	  it	  will	  always	  
serve	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  human	  affairs.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Bacon’s	  new	  science	  is	  designed	  to	  
do	  what	  Machiavelli	  thought	  impossible—control	  chance.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488	  Ibid	  p.92	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  how	  social	  sciences	  have	  failed	  to	  produce	  
such	  results	  see	  Stanislav	  Andreski’s	  Social	  Sciences	  As	  Sorcery.	  	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  
Press,	  1972)	  
489	  After	  Virtue	  p.91	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  MacIntyre	  points	  to	  Machiavelli	  as	  an	  alternative	  foundation	  to	  social	  science	  precisely	  
because	  Machiavelli	  correctly	  diagnoses	  the	  role	  that	  chance	  plays	  in	  human	  affairs.490	  
Machiavelli	  knew	  “no	  matter	  how	  good	  a	  stock	  of	  generalizations	  one	  amassed	  and	  no	  
matter	  how	  well	  one	  reformulated	  them,	  the	  factor	  of	  Fortuna	  was	  ineliminable	  from	  
human	  life.”	  This	  inevitably	  means	  that	  unpredictable	  counter-­‐examples	  will	  arise	  and	  it	  is	  
the	  frequency	  of	  such	  occurrences,	  which	  makes	  the	  production	  of	  “law-­‐like”	  
generalizations	  dubious.	  	  To	  further	  illustrate	  the	  point,	  MacIntyre	  outlines	  four	  systematic	  
sources	  of	  unpredictability	  in	  human	  affairs.	  	  The	  first	  is	  “radical	  conceptual	  innovation.”	  	  
We	  cannot	  predict	  a	  radical	  conceptual	  innovation	  (such	  as	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  wheel)	  
because	  to	  do	  so	  would	  require	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  concept	  that	  only	  comes	  about	  
through	  the	  innovation.491	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  predict	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  
wheel,	  he	  would	  have	  already	  discovered	  it.	  	  The	  second	  type	  of	  unpredictability	  relates	  to	  
the	  unpredictability	  of	  an	  agent’s	  own	  actions.	  	  As	  MacIntyre	  explains,	  “decisions	  
contemplated	  but	  not	  yet	  made	  by	  me	  entail	  unpredictability	  of	  me	  by	  me	  in	  the	  relevant	  
areas.”492	  
	  	  	  	  The	  third	  source	  of	  systematic	  unpredictability	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  for	  our	  study	  
since	  it	  deals	  directly	  with	  a	  methodology	  that	  has	  become	  prevalent	  in	  political	  science:	  
game	  theory.	  	  Game	  theory	  represents	  the	  most	  prevalent	  attempt	  within	  the	  discipline	  to	  
provide	  law-­‐like	  generalizations.	  	  MacIntyre	  characterizes	  it	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490	  Ibid	  p.92	  
491	  Ibid	  p.93	  
492	  	  MacIntyre	  points	  out	  that	  a	  trained	  observer	  may	  seemingly	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  actions	  
that	  the	  agent	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to.	  However,	  this	  also	  fails	  because	  the	  observer	  cannot	  
“predict	  the	  impact	  of	  his	  future	  actions	  on	  my	  future	  decision-­‐making,	  he	  cannot	  predict	  
my	  future	  actions	  any	  more	  than	  his	  own.”	  	  Pp.95-­‐96	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Take	  the	  formal	  structure	  of	  an	  n-­‐person	  game,	  identify	  the	  relevant	  interests	  of	  the	  players	  
in	  some	  empirical	  situation	  and	  we	  shall	  at	  the	  very	  least	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  what	  alliances	  
and	  coalitions	  a	  fully	  rational	  player	  will	  enter	  into	  and,	  at	  a	  perhaps	  Utopian	  most,	  the	  
pressures	  upon	  and	  the	  subsequent	  behavior	  of	  not	  fully	  rational	  players.493	  
	  
MacIntyre	  outlines	  three	  reasons	  why	  the	  aims	  of	  such	  a	  theory	  necessarily	  fall	  short.	  	  The	  
first	  concerns	  the	  “indefinite	  reflexivity”	  of	  game	  theory	  situations.	  	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  both	  sides	  will	  have	  to	  predict	  what	  the	  other	  will	  do;	  yet	  each	  actor	  will	  try	  to	  
misrepresent	  his	  own	  intentions.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  other	  actor	  is	  trying	  to	  misrepresent	  his	  
intentions	  is	  known	  by	  both	  sides;	  and	  thus	  a	  situation	  arises	  where	  neither	  actor	  can	  be	  
certain	  as	  to	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  other.	  	  While	  MacIntyre	  acknowledges	  that	  this	  alone	  may	  
not	  prove	  insurmountable,	  the	  second	  obstacle,	  imperfect	  knowledge,	  makes	  it	  highly	  
unlikely.	  Each	  actor	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  “misinform”	  the	  other	  side.	  	  This	  proves	  
problematic	  for	  any	  external	  observer	  for	  “success	  at	  misinforming	  other	  actors	  is	  likely	  to	  
be	  the	  successful	  production	  of	  false	  impressions	  in	  external	  observers	  too.”494	  The	  final	  
obstacle	  that	  prevents	  game	  theory	  from	  successful	  predictions	  is	  that	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  it	  
is	  rare	  that	  simply	  one	  game	  is	  being	  played.	  	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  several	  games	  are	  being	  
played;	  even	  by	  members	  of	  the	  same	  group.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  real-­‐life	  situations	  are	  often	  
too	  complex	  to	  “fit”	  into	  a	  formal	  scheme.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  final	  source	  of	  “systematic	  unpredictability”	  is	  pure	  contingency.	  	  MacIntyre	  points	  
to	  Napoleon’s	  cold	  at	  Waterloo	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this.	  	  Had	  he	  not	  fallen	  ill,	  command	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493	  This	  scholarship	  is	  known	  as	  “rational	  choice	  theory”	  within	  political	  science.	  For	  a	  
prominent	  example,	  see	  Bueno	  De	  Mesquita’s	  War	  Trap.	  (New	  Haven	  and	  London:	  	  Yale	  
Press,	  1984).	  
494	  After	  Virtue	  p.97	  A	  classic	  example	  of	  this	  relates	  to	  warfare.	  	  Sides	  often	  exaggerate	  
their	  own	  relative	  power.	  If	  both	  sides	  had	  perfect	  information	  as	  to	  the	  capabilities	  of	  their	  
opposition,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  fight.	  	  Or	  we	  could	  think	  of	  a	  poker	  game.	  	  If	  I	  know	  
what	  my	  opponent	  is	  holding,	  I	  will	  only	  call	  a	  bet	  if	  my	  own	  hand	  is	  superior.	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not	  have	  been	  delegated	  to	  Ney	  and	  the	  Imperial	  forces	  may	  have	  prevailed.495	  The	  
beginning	  of	  World	  War	  1	  can	  also	  be	  attributed	  to	  pure	  contingency,	  as	  Archduke	  
Ferdinand’s	  assassination	  was	  hardly	  the	  result	  of	  a	  well-­‐planned	  scheme.	  	  Nearly	  every	  
major	  conflict	  has	  contained	  elements	  of	  contingency,	  and	  they	  often	  play	  crucial	  roles	  in	  
determining	  the	  outcome.	  	  Taken	  together,	  the	  sources	  of	  systematic	  unpredictability,	  
present	  a	  daunting	  task	  for	  anyone	  who	  wishes	  to	  explain	  (and	  especially	  predict)	  human	  
affairs.496	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  MacIntyre	  does	  concede	  that	  there	  are	  elements	  within	  the	  social	  world	  that	  can	  be	  
predicted.	  	  “Systematic	  predictability”	  consists	  of	  four	  primary	  elements.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  
we	  must	  schedule	  and	  coordinate	  our	  social	  actions.	  	  People	  generally	  go	  to	  work,	  eat,	  
sleep,	  etc.	  at	  similar	  times.497	  The	  second	  source	  of	  systematic	  predictability	  arises	  from	  
statistical	  regularities	  (suicides	  peak	  around	  Christmas,	  most	  catch	  colds	  in	  winter,	  etc.).498	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  we	  often	  have	  no	  concrete	  causal	  explanations	  of	  why	  these	  
occur;	  further	  strengthening	  MacIntyre’s	  point	  that	  predictability	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
entail	  explicability.499	  The	  third	  and	  fourth	  sources	  of	  systematic	  predictability	  are	  the	  
causal	  regularities	  in	  nature	  (seasons,	  storms,	  earthquakes,	  etc.)	  and	  causal	  regularities	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495	  Ibid	  p.100	  
496	  MacIntyre	  has	  harsh	  words	  for	  those	  that	  deny	  this	  fact:	  “omniscience	  excludes	  the	  
making	  of	  decisions.	  	  If	  God	  knows	  everything	  that	  will	  occur,	  he	  confronts	  no	  as	  yet	  
unmade	  decision.	  He	  has	  a	  single	  will.	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  insofar	  as	  we	  differ	  from	  God	  that	  
unpredictability	  invades	  our	  lives.	  	  This	  way	  of	  putting	  the	  point	  has	  one	  particular	  merit:	  	  
it	  suggests	  precisely	  what	  project	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  eliminate	  unpredictability	  from	  the	  
social	  world	  or	  to	  deny	  it	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  engaging	  in.”	  p.97	  
497	  MacIntyre	  points	  to	  an	  experiment	  where	  one	  hundred	  people	  were	  told	  they	  had	  to	  
meet	  an	  unknown	  person	  in	  Manhattan.	  The	  only	  knowledge	  provided	  was	  that	  the	  other	  
person	  had	  the	  same	  information.	  	  Over	  eighty	  picked	  the	  large	  clock	  in	  front	  of	  Grand	  
Central	  Station	  at	  noon.	  P.102	  
498	  Ibid	  p.102	  
499	  And	  perhaps	  of	  more	  important	  for	  social	  scientists,	  the	  corollary:	  	  unpredictability	  does	  
not	  necessarily	  entail	  inexplicability.	  P.102	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social	  life.500	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  factors,	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  sources	  of	  unsystematic	  
unpredictability	  remain	  prevalent.	  	  Chance	  is	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	  eliminated	  and	  
unpredictability	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  social	  life.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  So	  where	  does	  social	  science	  stand	  if	  MacIntyre’s	  argument	  holds?	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  
social	  science	  will	  never	  attain	  the	  law-­‐like	  generalizations	  that	  it	  currently	  seeks.	  	  It	  must	  
restrain	  itself	  to	  offering	  inductively	  based	  generalizations,	  not	  unlike	  those	  proffered	  by	  
Machiavelli.	  	  Likewise,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  well-­‐defined	  set	  of	  “counterfactual	  conditionals.”501	  
Moreover,	  he	  suggests	  that	  social	  scientists	  pay	  closer	  attention	  to	  error.	  If	  it	  is	  not	  
randomly	  distributed,	  as	  is	  often	  assumed,	  then	  we	  may	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  role	  chance	  
plays	  in	  specific	  parts	  of	  the	  social	  world.502	  But	  the	  more	  important	  implication	  of	  
MacIntyre’s	  critique	  is	  not	  that	  it	  “undermines”	  social	  science	  as	  presently	  constituted,	  but	  
that	  it	  questions	  the	  very	  social	  order	  that	  has	  ascended	  with	  it.	  	  MacIntyre	  characterizes	  
twentieth	  century	  social	  life	  as	  the	  “concrete	  and	  dramatic	  re-­‐enactment	  of	  eighteenth-­‐
century	  philosophy.	  	  And	  the	  characteristic	  institutional	  forms	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  social	  
life	  depends	  upon	  a	  belief	  that	  some	  of	  the	  central	  claims	  of	  that	  earlier	  philosophy	  have	  
been	  vindicated.”503	  MacIntyre’s	  argument	  is	  designed	  to	  show	  that	  those	  claims	  have	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500	  For	  social	  regularities,	  MacIntyre	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  19th	  and	  20th	  century	  
Britain/Germany	  where	  class	  determined	  the	  type	  of	  education	  one	  would	  receive.	  	  P.103	  
501	  Ibid	  p.	  104	  
502	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  that	  some	  scholars	  have	  indeed	  treated	  error	  in	  a	  constructive	  way.	  
See	  Eric	  Gartzke’s	  “War	  is	  in	  the	  Error	  Term.”	  International	  Organization	  (53).	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1999.	  pp.567-­‐587.	  	  Gartzke	  acknowledges	  the	  role	  that	  chance	  plays	  in	  
warfare	  and	  notes	  that	  it’s	  prevalence	  prevents	  us	  from	  successfully	  predicting	  the	  onset	  of	  
war.	  Uncertainty	  can	  lead	  to	  war	  or	  peace.	  
503	  MacIntyre	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  bureaucracy	  and	  “technocratic	  
expertise.”	  These	  institutions	  are	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  “expert	  knowledge”	  can	  be	  
obtained	  through	  social	  science;	  something	  that	  MacIntyre’s	  argument	  challenges.	  P.86	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been	  vindicated	  and	  can	  never	  be	  since	  they	  fail	  to	  recognize	  the	  inherent	  complexity	  and	  
unpredictability	  of	  human	  affairs.504	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Before	  turning	  to	  the	  constructive	  part	  of	  our	  study,	  let	  us	  examine	  one	  more	  facet	  of	  
social	  science	  that	  MacIntyre	  only	  hints	  at.	  	  The	  adaptation	  of	  natural	  scientific	  
methodology	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  could	  not	  have	  occurred	  without	  a	  fundamental	  
ontological	  shift.	  	  That	  such	  a	  shift	  occurred	  is	  hardly	  disputable,	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  shift	  
has	  been	  obscured.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  ontological	  questions	  were	  subsequently	  
“banned”	  by	  those	  who	  initiated	  the	  shift.505	  	  More	  specifically,	  a	  new	  view	  of	  man	  was	  
adopted.	  	  And	  it	  was	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  that	  view	  of	  man	  and	  his	  place	  in	  the	  world,	  that	  the	  
epistemological	  assumptions	  (addressed	  at	  length	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  MacIntyre,	  Hayek,	  
Andreski,	  and	  Voegelin)	  of	  social	  science	  were	  developed.506	  	  The	  methods	  of	  the	  natural	  
sciences	  could	  only	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  study	  of	  man	  if	  man	  was	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  
“natural”	  or	  “material”	  world.	  	  As	  we	  have	  noted	  throughout	  this	  study,	  that	  view	  was	  
adopted	  in	  part	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  classical	  and	  medieval	  philosophy	  (concretely	  in	  the	  work	  
of	  Bacon	  and	  Comte)	  and	  also	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  astounding	  success	  of	  natural	  science	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504	  And	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  unpredictability	  is	  recognized,	  the	  attempt	  to	  produce	  law-­‐
like	  generalizations	  will	  be	  abandoned.	  	  
505	  In	  eschewing	  ontological	  questions	  and	  abandoning	  “metaphysics”,	  Enlightenment	  
thinkers	  failed	  to	  recognize	  that	  they	  were	  themselves	  engaging	  in	  metaphysics.	  In	  
Voegelin’s	  terms,	  they	  are	  merely	  rejecting	  an	  “idealistic	  metaphysic”	  for	  a	  “materialistic	  
metaphysic.”	  As	  MacIntyre	  notes,	  they	  took	  part	  in	  an	  “unacknowledged	  and	  unrecognized	  
transition	  from	  on	  stance	  of	  theoretical	  interpretation	  to	  another.”	  	  This	  led	  him	  to	  
characterize	  the	  Enlightenment	  as	  the	  “period	  par	  excellence	  in	  which	  most	  intellectuals	  
lack	  self	  knowledge.”	  	  See	  After	  Virtue	  p.81	  and	  Anamnesis	  p.32.	  	  As	  we	  noted	  previously,	  
metaphysical	  questions	  are	  derided	  in	  Bacon’s	  work	  and	  banned	  outright	  in	  the	  systems	  of	  
Comte	  and	  Marx.	  
506	  A	  view	  that	  we	  discussed	  at	  some	  length	  in	  the	  Voegelin’s	  analysis	  of	  race	  theory.	  See	  
Eric	  Voegelin.	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Race	  Idea:	  From	  Ray	  to	  Carus.	  Volume	  3	  of	  the	  Collected	  
Works	  of	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  Ed.	  Vondung	  (Baton	  Rouge:	  	  Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press,	  
1998)	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(especially	  with	  Newton’s	  work).	  	  The	  “materialistic	  metaphysic”	  allows	  for	  a	  purely	  
phenomenal	  epistemology.507	  	  Nature	  is	  asserted	  as	  the	  whole	  of	  being;	  to	  exist	  is	  to	  take	  
part	  in	  the	  physical	  existence	  of	  this	  world.	  Man’s	  physical	  nature	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  whole	  
of	  his	  existence	  and	  knowledge	  is	  attained	  through	  sense	  perception.	  	  Once	  these	  
ontological	  and	  epistemological	  assumptions	  are	  adopted,	  it	  is	  of	  little	  surprise	  that	  the	  
methods	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  are	  implemented.	  	  If	  man	  is	  simply	  another	  part	  of	  the	  
natural	  world,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  he	  cannot	  be	  studied	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  that	  other	  
living	  beings	  are	  examined.	  	  Our	  central	  claim	  however	  is	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  does	  not	  
and	  cannot	  work.	  And	  this	  is	  due	  not	  only	  to	  the	  epistemological	  questions	  raised	  by	  critics	  
such	  as	  Voegelin,	  Kolakowski,	  Andreski,	  and	  MacIntyre,	  but	  more	  importantly,	  because	  it	  
bases	  its	  claims	  on	  a	  faulty	  ontology.	  	  Thus,	  even	  if	  it	  succeeds	  in	  its	  epistemological	  aims	  
(which	  we	  maintain	  that	  it	  does	  not),	  it	  wrongly	  identifies	  the	  part(s)	  as	  the	  whole.	  	  And	  
this	  mistake	  is	  what	  ultimately	  renders	  social	  science,	  and	  contemporary	  political	  science,	  
unable	  to	  fully	  address	  the	  major	  political	  problems	  of	  our	  age.	  	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  
identified	  some	  of	  the	  critical	  issues	  that	  have	  plagued	  political	  science	  (and	  social	  science	  
in	  general)	  since	  its	  inception,	  let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  constructive	  part	  of	  our	  study	  and	  
suggest	  some	  corrective	  measures.508	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  From	  the	  onset,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  an	  inherent	  difficulty	  in	  proposing	  such	  a	  
solution:	  language	  has	  been	  co-­‐opted	  by	  the	  very	  system	  that	  we	  propose	  to	  replace.	  	  More	  
specifically,	  terms	  such	  as	  reason,	  experience,	  facts,	  empiricism,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  	  Anamnesis.	  Trans.	  Gerhart	  Niemeyer.	  (Columbia:	  	  University	  of	  Missouri	  
Press,	  1978).	  pp.32-­‐33	  	  
508	  	  The	  constructive	  part	  of	  our	  study	  is	  especially	  indebted	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Eric	  
Voegelin	  and	  more	  specifically,	  his	  theory	  of	  consciousness	  as	  presented	  in	  Anamnesis.	  	  See	  
also	  Ellis	  Sandoz’s	  “Principia	  Noetica”	  in	  The	  Voegelinian	  Revolution.	  2nd	  edition	  (New	  
Jersey:	  	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  2000)	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importantly,	  science,	  have	  taken	  on	  different	  meanings	  within	  modernity.	  Bacon	  and	  Comte	  
both	  appeal	  to	  experience	  and	  reason,	  but	  they	  have	  something	  different	  in	  mind	  than	  did	  
Plato	  and	  Aristotle.	  Thus,	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  our	  task	  will	  be	  to	  clarify	  the	  different	  meanings	  
of	  these	  terms	  and	  to	  ultimately	  recover	  the	  elements	  that	  were	  lost	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  
modernity.	  	  Let	  us	  begin	  with	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  terms,	  reason,	  for	  all	  
science	  (whether	  of	  the	  ancient	  or	  modern	  variety)	  depends	  on	  it	  for	  its	  justification	  and	  
implementation.	  	  	  
Reason	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  one	  thing	  that	  nearly	  every	  philosopher	  and	  scientist	  will	  agree	  upon	  is	  that	  reason	  
is	  crucial	  to	  his	  enterprise.	  	  Yet,	  we	  would	  find	  less	  agreement	  if	  we	  asked	  them	  to	  define	  
reason.	  	  This	  is	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  fundamental	  shift	  that	  occurred	  with	  the	  inception	  of	  
modernity	  whereby	  reason	  acquired	  a	  much	  more	  “practical”	  bent.509	  	  The	  bios	  theoretikos,	  
or	  contemplative	  life,	  was	  diminished	  in	  favor	  a	  practical	  utility.	  	  Reason,	  instead	  of	  being	  
considered	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  the	  soul	  as	  in	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle,	  became	  a	  mere	  means	  to	  an	  
end	  within	  modernity.	  	  And	  instead	  of	  ordering	  the	  soul,	  reason	  became	  the	  slave	  of	  the	  
passions	  and	  was	  relegated	  to	  a	  tool	  used	  in	  their	  service.510	  By	  the	  time	  of	  Darwin,	  reason	  
had	  become	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  evolutionary	  tool	  to	  aid	  in	  survival	  and	  serve	  the	  self-­‐
interest	  of	  human	  beings.	  And	  unlike	  Aristotle,	  who	  posited	  reason	  as	  the	  differentia	  
specifica,	  Darwin	  was	  quick	  to	  ascribe	  it	  to	  other	  living	  beings.	  Reason	  could	  help	  us	  (and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509	  Strauss	  points	  to	  this	  shift	  as	  one	  of	  the	  distinguishing	  features	  of	  modernity.	  	  See	  Leo	  
Strauss.	  Liberalism:	  Ancient	  and	  Modern.	  (Chicago:	  	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1989)	  
pp.20-­‐21	  	  
510	  “Reason	  is,	  and	  ought	  only	  to	  be	  the	  slave	  of	  the	  passions,	  and	  can	  never	  pretend	  to	  any	  
other	  office	  than	  to	  serve	  and	  obey	  them.”	  See	  David	  Hume.	  A	  Treatise	  of	  Human	  Nature.	  Ed.	  
L.A.	  Sigby-­‐Bigge	  (Oxford:	  	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1896)	  Book	  II,	  Section	  III,	  Part	  III	  “Of	  the	  
influencing	  motives	  of	  the	  will.”	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other	  living	  beings)	  secure	  certain	  ends,	  but	  it	  would	  have	  little,	  if	  anything,	  to	  say	  about	  
which	  ends	  to	  pursue.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  reasons	  that	  we	  can	  point	  to	  for	  this	  change	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  
reason.	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  tremendous	  success	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  in	  providing	  tangible	  
benefits.	  	  Medicine	  and	  technology	  provided	  “proof”	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  new	  conception	  of	  
science	  and	  its	  implementation	  of	  reason.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  gradual	  diminishment	  of	  
Christianity’s	  influence	  led	  to	  an	  emphasis	  of	  the	  physical	  over	  the	  spiritual,	  which	  
subsequently	  meant	  that	  the	  body	  gained	  primacy	  over	  the	  soul.511	  Aristotle	  had	  praised	  
the	  bios	  theoretikos	  as	  the	  happiest	  life	  because	  it	  requires	  the	  utilization	  of	  man’s	  most	  
divine	  capacity.512	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  embrace	  that	  capacity	  and	  engage	  in	  
contemplation,	  we	  are	  “immortalizing.”	  Like	  Plato,	  he	  places	  reason	  at	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  the	  
soul.	  	  And	  to	  care	  for	  the	  soul	  is	  far	  more	  important	  than	  the	  body	  as	  Plato	  makes	  clear	  
throughout	  his	  works.513	  	  Once	  the	  soul’s	  existence	  is	  denied	  or	  placed	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  
body,	  reason	  necessarily	  must	  be	  redefined.	  	  And	  in	  this	  redefinition,	  reason	  loses	  any	  
connection	  to	  the	  divine	  and	  ceases	  to	  be	  the	  constitutive	  part	  of	  man’s	  nature.514	  It	  is	  our	  
argument	  that	  this	  redefinition	  of	  reason	  was	  not	  justified	  and	  that	  it	  has	  led	  to	  stasis,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511	  To	  the	  extent	  the	  soul	  was	  thought	  to	  exist	  at	  all,	  discussion	  of	  it	  was	  relegated	  to	  
“unscientific”	  fields	  such	  as	  theology.	  	  	  
512	  See	  Aristotle.	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  Trans.	  Ostwald	  (New	  Jersey:	  	  Prentice	  Hall	  
Publishing).	  	  To	  the	  extent	  man	  leads	  the	  contemplative	  life,	  his	  life	  “would	  be	  more	  than	  
human.	  	  A	  man	  would	  do	  so	  not	  insofar	  as	  he	  is	  human,	  but	  because	  there	  is	  a	  divine	  
element	  within	  him.”	  1177b	  25-­‐30	  
513	  For	  example,	  see	  the	  Phaedo	  (63A-­‐B).	  	  Socrates	  defines	  philosophy	  as	  the	  practice	  of	  
dying.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  body	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  hindrance	  to	  the	  soul.	  	  He	  then	  proceeds	  to	  
provide	  epideictic	  proofs	  for	  the	  immortality	  of	  the	  soul.	  	  
514	  We	  are	  simply	  referring	  to	  the	  new	  view	  of	  reason	  and	  the	  subsequent	  understanding	  of	  
man	  that	  results.	  We	  are	  not	  suggesting	  an	  actual	  change	  in	  human	  nature.	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rigidification,	  within	  the	  political	  order.	  	  To	  understand	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  let	  us	  turn	  to	  a	  
more	  in	  depth	  examination	  of	  reason	  in	  the	  classical	  sense.	  
	  	  	  	  	  Eric	  Voegelin	  offers	  a	  penetrating	  analysis	  of	  reason’s	  role	  in	  antiquity	  in	  his	  essay,	  
Reason:	  	  The	  Classic	  Experience.	  	  Voegelin	  posits	  reason	  as	  an	  epochal	  event	  in	  the	  history	  of	  
mankind.	  	  It	  represents	  a	  “process	  in	  reality	  in	  which	  concrete	  human	  beings,	  ‘the	  lovers	  of	  
wisdom,’	  the	  philosophers	  as	  they	  styled	  themselves,	  were	  engaged	  in	  an	  act	  of	  resistance	  
against	  the	  personal	  and	  social	  disorder	  of	  their	  age.”515	  It	  serves	  as	  an	  ordering	  structure	  
in	  the	  psyche,	  or	  soul,	  of	  man	  and	  is	  borne	  out	  of	  a	  concrete	  resistance	  to	  disorder	  (both	  
within	  the	  individual	  and	  in	  society).	  	  To	  this	  particular	  kind	  of	  reason,	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  
gave	  the	  name	  nous.	  	  As	  Voegelin	  notes,	  the	  nous	  serves	  as	  the	  “cognitively	  luminous	  force	  
that	  inspired	  philosophers	  to	  resist	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  enabled	  them	  to	  recognize	  the	  
phenomena	  of	  disorder	  in	  the	  light	  of	  a	  humanity	  ordered	  by	  nous.”516	  Therefore,	  noetic	  
reason	  constitutes	  both	  the	  “force	  and	  criterion	  of	  order.”517	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  provides	  us	  
with	  the	  cognitive	  tools	  necessary	  to	  recognize	  disorder	  while	  also	  providing	  us	  with	  the	  
model	  of	  proper	  order	  to	  correct	  it.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Voegelin	  is	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  discovery	  of	  nous,	  although	  epochal	  in	  the	  
philosophical	  sense,	  did	  not	  magically	  cure	  the	  political	  ills	  of	  the	  time:	  
Reason	  in	  the	  noetic	  sense,	  it	  should	  be	  understood,	  does	  not	  put	  an	  apocalyptic	  end	  to	  
history	  either	  now	  or	  in	  a	  progressivist	  future.	  	  It	  rather	  pervades	  the	  history	  which	  it	  
constitutes	  with	  a	  new	  luminosity	  of	  existential	  order	  in	  resistance	  to	  disordering	  passion.	  	  
Its	  modus	  operandi	  is	  not	  revolution,	  action,	  or	  compulsion,	  but	  persuasion,	  the	  peitho	  that	  
is	  central	  to	  Plato’s	  existence	  as	  a	  philosopher.	  	  It	  does	  not	  abolish	  the	  passions	  but	  makes	  
reason	  articulate,	  so	  that	  noetic	  consciousness	  becomes	  a	  persuasive	  force	  of	  order	  the	  
stark	  light	  it	  lets	  fall	  on	  the	  phenomena	  of	  personal	  and	  social	  disorder.	  	  To	  have	  raised	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515	  	  Anamnesis	  p.89	  
516	  Ibid.	  p.89	  
517	  Ibid	  p.89	  
	   160	  
tension	  of	  order	  and	  disorder	  in	  existence	  to	  the	  luminosity	  of	  noetic	  dialogue	  and	  
discourse	  is	  the	  epochal	  feat	  of	  the	  classic	  philosophers.518	  
	  
The	  reason	  that	  nous	  cannot	  provide	  a	  magical	  political	  cure	  is	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  
individual	  must	  first	  overcome	  disorder	  in	  his	  own	  soul.519	  	  The	  tension	  of	  existence,	  to	  use	  
Voegelin’s	  terminology,	  requires	  “balance	  of	  consciousness.”520	  The	  “aperionic	  depth”,	  or	  
nothingness,	  holds	  an	  equally	  prominent	  place	  in	  man’s	  nature,	  as	  does	  the	  divine	  nous.	  	  
Furthermore,	  man	  is	  not	  a	  “disembodied	  psyche	  ordered	  by	  reason.”521	  	  He	  possesses	  a	  
corporeal	  nature	  and	  experiences	  the	  pull	  of	  the	  passions.	  	  Thus,	  while	  we	  are	  critical	  of	  the	  
radically	  immanent	  conception	  of	  man	  proffered	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Darwin	  and	  Marx,	  any	  
attempt	  to	  downplay	  the	  passions	  and	  corporeal	  nature	  of	  man	  must	  also	  be	  rejected	  for	  
they	  constitute	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  man’s	  nature.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Due	  to	  the	  luminosity	  provided	  by	  noetic	  insight,	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  were	  able	  to	  
acknowledge	  their	  own	  ignorance.	  	  Indeed,	  both	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  place	  “wondering”	  as	  
the	  starting	  point	  for	  philosophy.522	  In	  fact,	  Aristotle	  extends	  the	  dictum	  to	  everyone:	  “All	  
men	  by	  nature	  desire	  to	  know.”523While	  all	  men	  experience	  this	  desire,	  it	  is	  stronger	  in	  
some.	  	  The	  philosopher	  is	  one	  who	  is	  drawn	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  to	  seek	  answers	  to	  the	  
questions	  of	  his	  existence.	  	  Plato’s	  parable	  of	  the	  Cave	  is	  the	  symbolization	  par	  excellence	  of	  
this	  search.524	  	  The	  prisoner	  is	  moved	  to	  turn	  around	  (periagoge)	  and	  ascend	  out	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518	  Ibid	  pp.90-­‐91	  
519	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  anthropological	  principle	  of	  Plato.	  	  The	  polis	  is	  “man	  writ	  large.”	  This	  
means	  that	  the	  order	  of	  a	  society	  will	  reflect	  the	  order	  of	  the	  individuals	  that	  constitute	  it.	  
See	  Republic	  Book	  II	  (367C-­‐369C)	  
520	  Anamnesis	  p.90	  
521	  Ibid	  p.92	  
522	  See	  Plato’s	  Theaetetus	  Trans.	  Sachs.	  (Newbury	  Port,	  MA:	  	  Focus	  Publishing,	  2004)	  
(155d)	  	  
523	  Anamnesis	  p.93	  (emphasis	  added)	  
524	  See	  Plato’s	  Republic.	  Book	  VII	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cave	  by	  a	  mysterious,	  unknown	  force.525	  	  The	  wisdom	  acquired	  outside	  of	  the	  cave	  is	  only	  
attainable	  because	  of	  that	  force,	  but	  the	  draw	  alone	  is	  not	  enough:	  the	  prisoner	  must	  
respond	  to	  the	  calling	  that	  compels	  him	  to	  turn	  around.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  
experience	  of	  wondering	  in	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  is	  not	  one	  of	  fear	  and	  anxiety:	  it	  is	  one	  of	  
joy.526	  As	  Voegelin	  notes,	  this	  is	  “because	  the	  questioning	  has	  direction;	  the	  unrest	  is	  
experienced	  as	  a	  theophanic	  event	  in	  which	  the	  nous	  reveals	  itself	  as	  the	  divine	  ordering	  
force	  in	  which	  the	  psyche	  of	  the	  questioner	  and	  cosmos	  at	  large;	  it	  is	  an	  invitation	  to	  pursue	  
its	  meaning	  into	  the	  actualization	  of	  noetic	  consciousness.”527	  
	  	  	  	  	  Voegelin	  contrasts	  the	  classic	  experience	  of	  reason	  with	  some	  of	  the	  prominent	  
representatives	  of	  modern	  reason	  in	  order	  to	  exemplify	  what	  happens	  when	  nous	  is	  
disregarded	  and	  the	  directive	  nature	  of	  the	  search	  has	  been	  lost:	  
In	  the	  modern	  Western	  history	  of	  unrest,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  from	  the	  Hobbesian	  “fear	  of	  
death”	  to	  Heidegger’s	  Angst,	  the	  tonality	  has	  shifted	  from	  joyful	  participation	  in	  a	  
theophany	  to	  the	  agnoia	  ptoiodes,	  to	  the	  hostile	  alienation	  from	  a	  reality	  that	  rather	  hides	  
than	  reveals	  itself.	  	  A	  Hobbes	  replaces	  the	  summum	  bonum	  with	  the	  summum	  malum	  as	  the	  
ordering	  force	  of	  man’s	  existence;	  a	  Hegel	  builds	  his	  state	  of	  alienation	  into	  a	  system	  and	  
invites	  all	  men	  to	  become	  Hegelians;	  a	  Marx	  rejects	  the	  Aristotelian	  quest	  of	  the	  ground	  
outright	  and	  invites	  you	  to	  join	  him,	  as	  a	  “socialist	  man,”	  in	  his	  state	  of	  alienation,	  a	  Freud	  
diagnoses	  the	  openness	  toward	  the	  ground	  as	  an	  “illusion,”	  a	  “neurotic	  relict,”	  and	  an	  
“infantilism”;	  a	  Heidegger	  waits	  for	  a	  “parousia	  of	  being”	  which	  does	  not	  come,	  a	  Sartre	  
feels	  “condemned	  to	  be	  free”	  and	  thrashes	  around	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  substitute	  meanings	  
for	  the	  meaning	  he	  has	  missed.528	  
	  
Yet,	  the	  shift	  represents	  more	  than	  just	  a	  change	  in	  tone	  or	  emphasis.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  
those	  thinkers	  invoke	  “reason”	  as	  justification	  for	  their	  respective	  systems.	  	  The	  zoon	  noun	  
echon	  (the	  being	  that	  possesses	  nous)	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  zoon	  agnoian	  echon	  (the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525	  Anamnesis	  p.94	  
526	  Ibid	  p.101	  
527	  Ratio	  is	  what	  gives	  the	  search	  direction	  toward	  to	  the	  Ground.	  p.101	  
528	  Ibid	  pp.102-­‐103	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being	  that	  possesses	  ignorance).529	  	  But	  if	  all	  men	  desire	  by	  nature	  to	  know,	  then	  how	  can	  
we	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  derailment?	  	  The	  answer	  lies	  within	  the	  response	  to	  the	  state	  of	  
unrest.	  	  If	  man	  fails	  to	  utilize	  and	  nurture	  his	  highest	  capacity,	  noetic	  reasoning,	  then	  the	  
questioning	  will	  have	  no	  direction.	  	  The	  sense	  of	  disorientation	  that	  results	  will	  then	  lead	  to	  
artificial	  constructions	  of	  order,	  or	  second	  realities,	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  can	  gain	  a	  sense	  
of	  certainty	  and	  control	  over	  his	  existence.	  	  Such	  constructions,	  however,	  must	  be	  protected	  
because	  they	  will	  fail	  under	  rational	  scrutiny.	  	  Thus,	  a	  key	  tenet	  of	  modern	  systems	  (such	  as	  
those	  offered	  by	  Marx	  and	  Comte),	  explicitly	  prohibit	  philosophical	  questioning	  in	  the	  
classic	  sense.530	  	  A	  recovery	  of	  reason	  then	  will	  necessarily	  entail	  an	  “open”	  approach	  to	  
politics:	  one	  that	  features	  philosophical	  questioning	  at	  its	  core.	  	  
Experience	  
	  	  	  	  	  Another	  term	  that	  has	  acquired	  a	  new	  meaning	  within	  modernity	  is	  experience.	  	  When	  
faced	  with	  questions	  of	  verification,	  both	  classical	  and	  modern	  political	  philosophers	  will	  
point	  to	  experience	  as	  proof,	  or	  evidence,	  of	  their	  respective	  claims.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  the	  differences	  in	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  experience.	  	  For	  instance,	  when	  
Bacon	  laments	  that	  none	  before	  him	  has	  “spent	  an	  adequate	  amount	  of	  time	  on	  things	  
themselves	  and	  on	  experience,”531	  he	  is	  referring	  to	  observation	  and	  experimentation.	  	  
Sense	  perception	  alone	  may	  mislead	  us,	  but	  the	  experiment	  serves	  as	  the	  “assistant	  to	  the	  
senses”	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  gain	  true	  insight	  into	  nature.	  	  So	  while	  admitting	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  
the	  senses	  if	  unaided,	  Bacon’s	  “experience”	  is	  one	  based	  on	  information	  gained	  through	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529	  Ibid	  p.102	  
530	  Voegelin	  asserts	  that	  those	  thinkers	  knowingly	  distort	  reality;	  it	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  
intellectual	  error.	  	  Ibid	  p.3	  
531	  Francis	  Bacon.	  Novum	  Organum.	  	  Ed.	  Jardine	  and	  Silverthorne.	  (Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2000)	  	  p.8	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sense	  perception.	  	  This	  is	  a	  perfectly	  reasonable	  definition	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  natural	  
sciences,	  but	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  human	  existence	  is	  ignored	  if	  we	  simply	  import	  Bacon’s	  
notion	  of	  experience	  into	  the	  study	  of	  human	  affairs.532	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  also	  appeal	  to	  experience,	  but	  they	  include	  an	  aspect	  that	  is	  missing	  
in	  Bacon’s	  account:	  	  apperceptive	  experience.	  This	  is	  an	  inner,	  participatory	  experience.	  	  As	  
Ellis	  Sandoz	  notes	  in	  The	  Voegelinian	  Revolution,	  “it	  is,	  in	  any	  event,	  evident	  that	  the	  
material	  and	  quantifiable	  do	  not	  exhaust	  the	  whole	  of	  experienced	  reality.	  	  No	  account	  that	  
takes	  only	  these	  factors	  into	  consideration	  can	  form	  a	  sufficient	  basis	  for	  understanding	  
man	  in	  his	  humanity	  or	  for	  understanding	  the	  science	  of	  politics.”533	  Man’s	  noetic	  capacity	  
gives	  insight	  into	  areas	  of	  reality	  that	  are	  not	  exhausted	  by	  sensory	  perception.	  	  Insight	  into	  
the	  structure	  of	  reality,	  and	  the	  realization	  of	  one’s	  own	  participation	  in	  the	  metaxy	  are	  
apperceptive	  experiences.534	  The	  divine	  draw,	  or	  pull,	  that	  man	  experiences,	  the	  force	  that	  
compels	  him	  to	  turn	  around;	  these	  are	  just	  as	  real	  (Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  would	  argue	  that	  
they	  are	  more	  so)	  as	  any	  sensory	  perception.	  The	  fact	  that	  man	  participates	  in	  this	  process	  
precludes	  any	  notion	  of	  the	  traditional	  subject-­‐object	  dichotomy	  that	  is	  prevalent	  in	  the	  
methodology	  of	  natural	  science.	  Plato	  turns	  to	  the	  myth	  in	  part	  because	  apperceptive	  
experiences	  are	  often	  ineffable.	  	  The	  medium	  of	  myth	  allows	  him	  to	  symbolize	  experiences	  
that	  do	  not	  lend	  themselves	  easily	  to	  a	  standard,	  philosophical	  exegesis.	  	  This	  necessitates	  
the	  understanding	  that	  politics	  is	  a	  relatively	  “imprecise”	  science	  for	  one	  can	  only	  be	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532	  And	  as	  we	  noted	  in	  the	  Chapter	  on	  Bacon’s	  New	  Science,	  ethical	  and	  political	  constraints	  
prohibit	  the	  implementation	  of	  experimentation	  on	  human	  beings.	  	  We	  cannot	  “vex”	  
humans	  in	  the	  same	  way	  we	  can	  manipulate	  nature	  in	  the	  laboratory.	  	  
533	  Ellis	  Sandoz.	  The	  Voegelinian	  Revolution.	  2nd	  edition.	  (New	  Brunswick	  and	  London:	  	  
Transaction	  Publishers,	  2000)	  p.148	  
534	  Anamnesis	  p.209	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precise	  as	  the	  subject	  matter	  allows.535	  	  And	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  questions	  raised	  by	  
Macintyre,	  man’s	  apperceptive	  experiences	  are	  not	  expressible	  as	  mathematical	  formulae,	  
nor	  can	  they	  be	  reduced	  to	  mere	  description.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  experience	  that	  is	  often	  neglected	  within	  modernity,	  and	  
certainly	  in	  its	  scientistic	  manifestations,	  is	  common	  sense.	  	  Common	  sense	  serves	  as	  a	  line	  
of	  defense	  against	  ideologies	  and	  systems	  that	  exclude	  or	  inhibit	  important	  aspects	  of	  
political	  reality.	  	  As	  Thomas	  Reid	  notes:	  
There	  is	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  it	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  our	  being	  subjects	  of	  law	  and	  
government,	  capable	  of	  managing	  our	  own	  affairs,	  and	  answerable	  for	  our	  conduct	  towards	  
others:	  	  This	  is	  called	  common	  sense,	  because	  it	  is	  common	  to	  all	  men	  with	  whom	  we	  can	  
transact	  business,	  or	  call	  to	  account	  for	  their	  conduct.536	  
	  
Voegelin	  points	  out	  that	  it	  means	  the	  same	  as	  a	  “branch	  or	  degree	  of	  ratio”	  and	  represents	  
the	  “habit	  of	  judgment	  and	  conduct	  of	  a	  man	  formed	  by	  ratio.”537	  Voegelin	  points	  to	  
Aristotle’s	  Politics	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  “commonsense	  study,”	  since	  it	  deals	  with	  situations	  
that	  typically	  arise	  in	  society	  and	  history.538	  Common	  sense	  is	  also	  what	  allows	  us	  to	  
recognize	  the	  deficiencies	  of	  ideological	  systems.	  	  So	  when	  Marx	  tells	  a	  hypothetical	  
interlocutor	  to	  give	  up	  his	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  existence	  or	  posits	  that	  man	  is	  
a	  self-­‐created	  being,	  common	  sense	  experience	  leads	  us	  to	  reject	  such	  propositions.539	  	  
Marx’s	  systematic	  ban	  on	  such	  questions	  serves	  as	  proof	  that	  he	  realizes	  the	  sway	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535	  As	  Aristotle	  readily	  points	  out	  in	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics:	  “a	  well-­‐schooled	  man	  is	  one	  
who	  searches	  for	  that	  degree	  of	  precision	  in	  each	  kind	  of	  study	  which	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
subject	  at	  hand	  admits.”	  To	  do	  otherwise	  is	  “foolish.”	  	  (1094b	  lines	  23-­‐26)	  
536	  As	  quoted	  by	  Voegelin.	  See	  Anamnesis	  pp.211-­‐12	  
537	  Ibid	  p.212	  
538	  Ibid	  p.212	  
539	  See	  Karl	  Marx.	  Economic	  and	  Philosophic	  Manuscripts	  of	  1844.	  Trans.	  Milligan	  (New	  
York:	  	  Prometheus	  Books,	  1988)	  p.111	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common	  sense	  experience	  and	  therefore,	  he	  must	  find	  a	  way	  to	  convince	  his	  followers	  to	  
ignore	  it.	  	  
	  Facts	  
	  	  	  	  	  Again,	  we	  run	  into	  the	  problem	  of	  meaning	  when	  we	  assess	  the	  term	  “facts.”	  	  As	  with	  
reason	  and	  experience,	  most	  thinkers	  will	  claim	  to	  have	  “facts”	  on	  their	  side.	  And	  any	  
science	  must	  rely	  on	  facts	  for	  its	  validation.	  	  Positivism	  helped	  initiate	  the	  separation	  
between	  “fact”	  and	  “value.”	  	  Under	  this	  conception,	  facts	  are	  held	  to	  be	  empirically	  
demonstrable;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  accessible	  through	  sense	  perception.	  	  Furthermore,	  facts	  
cannot	  be	  tied	  to	  any	  sense	  of	  right	  or	  wrong;	  they	  are	  “value-­‐free.”	  	  To	  be	  scientific,	  on	  this	  
account,	  is	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  facts.	  Thus,	  science	  is	  ethically	  neutral	  and	  the	  social	  
scientist	  must	  strive	  to	  be	  so	  as	  well	  (to	  the	  extent	  he	  is	  being	  a	  good	  scientist).	  As	  Leo	  
Strauss	  points	  out,	  such	  an	  attitude	  can	  lead	  not	  only	  to	  nihilism,	  but,	  perhaps	  more	  
importantly,	  to	  a	  blind	  acceptance	  of	  the	  status	  quo.540	  As	  Strauss	  notes,	  “ethical	  neutrality	  .	  
.	  .	  is	  not	  more	  than	  an	  alibi	  for	  thoughtlessness	  and	  vulgarity:	  	  by	  saying	  that	  democracy	  
and	  truth	  are	  values,	  he	  says	  in	  effect	  that	  one	  does	  not	  have	  to	  think	  about	  the	  reasons	  
why	  these	  things	  are	  good,	  and	  that	  he	  may	  bow	  as	  well	  as	  anyone	  else	  to	  the	  values	  that	  
are	  adopted	  and	  respected	  by	  his	  society.	  	  Social	  science	  positivism	  fosters	  not	  so	  much	  
nihilism	  as	  conformism	  and	  philistinism.”541	  Strauss	  points	  to	  the	  almost	  unanimous	  
acceptance	  of	  democracy	  amongst	  American	  social	  scientists	  as	  evidence	  of	  this	  claim.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
540	  See	  Leo	  Strauss.	  What	  Is	  Political	  Philosophy?	  And	  Other	  Studies.	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  1988).	  pp.19-­‐20.	  	  Stanislav	  Andreski	  makes	  a	  similar	  claim	  noting	  social	  
scientists	  “have	  followed	  and	  continue	  to	  follow	  the	  intellectual	  fashions	  of	  the	  day:	  	  
hurrah-­‐patriotic	  in	  1914,	  pacifist	  in	  the	  twenties,	  leftist	  in	  the	  thirties,	  celebrating	  the	  end	  
of	  ideology	  in	  the	  fifties,	  youth-­‐cultured	  and	  new	  leftist	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  sixties.”	  Social	  
Sciences	  as	  Sorcery.	  p.30	  
541	  Strauss	  p.20	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Furthermore,	  the	  social	  scientists	  in	  his	  homeland	  of	  Germany,	  offered	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  
critique	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  (something	  that	  Eric	  Voegelin	  vigorously	  pointed	  out	  as	  well).	  	  
That	  this	  was	  the	  case	  should	  not	  be	  too	  surprising	  given	  the	  positivistic	  outlook	  of	  those	  
practitioners.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  positive	  conception	  of	  social	  science,	  we	  again	  can	  turn	  to	  
Aristotle.	  	  Far	  from	  being	  ethically	  neutral,	  Aristotle	  was	  adamant	  that	  ethics	  served	  as	  the	  
foundation	  for	  political	  order.542	  	  Like	  the	  positive	  social	  scientist,	  Aristotle	  noted	  the	  
importance	  of	  facts,	  but	  he	  was	  much	  more	  expansive	  in	  his	  definition.	  The	  student	  of	  
politics	  has	  to	  study	  the	  soul	  first	  and	  foremost	  since	  the	  end	  of	  politics	  is	  the	  good	  of	  
man.543	  	  The	  philosophical	  anthropology	  offered	  by	  Aristotle	  does	  not	  represent	  a	  “value	  
judgment”	  or	  an	  “opinion.”	  	  As	  Voegelin	  notes:	  	  
Neither	  classical	  nor	  Christian	  ethics	  and	  politics	  contain	  value	  judgments	  but	  elaborate	  
empirically	  and	  critically,	  the	  problems	  of	  order	  which	  derive	  from	  philosophical	  
anthropology	  as	  part	  of	  a	  general	  ontology.	  	  Only	  when	  ontology	  as	  a	  science	  was	  lost,	  and	  
when	  consequently	  ethics	  and	  politics	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  understood	  as	  sciences	  of	  the	  
order	  in	  which	  human	  nature	  reaches	  its	  maximal	  actualization,	  was	  it	  possible	  for	  this	  
realm	  of	  knowledge	  to	  become	  suspect	  as	  a	  field	  of	  subjective,	  uncritical	  opinion.544	  	  
	  
Man’s	  nature	  includes	  not	  only	  the	  corporeal,	  but	  also	  the	  spiritual.	  The	  reductionist	  
philosophical	  anthropologies	  offered	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Comte,	  Marx,	  and	  Darwin	  fail	  to	  
account	  for	  man’s	  non-­‐corporeal	  nature,	  and	  thus	  the	  systems	  that	  they	  base	  around	  such	  
conceptions	  necessarily	  fail.	  	  They	  mistakenly	  subordinate	  theoretical	  relevance	  to	  
methodology	  and	  exclude	  from	  examination	  the	  questions	  that	  matter	  the	  most	  in	  human	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542	  “To	  be	  a	  competent	  student	  of	  what	  is	  right	  and	  just,	  and	  of	  politics	  generally,	  one	  must	  
first	  have	  received	  a	  proper	  upbringing	  in	  moral	  conduct.”	  See	  Nicomachean	  Ethics.	  1095B,	  
lines	  5-­‐10	  
543	  Ibid.	  1102A,	  lines	  20-­‐25	  
544	  Eric	  Voegelin.	  The	  New	  Science	  of	  Politics:	  An	  Introduction.	  (Chicago	  and	  London:	  	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1952)	  pp.11-­‐12	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affairs.	  	  Science	  is	  not	  to	  be	  characterized	  by	  any	  particular	  method;	  it	  provides	  insight	  into	  
the	  nature	  and	  order	  of	  things.	  Thus,	  it	  aspires	  to	  rise	  above	  mere	  opinion	  and	  arrive	  at	  
knowledge.	  	  The	  methods	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  are	  scientific	  only	  because	  they	  serve	  to	  
provide	  insight	  into	  the	  subject	  matter	  that	  is	  being	  investigated,	  not	  because	  there	  is	  any	  
inherent	  worth	  in	  the	  method	  itself.	  	  Yet,	  politics	  deals	  with	  the	  most	  complex	  of	  subjects,	  
human	  beings,	  and	  as	  such,	  it	  cannot	  be	  studied	  using	  methods	  that	  were	  designed	  to	  study	  
different	  (and	  much	  simpler)	  subjects.545	  Moreover,	  ethics	  and	  politics	  are	  prudential	  
sciences;	  they	  deal	  with	  action	  primarily.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  rigid	  rules	  of	  action	  cannot	  be	  
formulated.	  	  The	  fluidity	  of	  human	  affairs	  allows	  for	  generalizations	  and	  guideposts,	  but	  
cannot	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  rigorous	  quantification	  and	  precision	  found	  in	  fields	  with	  less	  
complex	  subject	  matter.	  	  Facts	  must	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  anything	  that	  corresponds	  to	  reality;	  
a	  reality	  experienced	  by	  concrete	  human	  beings	  (whether	  it	  be	  of	  the	  perceptive	  or	  
apperceptive	  variety).	  	  And	  thus	  a	  student	  of	  politics,	  far	  from	  being	  removed	  from	  politics,	  
must	  be	  immersed	  in	  it.	  	  
Empiricism	  
	  	  	  	  	  Another	  term	  that	  deserves	  our	  attention	  is	  empiricism.	  	  The	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  has	  
narrowed	  considerably	  within	  modernity,	  especially	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  positivism.	  	  Modern	  
day	  social	  scientists	  often	  equate	  empiricism	  with	  measurability	  or	  with	  quantification.	  	  A	  
study	  is	  said	  to	  be	  “empirical”	  if	  it	  utilizes	  objective,	  quantitative	  measures	  or	  if	  it	  refers	  to	  
concrete	  historical	  cases.	  While	  such	  measures	  do	  indeed	  belong	  in	  the	  empirical	  realm,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
545	  Andreski	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  human	  beings	  react	  to	  what	  is	  said	  about	  them	  as	  the	  
primary	  reason	  for	  the	  impasse.	  “Imagine	  how	  sorry	  would	  be	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  natural	  
scientist	  if	  objects	  of	  his	  inquiry	  were	  in	  a	  habit	  of	  reacting	  to	  what	  he	  says	  about	  them:	  	  if	  
the	  substances	  could	  read	  or	  hear	  what	  the	  chemist	  writes	  or	  says	  about	  them,	  and	  were	  
likely	  to	  jump	  out	  of	  their	  containers	  and	  burn	  him	  if	  they	  did	  not	  like	  what	  they	  saw	  on	  the	  
blackboard	  or	  in	  his	  notebook.”	  Social	  Sciences	  as	  Sorcery	  p.20	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they	  are	  not	  exhaustive.	  	  The	  misunderstanding	  has	  arisen	  from	  the	  tendency	  to	  separate	  
the	  normative	  from	  the	  empirical,	  with	  the	  assumption	  being	  that	  only	  the	  latter	  is	  
scientific.	  	  The	  empirical	  merely	  states	  “what	  is”	  while	  the	  normative	  suggests	  “what	  ought	  
to	  be.”	  	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  distinction	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  found	  in	  the	  fact-­‐value	  
dichotomy:	  it	  unnecessarily	  reduces	  the	  legitimate	  realm	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Any	  study	  that	  
bases	  its	  claims	  on	  experiential	  reality	  has	  the	  right	  to	  be	  called	  empirical.546	  	  An	  
examination	  of	  human	  nature	  or	  political	  order	  is	  just	  as	  empirical	  as	  the	  number	  of	  
representatives	  a	  state	  has	  in	  Congress.	  	  The	  standard	  for	  determining	  if	  a	  statement	  is	  
empirical	  rests	  on	  its	  relation	  to	  reality	  and	  to	  the	  facts,	  not	  on	  its	  proclivity	  to	  
quantification.	  Thus,	  the	  likes	  of	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  are	  not	  merely	  offering	  normative	  
suggestions;	  they	  are	  conveying	  empirical	  facts	  about	  reality!547	  	  	  
Science	  
	  	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  other	  terms	  we	  have	  mentioned	  (reason,	  experience,	  facts,	  and	  
empiricism),	  a	  change	  also	  occurred	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  science	  itself.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  problem	  of	  
scientism	  is	  directly	  tied	  to	  the	  “new”	  meaning	  of	  science	  that	  has	  arisen	  within	  modernity.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  noted,	  science	  holds	  great	  prestige	  and	  any	  claim	  can	  be	  bolstered	  
exponentially	  if	  it	  can	  be	  labeled	  as	  “scientific.”	  	  Conversely,	  any	  claim	  that	  is	  seen	  as	  
“unscientific”	  can	  readily	  be	  dismissed.	  	  Thus,	  the	  question	  about	  what	  constitutes	  science	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  empirical	  statements	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  (and	  often	  are	  not)	  
“scientific.”	  	  
547	  Again,	  we	  are	  working	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  only	  reality	  we	  have	  is	  experiential	  
reality.	  	  We	  are	  not	  suggesting	  that	  normative	  claims	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  empirical	  or	  that	  
the	  distinction	  cannot	  be	  made.	  	  For	  example,	  Aristotle’s	  claim	  that	  the	  contemplative	  life	  is	  
the	  happiest	  is	  not	  meant	  as	  an	  opinion.	  It	  is	  a	  statement	  of	  fact	  about	  what	  is	  best	  for	  man	  
and	  therefore	  is	  empirical.	  But	  the	  suggestion	  that	  man	  should	  pursue	  such	  a	  life	  is	  
normative.	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is	  paramount.548	  Without	  some	  idea	  of	  what	  constitutes	  science,	  we	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  
distinguish	  pseudo-­‐science	  from	  science	  and	  scientific	  claims	  would	  hold	  little	  persuasive	  
power.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  One	  aim	  that	  our	  study	  has	  in	  common	  with	  present	  day	  social	  science,	  and	  more	  
specifically	  political	  science,	  is	  to	  be	  scientific.	  	  Yet	  our	  study	  is	  quite	  obviously	  
“philosophical”	  so	  we	  must	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  also	  scientific.	  The	  distinction	  between	  
philosophy	  and	  science	  is	  a	  modern	  invention.	  	  Prior	  to	  Bacon,	  philosophy	  and	  science	  were	  
identical.	  	  “Natural	  philosophy”	  was	  the	  term	  applied	  to	  what	  we	  now	  refer	  to	  as	  natural	  
science.	  Beginning	  with	  Bacon,	  the	  break	  with	  the	  Aristotelian	  tradition,	  led	  to	  a	  separation	  
of	  philosophy	  and	  science.	  	  As	  Strauss	  explains:	  
The	  distinction	  between	  philosophy	  and	  science	  or	  the	  separation	  of	  science	  from	  
philosophy	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  revolution	  which	  occurred	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  
century.	  This	  revolution	  was	  primarily	  not	  the	  victory	  of	  science	  over	  metaphysics,	  but	  
what	  one	  may	  call	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  new	  philosophy	  or	  science	  over	  Aristotelian	  
philosophy	  or	  science.	  	  Yet	  the	  new	  philosophy	  or	  science	  was	  not	  equally	  successful	  in	  all	  
its	  parts.	  	  Its	  most	  successful	  part	  was	  physics	  (and	  mathematics)	  .	  .	  .The	  victory	  of	  the	  new	  
physics	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  physics	  which	  seemed	  to	  be	  as	  metaphysically	  neutral	  as,	  
say,	  mathematics,	  medicine,	  or	  the	  art	  of	  shoemaking.	  	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  metaphysically	  
neutral	  physics	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  “science”	  to	  become	  independent	  of	  “philosophy”	  and	  
in	  fact	  an	  authority	  for	  the	  latter.	  	  It	  paved	  the	  way	  .	  .	  .for	  the	  separation	  of	  political	  science	  
from	  political	  philosophy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  separation	  of	  economics	  and	  sociology	  from	  
political	  science.549	  
	  
The	  new	  standard	  of	  science	  became	  physics	  and	  those	  in	  other	  fields	  tried	  their	  best	  to	  
legitimate	  their	  studies	  by	  emulating	  it.	  	  The	  prestige	  afforded	  to	  the	  new	  science	  was	  
something	  that	  all	  wished	  to	  share	  in.	  	  This	  is	  why	  Hume	  tried	  to	  imitate	  Newton’s	  
methodology	  in	  the	  field	  of	  ethics	  and	  why	  Comte	  went	  through	  great	  pains	  to	  create	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  term	  will	  not	  be	  abused	  if	  the	  original	  meaning	  is	  recovered.	  	  	  	  
549	  Leo	  Strauss.	  “An	  Epilogue.”	  Taken	  from	  Liberalism:	  	  Ancient	  and	  Modern.	  (University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press:	  	  Chicago,	  1995)	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“social	  physics.”550	  	  With	  the	  rejection	  of	  Aristotle’s	  physics	  came	  the	  rejection	  of	  his	  
politics	  and	  ethics.551	  The	  problem	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  methods	  that	  work	  so	  well	  
in	  physics	  do	  not	  prove	  as	  fruitful	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  affairs.	  	  And	  the	  misguided	  
emphasis	  on	  method	  has	  led	  to	  an	  oversight	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  matter	  most.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  An	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  recovery	  of	  nous	  is	  the	  recognition	  that	  it	  is	  the	  driving	  force	  
of	  what	  constitutes	  science	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  As	  Voegelin	  explains:	  
The	  truth	  of	  noesis	  has	  the	  character	  of	  rationality	  and	  science	  .	  .	  .(it)	  establishes	  the	  
historical	  fact	  that	  the	  Platonic-­‐Aristotelian	  noesis	  has	  developed	  the	  indices	  science	  
(episteme)	  and	  theory	  (theoria)	  in	  order	  to	  express	  the	  character	  of	  their	  mode	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  non-­‐noetic	  modes	  of	  knowledge	  as	  the	  doxai,	  
beliefs	  or	  opinions.	  “Science”	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  the	  mystery	  of	  a	  pre-­‐existent	  definition,	  
it	  rather	  discovers	  itself	  as	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  reality,	  when	  consciousness	  
historically	  attains	  the	  illumination	  of	  itself	  and	  its	  ratio	  .	  .	  .	  Modern	  natural	  science	  is	  
science	  not	  because	  we	  recognize	  it	  as	  such	  by	  convention	  but	  because	  the	  methods	  it	  uses	  
to	  investigate	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  world	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  ratio	  of	  noesis.552	  	  
	  
Under	  this	  conception,	  the	  term	  “science”	  can	  indeed	  be	  appropriated	  beyond	  the	  methods	  
of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  to	  the	  insights	  of	  Platonic	  and	  Aristotelian	  philosophy.	  	  And	  the	  
assumption	  that	  “mathematical	  natural	  science”	  is	  the	  model	  of	  science	  itself	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  
an	  “ideological	  dogma	  stemming	  from	  modern	  scientism.”553	  The	  aspiration	  to	  be	  
“scientific”	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  has	  unfortunately	  led	  social	  scientists	  to	  overlook	  the	  
fundamental	  problems	  of	  human	  existence.	  The	  call	  for	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics	  then	  is	  not	  
simply	  a	  nostalgic	  desire	  to	  return	  to	  the	  past,	  but	  a	  necessity	  for	  the	  future.	  	  Just	  as	  
political	  philosophy	  was	  concretely	  founded	  in	  response	  to	  corruption;	  so	  to	  is	  our	  study	  
aimed	  directly	  at	  vitiating	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  of	  scientism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550	  Hume’s	  subtitle	  to	  A	  Theory	  of	  Human	  Nature	  clearly	  indicates	  his	  intentions	  to	  follow	  
Newton’s	  lead:	  “an	  attempt	  to	  introduce	  the	  experimental	  method	  of	  reasoning	  into	  moral	  
subjects.”	  
551	  A	  problem	  addressed	  fully	  by	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre.	  See	  After	  Virtue	  pp.81-­‐82	  
552	  Anamnesis	  p.177	  
553	  Ibid	  p.178	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Conclusion	  
	  	  	  	  In	  summary,	  we	  can	  outline	  the	  constructive	  features	  of	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics.	  	  The	  
first	  clue	  is	  in	  the	  very	  title	  of	  the	  chapter.	  	  A	  science	  of	  politics	  must	  at	  its	  core	  rest	  on	  a	  
proper	  understanding	  of	  man.	  	  The	  good	  of	  man	  is	  the	  proper	  end	  of	  politics	  and	  that	  good	  
cannot	  be	  determined	  or	  acquired	  unless	  man’s	  full	  nature	  is	  accounted	  for.	  	  This	  means	  
going	  beyond	  his	  corporeal	  nature	  and	  beyond	  the	  methods	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  study	  his	  
phenomenal	  nature.	  	  As	  Voegelin	  points	  out,	  “a	  theory	  of	  politics	  must	  cover	  the	  problem	  of	  
the	  order	  of	  man’s	  entire	  existence.”554	  	  This	  includes	  both	  the	  corporeal	  foundation	  and	  
ordering	  consciousness;	  any	  attempt	  to	  focus	  on	  one	  or	  the	  other	  necessarily	  misses	  the	  
mark.	  Political	  science	  must	  again	  be	  conducted	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  citizen	  and	  
statesman:	  not	  from	  an	  imaginary	  Archimedean	  point	  of	  objective	  neutrality.	  	  Political	  
analysis	  must	  start	  from	  common	  sense	  experience	  and	  any	  attempt	  to	  systematize	  politics	  
into	  a	  fixed	  set	  of	  propositions	  must	  be	  rejected.	  	  As	  a	  corollary,	  any	  analysis	  must	  
ultimately	  be	  subjected	  to	  open	  questioning	  and	  the	  “proof”	  of	  a	  claim	  will	  be	  guaranteed	  
not	  by	  a	  particular	  methodology	  but	  through	  experience	  (in	  the	  broad	  sense	  of	  the	  term).	  	  
The	  search	  does	  not	  stop	  at	  the	  common	  sense	  level	  however;	  science	  aspires	  to	  move	  
beyond	  opinion	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Thus,	  reason	  becomes	  paramount	  and	  more	  
specifically,	  nous	  must	  be	  accounted	  for.	  The	  “sensorium”	  for	  this	  capacity	  is	  consciousness	  
and	  each	  man	  must	  account	  for	  his	  own	  existence	  within	  the	  metaxy.	  	  Consciousness	  
represents	  a	  participatory	  experience;	  the	  structure	  of	  reality	  is	  illuminated	  through	  the	  
noetic	  capacity,	  but	  it	  also	  represents	  a	  process	  in	  the	  journey	  towards	  truth.	  	  In	  other	  
words,	  noetic	  knowledge	  is	  subjective,	  but	  not	  solipsistic.	  	  The	  luminosity	  that	  Plato	  or	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Aristotle	  experiences	  is	  representative	  for	  all	  men	  and	  assuming	  that	  human	  nature	  is	  
constant,	  it	  holds	  true	  throughout	  time.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Appeals	  to	  common	  sense	  experience	  and	  to	  consciousness	  may	  have	  an	  alienating	  effect	  
on	  those	  who	  have	  been	  immersed	  in	  the	  positivist	  dogma	  and	  understandably	  so.	  Yet,	  
those	  are	  indispensable	  parts	  of	  reality	  as	  experienced	  by	  man,	  and	  thus	  we	  cannot	  simply	  
eliminate	  them	  because	  they	  do	  not	  happen	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  preferred	  way	  of	  doing	  things.	  	  As	  
Sandoz	  succinctly	  summarizes,	  noetic	  science:	  
“Consists	  in	  the	  exploration	  of	  experience	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  participation	  as	  its	  
empirical	  basis;	  it	  sets	  aside	  the	  mathematizing	  method	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences	  and	  of	  
conventional	  (or	  positivist)	  social	  science,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  extraneous	  language	  of	  subject-­‐
object,	  the	  dogmatic	  fact-­‐value	  dichotomy,	  and	  the	  contraction	  of	  scientifically	  relevant	  
“experience”	  to	  the	  world	  of	  sense	  perception	  as	  the	  controlling	  (if	  not	  sole)	  reality	  
screening	  scientific	  questions	  from	  pseudo-­‐questions.	  Not	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  to	  abandon	  
reality	  as	  experienced.”555	  
	  
Furthermore,	  if	  political	  science	  is	  to	  have	  any	  authority	  whatsoever	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  “real-­‐
world”	  politics,	  it	  must	  account	  for	  things	  that	  matter	  to	  the	  citizenry.	  	  While	  a	  glance	  at	  
current	  scholarship	  would	  have	  us	  believe	  that	  the	  question	  of	  the	  best	  regime	  has	  been	  
settled	  (democracy	  is	  clearly	  the	  answer),	  how	  are	  we	  to	  recognize	  when	  a	  not	  so	  
innocuous	  form	  of	  government	  begins	  to	  arise?	  Does	  current	  political	  science	  possess	  the	  
cognitive	  tools	  both	  to	  recognize	  disorder	  and	  to	  offer	  a	  corrective?	  The	  answer	  given	  by	  
the	  likes	  of	  Voegelin,	  Strauss,	  Andreski,	  Hayek,	  MacIntyre,	  and	  Kolakowski	  is	  a	  resounding	  
no,	  and	  our	  own	  analysis	  confirms	  that	  conclusion.	  It	  is	  our	  contention	  that	  one	  of	  the	  key	  
crises	  of	  our	  age,	  scientism,	  has	  infected	  both	  the	  political	  order	  and	  the	  very	  science	  that	  is	  
designed	  to	  protect	  it.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  discovery	  of	  nous	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  magical	  
transformation	  of	  the	  political	  order	  in	  Athens,	  a	  new	  (or	  refined)	  political	  science	  cannot	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be	  expected	  to	  solve	  the	  perpetual	  problems	  of	  human	  existence.	  But	  it	  can	  at	  least	  allow	  us	  
to	  recognize	  those	  problems	  and	  provide	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  vitiate	  their	  effects.	  	  Let	  us	  
therefore	  begin	  the	  constructive	  part	  of	  our	  study	  by	  offering	  a	  preliminary	  sketch	  of	  what	  










































Conclusion:	  	  Scientism	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  and	  Beyond	  
	  
“No	  one	  is	  obliged	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  spiritual	  crisis	  of	  a	  society;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  everyone	  is	  obliged	  to	  avoid	  
this	  folly	  and	  live	  his	  life	  in	  order.”556	  –Eric	  Voegelin	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  While	  our	  analysis	  has	  encompassed	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  sources	  across	  hundreds	  of	  years,	  
we	  have	  discovered	  an	  underlying	  consistency	  in	  the	  manifestations	  of	  scientism.	  	  From	  
Francis	  Bacon	  to	  present	  day,	  scientism	  has	  had	  a	  profound	  influence	  on	  politics,	  and	  there	  
is	  little	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  will	  not	  continue	  to	  do	  so	  unless	  action	  is	  taken.	  	  The	  first	  
step	  in	  any	  therapeutic	  endeavor	  is	  to	  properly	  identify	  the	  problem	  and	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  
systematic	  studies	  on	  the	  subject,	  we	  spent	  considerable	  time	  establishing	  scientism	  as	  the	  
cause	  of	  significant	  political	  problems	  within	  modernity.	  	  From	  Bacon’s	  dream	  of	  a	  
scientific	  utopia	  in	  New	  Atlantis	  to	  Comte’s	  religion	  of	  humanity	  to	  Marx’s	  “scientific	  
socialism”	  to	  the	  eugenics	  programs	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  we	  demonstrated	  how	  scientism	  
played	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  those	  politically	  dangerous	  and	  misguided	  
endeavors.	  	  The	  therapy	  offered	  through	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics	  is	  but	  a	  first	  step	  in	  what	  
must	  be	  a	  long	  and	  arduous	  process	  if	  scientism’s	  deleterious	  effects	  are	  to	  be	  quelled.	  	  
While	  the	  problem	  is	  undoubtedly	  complex,	  we	  can	  point	  to	  several	  consistent	  features	  that	  
have	  accompanied	  the	  scientistic	  attitude	  within	  modernity.	  	  These	  include	  a	  radically	  
immanent	  and	  materialistic	  worldview,	  the	  diminishment	  of	  the	  bios	  theoretikos,	  the	  
dogmatic	  faith	  in	  the	  methods	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences,	  and	  the	  prohibition	  of	  philosophical	  
questioning.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  troubling	  aspect	  is	  that	  scientistic	  programs	  are	  always	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  Eric	  Voegelin.	  Science,	  Politics,	  and	  Gnosticism.	  Ed.	  Sandoz.	  (Wilmington:	  	  ISI	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Books,	  2004)	  p.17	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presented	  as	  being	  scientific.	  	  Thus,	  the	  ability	  to	  distinguish	  between	  science	  and	  pseudo-­‐
science	  becomes	  paramount.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Even	  if	  our	  study	  has	  established	  the	  connection	  between	  scientism	  and	  the	  political	  
problems	  outlined	  herein,	  it	  does	  little	  good	  if	  we	  do	  not	  possess	  the	  tools	  to	  recognize	  and	  
prevent	  future	  manifestations.	  	  The	  recovery	  of	  reason,	  in	  the	  noetic	  sense,	  is	  the	  primary	  
requirement	  for	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics	  precisely	  because	  it	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  critical	  
framework	  necessary	  to	  make	  political	  judgments.	  	  Noetic	  science	  provides	  insight	  into	  the	  
structure	  of	  reality	  in	  addition	  to	  providing	  a	  model	  of	  order	  to	  aspire	  to.	  	  The	  recognition	  
of	  disorder	  can	  come	  only	  if	  one	  has	  a	  proper	  model	  of	  order	  by	  which	  to	  critique	  it.	  	  The	  
same	  holds	  for	  the	  distinction	  between	  science	  and	  pseudo-­‐science.	  	  We	  can	  recognize	  
pseudo-­‐scientific	  claims	  as	  manifestations	  of	  scientism	  only	  if	  our	  understanding	  of	  science	  
is	  adequate.	  That	  understanding	  of	  science	  requires	  us	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  methodology	  of	  
the	  natural	  sciences	  and	  instead	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  spirit	  that	  motivates	  it.	  There	  is	  an	  inherent	  
openness	  in	  the	  approach	  of	  a	  Newton	  or	  Einstein	  that	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  the	  “wondering”	  
described	  by	  Aristotle	  and	  Plato	  as	  the	  proper	  beginning	  of	  philosophy	  (and	  subsequently	  
of	  knowledge).	  	  And	  just	  as	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  suffered	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  
subsequent	  dogmatizers,	  so	  too	  did	  Newton’s	  rightly	  earned	  accolades	  lead	  to	  abuses	  by	  an	  
appreciably	  influential	  group	  of	  followers.557	  	  Newton’s	  insights	  came	  only	  because	  he	  was	  
willing	  to	  step	  outside	  of	  conventional	  bounds.	  Had	  he	  bound	  himself	  to	  a	  particular	  
methodology,	  he	  would	  have	  never	  revolutionized	  physics.558	  	  Likewise,	  the	  insights	  by	  
Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  were	  epochal	  events	  in	  the	  history	  of	  man.	  	  They	  were	  just	  as	  scientific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557	  Such	  as	  the	  Encylopedists	  and	  Saint-­‐Simon.	  
558	  Paul	  Feyerabend	  argues	  that	  science	  advances	  through	  insights	  that	  often	  do	  not	  fall	  
within	  the	  established	  theoretical	  and	  methodological	  assumptions	  of	  a	  field.	  See	  Against	  
Method.	  3rd	  edition.	  New	  York	  and	  London:	  	  Verso,	  1993.	  p.2	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as	  Newton’s,	  but	  their	  subject	  matter	  prevented	  them	  from	  offering	  the	  precision	  that	  
Newton	  could	  provide	  in	  his	  Principia.	  	  Once	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  science	  is	  reached,	  
the	  scientistic	  claims	  to	  authority	  lose	  much	  of	  their	  appeal	  since	  they	  are	  rooted	  in	  a	  highly	  
restrictive,	  deformed	  view	  of	  science	  and	  reality.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Recognizing	  what	  constitutes	  legitimate	  science	  is	  only	  one	  of	  several	  steps	  that	  must	  be	  
taken	  however.	  	  Given	  the	  increased	  control	  over	  nature	  that	  science	  has	  given	  man,	  we	  
must	  be	  concerned	  with	  how	  that	  power	  is	  utilized.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  
new	  science	  of	  politics	  outlined	  in	  our	  previous	  chapter	  is	  to	  provide	  practical	  guidance.	  	  
Our	  argument	  for	  a	  new	  science	  of	  politics	  is	  based	  first	  and	  foremost	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  
contemporary	  political	  science	  has	  failed	  to	  adequately	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  scientism.	  
What	  we	  find	  to	  be	  sorely	  lacking	  in	  modern	  social	  science,	  and	  specifically	  political	  
science,	  is	  a	  fostering	  of	  phronesis,	  or	  practical	  wisdom.	  	  Politics	  is	  primarily	  a	  prudential	  
science	  and	  thus	  requires	  an	  emphasis	  on	  how	  to	  act	  properly.	  	  An	  adequate	  science	  of	  
politics	  then	  must	  be	  able	  to	  counsel	  the	  statesman	  in	  matters	  of	  concrete	  politics.	  	  This	  
also	  requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  and	  of	  justice:	  	  knowledge	  that	  is	  
ultimately	  gained	  through	  the	  faculty	  of	  noesis.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Since	  it	  is	  our	  contention	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  scientism	  must	  be	  addressed	  by	  political	  
science	  and	  that	  contemporary	  political	  science	  has	  been	  insufficient	  to	  the	  task,	  we	  must	  
assess	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  change	  in	  course	  within	  the	  discipline.	  From	  its	  inception,	  modern	  
political	  science	  has	  aimed	  to	  provide	  the	  law-­‐like	  generalizations	  found	  in	  the	  natural	  
sciences.	  In	  the	  20th	  century,	  there	  was	  a	  concerted	  effort	  within	  American	  political	  science	  
to	  move	  towards	  a	  more	  “scientific”	  understanding	  of	  politics.	  As	  John	  Shotwell	  wrote	  in	  
1921,	  “the	  only	  safety	  for	  democracy	  .	  .	  .	  is	  to	  apply	  scientific	  methods	  to	  the	  management	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of	  society	  as	  we	  have	  been	  learning	  to	  apply	  them	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  .	  .	  .	  We	  are	  in	  the	  
political	  sciences	  where	  the	  natural	  sciences	  were	  two	  hundred	  years	  ago.”559	  And	  Bernard	  
Crick,	  echoing	  contemporary	  critics	  such	  as	  Eric	  Voegelin	  and	  Leo	  Strauss,	  noted	  that	  the	  
movement	  had	  only	  grown	  stronger	  by	  the	  time	  he	  published	  his	  seminal	  study,	  The	  
American	  Science	  of	  Politics,	  in	  1959.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Half	  a	  century	  later,	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  character	  and	  direction	  of	  political	  science	  is	  
still	  not	  a	  settled	  issue.	  Political	  science	  has	  arguably	  become	  more	  “scientific”	  during	  that	  
time,	  in	  the	  positivistic	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  	  Methodology	  has	  even	  begun	  to	  gain	  acceptance	  
as	  a	  subfield.560And	  some	  departments	  have	  recently	  decided	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  their	  political	  
theory	  subfields	  altogether.561	  Rehfeld	  raises	  concerns	  about	  the	  apparent	  confusion	  within	  
the	  discipline	  and	  points	  to	  an	  “ongoing	  lack	  of	  engagement,	  suspicion,	  and	  animosity.”562	  A	  
primary	  reason	  for	  the	  discord	  lies	  precisely	  in	  the	  misconception	  of	  science.	  	  Few	  wish	  to	  
engage	  in	  a	  discipline	  that	  is	  viewed	  as	  “unscientific”	  and	  if	  science	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  
implementation	  of	  a	  particular	  method,	  then	  we	  can	  at	  least	  make	  sense	  of	  why	  political	  
theory	  has	  fallen	  out	  of	  favor.	  	  It	  also	  explains	  why	  methodology	  has	  been	  conferred	  with	  so	  
much	  prestige	  as	  to	  raise	  it	  to	  the	  level	  of	  a	  “substantive”	  field	  of	  inquiry.	  If	  progress	  is	  to	  
occur,	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  discipline	  must	  rest	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  politics	  is	  a	  multi-­‐
faceted,	  complex	  subject	  matter.	  And	  as	  such,	  a	  variety	  of	  approaches	  are	  necessary	  to	  gain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559	  See	  James	  Shotwell.	  Intelligence	  and	  Politics.	  (New	  York:	  1921)	  pp.21,	  26-­‐27	  as	  quoted	  
by	  Bernard	  Crick	  in	  The	  American	  Science	  of	  Politics.	  Routledge	  and	  Kegan	  Paul	  Publishing,	  
1959	  p.xii	  	  	  	  	  	  
560	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  question	  exactly	  what	  subjects	  can	  be	  investigated	  using	  a	  particular	  
methodology.	  But	  methodology	  itself	  is	  clearly	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  substance	  of	  politics.	  	  
561	  See	  Andrew	  Rehfeld’s	  “Offensive	  Political	  Theory.”	  Perspectives	  on	  Politics	  8	  (June,	  2010)	  
pp.465-­‐486	  
562	  Ibid	  p.478	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a	  sufficient	  understanding	  of	  that	  subject	  matter.	  	  Methodological	  thoroughness	  is	  indeed	  
desirable,	  but	  theoretical	  relevance	  must	  be	  given	  priority.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Although	  scientism	  may	  manifest	  itself	  in	  various	  ways,	  we	  can	  point	  to	  a	  few	  issues	  that	  
will	  likely	  be	  of	  utmost	  concern	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  One	  that	  we	  have	  previously	  discussed	  
is	  eugenics,	  or	  genetic	  engineering.	  	  As	  our	  knowledge	  of	  heredity	  and	  genetics	  has	  
continued	  to	  increase,	  the	  prospects	  of	  human	  intervention	  has	  grown	  exponentially.	  	  The	  
aforementioned	  Human	  Genome	  project	  represents	  a	  sweeping,	  systematic	  inquiry	  into	  
genetics	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  revolutionize	  the	  field.	  	  While	  the	  eugenics	  programs	  of	  the	  early	  
20th	  century	  were	  modeled	  primarily	  on	  the	  enhancement	  of	  overall	  characteristics	  (such	  
as	  intelligence	  or	  physical	  strength),	  modern	  genetics	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  much	  more	  exact.	  	  
We	  can	  now	  identify	  particular	  traits	  and	  predict	  with	  great	  accuracy,	  how	  those	  traits	  will	  
be	  transmitted.	  	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  question	  of	  if	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  control	  the	  transmission	  of	  
certain	  traits,	  but	  when.	  	  Important	  ethical	  and	  political	  questions	  accompany	  such	  
developments.	  Eugenics	  lost	  its	  appeal	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  crude	  (and	  
often	  inhumane)	  measures	  that	  were	  taken	  to	  enact	  the	  various	  programs	  devoted	  to	  it.	  
Moreover,	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  identify	  those	  who	  should	  be	  subjected	  to	  negative	  eugenics,	  
making	  the	  programs	  inefficient	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  inhumane.	  But	  modern	  science	  
provides	  us	  with	  the	  means	  to	  precisely	  identify	  genetic	  defects	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  to	  
correct	  those	  defects.	  	  Thus,	  the	  problem	  of	  inefficiency	  could	  conceivably	  be	  overcome,	  
especially	  with	  further	  developments.	  	  And	  instead	  of	  forced	  sterilization,	  genetic	  
engineering	  could	  provide	  a	  much	  more	  humane	  way	  to	  control	  the	  transmission	  of	  
undesirable	  traits.	  	  It	  will	  be	  important	  to	  define	  what	  will	  and	  will	  not	  be	  allowed	  as	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technology	  continues	  to	  give	  us	  more	  control	  over	  nature	  and	  the	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  
will	  lie,	  in	  part,	  on	  the	  view	  of	  man	  that	  predominates	  society.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research	  is	  another	  “hot-­‐button”	  political	  issue	  and	  just	  as	  with	  
genetic	  engineering,	  the	  controversy	  is	  over	  the	  proper	  limits	  of	  scientific	  inquiry.	  	  
Proponents	  of	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research	  point	  to	  the	  vast	  potential	  of	  the	  field	  to	  
provide	  cures	  for	  debilitating	  diseases.	  	  This	  is	  because	  embryonic	  cells,	  unlike	  adult	  cells,	  
can	  reproduce	  themselves	  indefinitely	  and	  take	  the	  form	  of	  any	  type	  of	  cell.	  At	  least	  in	  
theory,	  such	  cells	  could	  be	  used	  to	  cure	  a	  variety	  of	  afflictions	  such	  as	  Parkinson’s	  disease,	  
cancer,	  and	  spinal	  cord	  injuries.	  	  Opponents	  are	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  practical	  benefits	  
have	  yet	  to	  occur	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  research	  requires	  the	  destruction	  of	  human	  
embryos.	  	  As	  Peter	  Boyer	  points	  out	  even	  the	  originator	  of	  the	  process,	  Dr.	  James	  Thomson,	  
expressed	  concerns:	  “if	  human	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research	  does	  not	  make	  you	  at	  least	  a	  
little	  uncomfortable,	  you	  have	  not	  thought	  about	  it	  enough.”563	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  
agreed	  and	  placed	  restrictions	  on	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research.	  	  Federal	  funding	  was	  
restricted	  and	  the	  lines	  that	  had	  been	  previously	  established	  could	  be	  utilized,	  but	  no	  new	  
lines	  could	  be	  created.	  	  As	  part	  of	  his	  2008	  campaign,	  Barack	  Obama	  had	  pledged	  to	  
support	  embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research	  and	  one	  can	  infer	  that	  he	  had	  it	  in	  mind	  in	  his	  
inaugural	  address	  when	  he	  pledged	  to	  “restore	  science	  to	  its	  rightful	  place.”	  Just	  two	  
months	  after	  his	  inauguration,	  President	  Obama	  made	  good	  on	  that	  promise	  by	  issuing	  an	  
executive	  order	  that	  would	  lift	  the	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  President	  Bush.564	  	  President	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563	  See	  Peter	  Boyer.	  “The	  Covenant.”	  The	  New	  Yorker.	  	  September	  6,	  2010	  
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/09/06/100906fa_fact_boyer?currentPage=a
ll	  
564	  This	  essentially	  allowed	  federal	  funding	  for	  lines	  that	  were	  created	  elsewhere,	  but	  still	  
did	  not	  allow	  federal	  funding	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  lines.	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Obama’s	  decision	  was	  lauded	  by	  political	  supporters	  and	  also	  had	  appreciable	  support	  
within	  the	  scientific	  community,	  but	  it	  was	  recently	  halted	  by	  a	  preliminary	  injunction	  
issued	  in	  a	  United	  States	  district	  court.565	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  issue	  ultimately	  hinges	  on	  a	  delicate	  
ethical	  decision,	  but	  the	  rhetoric	  has	  often	  been	  vehement,	  as	  some	  proponents	  of	  
embryonic	  stem	  cell	  research	  have	  accused	  opponents	  of	  being	  “anti-­‐science.”	  And	  since	  
those	  opponents	  often	  use	  their	  religious	  faith	  as	  justification	  for	  their	  positions,	  the	  issue	  
has	  been	  framed	  as	  one	  of	  science	  against	  religion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Part	  of	  our	  argument	  has	  been	  that	  the	  current	  worldview	  is	  one	  infected	  by	  scientism.	  	  
The	  view	  of	  man	  and	  his	  place	  in	  the	  world	  is	  still	  largely	  governed	  by	  Darwinian	  concepts.	  
This	  is	  evident	  in	  everything	  from	  the	  debates	  on	  school	  curriculum	  to	  the	  place	  of	  religion	  
within	  society.	  	  Invoking	  Darwin	  as	  authority,	  the	  likes	  of	  Richard	  Dawkins	  and	  Christopher	  
Hitchens	  have	  staunchly	  advocated	  the	  abolition	  of	  religion,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  science,	  
humanity	  and	  reason.566	  Dawkins,	  an	  Oxford	  trained	  biologist,	  is	  one	  of	  Darwin’s	  most	  
outspoken	  supporters,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  he	  earned	  the	  nickname	  “Darwin’s	  Rottweiler.”567	  
Dawkins	  considers	  the	  evidence	  of	  evolution	  to	  be	  overwhelming	  and	  contends	  that	  
religion	  and	  evolution	  are	  strictly	  incompatible.	  Just	  as	  Darwin	  had	  admitted	  in	  his	  
autobiography	  that	  his	  theory	  of	  natural	  selection	  undermined	  his	  former	  beliefs	  of	  design	  
in	  the	  universe,	  Dawkins	  adamantly	  rejects	  any	  explanation	  that	  encompasses	  a	  divine	  
creator.	  	  The	  primary	  difference	  is	  that	  Darwin	  did	  not	  claim	  to	  refute	  the	  idea	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565	  Judge	  Royce	  Lamberth	  issued	  the	  injunction	  citing	  the	  destruction	  of	  embryos	  as	  a	  
violation	  of	  the	  Dickey-­‐Wicker	  Amendment	  of	  1995	  (which	  has	  been	  subsequently	  
renewed	  by	  Congress).	  http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67M4HA20100823	  
566	  For	  instance,	  See	  Dawkins’	  The	  God	  Delusion	  and	  The	  Blind	  Watchmaker:	  	  Why	  the	  
Evidence	  of	  Evolution	  Reveals	  a	  World	  without	  Design	  and	  Hitchens’	  God	  is	  not	  Great:	  	  How	  
Religion	  Poisons	  Everything.	  
567	  See	  Stephen	  Hall’s	  article	  “Darwin’s	  Rottweiler”	  in	  Discover	  Magazine	  (September	  05	  
edition).	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certainty,	  while	  Dawkins	  does.	  	  Darwin’s	  work,	  as	  we	  noted	  in	  our	  analysis,	  does	  not	  speak	  
to	  questions	  of	  a	  first	  cause	  or	  the	  origin	  of	  life	  itself.	  	  He	  simply	  explains	  how	  life,	  once	  
given,	  evolves.	  	  Yet	  Dawkins	  takes	  it	  to	  be	  a	  settled	  fact	  that	  evolution	  did	  not	  require	  a	  
master	  craftsmen	  or	  “watchmaker.”	  He	  therefore	  chides	  those	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  
the	  scientific	  community	  who	  try	  to	  find	  compatibility	  between	  evolution	  and	  any	  type	  of	  
creationism.	  In	  fact,	  any	  appeal	  to	  the	  supernatural	  is	  strictly	  off	  limits.568	  	  As	  Dawkins	  
forcefully	  states,	  “I	  am	  not	  attacking	  any	  particular	  version	  of	  God	  or	  gods.	  I	  am	  attacking	  
God,	  all	  gods,	  anything	  and	  everything	  supernatural,	  wherever	  and	  whenever	  they	  have	  
been	  or	  will	  be	  invented.”569	  Dawkins’	  approach	  is	  clearly	  scientistic,	  as	  he	  places	  a	  
dogmatic	  faith	  in	  science	  and	  takes	  his	  argument	  much	  further	  than	  the	  evidence	  allows.	  	  
However,	  Dawkins	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  outlier	  or	  the	  representative	  of	  a	  fringe	  movement,	  as	  
evident	  by	  the	  millions	  of	  copies	  that	  have	  been	  sold	  of	  The	  God	  Delusion.	  	  He	  is	  adamantly	  
opposed	  to	  any	  worldview	  that	  encompasses	  the	  transcendent	  or	  spiritual	  nature	  of	  man.	  
The	  reductionist,	  biological	  view	  of	  man	  he	  presents	  is	  particularly	  dangerous	  because	  he	  
frames	  it	  as	  scientific.570	  	  And	  nobody	  wishes	  to	  argue	  with	  science.	  	  Anyone	  opposed	  to	  
Dawkins	  then	  must	  be	  anti-­‐scientific	  and	  irrational.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Dawkins	  serves	  as	  a	  concrete	  example	  of	  the	  power	  of	  scientism	  within	  contemporary	  
society.	  	  We	  did	  not	  list	  atheism	  as	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  scientism,	  although	  it	  is	  somewhat	  
implied	  in	  the	  radically	  immanent	  worldview.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  omission	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568	  For	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  the	  spiritual	  reductionism	  inherent	  in	  Dawkins’	  work	  see	  Meins	  
Coetsier.	  “God	  the	  Creative	  Ground	  of	  Existence:	  	  A	  Response	  to	  Richard	  Dawkins’	  The	  God	  
Delusion.”	  Conference	  paper	  given	  at	  the	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  Eric	  Voegelin	  Society.	  
Boston,	  MA	  2008.	  	  
569	  Richard	  Dawkins.	  The	  God	  Delusion.	  (Boston	  and	  New	  York:	  Mariner	  Books,	  2006)	  p.57	  	  
570	  The	  problem	  does	  not	  lie	  with	  the	  scientific	  findings	  he	  utilizes,	  but	  rather	  the	  
extrapolations	  he	  makes	  as	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  those	  findings.	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because	  atheism	  is	  often	  understood	  as	  being	  anti-­‐religious	  and	  in	  fact,	  Dawkins	  couches	  
his	  own	  arguments	  as	  being	  so.	  But	  scientism	  is	  religious	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  its	  adherents	  
express	  a	  dogmatic	  faith	  in	  its	  power.	  	  Dawkins	  expresses	  the	  type	  of	  certainty	  that	  is	  not	  
found	  within	  science	  or	  philosophy	  properly	  speaking;	  he	  speaks	  as	  forcefully	  as	  the	  most	  
religious	  of	  the	  “zealots”	  he	  criticizes.	  	  The	  faith	  that	  Dawkins	  places	  in	  science	  is	  
overlooked	  because	  he	  has	  rhetorically	  placed	  faith	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  religion.	  	  This	  brings	  us	  
back	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  language	  and	  exemplifies	  why	  we	  seek	  to	  recover	  the	  original	  
meanings	  of	  “reason”	  and	  “science.”	  Reason,	  in	  the	  noetic	  sense,	  is	  not	  antithetical	  to	  faith	  
(indeed	  it	  relies	  on	  it)	  and	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  man’s	  participatory	  
experience	  in	  the	  metaxy.	  	  This	  encompasses	  the	  corporeal	  drive	  of	  the	  passions,	  but	  it	  also	  
includes	  the	  divine	  pull	  that	  draws	  us	  towards	  truth.	  Because	  of	  its	  divine	  component,	  it	  
can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  discovery	  of	  Nous	  is	  itself	  a	  revelatory	  event.571	  And	  science	  
represents	  knowledge	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  things;	  it	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  phenomenal	  relations	  
or	  to	  a	  particular	  methodology	  and	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  inherent	  openness	  to	  reality.	  	  If	  
we	  understand	  science	  and	  reason	  in	  this	  manner,	  then	  Dawkins’	  argument	  is	  exposed	  as	  
both	  antithetical	  to	  reason	  and	  science.	  	  This	  is	  because	  it	  obliterates	  the	  highest	  capacity	  of	  
the	  human	  intellect,	  nous,	  and	  unnecessarily	  reduces	  man’s	  nature	  to	  the	  corporeal.	  	  
Dawkins’	  scientific	  credentials	  are	  impressive,	  but	  to	  the	  extent	  he	  makes	  arguments	  such	  
as	  those	  found	  in	  The	  God	  Delusion,	  he	  is	  doing	  so	  not	  as	  a	  scientist,	  but	  as	  a	  purveyor	  of	  
scientism.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571	  This	  is	  the	  interpretation	  offered	  by	  Voegelin.	  As	  Sandoz	  notes,	  “faith	  in	  the	  reason	  of	  
the	  Whole	  is	  the	  foundation	  .	  .	  .	  of	  all	  inquiry.	  	  The	  first	  principles	  or	  basic	  assumptions	  of	  all	  
science	  rest	  on	  faith,	  the	  dimension	  of	  Nous	  that	  embraces	  pistis.”	  See	  Voegelinan	  Revolution	  
p.198	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  A	  final	  area	  that	  is	  undoubtedly	  prone	  to	  scientistic	  infection	  is	  climate	  change	  and	  
environmental	  policy.	  	  As	  we	  briefly	  mentioned	  previously,	  Al	  Gore’s	  An	  Inconvenient	  Truth	  
helped	  draw	  popular	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change.	  	  Rising	  oil	  prices	  and	  
devastating	  natural	  disasters,	  such	  as	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  further	  increased	  the	  saliency	  of	  
the	  issue	  as	  some	  asserted	  that	  the	  events	  were	  essentially	  self-­‐inflicted.	  	  Gore,	  much	  like	  
Dawkins,	  appeals	  primarily	  to	  science	  as	  justification	  for	  his	  claims.	  	  And	  to	  be	  sure,	  
evidence	  does	  exist	  that	  the	  planet’s	  temperature	  has	  been	  increasing.	  	  That	  rise	  in	  
temperature	  has	  roughly	  coincided	  with	  the	  industrialization	  of	  large	  population	  centers,	  
such	  as	  China	  and	  India.	  	  Gore	  takes	  such	  a	  correlation	  to	  be	  proof	  of	  causation,	  so	  much	  so	  
that	  he	  calls	  human	  made	  global	  warming	  an	  “absolutely	  indisputable	  fact.”572	  The	  problem	  
is	  that	  not	  all	  scientists	  agree,	  which	  of	  course	  means	  that	  the	  fact	  is	  not	  quite	  as	  certain	  as	  
Gore	  presents	  it.	  	  A	  quick	  glance	  at	  any	  geology	  textbook	  will	  show	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  a	  
constant	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  earth.	  	  According	  to	  geologists,	  there	  have	  been	  
several	  periods	  with	  much	  warmer	  temperatures	  than	  anything	  humans	  have	  experienced;	  
just	  as	  there	  have	  been	  much	  cooler	  ages.	  	  This	  general	  fact	  seems	  to	  point	  to	  the	  possibility	  
that	  recent	  increases	  in	  the	  earth’s	  temperature	  may	  have	  occurred	  regardless	  of	  human	  
intervention.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  actual	  data	  that	  shows	  an	  appreciable	  increase	  in	  the	  
earth’s	  temperature	  has	  recently	  been	  disputed.573	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  whole	  ordeal	  is	  
that	  the	  debate	  is	  being	  conducted	  with	  political	  motivations.	  	  Proponents	  of	  climate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572	  “I	  have	  learned	  that,	  beyond	  death	  and	  taxes,	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  absolutely	  
indisputable	  fact:	  	  not	  only	  does	  human	  caused	  global	  warming	  exist,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  growing	  
more	  and	  more	  dangerous,	  and	  at	  a	  pace	  that	  has	  now	  made	  it	  a	  planetary	  emergency.”	  See	  
Al	  Gore.	  An	  Inconvenient	  Truth.	  (New	  York:	  	  Rodale	  Publishing,	  2006)	  p.8	  
573	  This	  became	  known	  “Climate	  gate.”	  Private	  emails	  between	  some	  prominent	  global	  
warming	  proponents	  indicated	  that	  data	  that	  did	  not	  support	  their	  position	  was	  either	  
manipulated	  or	  deliberately	  obscured.	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change	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  science	  confirming	  their	  position.	  	  And	  likewise,	  there	  are	  
those	  who	  benefit	  from	  the	  status	  quo	  (such	  as	  those	  within	  the	  traditional	  energy	  sector)	  
and	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  denying,	  or	  minimizing,	  the	  negative	  environmental	  effects	  of	  their	  
respective	  industries.	  	  	  Both	  sides	  realize	  that	  science	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  powerful	  tool	  to	  
protect	  their	  political	  interests.	  	  And	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  ignore	  evidence	  that	  undermines	  
their	  positions.	  This	  is	  a	  lingering	  effect	  of	  scientism	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  well	  into	  the	  
future.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  a	  last	  point	  of	  emphasis,	  we	  wish	  to	  clarify	  both	  the	  intentions	  and	  implications	  of	  
our	  study.	  	  Clearly,	  we	  have	  identified	  scientism	  as	  a	  political	  and	  intellectual	  problem	  of	  
utmost	  importance.	  	  Although	  our	  solution	  encompasses	  a	  return	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  
classical	  political	  science,	  we	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  suggest	  that	  its	  content	  be	  directly	  imported.574	  	  
The	  necessity	  of	  a	  return	  to	  those	  principles	  is	  due	  to	  the	  dogmatic	  closure	  to	  fundamental	  
aspects	  of	  reality.	  	  Science	  and	  philosophy,	  properly	  speaking,	  are	  open	  endeavors	  that	  are	  
motivated	  by	  the	  search	  for	  truth	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  things.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  “answers”	  are	  
not	  necessarily	  as	  important	  as	  the	  asking	  of	  the	  Question.575	  	  Each	  individual,	  as	  well	  as	  
each	  society,	  must	  reflect	  upon	  the	  pressing	  questions	  that	  are	  necessitated	  by	  the	  
participation	  in	  the	  metaxy,	  or	  reality.	  	  	  A	  key	  feature	  of	  scientism	  is	  the	  prohibition	  of	  such	  
questions,	  and	  thus	  our	  solution	  embraces	  an	  approach	  that	  not	  only	  allows,	  but	  also	  
encourages	  such	  questions.	  	  Likewise,	  an	  incessant	  focus	  upon	  a	  particular	  methodology	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574	  Nor	  do	  we	  wish	  to	  suggest	  that	  contemporary	  political	  science	  has	  not	  produced	  
appreciable	  knowledge	  about	  politics.	  Our	  main	  contention	  is	  that	  contemporary	  political	  
science	  paints	  an	  “incomplete	  picture”	  of	  political	  reality	  by	  remaining	  silent	  on	  certain	  
questions.	  	  And	  unless	  it	  begins	  to	  address	  those	  questions,	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  remain	  silent	  
about	  the	  concrete	  political	  problems	  we	  have	  outlined	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
575	  Questions	  such	  as	  Leibniz’s:	  “Why	  is	  there	  something,	  why	  not	  nothing?”	  and	  “Why	  do	  
things	  have	  to	  be	  the	  way	  they	  are	  and	  not	  different.”	  See	  Sandoz	  pp.196-­‐197	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represents	  a	  closure	  to	  important	  aspects	  of	  reality;	  deforming	  science	  in	  principle	  and	  
leading	  to	  less	  than	  desirable	  political	  consequences	  in	  practice.	  	  In	  regards	  to	  natural	  
science,	  it	  can	  undoubtedly	  continue	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  helpful	  innovations.	  	  Advances	  in	  
medicine	  and	  technology	  will,	  and	  should,	  continue	  to	  flourish.	  	  Problems	  do	  not	  arise	  from	  
science	  itself,	  but	  from	  men	  who	  wish	  to	  use	  its	  power	  to	  dominate	  others.	  	  Therefore,	  what	  
is	  needed	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  science	  of	  man:	  	  one	  that	  can	  provide	  ethical	  and	  political	  
guidance.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  We	  began	  our	  study	  with	  President	  Obama’s	  assertion	  that	  we	  must	  “restore	  science	  to	  
its	  rightful	  place.”	  This	  implied	  that	  science	  once	  was	  in	  its	  rightful	  place	  and	  that	  somehow	  
it	  had	  been	  derailed.	  	  To	  anyone	  that	  followed	  Obama’s	  campaign,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  meant	  
to	  suggest	  that	  science	  had	  been	  derailed	  by	  his	  predecessor	  (George	  W.	  Bush).	  	  By	  coming	  
out	  against	  stem	  cell	  research	  and	  apparently	  not	  taking	  climate	  change	  seriously,	  Bush	  
was	  turning	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  science.576	  Obama	  promised	  to	  bring	  science	  back	  to	  
prominence,	  which	  presumably	  meant	  that	  he	  would	  let	  it	  guide	  policy	  decisions	  or	  at	  least	  
form	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  shaping	  them.	  	  While	  we	  agree	  with	  the	  assertion	  that	  science	  
should	  be	  put	  in	  its	  rightful	  place,	  the	  task	  is	  necessary	  not	  because	  of	  the	  policies	  of	  any	  
particular	  leader	  or	  lawmaker,	  but	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  of	  scientism.	  	  
Restoring	  science	  to	  its	  rightful	  place	  requires	  us	  to	  recover	  the	  original	  meaning	  of	  
science,	  and	  in	  regards	  to	  natural	  science,	  we	  must	  recognize	  the	  inherent	  limits	  to	  its	  
guidance	  and	  the	  dangers	  of	  its	  misapplication.	  Natural	  science	  cannot	  tell	  us	  how	  to	  act	  or	  
which	  ends	  to	  pursue;	  it	  aspires	  to	  tell	  us	  how	  things	  work	  within	  the	  natural	  world.	  	  And	  
as	  Bacon	  rightly	  pointed	  out,	  such	  knowledge	  can	  lead	  to	  practical	  utility	  by	  giving	  us	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576	  Al	  Gore	  made	  similar	  accusations	  in	  An	  Inconvenient	  Truth,	  further	  illustrating	  the	  
political	  (and	  partisan)	  nature	  of	  the	  “scientific”	  debates.	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power	  over	  nature.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  us	  with	  guidance	  as	  to	  how	  that	  power	  should	  
be	  utilized	  and	  as	  we	  have	  shown,	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  destroy	  man	  just	  as	  easily	  as	  it	  can	  to	  
help	  his	  cause.	  	  Thus,	  what	  is	  truly	  needed	  is	  a	  political	  science:	  one	  that	  can	  speak	  to	  
questions	  of	  the	  human	  good.	  	  The	  rise	  of	  natural	  science	  has	  given	  us	  unprecedented	  
power	  over	  nature,	  but	  without	  a	  comprehensive	  science	  of	  human	  affairs,	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  
experience	  abuses	  of	  that	  power.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  assert	  that	  our	  project	  aspires	  to	  
restore	  political	  science	  to	  its	  rightful	  place	  as	  the	  master	  science	  of	  human	  affairs.	  	  And	  in	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